Permits and Licences (Section 12)

Section 12 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 is the second of the two narrow gateways — alongside Section 11 — through which the otherwise absolute prohibition on hunting under Section 9 can be lawfully crossed. It empowers the Chief Wild Life Warden to issue a written, reasoned permit allowing a person to hunt a specified wild animal for a closed list of special purposes: education, scientific research, scientific management, collection of specimens for zoos and museums, and the derivation of snake-venom for life-saving drugs. This note dissects the provision clause by clause, distinguishes it from the licensing regime in Chapters V and VA, and grounds each proposition in verified statutory text and Supreme Court authority.

Where Section 12 sits in the statutory scheme

The hunting chapter of the Act (Chapter III) is built on a prohibition-plus-exception model. Section 9 enacts the prohibition: "No person shall hunt any wild animal specified in Schedule I, II, III and IV except as provided under section 11 and section 12." The two saving sections are therefore the only doors out of that prohibition. Section 11 deals with hunting that is reactive — a dangerous animal, an animal that has become a danger to human life or property, or one disabled or diseased beyond recovery. Section 12, by contrast, is purposive and proactive: it permits a deliberate, planned interference with a wild animal for the public-interest objects the section lists. Because both sections open with a non-obstante clause, they prevail over Section 9, but only within their own four corners. The architecture matters for examiners: a hunting that fits neither Section 11 nor Section 12 is an offence under Section 9 read with Section 51, full stop.

The definition of hunting in Section 2(16) is deliberately wide — it covers killing, poisoning, trapping, capturing, baiting and even injuring — so capturing a tiger alive for a captive-breeding programme is just as much "hunting" as shooting it. That is why translocation and live-capture for scientific management have to be expressly authorised by a Section 12 permit; without one they would themselves be hunting offences.

The text, the grantor and the form of the permit

Section 12 opens: "Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act, it shall be lawful for the Chief Wild Life Warden, to grant a permit, by an order in writing stating the reasons therefor, to any person, on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, which shall entitle the holder of such permit to hunt subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, any wild animal specified in such permit, for the purpose of" the listed objects. Four structural features deserve emphasis. First, the granting authority is the Chief Wild Life Warden alone — not a Wildlife Warden, not the State Government — making this a centralised, non-delegable check (see Authorities under the Act for the office's status under Section 4). Second, the permit must be in writing and state reasons: a speaking order is mandatory, which renders the decision amenable to judicial review for arbitrariness. Third, the permit is animal-specific and condition-bound — it names the particular animal and may attach conditions, breach of which voids the protection. Fourth, prescribed fees are payable, reflecting that this is a regulated privilege, not a right.

The five special purposes: clauses (a) to (d)

The permissible objects are an exhaustive list, not an illustrative one. Clause (a) is education. Clause (b) is scientific research. Clause (bb), inserted by the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 1991, is scientific management. Clause (c) covers collection of specimens — (i) for recognised zoos subject to the permission under Section 38-I, and (ii) for museums and similar institutions. Clause (d) permits the derivation, collection or preparation of snake-venom for the manufacture of life-saving drugs. The snake-venom clause is the statutory basis on which institutions such as venom-extraction cooperatives operate lawfully; without it, the capture of cobras and kraits for antivenom production would be hunting under Section 2(16).

Because the list is closed, a purpose outside it — commercial trophy hunting, sport, or population reduction by killing — cannot be authorised under Section 12 at all. This closed-list character is what made Section 12 the appropriate vehicle the Supreme Court contemplated for the live-capture and translocation of Asiatic lions in Centre for Environment Law, WWF-I v. Union of India, discussed below.

"Scientific management": the no-kill definition in the Explanation

Clause (bb) is the most examined limb because it is the only one that contemplates handling a Schedule I animal for conservation logistics rather than study. Its meaning is tightly fenced by the Explanation, which provides: "For the purposes of clause (bb), the expression 'scientific management' means — (i) translocation of any wild animal to alternative suitable habitat; or (ii) population management of wildlife without killing or poisoning or destroying any wild animal." The drafting is significant. Translocation under sub-clause (i) is unconditional as to method, but population management under sub-clause (ii) carries an express no-kill, no-poison, no-destruction rider. In other words, the Act permits scientists to move animals to establish a second home or to manage numbers through capture, relocation or contraception, but never to cull. This is a legislative endorsement of non-lethal conservation and a deliberate refusal to import the "sustainable harvest" model found in some foreign wildlife statutes.

Read with the wide definition of hunting in Section 2(16), clause (bb) is what legalises the capture-and-release essential to radio-collaring, disease surveillance and reintroduction projects — provided a written, reasoned permit precedes the operation.

The proviso: a second key for the most protected animals

The power of the Chief Wild Life Warden is not unfettered. The proviso reads: "Provided that no such permit shall be granted — (a) in respect of any wild animal specified in Schedule I, except with the previous permission of the Central Government, and (b) in respect of any other wild animal, except with the previous permission of the State Government." This creates a two-tier consent mechanism layered on top of the Warden's own discretion. For the most endangered species — historically Schedule I, which included the tiger, elephant, Asiatic lion, snow leopard and great Indian bustard — even the Warden cannot act alone; the Central Government must concur in advance. For animals in the other schedules, the State Government's prior permission suffices. The word "previous" is operative: the concurrence must precede the grant, so a permit issued first and ratified later is bad in law.

The Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2022 rationalised the schedules — reducing the multiple animal schedules into a smaller set with Schedule I now covering the highest-protection species and a separate Schedule listing CITES specimens — but the structural logic of the Section 12 proviso (Central concurrence for the top schedule, State concurrence for the rest) was retained. Aspirants should answer on the principle of dual consent rather than on a now-superseded schedule count.

Section 9 read with Section 12: State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan

The leading authority on the prohibition that Section 12 carves into is State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1, (1988) 4 SCC 655, decided on 10 October 1988. The respondents were prosecuted for unlawfully hunting and killing an elephant — a Schedule I animal — the cognizance being taken under Section 9(1) read with Section 51. The Patna High Court had quashed the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC. The Supreme Court restored the prosecution, holding that the High Court had exceeded the limited ambit of Section 482: at the cognizance stage the court cannot weigh whether the offence will ultimately be proved by evidence. The case is doctrinally important for Section 12 because it confirms that hunting a Schedule I animal is an offence unless brought within the exceptions in Sections 11 and 12; the burden of bringing oneself within a Section 12 permit lies on the accused. The decision also recognised that the Act and the Indian Penal Code can operate on the same facts without the offences being mutually exclusive.

Translocation in action: the Asiatic Lion case

Centre for Environment Law, WWF-I v. Union of India, (2013) 8 SCC 234, decided on 15 April 2013, is the clearest judicial illustration of "scientific management" by translocation under clause (bb). The Wildlife Institute of India had recommended a second home for the Asiatic lion, then confined to the Gir forest in Gujarat, to insulate the species from extinction by epidemic or catastrophe; Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary in Madhya Pradesh was identified as the most suitable site. Gujarat resisted parting with "its" lions. The Supreme Court, adopting an explicitly eco-centric rather than anthropocentric philosophy, directed that the translocation of Asiatic lions from Gir to Kuno be carried out within six months, holding that no State has proprietary ownership over a species and that the survival of an endangered animal is a national, indeed constitutional, concern. The Court also struck down, as taken without the requisite scientific study, the parallel proposal to introduce African cheetahs into Kuno. The case shows the conservation object that clause (bb) and its translocation Explanation are designed to serve, and links naturally to the law on sanctuaries and national parks where such translocated populations are housed.

Permit under Section 12 versus licence under Chapters V and VA

Examiners frequently test the distinction between a permit and a licence under the Act, and the two must not be conflated. A Section 12 permit authorises an act of hunting (capture, killing, translocation) of a living wild animal for a special purpose; it is granted by the Chief Wild Life Warden and is one-off and animal-specific. A licence, by contrast, regulates ongoing commercial dealings in dead wildlife and its products. Under Section 44 in Chapter V, no person may, except under and in accordance with a licence, carry on business as a manufacturer of or dealer in animal articles or trophies, or as a taxidermist; and Chapter VA (Sections 49A–49C), inserted in 1986, super-imposes a near-total prohibition on trade in scheduled animals and their derivatives. There are also the parallel licences in Section 17C and 17D governing cultivation of and dealing in specified plants. The mental model to carry into the exam: permit = a controlled exception to the no-hunting rule; licence = a controlled exception to the no-trade rule.

Cognate permit powers: specified plants and zoo specimens

Section 12 is not the only special-purpose permit power in the Act, and a complete answer notes its cousins. Section 17B empowers the Chief Wild Life Warden, with the previous permission of the State Government, to grant a permit to pick, uproot, acquire, collect or transport a specified plant from forest land for education, scientific research, herbarium preservation, or propagation by an approved institution — a botanical mirror of Section 12 built on the same reasoned-order, State-concurrence template. Within Section 12 itself, clause (c)(i) cross-refers to Section 38-I: a specimen may be collected for a recognised zoo only with the permission of the Central Zoo Authority's recognition regime, ensuring that "collection for a zoo" cannot be used as a backdoor for unregulated capture. These cross-references reward the candidate who reads Section 12 not in isolation but as one node in an integrated permit-and-licence network running from the Act's objects through to the trade controls.

Enforcement, burden of proof and the cost of acting without a permit

A person who hunts without a valid Section 12 permit, or who exceeds its conditions, commits an offence under Section 51, which prescribes imprisonment and fine, with enhanced minimum sentences for Schedule I animals and for protected areas. The deterrent purpose was underscored in Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 10 SCC 604, where the Supreme Court, upholding the conviction of a notorious trafficker in tiger and leopard skins, observed that organised wildlife crime had pushed several species to the brink of extinction and that the courts must take a stern view. Although Sansar Chand concerned illegal trade and possession rather than a Section 12 permit, it confirms the judicial posture against any unlawful taking. Possession-based prosecutions for scheduled-animal trophies — such as the Chinkara-skin matter reported as Pyarelal v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1995 SC 1159, where the minimum-sentence proviso to Section 51 was held not attracted for want of proof of the date of possession — reinforce that the prosecution must prove the unlawful act, after which the onus shifts to the accused to establish the cover of a permit or licence. The practical lesson is unambiguous: in the wildlife-protection scheme, lawful interference with a wild animal exists only on the strength of a written instrument — a Section 12 permit or a Chapter V licence — and never on good intentions alone. For the wider framework, return to the Wildlife Protection Act hub.