Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Test 3 — Questions & Solutions
Every question from this subject test with the correct answer and a detailed, source-backed solution. Free to read. Want the real exam feel — a timer, instant scoring, and a topic-wise weakness report? Take it as a test.
50
Questions
7
Topics
+ solutions
Every question
Take this as a timed mock test — instant score + subject-wise analytics. First mock free, then ₹999/year for unlimited.
Before a mortgage is created over immovable property, the owner had already validly leased the same property to a lessee. As against a subsequent mortgagee, the lessee's right to enjoy the leased property:
aSubsists in accordance with the lease terms irrespective of whether the subsequent mortgagee had knowledge of the lease
bSurvives only if the mortgagee had notice of the lease
cIs extinguished automatically on creation of the mortgage
dSubsists only until the mortgagee takes possession
Answer: A
Where the property was leased before the mortgage, the lessee retains the right to enjoy it per the lease, irrespective of whether the subsequent mortgagee knew of the lease (Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v International Assets Reconstruction Co Ltd, (2014) 6 SCC 1).
Q2Mortgages (S58–104)
A bank's memorandum of association prohibited it from lending on mortgage, yet it advanced money on a mortgage and later sued to enforce it. What is the correct position?
aThe mortgage is illegal and wholly unenforceable
bThe bank may enforce the mortgage notwithstanding the ultra vires prohibition
cThe bank may recover the money but not enforce the security
dThe mortgage is void and the borrower keeps the loan
Answer: B
A contract ultra vires a company is void for want of power, not because it is illegal; a bank has been held entitled to enforce a mortgage although its memorandum prohibited loans on mortgage (Ahmed Sait v Bank of Mysore; cf Turner v Bank of Bombay).
Q3Mortgages (S58–104)
In a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds (equitable mortgage), the mortgagee assigns the debt to a third person without a registered assignment of the mortgage. What passes?
aBoth the debt and the security pass automatically
bOnly the security passes, not the debt
cThe debt passes, but the security does not pass in the absence of a registered assignment of the mortgage
dNeither the debt nor the security passes
Answer: C
The assignment of a debt secured by a deposit of title-deeds does not pass the security in the absence of a registered assignment of the mortgage (Elumalai v Balakrishna, (1921) ILR 44 Mad 965).
Q4Mortgages (S58–104)
Where a transfer of a mortgage debt fails for want of a registered assignment, the Privy Council in Imperial Bank of India v Bengal National Bank held that:
aThe whole transaction is a nullity and nothing passes
bThe security passes but the debt is extinguished
cThe transfer is valid as a mortgage despite non-registration
dThe transfer may be treated as a transfer of the debt divorced from the security, capable of transfer under section 6
Answer: D
The Privy Council held that the transfer might be treated as a transfer of the debt dissociated from the security, that debt being a species of property transferable under section 6 (Imperial Bank of India v Bengal National Bank, (1931) ILR 59 Cal 377).
Q5Mortgages (S58–104)
A charge over immovable property differs fundamentally from a mortgage in that:
aA charge does not transfer an interest in the property but only creates a right to payment out of the specified property
bA charge transfers absolute ownership while a mortgage transfers only possession
cA charge can be created only orally whereas a mortgage must always be registered
dA charge is always for a fixed term while a mortgage is perpetual
Answer: A
A charge differs from a mortgage in that it does not transfer an interest in the property but merely creates a right to payment out of the property specified (s 100 commentary; s 8.16).
Q6Mortgages (S58–104)
A debt secured merely by a charge (not a mortgage debt) is assigned. How may it be transferred and what passes on an unregistered assignment?
aIt is a mortgage debt and needs no registration; both debt and charge pass
bIt may be transferred as an actionable claim; an unregistered assignment passes the debt but not the charge
cIt can only be transferred by registered instrument and nothing passes otherwise
dIt passes by mere delivery of the document along with the charge
Answer: B
A debt secured by a charge is not a mortgage debt and may be transferred as an actionable claim, but as a charge falls within s 17 of the Registration Act, an unregistered assignment passes the debt and not the charge (s 8.16; Rajagopala v Ranganatha).
Q7Mortgages (S58–104)
The rule in section 8 (passing of securities with a transferred debt) and the doctrine of subrogation in section 92 share which feature in the case of partial payment?
aBoth allow full subrogation even on partial payment of a mortgage
bBoth deny any security to a co-debtor who has paid the whole debt
cJust as there is no subrogation when a mortgage is only partially paid off, there is no transfer of a security on payment of a debt when the security also covers other debts
dBoth require a registered instrument for partial payment
Answer: C
The exception in section 8 mirrors the last paragraph of section 92: just as there is no subrogation when a mortgage is only partially paid off, there is no transfer of a security on payment of a debt where the security covers other debts also (s 8 commentary; s 92).
Q8Mortgages (S58–104)
A mortgage was executed in consideration of past illicit cohabitation between the parties. Is it hit by section 6(h) (unlawful consideration)?
aYes, because cohabitation is always an immoral consideration voiding the mortgage
bYes, but only if the mortgage is unregistered
cNo, because a mortgage can never be challenged under section 6(h)
dNo, because past cohabitation is only the motive and not the consideration or object
Answer: D
A mortgage said to be in consideration of past cohabitation was held not to be hit by s 6(h), past cohabitation being strictly only the motive and not the object or consideration (Belo v Parbati, approved in Nagaratnamma v Ramayya).
Q9Mortgages (S58–104)
A possessory mortgage in favour of a non-agriculturist was prohibited by the Punjab Land Alienation Act, so it was executed benami in favour of an agriculturist, who then sued to recover possession. The court held:
aThe mortgagors were entitled to show the real nature of the transaction, and the benamidar's suit failed
bThe benamidar must succeed, since a party to a deed cannot impeach it
cThe mortgage was valid because possession had passed
dOnly the original non-agriculturist mortgagee could sue
Answer: A
Where a possessory mortgage contravening the Punjab Land Alienation Act was made benami in an agriculturist's name, the court dismissed the benamidar's suit and held the mortgagors entitled to show the real nature of the transaction (Lahore HC case per Tekchand J; s 6.30.2).
Q10Mortgages (S58–104)
A mortgages a future crop (crop not yet in existence) to B. Which statement is correct?
aSuch a mortgage is void as a transfer of a mere possibility under section 6(a)
bSuch a mortgage is recognised, but it will not affect a transferee without notice
cSuch a mortgage binds all subsequent transferees regardless of notice
dSuch a mortgage is valid only if the crop is already standing
Answer: B
A mortgage of a future crop has been recognised, but such a mortgage will not affect a transferee without notice (Ch 2 commentary on transfer of after-acquired property).
Q11General principles of transfer (S5–37)
A minor falsely represents that he is of full age and executes a sale deed. On a suit by the transferee, which principle correctly governs the validity of the transfer and the plea of estoppel?
aThe transfer is voidable but the minor is estopped by his fraudulent representation
bThe transfer is valid because the minor is competent to contract by virtue of his representation
cThe transfer is void and no estoppel can be raised against the minor, as there can be no estoppel against a statute
dThe transfer is void but the minor can ratify it on attaining majority
Answer: C
A minor's transfer is void (Section 7 read with Section 11, Contract Act), and being incapable of contracting he cannot be estopped by a false representation of age, the principle being that there can be no estoppel against a statute (Sadiq Ali Khan v Jai Kishore).
Q12General principles of transfer (S5–37)
A sells a farm absolutely to B and the sale deed directs that B shall not cut down the trees on it. A separately, by sale, assigns a life interest in another farm to C for maintenance with a direction that C shall not cut down its trees. Considering Section 11, which statement is correct?
aBoth directions are valid as conditions of enjoyment
bBoth directions are void as repugnant to the interests created
cThe direction against B is valid, but the direction against C is void
dThe direction against B is void, but the direction against C is valid
Answer: D
Under Section 11, a direction restraining enjoyment is void when an absolute interest is created (so the direction binding B fails), but it may validly attach to a limited interest such as a life estate (so the direction binding C holds).
Q13General principles of transfer (S5–37)
A settles property in trust for himself until his death or insolvency, and thereafter on his wife. A is later adjudged insolvent. What happens to A's life interest?
aIt vests in the Official Receiver/Official Assignee, the condition being void under Section 12
bIt passes to the wife under the condition of defeasance
cThe whole settlement fails as fraudulent on creditors
dIt reverts to A absolutely, freed of the trust
Answer: A
Section 12 makes void a condition making any interest cease on the holder's insolvency; despite the defeasance clause, A's life interest vests in the Official Receiver/Assignee for the benefit of creditors.
Q14General principles of transfer (S5–37)
A transfers property to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for life, then to the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death to A's second son. The interest of the eldest son:
ais valid, since it is preceded by a prior life interest
bdoes not take effect, because as an interest to an unborn person it does not extend to the whole remaining interest of the transferor
cis void only because the second son is also unborn
dtakes effect as a vested remainder on the eldest son's birth
Answer: B
This is the statutory illustration to Section 13: an interest for an unborn person must comprise the whole of the transferor's remaining interest; a mere life interest to the unborn eldest son fails.
Q15General principles of transfer (S5–37)
In construing the rule against perpetuity under Section 14, in deciding whether a disposition offends the rule, regard must be had to:
athe actual events that ultimately occurred
bthe intention of the transferor as later expressed
cpossible events, not actual events, at the date of transfer
dthe date the ultimate beneficiary actually takes possession
Answer: C
Remoteness under the rule against perpetuity is tested by possible, not actual, events (the corresponding Section 114, Succession Act uses 'may be delayed'); thus a disposition that on the facts vested in time may still be void if it could possibly have vested too remotely.
Q16General principles of transfer (S5–37)
Under Section 14, the latest point of time up to which the vesting of an interest in the ultimate beneficiary may be lawfully postponed is:
athe lifetime of the last prior interest-holder only
bthe lifetime of one or more living persons plus a further fixed period of twenty-one years in all cases
cthe birth of the ultimate beneficiary
dthe lifetime of one or more living persons plus the minority of a person in existence at the expiration of that period
Answer: D
Section 14 permits postponement only up to the lifetime of one or more persons living at the date of transfer and the minority of a person in existence at the expiration of that period; the minority of the ultimate beneficiary is the latest period at which the estate can be made to vest.
Q17General principles of transfer (S5–37)
A fund is bequeathed to A for life, and after his death to B. On the testator's death, what is the nature of B's interest, and what is the effect of B dying before A?
aVested; the interest passes to B's representatives even if B predeceases A
bContingent; B's interest lapses entirely on his death before A
cContingent; it vests in B's heirs only if B survives A
dA spes successionis; neither vested nor contingent
Answer: A
Under Section 19, the determination of the prior life estate is a certain event, so B takes a vested interest on the testator's death; a vested interest is not defeated by the death of the transferee before obtaining possession and passes to his representatives.
Q18General principles of transfer (S5–37)
An interest is created in favour of such of the children of A as shall attain the age of 18. The first child of A attains 18. As regards children of A born after that date but who are still minors, under Section 22 they:
aare included in the class on attaining 18
bcannot take, because the class is ascertained when the first child attains 18
ctake a vested interest immediately on birth
dtake a contingent interest only if there is a gift over
Answer: B
Under Section 22 (gift to a contingent class), the class is ascertained when the first member attains the specified age; no child born after that time can take (Whitbread v Lord St John).
Q19General principles of transfer (S5–37)
A transfers Rs 5,000 to B on condition that he marry with the consent of C, D and E. E dies; B then marries with the consent of C and D. Separately, in another gift, B marries first and obtains the consents of the named persons only after the marriage. Which statement is correct?
aIn both cases B has fulfilled the condition
bIn neither case has B fulfilled the condition
cIn the first case B has fulfilled the condition; in the second he has not
dIn the first case B has not fulfilled the condition; in the second he has
Answer: C
Under Section 26, a condition precedent is fulfilled by substantial compliance: consent of the survivors after one consenter's death suffices (first case); but obtaining consent only after the marriage is not substantial compliance (second case) — these are the two illustrations to Section 26.
In Girish/Girjesh Dutt v Data Din, A gifted property to B (her nephew's daughter) for life, then to B's male descendants absolutely, but if she had no male descendants, then to B's daughters WITHOUT power of alienation, and if no descendants at all, then to the nephew. B died without issue. Why did the gift to the nephew fail?
aBecause the nephew was not in existence at the date of the transfer
bBecause the gift to the nephew was itself remote under section 14
cBecause a gift to a class can never be made under the Act
dBecause the gift to the unborn daughters (a limited interest subject to a prior interest) was invalid under section 13, and the gift to the nephew, being dependent on it, failed under section 16
Answer: D
Per section 16 (illustrated by Girjesh Dutt v Data Din), an interest intended to take effect after or upon failure of a prior interest that is void under section 13 or 14 also fails; the limited gift to B's unborn daughters offended section 13, dragging down the gift over to the nephew.
Regarding the maximum permissible period of vesting under the rule against perpetuity in section 14 TPA, which statement is correct?
aVesting may be postponed up to the lives of persons living at the date of transfer plus the minority of a person in existence at the expiration of that period
bVesting may be postponed up to a life or lives in being plus a fixed period of twenty-one years thereafter, exactly as in English law
cVesting may never be postponed beyond the lifetime of the transferor
dVesting may be postponed indefinitely so long as the property is held in trust
Answer: A
Section 14 TPA adopts the modern English rule with a modification: the latest period for vesting is one or more lives in being plus the minority (18 years in India) of a person in existence at the end of those lives, not a flat 21-year gross period.
A reserves two bighas excluded from a sale, to remain with him for life and then with his lineal descendants who shall have no power to transfer, and if no lineal descendant is alive, the land shall belong to the vendee. A's only son, alive at the transfer, in fact died childless soon after, so the vendee actually got the land within a short time. Is the transfer of the two bighas to the vendee valid?
aValid, because on the actual facts the interest vested well within the permitted period
bVoid, because in deciding remoteness regard must be had to possible and not actual events, and the vesting might have been postponed for generations
cValid, because the vendee was a living person at the date of transfer
dVoid, because a vendor can never reserve any interest while selling
Answer: B
Under section 14 (note on remoteness, cf. ISA s.114 'may be delayed'), validity is tested on possible events; since the gift over could have been delayed until the line of descendants was extinct (possibly centuries), the transfer was void despite the favourable actual outcome.
Which of the following is NOT subject to the rule against perpetuity under section 14 TPA?
aA future interest created in immovable property in favour of an unborn person
bA future interest created in movable property
cA covenant of pre-emption / a mere contract for sale of immovable property
dA successive life interest created in a person not in existence at the date of transfer
Answer: C
Per Rambaran v Ram Mohit, a mere contract for sale (e.g. a pre-emption covenant) creates no interest in land (s.54), and section 14 opens with 'No transfer of property...', so the rule does not apply; the rule does apply to both movable and immovable property.
Under section 17 TPA, a direction to accumulate the income of property is valid only up to the longer of which periods?
aTwenty-one years from the date of transfer in every case
bThe minority of the beneficiary, or twenty-one years, whichever is longer
cThe life of the transferor plus eighteen years
dThe life of the transferor, or eighteen years from the date of transfer
Answer: D
Section 17(1) TPA limits accumulation to the longer of (a) the life of the transferor, or (b) eighteen years from the date of transfer; the two periods are alternatives and cannot be combined.
A fund is bequeathed/transferred to B, to be PAID to him on his attaining the age of 18. On the transferor's death, the interest of B is:
aVested in interest, the words 'to be paid' merely postponing enjoyment, so that if B dies before 18 his representatives take
bContingent, because the words refer to attaining a particular age
cA mere spes successionis, neither vested nor contingent
dVoid for uncertainty
Answer: A
Under section 19 (cf. ISA s.119 illustrations), the expression 'to be paid' or 'payable' at a certain age postpones enjoyment only and creates a vested interest; this is distinct from a gift 'at', 'if' or 'when' a certain age is attained, which is contingent.
A transfers property to B in trust for C, directing B to give C possession when C attains the age of 25. At what age, and with what nature of interest, is C entitled?
aC has a contingent interest and gets possession only at 25
bC has a vested interest and is entitled to possession at the age of 18, the postponement of enjoyment being void for repugnancy after majority
cC has a vested interest but cannot get possession before 25
dC takes nothing as the transfer to an unascertained interest is void
Answer: B
Under section 19 and its illustration, a mere postponement of enjoyment does not prevent vesting; C has a vested interest, and the condition postponing possession is void for repugnancy after C attains majority (18), so C may claim possession at 18.
An estate is transferred to A for life, and after his death to B if B shall then be living, but if B shall not then be living, to C. A, B and C all survive the transferor. During A's lifetime, what is the nature of the interests of B and C?
aB has a vested interest and C has nothing
bBoth B and C have vested interests as tenants in common
cB and C each have a contingent interest until the event (B surviving or not surviving A) happens
dOnly C has a contingent interest; B's interest is vested
Answer: C
Under section 21 (cf. ISA s.120 illustration iii), where the gift over depends on B surviving A, both B and C take only contingent interests until the uncertain event of B's survival of A is determined.
Q28Sale of immovable property (S54–57)
Under Section 57 of the Transfer of Property Act, the court may provide for encumbrances and declare property freed therefrom only:
aSuo motu, even without any application by a party
bOn the application of the encumbrancer alone
cAfter the sale is fully concluded and never before
dOn the application of any party to the sale, the power being discretionary
Answer: D
Section 57 is invoked on the application of any party to the sale and the power is discretionary ('if it thinks fit'); the court does not act suo motu, and the Kerala High Court has held a party may invoke it even at the time a sale of encumbered property is proposed.
Q29Sale of immovable property (S54–57)
A sells tangible immovable property worth Rs 90 to B by delivering possession, without any written or registered instrument. With respect to validity of the transfer under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
aThe sale is valid, since for tangible immovable property of value less than Rs 100 transfer may be made either by registered instrument or by delivery of possession
bThe sale is void, as all sales of immovable property require a registered instrument
cThe sale is valid only if it is also reduced to writing, though registration is excused
dThe sale is valid only if it is intangible property
Answer: A
Under Section 54, tangible immovable property of value less than Rs 100 may be transferred either by a registered instrument or by delivery of possession; delivery occurs when the seller places the buyer in possession.
Q30Sale of immovable property (S54–57)
A executes and registers a sale deed of land worth Rs 2 lakh in favour of B, but B has actually paid nothing and only promised to pay the price later. Relying on Vidyadhar v Manikrao, which statement is correct?
aThe sale is incomplete because actual payment of the whole price at execution is a sine qua non for completion
bThe sale is complete on registration; payment of the whole price at execution is not a sine qua non, the words 'price paid or promised' covering it
cThe sale is void as price is an essential element and none was paid
dThe deed operates only as a contract for sale and not as a sale
Answer: B
Per Section 54 and Vidyadhar v Manikrao, 'price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised' shows full payment at execution is not essential; on registration the sale is complete even if price remains unpaid.
Q31Sale of immovable property (S54–57)
X transfers immovable property to Y, the consideration being not money but the transfer of another item of immovable property by Y to X. Under the scheme of the Transfer of Property Act, this transaction is:
aA sale, because immovable property is involved
bA gift, as no money is paid
cAn exchange and not a sale, since the presence of money consideration is essential to a sale
dA mortgage
Answer: C
Under Section 54 'price' means money only (State of Madras v Gannon Dunkerley); where the consideration is another thing rather than money, the transaction is an exchange (Section 118), not a sale.
Q32Sale of immovable property (S54–57)
Regarding a 'contract for sale' of immovable property under the last paragraph of Section 54, which of the following is correct?
aIt of itself creates an interest in or charge on the property in favour of the proposed buyer
bIt transfers ownership immediately upon settlement of terms
cIt must always be registered to be valid
dIt does not of itself create any interest in or charge on the property, but only an enforceable right between the parties
Answer: D
The last paragraph of Section 54 expressly provides that a contract for sale does not of itself create any interest in or charge on the property (Rambaran v Ram Mohit); it only creates an enforceable right.
Q33Sale of immovable property (S54–57)
A sale of intangible immovable property (such as a right to ferry) of the value of Rs 50 is sought to be effected. Under Section 54 read with the Registration Act, the proper mode is:
aOnly by a registered instrument, whatever the value of such property
bEither by registered instrument or by delivery of possession, as the value is below Rs 100
cOnly by delivery of possession
dBy an oral agreement, since the value is small
Answer: A
Under Section 54 a reversion or other intangible thing can be transferred only by a registered instrument, irrespective of value; the 'delivery' alternative applies only to tangible immovable property worth less than Rs 100.
Q34Sale of immovable property (S54–57)
Under Section 55(1)(a), the seller's statutory duty of disclosure extends to:
aEvery defect, whether or not the buyer could discover it with ordinary care
bAny material defect in the property or in the seller's title of which the seller is, and the buyer is not, aware and which the buyer could not with ordinary care discover
cOnly patent defects discoverable on ordinary inspection
dDefects in the property but never defects in title
Answer: B
Section 55(1)(a), as amended in 1929 to add 'or in the seller's title thereto' (giving effect to Haji Essa v Dayabhai), requires disclosure of material defects known to the seller, not to the buyer, and not discoverable by ordinary care.
Q35Leases (S105–117)
A lessee retains possession after the determination of the lease, and the lessor (or his legal representative) accepts rent from him or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession. Under Section 116, the lease is, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, renewed:
aFor the original full term of the lease
bPermanently, as the lessee becomes a tenant for life
cFrom year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased
dAs a tenancy at sufferance only
Answer: C
Section 116 (effect of holding over) provides that on the lessor's assent to continued possession, the lease is renewed from year to year or month to month according to the purpose of the lease, as governed by Section 106.
Q36Leases (S105–117)
Under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which of the following is the essential characteristic that distinguishes a lease from a sale of immovable property?
aA lease must always reserve rent payable in money only
bA lease can only be created over agricultural land
cA lease necessarily requires payment of a premium in addition to rent
dA lease transfers a right to enjoy the property for a certain time, not the ownership itself
Answer: D
Section 105 defines a lease as a transfer of a 'right to enjoy' property for a certain time, i.e. a partial transfer, whereas Section 54 defines sale as transfer of ownership in exchange for a price. Rent may be money, share of crops, service or any thing of value.
Q37Leases (S105–117)
A tenant of a shop takes a third person into partnership to run the business in the tenanted premises but continues to retain use and control over the premises along with the partners. On these facts, has the tenant 'sub-let' the premises?
aNo, because so long as legal possession remains with the tenant there is no parting of possession amounting to a sub-lease
bYes, because a third person is now using the premises
cYes, because the business is being run jointly
dNo, because partnerships can never amount to sub-letting in any circumstances
Answer: A
Per Parvinder Singh v Renu Gautam and Mahendra Saree Emporium v G.C. Srinivasa Murthy, sub-letting requires parting with legal possession; if the tenant remains actively associated and retains use and control, mere entry into partnership is not sub-letting.
Q38Leases (S105–117)
In the absence of any contract, local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for manufacturing purposes is deemed under Section 106 to be a lease of which duration and terminable by what notice?
aFrom month to month, terminable by fifteen days' notice
bFrom year to year, terminable by six months' notice
cFrom month to month, terminable by six months' notice
dFrom year to year, terminable by fifteen days' notice
Answer: B
Section 106(1) deems leases for agricultural or manufacturing purposes to be from year to year, terminable by six months' notice; leases for any other purpose are from month to month, terminable by fifteen days' notice.
Q39Leases (S105–117)
After the 2002 amendment, a notice to quit under Section 106 mentions a period falling short of the statutory period, but the eviction suit is filed only after the full statutory period had in fact expired. What is the legal effect?
aThe notice is void and the suit must be dismissed on that ground
bThe notice is invalid but can be cured by a fresh suit
cThe notice shall not be deemed invalid merely because the period stated falls short, since the suit was filed after expiry of the statutory period
dThe court must remand the matter for issuing a fresh notice
Answer: C
Section 106(3), inserted by the 2002 amendment, provides that a notice is not invalid merely because the period stated falls short, where the suit or proceeding is filed after expiry of the statutory period—closing the loophole that earlier dismissed suits on this technicality.
Q40Leases (S105–117)
Under Section 107, which of the following leases can be made only by a registered instrument?
aA lease for a term of six months reserving a lump-sum rent
bA lease for eleven months reserving a monthly rent
cAny lease whatsoever, irrespective of its term
dA lease from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent
Answer: D
Para 1 of Section 107 mandates a registered instrument only for leases from year to year, for a term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent. All other leases may be made by registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession.
Q41Leases (S105–117)
After the 1929 amendment to Section 107, where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered instrument, by whom must the instrument be executed?
aBy both the lessor and the lessee
bBy the lessor alone
cBy the lessee alone, in the nature of a kabuliyat
dBy the lessor and two attesting witnesses
Answer: A
The third paragraph of Section 107, inserted by Act 20 of 1929, requires that where a lease is made by a registered instrument, each such instrument must be executed by both the lessor and the lessee—this is why a lease to a minor (who cannot execute) is void.
Q42Exchange & gift (S118–129)
A gift of one property is made to two donees, X and Y, as tenants in common. Y refuses to accept the gift. What is the effect under Section 125?
aThe whole gift fails because acceptance must be by all donees
bThe gift is void only as to Y's interest; X's share takes effect
cX automatically takes the whole property, including Y's share, by survivorship
dThe gift is suspended until Y reconsiders his refusal
Answer: B
S125 provides that where one of several donees does not accept, the gift is void only as to the interest he would have taken; the refusal of one does not prevent the gift taking effect as to the others' shares (Sankaran Poulu v Sundari Vijayamma).
Q43Exchange & gift (S118–129)
Which of the following stipulations in a gift deed would be VALID under Section 126 read with the Act?
aA clause that the gift shall be revocable wholly at the mere will and pleasure of the donor
bA clause absolutely restraining the donee from ever alienating the gifted property
cAn agreement that the gift shall be revoked on the happening of a specified event not depending on the donor's will
dA unilateral right reserved by the donor to cancel the completed gift by a deed of cancellation for any reason
Answer: C
S126 permits revocation on the happening of a specified event not depending on the donor's will, but a gift revocable at the mere will of the donor is void. A total restraint on alienation is void under S10, and a completed gift cannot be unilaterally cancelled.
Q44Exchange & gift (S118–129)
A makes a single transfer to B of all his shares in two joint-stock companies, one prosperous (X) and one in difficulties facing heavy calls (Y). B wishes to keep the X shares but refuse the Y shares. What is the position under Section 127?
aB may accept the X shares and reject the Y shares since they are different companies
bB may accept both but later disclaim the Y shares within a reasonable time
cThe gift of the Y shares alone is void, leaving the X shares with B
dB can take nothing from the gift unless he accepts it fully
Answer: D
Under the first paragraph of S127, where a gift is a single transfer of several things, one onerous, the donee takes nothing unless he accepts it fully (illustration (a), adapted from Moffett v Bates). Only separate and independent transfers may be accepted or refused individually.
Q45Exchange & gift (S118–129)
Under Section 128, where a gift consists of the donor's whole property, to what extent is the universal donee liable for the donor's debts and liabilities existing at the time of the gift?
aHe is personally liable, but only to the extent of the property comprised in the gift
bHe is liable for all such debts without any limit
cHe bears no personal liability, the donor remaining solely liable while alive
dHe is liable only for secured debts, not simple contract debts
Answer: A
S128 makes the universal donee personally liable for the donor's debts and liabilities at the time of the gift, but only to the extent of the property comprised in the gift (Mudhukkas Sagun Karpe v Institute of Public Assistance); this rests on the maxim qui sentit commodum debet et sentire onus.
Q46Exchange & gift (S118–129)
Section 129 expressly provides that nothing in the Chapter on Gifts shall apply to which of the following?
aGifts of immovable property made by Hindus
bGifts of movable property made in contemplation of death (donatio mortis causa), and rules of Muhammadan law
cOnerous gifts made to a minor donee
dGifts comprising both existing and future property
Answer: B
S129 saves donations mortis causa (gifts of movable property made in contemplation of death) and the rules of Muhammadan law from the operation of the Chapter, so that a hiba need not comply with the registration requirement of S123 (Hafeeza Bibi v Sheikh Farid).
Per the Explanation to Section 52, the pendency of a suit for the purpose of lis pendens commences and continues:
aFrom the date of service of summons until pronouncement of the trial-court decree only
bFrom the date of registration of the suit until the first appeal is decided
cFrom the date of presentation of the plaint until complete satisfaction or discharge of the final decree (or until execution becomes time-barred)
dOnly during the period the suit is actively prosecuted
Answer: C
The Explanation to S52 deems pendency to commence from presentation of the plaint and to continue until the final decree is fully satisfied/discharged or execution becomes barred by limitation; appeal and execution are a continuation of the suit.
Under Section 53(1), a transfer of immovable property made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor is:
aVoid ab initio and incapable of operating even between transferor and transferee
bVoidable only at the option of the transferor
cValid in all circumstances unless the transferee is insolvent
dVoidable at the option of any creditor so defeated or delayed
Answer: D
S53(1) makes such a transfer voidable (not void) at the option of any creditor defeated or delayed; it is valid and binding between the parties until avoided.
A creditor who wishes to set aside a transfer made with intent to defeat or delay creditors, under Section 53(1), must:
aInstitute the suit on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all the creditors
bSue only on his own behalf to recover his individual debt
cFirst obtain the consent of the transferee
dWait until the transferor is adjudged insolvent
Answer: A
S53(1) expressly requires that a suit to avoid the transfer be instituted on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all the creditors (a representative suit under O.I r.8 CPC).
Which limitation on the operation of Section 53 is correctly stated?
aIt applies to both movable and immovable property
bIt does not impair the rights of a transferee in good faith and for consideration
cIt makes the impugned transfer absolutely void against the world
dIt can never be raised as a defence by an attaching creditor
Answer: B
S53(1) expressly provides that nothing in it shall impair the rights of a transferee in good faith and for consideration; and S53 applies only to immovable property, not movables.
Practiced enough reading? Attempt Transfer of Property Act, 1882 mocks under real exam conditions and track your weak subjects.
Law Mock is an independent preparation resource and is not affiliated with any High Court, Public Service Commission, or government body. All exam information is sourced from official notifications and is updated periodically.
