Eviction of Tenant — Grounds (Section 10)

Section 10 is the heart of the Telangana Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. It converts a landlord's common-law right to recover possession on determination of a lease into a tightly fenced statutory remedy: a tenant "shall not be evicted" except on one of the grounds the section itself enumerates, and only after the Rent Controller is satisfied that the ground is made out. The Act - the former Andhra Pradesh Act 15 of 1960, carried into Telangana on bifurcation - distributes those grounds across two distinct sub-sections: the conduct-based grounds in Section 10(2), where eviction is largely a matter of proof, and the need-based grounds in Section 10(3), where the landlord must additionally establish bona fides. This note works through each ground, the burden it carries, and the controlling case law, and connects to the wider scheme set out in our introduction and subject hub.

The scheme: a code that displaces the contract

Section 10(1) opens with a prohibition rather than a power: "A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or sections 12 and 13." The effect is that contractual termination, valid notice to quit, and even a civil court decree are all subordinated to the statutory grounds. A landlord who wants possession must apply to the Rent Controller, who may order eviction only "if he is satisfied" that a listed ground exists. The architecture mirrors every State rent-control statute of the era, and the Supreme Court in Raval & Co. v. K.G. Ramachandran (AIR 1974 SC 818) - construing the materially identical 1960 framework - treated such Acts as a complete code that balances the landlord's proprietary interest against security of tenure. The grounds fall into two families: the conduct grounds in sub-section (2) and the requirement grounds in sub-section (3). The distinction is not cosmetic - it dictates what the landlord must prove and what defences remain open to the tenant, as the bona fide need note develops in detail.

Ground 1 - Wilful default in payment of rent [Section 10(2)(i)]

The first and most litigated ground is non-payment. Under Section 10(2)(i) the Controller may order eviction where the tenant "has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable." The proviso softens this: where there is no dispute as to the rent payable but the default is found not to be wilful, the Controller may give the tenant a further opportunity, fixing a time within which the arrears must be deposited, and decline eviction if it is so paid.

The decisive word is "wilful." In S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman (1985) 1 SCC 591 - a decision arising in part under this very Andhra Pradesh statute - the Supreme Court held that wilful default "connotes a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof," that is, default that is "intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious." Mere default is therefore not enough; the landlord must show the omission was contumacious. The Court also explained how an explanatory amendment operates: where the landlord has issued the requisite notice and the tenant still does not pay, default is presumed wilful unless the tenant proves circumstances beyond his control. The practical lesson for a Controller is that he must record a finding on wilfulness, not merely on arithmetic arrears.

Ground 2 - Unlawful sub-letting, assignment and change of user [Section 10(2)(ii)]

Section 10(2)(ii) supplies three related grounds in one clause: that the tenant has, after the commencement of the Act and without the landlord's written consent, (a) transferred his right under the lease or sub-let the building or any part of it, or (b) used the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. The clause guards both the identity of the occupier and the agreed user of the premises.

For the sub-letting limb, the operative concept is parting with exclusive possession for consideration. The settled position, restated by the Supreme Court in Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa v. Mahendra Watch Company (2026 INSC 348), is that the landlord discharges his initial burden by establishing exclusive possession of a third party coupled with the original tenant's absence from possession; once that is shown, a presumption of unlawful sub-letting arises and the onus shifts to the tenant to prove that the occupation is lawful and not a sub-tenancy. Casual permission to a relative or a partner who runs a genuine joint business will not always cross the line; exclusive, consideration-backed occupation by a stranger usually will. The "change of user" limb is narrower than it looks - a marginal or incidental deviation is generally not enough; the user must be shown to be materially different from the leased purpose.

Grounds 3 and 4 - Acts of waste and nuisance [Section 10(2)(iii)-(iv)]

Section 10(2)(iii) permits eviction where the tenant "has committed such acts of waste as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building." Two thresholds are built in. First, the waste must be of the tenant's commission, not mere natural deterioration or fair wear and tear. Second - and this is where most petitions fail - the waste must be such as is "likely to impair materially" the value or utility. Trivial alterations, minor nail-holes, or cosmetic changes that a reasonable tenant might make do not satisfy the clause; the landlord must demonstrate substantial, durable damage to the fabric or worth of the premises.

Section 10(2)(iv) addresses conduct rather than fabric: eviction lies where the tenant "is guilty of such acts and conduct which are a nuisance to the occupiers of other portions in the same building or of buildings in the neighbourhood." The nuisance must affect identifiable neighbouring occupiers and be more than a passing irritation; isolated friction between neighbours is not the statutory mischief. Because both grounds turn on degree, the Controller's finding is essentially factual, and appellate authorities are slow to disturb a concurrent finding on the materiality of the waste or the gravity of the nuisance.

Ground 5 - Cessation of occupation for four months [Section 10(2)(v)]

Section 10(2)(v) allows eviction where the tenant "has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause." The ground reflects the policy that rent control protects a genuine occupier and not a tenant who hoards a controlled building while living and trading elsewhere. The landlord must establish both elements - a continuous four-month cessation and the absence of reasonable cause. Intermittent absence, temporary closure of a shop for repairs, seasonal non-use, or absence compelled by illness or external circumstance can amount to reasonable cause and defeat the ground. The enquiry is into actual user of the premises, not the mere retention of keys or storage of token belongings, though courts treat a real animus to return, evidenced by continued control, as relevant to whether occupation has truly ceased.

Ground 6 - Denial of the landlord's title [Section 10(2)(vi)]

Section 10(2)(vi) makes it a ground that the tenant "has denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide." This dovetails with the special machinery in Section 10(1): where a tenant denies title or claims permanent tenancy, the Controller must first decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide, and only if he finds it is not does the landlord become entitled to evict (with the proviso preserving the landlord's separate right to sue in a civil court in defined situations).

The qualifying word "bona fide" is decisive. A tenant who merely puts the landlord to proof of ownership, or who cautiously protects himself without disowning his own character as tenant, has not denied title in the forfeiture sense. To attract the ground the disclaimer must be clear and unequivocal - a renunciation of the tenant's own character coupled with the setting up of title in himself or a stranger. A genuine, arguable dispute about who is entitled to receive rent is therefore not fatal; only a mala fide, baseless repudiation is. This is consistent with the general law on disclaimer that the Supreme Court has applied across rent statutes, and it keeps the ground from becoming a trap for tenants who raise honest defences.

Ground 7 - Landlord's bona fide requirement [Section 10(3)]

Sub-section (3) shifts from the tenant's conduct to the landlord's need. A landlord may seek eviction where he requires a residential building for his own occupation and is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned [Section 10(3)(a)(i)]; or, for non-residential premises, where he is carrying on or bona fide proposes to carry on a business and is not occupying for that purpose a non-residential building of his own in the same locality [Section 10(3)(a)(iii)]; and there are parallel clauses for religious or charitable institutions and for a landlord occupying part of a building who needs an additional portion [Section 10(3)(c)]. Across all of these the unifying requirement is that the need be genuine.

The Supreme Court's guidance on bona fide requirement is well settled. In Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal (2005) 8 SCC 252 the Court held that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement and the tenant cannot dictate how the landlord should arrange his affairs or which premises he should use. In Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353 the Court reiterated that bona fide need is a question of fact and that the landlord, not the court, decides how he wishes to live or do business. And in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604 the Court fixed the crucial date for assessing the requirement as the date of the eviction petition, holding that a landlord should not be penalised for the slow pace of litigation. The fuller treatment, including subsequent events and comparative hardship, is in our bona fide need note.

The hardship balance and additional-accommodation cases

The discretionary character of sub-section (3) is sharpest in the additional-accommodation clause. The proviso to Section 10(3)(c) directs the Controller, on an application by a landlord occupying part of a building for further accommodation, to reject the claim if he is satisfied that the hardship that would be caused to the tenant by granting it would outweigh the advantage to the landlord. This statutory comparative-hardship test has no counterpart in the sub-section (2) conduct grounds, where proof of the ground generally entails the order. The lesson is that need-based eviction is never automatic: even a genuine requirement can be defeated, in the additional-accommodation context, by a tenant who shows that the balance of hardship tilts decisively in his favour. The Controller is also empowered to grant the tenant reasonable time to deliver possession, capped in aggregate, recognising that displacement is disruptive even where the ground is good.

Built-in protections and the tenant's right of restoration

Section 10 contains safeguards that survive a successful petition. Sub-section (4) shields certain tenants from a Section 10(3) order - notably a tenant engaged in a notified essential public service, unless the landlord is himself in such service, and buildings used as recognised educational institutions - reflecting a public-interest overlay on private possession. Sub-section (5) gives a powerful restoration remedy: where a landlord obtains possession on the ground of his own requirement but then fails to occupy the building within the stipulated period after eviction, or re-lets or vacates it without reasonable cause within the prescribed window, the evicted tenant may apply to be restored to possession. This converts the landlord's stated need into an enforceable promise and deters petitions dressed up as bona fide requirement but aimed at a higher-paying tenant. Sub-section (6) allows the Controller to award the tenant compensation for a frivolous or vexatious application, and the section confirms that where a requirement petition is rejected the tenancy continues on the same terms and can be ended only on a Section 10(2) or 10(3) ground.

The Controller's jurisdiction and the civil court boundary

Eviction under the Act is the exclusive preserve of the Rent Controller; a landlord cannot bypass Section 10 by filing an ordinary possession suit, because Section 10(1) bars eviction "whether in execution of a decree or otherwise" except as the Act allows. The boundary with the civil court arises chiefly through the title-dispute machinery: where the Controller finds that a tenant's denial of title or claim of permanent tenancy is bona fide, the rent-control forum cannot adjudicate the title, and the landlord's remedy lies in a civil suit. The relationship between the Controller's summary jurisdiction and the wider Act is best read alongside the application and notified areas note, since the Act - and therefore Section 10 - bites only on buildings to which the Act has been extended. Within that field, the Controller's findings of fact on grounds such as wilful default, sub-letting, waste and bona fide need are ordinarily final, subject only to appellate and revisional correction, which is why precise pleading and proof of the chosen ground matter so much.