The summary eviction machinery of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905 is powerful precisely because it bypasses the civil court. That power, however, is entrusted only to a closed list of named revenue officers — the Collector, the Tahsildar and the Deputy Tahsildar — each acting within a defined hierarchy of original, appellate and revisional authority. An order passed by an officer outside this scheme, or beyond the limits the Supreme Court has read into Sections 6 and 7, is a nullity. This note maps exactly who may evict, what each officer can do, and where the statutory and judicial boundaries lie.
The officers the statute actually names
Eviction under the Act is not an inherent executive power; it is a creature of statute exercisable only by the officers the statute identifies. Section 6, which authorises summary eviction, and Section 7, which mandates the prior show-cause notice, both speak of the same trio: “the Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar.” Section 5, dealing with assessment of penalty, names the identical officers. The list is therefore exhaustive — no other functionary, however senior, derives eviction power directly from the Act. This closed enumeration is the foundation of every jurisdictional challenge to an eviction order, and it ties directly to the substantive power to evict and remove encroachments in Section 6.
Who is the “Collector” — the definition that widens the net
The reach of the eviction power turns on how widely “Collector” is read. The definition clause (Section 1A) defines “Collector” to mean any officer in charge of a revenue division, and expressly includes a Deputy Collector, a Sub-Collector and an Assistant Collector. The drafting deliberately distinguishes this revenue-division “Collector” (in modern parlance the Revenue Divisional Officer / Sub-Collector) from the District Collector, who sits above him and figures only in the appellate hierarchy of Section 10. Reading the definition together with Sections 5–7 is essential: when those sections say “Collector,” they mean the divisional officer and his enumerated equivalents, not necessarily the district head. The precise scope of these labels is set out further in the definitions note.
The Tahsildar and Deputy Tahsildar — the front-line officers
In practice the bulk of eviction work is done not by the Collector but by the Tahsildar and Deputy Tahsildar at the mandal level, who under the reorganised revenue structure of Andhra Pradesh function as the Mandal Revenue Officer (and Deputy MRO). They are independently empowered: Section 6 lets the Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar fix the period within which the occupant must vacate and then remove him or depute a subordinate to do so. Because the front-line officer's order is the one most often challenged, the validity of his eviction stands or falls on two things — that he holds the office the statute names, and that he has first complied with the mandatory notice under the procedure for eviction, notice and hearing.
Section 6 — eviction, forfeiture and the arrest power
Section 6 prescribes the mode of eviction and allocates each step to a named officer. The Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar serves notice (in the manner of Section 7) on the person reputed to be in occupation or his agent, fixing a reasonable time to vacate; on default, that officer removes the occupant or deputes a subordinate to do so, and any structures or crops on the land stand liable to forfeiture. The Act then reserves a distinct coercive power to the senior officer alone: where the removing officer is resisted or obstructed, it is the Collector — not the Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar — who must hold a summary inquiry, and, if satisfied the resistance is without just cause and continuing, may issue a warrant of arrest and commit the person to custody for a period not exceeding thirty days. This deliberate elevation of the arrest power underscores that the statute matches gravity of action to seniority of officer.
Section 7 — the notice that conditions the officer's jurisdiction
No authorised officer can move to eviction without first crossing the Section 7 threshold. Before taking proceedings under Section 5 or Section 6, the Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar must serve on the reputed unauthorised occupant a notice specifying the land and calling on him to show cause, by a stated date, why he should not be proceeded against. Service follows the manner prescribed under Section 25 of the Andhra Pradesh Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, or as the rules under Section 8 direct. The show-cause notice is not a formality but a jurisdictional pre-condition: an eviction by an otherwise competent officer who skipped it is liable to be set aside for breach of natural justice, a theme developed in the procedure note.
Section 7-A — group encroachments and the District Collector
For organised, large-scale encroachment by a group of persons, Section 7-A creates a separate and more stringent track in which the higher officer takes charge. Here the power to order eviction — and to deploy such police force as is necessary to effect removal — is vested in the District Collector, reflecting the public-order dimension of mass encroachment. This is the one situation in the Act where eviction is steered to the district head rather than the divisional Collector or the mandal Tahsildar, and it should not be confused with the ordinary Section 6 power. The contrast illustrates the Act's calibrated allocation: routine individual eviction to front-line officers, mass eviction to the District Collector.
Section 10 — the appellate and revisional hierarchy
Section 10 fixes the chain of authority above the original officer, and a candidate must reproduce it exactly. An appeal lies to the Collector from any decision or order of a Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar; to the District Collector from an order of a Collector passed otherwise than on appeal; and to the Board of Revenue from an order of a District Collector passed otherwise than on appeal. No second appeal lies against an order passed on appeal, but the revisional power supplements this: the District Collector may revise an order of a Deputy Tahsildar or Collector, and the Board of Revenue may revise the order of any officer under the Act. Pending appeal or revision, the District Collector or Board of Revenue may suspend execution of the order. The same officer can thus wear an original hat under Section 6 and an appellate or revisional hat under Section 10 — but never over his own order.
The outer limit — Thummala Krishna Rao on bona fide title disputes
Even an indisputably authorised officer cannot use the summary power in every case. In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081 = (1982) 2 SCC 134 (decided 16 March 1982), the Supreme Court held that the summary remedy of eviction under the Act can be invoked only against an encroachment that is of recent origin or against a rank trespasser; it cannot be resorted to where a bona fide and complicated question of title is raised. There, after a civil suit by Osmania University had failed on the ground that the occupant had perfected title by adverse possession, the Government sought to evict summarily. The Court approved the High Court's view that such a dispute can be resolved only by a regular civil suit, and held the Government cannot unilaterally declare the land its own and then evict by the summary route. The practical lesson: the officer's competence under Section 6 is conditioned not just by office but by the nature of the dispute before him.
Summary power versus due process — the Express Newspapers warning
The same anxiety about misuse of summary eviction machinery animates Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 872 = (1986) 1 SCC 133. Though it arose under the Public Premises framework rather than the 1905 Act, the Supreme Court's reasoning is squarely applicable: where genuine rights such as a claimed re-entry on forfeiture of a lease are in issue, an officer cannot short-circuit adjudication by a summary process and must relegate the matter to a civil suit. Read alongside Thummala Krishna Rao, it confirms that an authorised officer's jurisdiction is hemmed in by due process — the existence of a contestable civil right ousts the summary route, regardless of which revenue officer signs the order.
Consequences when the wrong officer acts
An eviction order suffers a jurisdictional defect in three recurring situations: where it is passed by an officer not named in Sections 5–7; where the senior-officer-only power (the Section 6 arrest and custody) is exercised by a Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar; or where the appellate or revisional sequence of Section 10 is bypassed. Such defects go to jurisdiction, not mere irregularity, so the order is a nullity that can be assailed despite any finality clause, and a writ under Article 226 will lie. By contrast, errors within jurisdiction — say, a defective but curable notice — are ordinarily to be pursued through the statutory appeal under Section 10. Distinguishing the two is the analytical heart of any answer on authorised officers, and it links to the recovery machinery discussed under assessment of penalty and recovery.
Exam synthesis
For the judiciary and CLAT-PG paper, hold three propositions together. First, the original eviction power under Sections 5–7 belongs only to the Collector, Tahsildar and Deputy Tahsildar, with “Collector” defined (Section 1A) to mean the divisional revenue officer and his enumerated equivalents. Second, the Act calibrates authority by gravity — routine eviction to the front-line officer, the arrest-and-custody power to the Collector, group eviction to the District Collector under Section 7-A, and appeal/revision up the Section 10 ladder. Third, even a competent officer's jurisdiction is curtailed where a bona fide title dispute exists, per Thummala Krishna Rao, reinforced by Express Newspapers on the primacy of due process over summary action.
Frequently asked questions
Which officers are authorized to order eviction under the AP Land Encroachment Act, 1905?
Only the three officers named in Sections 5, 6 and 7 — the Collector, the Tahsildar and the Deputy Tahsildar. The list is exhaustive; no other functionary derives eviction power directly from the Act, although the District Collector has a special role in group eviction under Section 7-A and in the appellate hierarchy under Section 10.
Who is the “Collector” for eviction purposes — is it the District Collector?
Not ordinarily. Section 1A defines “Collector” as any officer in charge of a revenue division, including a Deputy Collector, Sub-Collector and Assistant Collector — in effect the Revenue Divisional Officer. The District Collector is a distinct, higher authority who appears mainly in the Section 10 appeal hierarchy and in the Section 7-A group-eviction power.
Can a Tahsildar order arrest of a person resisting eviction?
No. Under Section 6 the Tahsildar and Deputy Tahsildar can remove an occupant or depute a subordinate to do so, but where the removal is resisted or obstructed, only the Collector may hold a summary inquiry and, if satisfied the resistance is unjustified and continuing, issue a warrant of arrest and commit the person to custody for a period not exceeding thirty days.
Does the authorized officer's power apply to every encroachment?
No. In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081 = (1982) 2 SCC 134, the Supreme Court held the summary remedy is confined to encroachments of recent origin or rank trespass, and cannot be used where a bona fide, complicated question of title arises — such disputes must go to a regular civil court.
What is the appeal route from a Tahsildar's eviction order?
Under Section 10, an appeal from a Tahsildar's or Deputy Tahsildar's order lies to the Collector; from a Collector's original order to the District Collector; and from a District Collector's original order to the Board of Revenue. The District Collector may revise orders of a Deputy Tahsildar or Collector, and the Board of Revenue may revise any officer's order.
What happens if an officer not named in the Act passes an eviction order?
Such an order suffers from a defect of jurisdiction and is a nullity. It can be challenged by writ under Article 226 notwithstanding any finality clause, because the defect goes to the very competence to act — unlike a curable irregularity within jurisdiction, which is ordinarily pursued through the statutory appeal under Section 10.