Power to Evict and Remove Encroachments (Sections 5–7)

Sections 5 to 7 form the operative core of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905. They convert the State's proprietary claim over public land into a swift administrative remedy: a penalty under Section 5, summary eviction with forfeiture of crops and structures under Section 6, and a mandatory show-cause notice under Section 7 that anchors the whole scheme to natural justice. The power is potent precisely because it bypasses the civil court; the price of that potency, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, is that it may be used only against plain trespassers and never to decide a genuine dispute of title.

The Statutory Scheme of Sections 5-7

The three sections operate as a graded sequence rather than independent powers. Section 5 fixes the monetary penalty for unauthorised occupation; Section 6 authorises summary eviction and forfeiture; and Section 7 prefaces both by compelling a prior show-cause notice. The drafting reflects a deliberate logic: the State first quantifies the wrong (Section 5), then physically reverses it (Section 6), but only after warning the occupant and hearing him (Section 7). The penalty and eviction are therefore cumulative, not alternative remedies, and an occupant may be made to pay assessment and penalty under Section 5 and still be physically removed under Section 6. The unifying premise is that the land is, in the language of the Act, "the property of Government," so that the entire machinery presupposes undisputed Government title.

Section 5 - Penalty for Unauthorised Occupation

Section 5 makes a person who unauthorisedly occupies Government land liable, in addition to the assessment, to a penalty assessable at the discretion of the Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar. For assessed land the ceiling is the higher of five rupees or ten times the annual assessment; for unassessed land it is the higher of ten rupees or twenty times the notional assessment. The penalty is punitive, designed to make encroachment unprofitable rather than merely to recover dues, which is why it is pegged to a multiple of assessment. The marginal note itself - "liability ... to penalty, after notice" - signals that the levy is contingent on the Section 7 notice having been served. Detailed treatment of the computation appears in assessment of penalty and recovery; for the present purpose Section 5 is the financial limb of the eviction scheme.

Section 6 - Summary Eviction and Forfeiture

Section 6 is the heart of the eviction power. It empowers the Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar to summarily evict any person in unauthorised occupation of Government land. Crucially, it goes beyond removing the person: any crop or other product raised on the land, and any building, construction or thing erected or deposited on it, is liable to forfeiture. The officer may use reasonable force, and where the occupant resists or obstructs, the section permits the Collector to hold an inquiry and, on being satisfied of wilful resistance, to issue a warrant of arrest and commit the offender to custody for up to thirty days. The section adds that a person so committed shall not, in respect of the same facts, be liable to prosecution under the corresponding provisions of the Penal Code, so the occupant is not punished twice for the same resistance.

The forfeiture of structures and crops is what distinguishes this remedy from an ordinary suit for possession - the State recovers the land cleared of all that the trespasser added to it, and the occupant cannot resist eviction by pointing to the value of his constructions. The word "summarily" is the key to the section's character: it authorises an executive act of self-help by the State, dispensing with the decree, execution and delay of a civil suit. That same word is the source of the section's vulnerability, because a power exercised without the safeguards of trial is tolerable only against an indisputable trespasser. Every limb of Section 6 therefore depends on the foundational fact that the land genuinely belongs to Government, a condition the courts police strictly and which, if absent, defeats the jurisdiction to act at all.

Section 7 - The Mandatory Show-Cause Notice

Section 7 is the procedural safeguard that legitimises the summary character of Sections 5 and 6. Before taking any proceeding under either section, the Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar must cause a notice to be served on the person reputed to be in unauthorised occupation, specifying the land and calling on him to show cause by a stated date why he should not be proceeded against. Service follows the procedure of the Revenue Recovery Act or such manner as the Government prescribes. The notice is not a formality: it converts an executive act into a quasi-judicial one. The fuller mechanics of drafting, service and the hearing that must follow are set out in the procedure for eviction, and the officers competent to act are detailed under officers authorized for eviction.

The Title-Dispute Bar: Thummala Krishna Rao

The single most important judicial gloss on Section 6 is Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081 : (1982) 2 SCC 134. Osmania University had failed in a possession suit because one Habibuddin was found to have perfected title to the three plots by adverse possession; the University then asked the Government to evict the occupants summarily under Section 6, and notices were duly issued. The Supreme Court (Chandrachud, C.J.) quashed the proceedings and held that the summary remedy could not be invoked. The Act's machinery, the Court reasoned, is meant for taking quick action against rank trespassers and persons in clandestine or surreptitious occupation, not for resolving complicated questions of title.

Two strands of reasoning support the holding. First, the very subject-matter of a summary inquiry is unsuited to a contest over ownership: a revenue officer acting in a few weeks cannot weigh evidence of long possession, pattas and adverse possession the way a civil court can. Second, and more fundamentally, the Government cannot make itself a judge in its own cause by unilaterally declaring that the land belongs to it and then using that self-serving conclusion to trigger the summary power. Where a bona fide dispute of title exists between the Government and the occupant, it must be adjudicated by the ordinary civil courts. The decision thus reads a jurisdictional limit into Section 6 - the existence of a genuine title dispute ousts the officer's authority to act summarily, so that an order passed in such a case is not merely erroneous but without jurisdiction.

Who Is a 'Rank Trespasser'?

The Thummala Krishna Rao distinction between a rank trespasser and a bona fide claimant decides almost every Section 6 challenge. The test is not whether the occupant will ultimately win on title, but whether his claim raises a serious, arguable question that cannot fairly be brushed aside by an administrative officer. A squatter on a tank bund or road margin with no colour of right is a fit subject for summary eviction; a person holding under a long-standing patta, a registered sale deed, or a plausible plea of adverse possession is not. The principle echoes Bishan Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1570, where the Supreme Court condemned the State's high-handed dispossession of occupants of a dharmasala and shops without authority of law, affirming that even on its own land the State must proceed by due process and not by executive muscle. Together the two decisions confine summary eviction to the clear case.

Natural Justice and the Consequences of a Defective Notice

Because Section 7 is mandatory, defects in notice are the commonest ground on which eviction orders are quashed. The notice must genuinely afford an opportunity to show cause, which imports three concrete requirements: the land must be described with enough precision that the occupant knows what is in issue; the time given to respond must be reasonable; and the objections actually filed must be considered, with reasons, before any order under Section 5 or 6 is passed. A notice that merely recites the statute, or an order that disposes of the matter without engaging the reply, fails the test. Andhra Pradesh High Court decisions have repeatedly set aside eviction orders where the occupant's representation was ignored, where the notice was vague as to the land, or where the order issued without a real hearing - each a violation of natural justice.

The defect is not curable as a mere irregularity. Section 7 is the source of the jurisdiction to evict summarily, so an order made in its breach is void and may be struck down in writ proceedings without the occupant having to show prejudice. The practical lesson for the revenue administration is stark: the speed promised by Section 6 is forfeited entirely if the Section 7 safeguard is treated as a ritual, because a hasty eviction that skips a genuine hearing simply invites a writ that restores the occupant and resets the clock.

Section 7A - Group Encroachment and Eviction by Force

Section 7A is a later, far harsher addition aimed at organised land-grabbing. Where a group of persons encroaches on Government land, the District Collector may order immediate eviction of the encroachers, and officers may remove them by force, taking such police assistance as is necessary. Strikingly, the section dispenses with the Section 7 show-cause notice and declares the Collector's order final and not liable to be questioned in any court. It is best understood as a targeted exception to the notice-and-hearing scheme of Sections 6 and 7, justified by the public-order dimension of mass encroachment, where individual notices would defeat the very object of swift clearance.

The finality clause must, however, be read with care. An ouster of the court's jurisdiction can validly bar a challenge to errors committed within jurisdiction; it cannot immunise an order passed without jurisdiction. So if the land is not in fact the property of Government, or if what is dressed up as a group encroachment is really the occupation of a single bona fide claimant, the foundational fact is missing and the order remains amenable to writ scrutiny under Article 226 notwithstanding the bar. Section 7A therefore trades the procedural safeguards of Section 7 for speed, but it does not - and constitutionally could not - displace judicial review of jurisdictional error or of the threshold question of Government title that Thummala Krishna Rao makes indispensable.

The Public-Trust Dimension of Eviction

The eviction power does not operate in a policy vacuum. In Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 11 SCC 396, the Supreme Court (Katju, J.) directed States to evict illegal occupants of village common land and ponds and refused to countenance regularisation of such encroachments, holding that no trespasser on public land can claim a right to remain merely because he has built upon it. Although that case arose under Punjab law, its reasoning powerfully reinforces Sections 5-7: land vested in Government or held for common public use is a trust to be protected, and the summary eviction machinery is the instrument of that protection. The corollary, consistent with Thummala Krishna Rao, is that the machinery must be reserved for genuine encroachers so that its legitimacy as a public-interest tool is not eroded by abuse against bona fide holders.

Interplay with Civil and Constitutional Remedies

Sections 5-7 do not extinguish the ordinary remedies; they sit alongside them. Where summary eviction is barred because a bona fide title dispute exists, the Government's recourse is a regular suit for possession - the very course Thummala Krishna Rao directed. Conversely, an aggrieved occupant who is evicted in breach of Section 7, or whose genuine title claim is steam-rolled under Section 6, may invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction to quash the order, or sue for restoration. The appeal and revision structure within the revenue hierarchy provides a further internal check before the matter reaches the High Court. This layered design - administrative speed for clear cases, judicial determination for contested ones - is what keeps the summary power constitutionally defensible. Read against the Act's object and constitutional position, Sections 5-7 emerge as a calibrated, not arbitrary, scheme.