If the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013 is the skeleton, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013 (the "SHWW Rules") are the muscle and sinew that make it move. Notified by the Central Government on 9 December 2013 under Section 29 of the Act, the Rules supply the operational detail the Act deliberately left to delegated legislation: who can sit on a committee and for what fee, how a complaint is filed, the day-by-day choreography of an inquiry, the interim relief available while it runs, and the consequences of a false or malicious complaint. For the judiciary and CLAT-PG aspirant, the Rules are where examiners hide their precision questions — the "seven working days", the "three consecutive hearings", the "fifteen days" notice. This note walks through each rule, anchors it in the statutory scheme traced from Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan onward, and flags the recurring traps.
Source, scheme and the line from Vishaka
The SHWW Rules are subordinate legislation. They draw their life from Section 29 of the Act, which empowers the Central Government to make rules, and Section 28, which declares that the Act is in addition to and not in derogation of any other law. The Rules cannot travel beyond the Act; where they appear to add detail — for example the precise inquiry timeline — they are filling gaps the Act expressly delegated, not creating new substantive obligations. This matters for the perennial exam question on whether a provision is "in the Act" or "in the Rules": the compensation factors and the interim-relief menu live in Sections 15 and 12 of the Act, whereas the mechanics of how an inquiry is run live in Rule 7.
The statutory edifice itself grew out of judicial law-making. In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 (also reported as (1997) 6 SCC 241), a three-Judge Bench led by Verma C.J. held that sexual harassment at the workplace violates Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21, and, invoking Article 32 read with Article 141 and India's obligations under CEDAW, laid down binding guidelines to operate "until suitable legislation" was enacted. The 2013 Act and these Rules are that suitable legislation. The reading is reinforced by Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625, and by Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 297, which together explain why the Rules read the way they do. For the foundational background see our introduction and definitions notes.
Rules 1–2: commencement and definitions
Rule 1 gives the short title — the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013 — and provides that they come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette, which was 9 December 2013, the same day the Act itself was brought into force. The simultaneous commencement is deliberate: the Act could not function without the procedural scaffolding the Rules provide, so Parliament's delegate timed the two together.
Rule 2 is the definitions clause. It is short because the heavy lifting is done by Section 2 of the Act, which defines "aggrieved woman", "employee", "employer", "respondent", "workplace" and the inclusive, behaviour-based definition of "sexual harassment". Rule 2 simply provides that words and expressions used but not defined in the Rules carry the meaning assigned to them in the Act. The exam point: the expansive definition of "workplace" in Section 2(o) — which the Supreme Court in A.K. Chopra foreshadowed by treating a hotel business centre to which the victim was taken as part of the working environment — is statutory, not a creature of the Rules.
Rule 3: fees and allowances for ICC members
Rule 3 prescribes the fees or allowances payable to the Member appointed from amongst non-governmental organisations or associations on the Internal Committee. It fixes a sitting fee — an amount of two hundred rupees per day for holding the proceedings of the Internal Committee — together with reimbursement of travel costs (rail, air, taxi or auto-rickshaw fare) actually incurred. The point of the rule is to ensure that the mandatory external member, required by Section 4(2)(c) of the Act, is not a mere ornament: she is to be paid so that an outside perspective is genuinely brought into the room.
This dovetails with the composition requirements discussed in our note on the constitution of the Internal Complaints Committee. Examiners frequently pair Rule 3 with Section 4 to test whether candidates know that the external member is a statutory necessity — an ICC constituted without her is improperly constituted, and an inquiry it conducts is vulnerable to challenge on that ground alone.
Rule 4: the "person familiar" with sexual-harassment issues for the LCC
Rule 4 prescribes the qualification of the person to be nominated as a member of the Local Committee under Section 7(1)(c) of the Act — the member who must be "familiar with the issues relating to sexual harassment". The rule clarifies who qualifies: a person of integrity and standing who has experience in social work or has legal knowledge of issues relating to sexual harassment. This is significant because the Local Committee, unlike the Internal Committee, deals with complaints from establishments employing fewer than ten workers and from the unorganised sector, where complainants are most vulnerable and least likely to have institutional support.
The Local Committee is the safety net the Act builds for women outside the formal corporate fold, and Rule 4 ensures the net is woven by people who understand the subject. For its full composition see our note on the constitution of the Local Complaints Committee. The judicial logic here traces directly to Medha Kotwal Lele, (2013) 1 SCC 297, where the Court stressed that the Vishaka mechanism had to reach women in every kind of workplace, not just organised establishments.
Rule 5: fees and allowances for the LCC Chairperson and members
Rule 5 fixes the fees or allowances payable to the Chairperson and Members of the Local Committee. It provides a sitting fee for the Chairperson — an honorarium of two hundred and fifty rupees per day — and two hundred rupees per day for each of the other members, again with reimbursement of travel expenses actually incurred. The slightly higher figure for the Chairperson reflects the leadership and report-signing responsibilities of that office under Section 7(1)(a), which requires the Chairperson to be an eminent woman committed to the cause of women.
Rules 3 and 5 are best learnt together as the "money rules": Rule 3 covers the ICC's external member; Rule 5 covers the LCC's Chairperson and members. The common exam confusion — attributing the whole composition of the committees to the Rules — should be resisted: composition is in Sections 4 and 7 of the Act; only the fees are in the Rules.
Rule 6: who may make a complaint
Rule 6 fleshes out Section 9 of the Act, which permits an aggrieved woman to make a written complaint within three months of the incident (extendable by a further three months for sufficient reasons). Section 9 also contemplates that where the aggrieved woman is unable to make a complaint herself, another person may do so on her behalf; Rule 6 supplies the list. It specifies who may file a complaint where the woman cannot — for reasons of physical incapacity, mental incapacity, or death.
Where the woman is physically unable, the complaint may be made by her relative or friend, a co-worker, an officer of the National or State Commission for Women, or any person who has knowledge of the incident, with her written consent. Where she is mentally incapacitated, a relative, friend, special educator, qualified psychiatrist or psychologist, the guardian or authority under whose care she is receiving treatment, or any person who has knowledge of the incident jointly with such a person, may file. Where the woman has died, a relative, friend or any person with knowledge of the incident may complain with the written consent of her legal heir. This careful tiering ensures the right to redress survives the very vulnerabilities that harassment exploits. The substantive complaint scheme is covered in our complaint procedure note.
Conciliation: Section 10 and its limits
Before an inquiry begins, Section 10 of the Act allows the Internal or Local Committee, at the written request of the aggrieved woman, to take steps to settle the matter through conciliation — the one consensual off-ramp the statute provides. Two limits define it. First, no monetary settlement may be made the basis of conciliation; the legislature was anxious not to let harassment be "bought off". Second, conciliation can only be initiated at the woman's request, never imposed on her; the choice is hers alone, reflecting the agency-centred philosophy of the Vishaka framework.
If a settlement is arrived at, the Committee records it and forwards copies to the employer or District Officer to take action as specified, and no further inquiry is conducted. But if the woman later informs the Committee that any term of the settlement has not been complied with, the Committee proceeds to inquire into the complaint or forwards it to the police. Conciliation, in short, is a door that opens only at the woman's touch and closes the moment the bargain is broken. It is the conceptual bridge between the complaint stage and the formal inquiry choreographed by Rule 7.
Rule 7: the manner of inquiry — the timeline that examiners love
Rule 7 is the heart of the SHWW Rules and the single most heavily examined provision. It prescribes the day-by-day conduct of an inquiry into a complaint and is a checklist of numbers that must be memorised precisely.
At the time of filing, the complainant submits to the Complaints Committee six copies of the written complaint along with supporting documents and the names and addresses of witnesses. On receipt, the Committee sends one copy to the respondent within a period of seven working days. The respondent must then file a reply, with his list of documents and the names and addresses of his witnesses, within a period not exceeding ten working days from the date of receipt. The inquiry is conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice, with a minimum of three members including the Presiding Officer or Chairperson present, and — a deliberate design choice — no party is permitted to be represented by a legal practitioner at any stage of the proceedings before the Committee.
The Committee may terminate the inquiry, or proceed ex parte, if the complainant or respondent fails, without sufficient cause, to present herself or himself for three consecutive hearings; but no such termination or ex-parte order may be passed without giving the party concerned fifteen days' notice in writing. Overarching all of this is Section 11(4) of the Act, which requires the inquiry to be completed within a period of ninety days. The constitutional anchor for the natural-justice insistence is Vishaka itself, and the principle that proven harassment must attract consequences even absent completed physical contact comes from Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625, where an attempt to molest, sitting too close and unwanted touching, was held sufficient to constitute sexual harassment warranting dismissal.
Rule 8 and Section 12: relief while the inquiry runs
The Act and Rules together protect the complainant during the pendency of the inquiry so that she is not made to choose between her safety and her livelihood. Section 12 of the Act empowers the Committee, on a written request, to recommend interim relief: transfer of the aggrieved woman or the respondent to another workplace; grant of leave to the aggrieved woman up to a period of three months, in addition to her ordinary entitlement; or such other relief as may be prescribed.
Rule 8 supplies that prescribed "other relief". It allows the Committee, at the written request of the aggrieved woman, to recommend that the respondent be restrained from reporting on her work performance or writing her confidential report — with that task assigned to another officer — and, in an educational institution, that the respondent be restrained from supervising any academic activity of the aggrieved woman. The logic is to neutralise the power asymmetry that makes harassment possible: a respondent who controls the complainant's appraisal or grades holds a weapon over her, and Rule 8 disarms him for the duration. High Courts have read these provisions purposively, granting leave and interim transfers to shield complainants, consistent with the protective spirit the Supreme Court demanded in Medha Kotwal Lele, (2013) 1 SCC 297.
Rule 9: the manner of taking action where harassment is proved
Where the Committee concludes that the allegation against the respondent has been proved, Section 13(3) of the Act directs it to recommend action, and Rule 9 spells out the menu. The action may include a written apology, a warning, reprimand or censure; withholding of promotion; withholding of pay rise or increments; terminating the respondent from service; undergoing a counselling session; or carrying out community service. The Committee may also recommend that the employer deduct from the respondent's salary such sum as it considers appropriate to be paid to the aggrieved woman, and where the respondent cannot be made to pay, may direct the employer to pay the sum.
The graduated character of the menu — from apology to dismissal — reflects proportionality. A.K. Chopra remains the touchstone for the upper end: the Supreme Court there restored the dismissal of a senior officer, holding that courts should not interfere with the quantum of punishment in proven sexual-harassment cases unless it is wholly disproportionate, because to dilute it would defeat the deterrent purpose. For how recommendations flow from the proven complaint, read alongside our prohibition of sexual harassment note.
Determining compensation: Section 15
Although the headline relief is disciplinary, the Act also provides for monetary compensation to the aggrieved woman, and the factors are set out in Section 15 of the Act — not, as candidates often assume, in the Rules. In determining the sum, the Internal or Local Committee must have regard to: the mental trauma, pain, suffering and emotional distress caused to the aggrieved woman; the loss in career opportunity due to the incident; the medical expenses incurred for physical or psychiatric treatment; the income and financial status of the respondent; and the feasibility of payment in a lump sum or in instalments.
The architecture is restitutionary rather than penal — it asks what the woman has lost and what the respondent can bear, not merely how badly the respondent behaved. The express reference to the respondent's income marks a departure from a flat-tariff approach and ties compensation to real capacity to pay, which is why the assessment is fact-sensitive and resists mechanical formulae. The conceptual root is again Vishaka, which recognised that a fundamental-rights violation demands an effective remedy, and the monetisation of that remedy is the legislature's answer.
Rule 10 and Section 14: false or malicious complaints
Rule 10, read with Section 14 of the Act, addresses the mirror-image problem — the false or malicious complaint or false evidence. The framework is built with deliberate caution. Action may be recommended against a complainant only where the Committee arrives at a conclusion that the allegation is malicious, or that the aggrieved woman or any other person making the complaint has made it knowing it to be false, or has produced any forged or misleading document.
Crucially, both the Act and Rule 10 contain an express safeguard: a mere inability to substantiate a complaint or provide adequate proof need not attract action against the complainant. The proviso protects the genuine complainant whose case fails on evidence from being punished for having come forward — a vital protection, because the fear of reprisal is precisely what the Vishaka framework set out to dismantle. Where malice is found, the action recommended is the same graduated menu available under Rule 9, applied this time to the complainant or false witness. The Committee must also give the person against whom action is contemplated a reasonable opportunity of being heard. This balance — deterring abuse without chilling genuine complaints — is the rule's defining feature.
Rules 11–14: appeal, penalty, workshops and the annual report
Rule 11 deals with the appeal under Section 18 of the Act: a person aggrieved by the recommendations or by non-implementation may appeal to the court or tribunal in accordance with the service rules, and where none apply, to the appellate authority notified under the relevant labour legislation, within ninety days of the recommendations. Rule 12 prescribes the manner of imposing the penalty for contravention of the employer's confidentiality obligation under Section 16 — the prohibition on publishing the identity of the woman, the respondent or the witnesses — and links it to the monetary penalty the Act authorises.
Rule 13 prescribes the manner in which an employer is to organise workshops and awareness programmes, display the penal consequences of sexual harassment at conspicuous places, and orient and train ICC members — the preventive limb that distinguishes the 2013 regime from a purely reactive one. Rule 14 prescribes the form and content of the annual report that the Internal and Local Committees must prepare under Section 21, recording the number of complaints received, disposed of, pending beyond ninety days, the workshops conducted and the nature of action taken. These reporting and training duties translate the abstract command of Medha Kotwal Lele — that implementation, not mere enactment, is what matters — into measurable employer obligations.
Common exam traps and how to dodge them
First, the Act-versus-Rules trap. Composition of committees (Sections 4 and 7), the complaint period (Section 9), conciliation (Section 10), interim relief (Section 12), the ninety-day inquiry deadline (Section 11(4)), action on a proved complaint (Section 13), false complaints (Section 14), compensation factors (Section 15) and appeal (Section 18) are all in the Act; the Rules supply fees (Rules 3, 5), the LCC qualification (Rule 4), the complainant list (Rule 6), the inquiry mechanics (Rule 7), the prescribed "other relief" (Rule 8), the action menu (Rule 9), the false-complaint mechanics (Rule 10), appeal forum detail (Rule 11), penalty mechanics (Rule 12), workshops (Rule 13) and the annual report (Rule 14).
Second, the timeline trap. Memorise: six copies of the complaint; copy to respondent within seven working days; respondent's reply within ten working days; ex-parte or termination only after three consecutive absences and fifteen days' written notice; inquiry within ninety days; appeal within ninety days. Third, the no-monetary-conciliation rule and the no-legal-practitioner rule are favourite single-line questions. Fourth, do not forget the protective proviso to Section 14 / Rule 10 — failure to prove is not the same as a false complaint. Grounding all of these in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, A.K. Chopra and Medha Kotwal Lele will let you justify each procedural choice rather than merely recite it. For consolidation, return to the subject hub.
Frequently asked questions
Are the SHWW Rules, 2013 part of the Act or separate?
They are separate subordinate legislation made by the Central Government under Section 29 of the Act and notified on 9 December 2013, the same day the Act came into force. They cannot exceed the Act; they only fill the procedural gaps the Act expressly delegated, such as fees, the complaint list and the inquiry mechanics in Rule 7.
What are the key timelines in Rule 7?
Six copies of the complaint are filed; the Committee sends a copy to the respondent within seven working days; the respondent replies within ten working days; the inquiry may be terminated or proceed ex parte only after three consecutive absences and fifteen days' written notice; and under Section 11(4) of the Act the inquiry must finish within ninety days.
Can a lawyer represent a party before the Complaints Committee?
No. Rule 7 expressly bars any party from being represented by a legal practitioner at any stage of the proceedings before the Internal or Local Committee. The inquiry is meant to be an internal, non-adversarial fact-finding process conducted on natural-justice principles, a design traceable to the guidelines in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan.
Where are the compensation factors found — the Act or the Rules?
In the Act. Section 15 lists the factors: mental trauma and emotional distress, loss of career opportunity, medical expenses, the income and financial status of the respondent, and feasibility of lump-sum or instalment payment. Candidates often wrongly attribute these to the Rules; the Rules deal with procedure, fees and the action menu.
Does a complaint that cannot be proved count as a false complaint under Rule 10?
No. Both Section 14 of the Act and Rule 10 contain an express safeguard: mere inability to substantiate a complaint or provide adequate proof does not attract action against the complainant. Action follows only where the Committee finds the complaint malicious, knowingly false, or supported by forged or misleading documents.
What interim relief is available while the inquiry is pending?
Under Section 12 of the Act the Committee may recommend transfer of the woman or the respondent, or leave to the woman up to three months over and above her ordinary entitlement. Rule 8 adds the prescribed "other relief": restraining the respondent from reporting on the woman's work performance or, in an educational institution, from supervising her academic activity.