Directive Principles of State Policy (Articles 36–51)

Part IV of the Constitution of India — Articles 36 to 51 — collects the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP). They are the social and economic blueprint that the framers chose not to make justiciable. Article 37 says it expressly: the principles “shall not be enforceable by any court”, but they are “nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.” The chapter therefore creates a duty without a remedy in court, an instrument of instruction addressed first to the Legislature, and through it to the Executive.

For the judiciary aspirant, three questions organise the entire Part: who is the “State” that is bound; how do these non-justiciable directives interact with the justiciable Fundamental Rights in Part III; and what does each individual directive ask the State to do. The third question is the bulk of the chapter; the first two control how the third is read.

Article 36 — definition of the “State”

Article 36 imports the definition of “State” from Article 12. The Government and Parliament of India, the Government and Legislature of each State, and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India are equally bound by Part IV. The definition has two practical consequences. First, statutory corporations and instrumentalities of the State — the courts have read public sector undertakings into this category — must take Part IV into account when fixing prices, conditions of service, and welfare measures (O.N.G.C. v. Association of Natural Gas Consuming Industries, AIR 1990). Second, courts and statutory tribunals are themselves part of the “State”, so they cannot ignore the directives when interpreting laws (N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Karumai Ammal, 1980).

Article 37 — the non-justiciability rule

Article 37 contains both a disabling clause and a mandate. The disabling clause keeps the principles outside the writ jurisdiction. The mandate says the State “shall” apply them in making laws. Five propositions follow from a long line of decisions:

1. The directives create no justiciable rights in individuals.
2. They require legislation to be operationalised; until that happens, neither the State nor an individual may violate an existing law on the strength of a directive (Mangru v. Commissioners of Budge Budge Municipality, 1951).
3. They neither confer nor take away any legislative power; competence must still be sourced from the Seventh Schedule (Deep Chand v. State of U.P., AIR 1959).
4. A law cannot be struck down merely because it offends a directive, and courts will not compel the State to legislate to give effect to one (U.P.S.E.B. v. Hari Shankar Jain, AIR 1979).
5. The duty to implement the directives is itself subject to the constitutional limits on legislative power, including the bar in Article 13(2) against laws that take away or abridge Fundamental Rights (State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, 1951).

The textual hierarchy looked, after Champakam, like absolute supremacy of Part III over Part IV. The position has since been refined into one of harmonious construction, but the basic point survives: a directive does not by itself authorise a law that breaches a fundamental right.

Classification of the directives

The directives are commonly grouped under three heads, although the Constitution itself does not classify them. The grouping helps the aspirant remember sixteen articles by their common purpose.

Socialistic principles

Article 38 (welfare state and minimisation of inequalities of income, status, facilities and opportunities), Article 39 (the six policy directions including adequate means of livelihood, distribution of material resources for the common good, prevention of concentration of wealth, equal pay for equal work, protection of workers and children), Article 39A (free legal aid and equal justice), Article 41 (right to work, education and public assistance), Article 42 (just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief), Article 43 (living wage and decent conditions of work), Article 43A (workers’ participation in management) and Article 47 (raising the level of nutrition, public health and prohibition) collectively map the welfare-state vision of the Preamble.

Gandhian principles

Article 40 (organisation of village panchayats as units of self-government), Article 43 again (cottage industries on individual or co-operative basis in rural areas), Article 43B (promotion of co-operative societies), Article 46 (educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and weaker sections), Article 47 (prohibition of intoxicating drinks and harmful drugs) and Article 48 (organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry, prohibition of slaughter of cows, calves and other milch and draught cattle) reflect the Gandhian programme.

Liberal-intellectual principles

Article 44 (uniform civil code), Article 45 (early childhood care and education for children below six), Article 48A (protection of environment and forests), Article 49 (protection of monuments and objects of national importance), Article 50 (separation of judiciary from executive) and Article 51 (promotion of international peace and security) make up this third group.

Part III and Part IV — the harmonious-construction story

The relationship between justiciable rights and non-justiciable directives is a recurring exam theme; it also drives a substantial part of the case law on Article 14, Article 19 and Article 21. Three doctrinal phases are distinguishable.

Phase 1 — Champakam supremacy of Part III. In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951), a communal G.O. reserving seats in medical and engineering colleges by community was struck down as offending Article 29(2), one of the cultural and educational rights. The Court held that Article 29(2) was not controlled by Article 46 and that the directives must run subsidiary to the Fundamental Rights. The decision triggered the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, inserting Article 15(4) to enable special provision for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

Phase 2 — the harmonious-construction shift. In Re Kerala Education Bill (AIR 1958), the Supreme Court began to read directives into the texture of fundamental-rights interpretation. By the time of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the position was that there is no inherent disharmony between Part III and Part IV: they supplement each other in aiming at the same goal of social revolution and the establishment of a welfare state, and the courts must apply the doctrine of harmonious construction to give effect to both. Together, the Court said, they form the conscience of the Constitution.

Phase 3 — Article 31C and the Minerva Mills correction. Article 31C, inserted by the 25th Amendment in 1971, originally provided that no law giving effect to the policy of Article 39(b) or (c) shall be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with Articles 14, 19 or 31; and a declaration in the law to that effect was made non-justiciable. The non-justiciability of the declaration was struck down in Kesavananda Bharati (1973). The 42nd Amendment then enlarged Article 31C to cover all directives in Part IV. In Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980), a Constitution Bench struck down the enlargement, restoring Article 31C to its original 39(b)/(c) form. The Court said that the Constitution rests on a balance between Part III and Part IV and that to give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb that balance, which is part of the basic structure.

The settled position therefore is: Part IV cannot directly override Part III; but in determining the scope of a fundamental right and the reasonableness of restrictions on it, the courts will read the directives into the analysis and will uphold a law that effectuates a directive provided it does not run in clear conflict with the fundamental right and is within legislative competence (State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, 2005). This is the operative test for the exam.

Article 38 — social order for the welfare of the people

Article 38(1) directs the State to promote the welfare of the people by securing a social order in which justice — social, economic and political — informs all the institutions of national life. Clause (2), inserted by the 44th Amendment in 1978, asks the State in particular to minimise inequalities in income and to endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, both among individuals and among groups in different areas or vocations. The provision has been used to read welfare statutes purposively (Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Union of India, 1996) and to direct municipal authorities to remove insanitary conditions in slums irrespective of financial constraints (Ratlam Municipal Council v. Vardhichand, AIR 1980).

Article 39 — the six policy directions

Article 39 lists six directions that the State “shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing”. The clauses are independent but read together. Clause (a) requires that citizens, men and women equally, have an adequate means of livelihood. Clause (b) requires that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. Clause (c) requires that the operation of the economic system does not result in concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. Clause (d) requires equal pay for equal work for both men and women. Clause (e) requires that the health and strength of workers and the tender age of children are not abused. Clause (f) requires that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation.

“Material resources” under Article 39(b) has been broadly construed to cover not only natural resources but also movable and immovable property, electrical energy generated by a private undertaking, and mines, minerals and quarries (Tinsukia Electric Supply Co. v. State of Assam, 1989; Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995). Nationalisation laws have been upheld as implementing 39(b) (Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., AIR 1983). Article 31C, in its restored form, shields laws giving effect to 39(b) and (c) from challenge under Articles 14 and 19.

“Equal pay for equal work” under Article 39(d) is not an independent fundamental right, but the Supreme Court has “elevated” it to that rank by reading it together with Articles 14 and 16 (Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982). Equality of work is, however, a matter of fact: differences in qualifications, mode of recruitment, status, responsibilities, and the absence of a comparable post defeat the claim (State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, 2002).

Articles 39(e), (f), 41 and 42 have been read into Article 21 to give content to the right to live with human dignity, free from exploitation. The bonded-labour and child-labour decisions — Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984; M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1996; Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, AIR 1984 — are the leading examples of the directives operating through Article 21 alongside the right against exploitation in Articles 23 and 24.

Article 39A — equal justice and free legal aid

Inserted by the 42nd Amendment in 1976, Article 39A directs the State to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity and, in particular, to provide free legal aid by suitable legislation, schemes or any other way. Read with Article 21, the Supreme Court has built a jurisprudence around it: an indigent accused is entitled to free legal representation from the moment he is first produced before a Magistrate (Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979; Khatri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1981; Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1986); free copies of judgment must be supplied to enable an appeal (Madhav Hayawandanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978); claimants for motor-accident compensation may sue in forma pauperis (State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi, AIR 1979). The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 is the principal statutory implementation.

Article 40 — village panchayats

Article 40 directs the State to take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with the powers and authority necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government. The directive received a major statutory boost through the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992, which inserted Part IX on the Panchayats, and through the parallel 74th Amendment for municipalities. Article 40 itself does not require that the entire country be governed exclusively through panchayats; extending the limits of a municipal corporation into areas earlier under panchayats is therefore not violative of Article 40 (Raghunath Pandey v. State of Bihar, AIR 1982).

Articles 41 to 43A — the labour-welfare cluster

Articles 41 to 43A together fix the State’s welfare obligations to workers. Article 41 requires effective provision, within the limits of economic capacity, for the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement. Job security has been read as an ingredient of the right to work (Daily Casual Labour Employed under P&T Department v. Union of India, 1988); the State cannot withhold pension without a definite finding of grave misconduct (D.V. Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR 1990); financial constraints, however, are valid considerations in framing health policy (State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, 1998).

Article 42 requires the State to provide just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 has been extended to women on muster-roll and casual-wage rolls in conformity with Article 42 (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), 2000).

Article 43 requires the State to endeavour to secure to all workers — agricultural, industrial or otherwise — work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities, and to promote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas. Restrictions imposed by the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 on the freedom of trade and profession in Article 19(1)(g) have been upheld with reference to Article 43 (Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore, AIR 1970). Article 43A, inserted by the 42nd Amendment, requires the State to take steps to secure the participation of workers in the management of undertakings, establishments and other organisations in industry. Article 43B, added by the 97th Amendment in 2011, requires the State to promote voluntary formation, autonomous functioning, democratic control and professional management of co-operative societies.

Article 44 — uniform civil code

Article 44 directs the State to endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India. The object is to integrate India by bringing communities to a common platform on matters that do not form the essence of any religion, principally divorce and maintenance. The Supreme Court has more than once regretted that Article 44 has “remained a dead letter” and has urged the Government to revisit it (Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, AIR 1985; Jordan Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra, AIR 1985; Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, 1995; John Vallamattom v. Union of India, 2003). Article 44 rests on the premise that there is no necessary connection between religion and personal law in a civilised society, although this premise is contested in academic and judicial discussion of the freedom of religion in Articles 25 to 28.

Article 45 — early childhood care and education

Article 45, in its original form, required the State to endeavour to provide free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years. The 86th Amendment, 2002 made two changes. First, it inserted Article 21A elevating free and compulsory education for children of 6 to 14 years to a fundamental right. Second, it substituted Article 45 to direct the State to endeavour to provide early childhood care and education for all children until they complete the age of six. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 implements Article 21A. Article 45 must now be read alongside Article 21A and the corresponding fundamental duty in Article 51A(k).

Article 46 — educational and economic interests of weaker sections

Article 46 directs the State to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections, and in particular of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and to protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. The directive embodies the concept of distributive justice — removing inequalities and rectifying transactions between unequals (Lingappa Pochanna Appealwar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1985). The expression “weaker sections” is wider than “backward classes”; it includes those rendered weak by poverty, calamity or physical handicap (Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992). Laws restoring tribal land alienated to non-tribals (Lingappa Pochanna) and a ban on mechanised fishing to protect traditional fishermen (State of Kerala v. Joseph Antony, AIR 1994) have been upheld with reference to Article 46.

Article 47 — nutrition, public health and prohibition

Article 47 makes the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living, and the improvement of public health, primary duties of the State; in particular, the State is to endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption — except for medicinal purposes — of intoxicating drinks and of drugs injurious to health. The provision has been used to enforce sanitary obligations against defaulting local authorities (Ratlam Municipal Council v. Vardhichand, AIR 1980); to require the Food Corporation of India to upgrade substandard rice before release for human consumption (Tapan Kumar Sadhukhan v. Food Corporation of India, 1996); and to read the right to food free from harmful residues into the right to life (Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2013). Restrictions on the manufacture and sale of liquor have repeatedly been upheld as referable to Article 47 (Nashirwar v. State of M.P., AIR 1975).

Article 48 — agriculture, animal husbandry, and the cow-slaughter directive

Article 48 enjoins the State to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines, and in particular to take steps for preserving and improving the breeds and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle. The latter half generated three rounds of litigation over total bans on bovine slaughter. In Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar (AIR 1958), a total ban was held excessive insofar as it covered cattle that had ceased to be useful. In State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat (2005), a seven-judge Constitution Bench upheld a complete ban, holding that the expression “milch or draught cattle” describes a category and includes cattle that have ceased to be functional through age, and that a restriction giving effect to Article 48 read with Articles 39(e), 47 and 48A is a reasonable restriction within Article 19(6).

Article 48A — environment, forests and wildlife

Article 48A, inserted by the 42nd Amendment, directs the State to endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country. Read with the corresponding fundamental duty in Article 51A(g), and through the prism of Article 21, the Supreme Court has built the modern environmental jurisprudence on this twin platform: standing in environmental public interest litigation under Article 32 (Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991), regulation of mining in ecologically sensitive areas (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2004), the inclusive dictionary meaning of “forest” (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2004), relocation of polluting industries from the Taj Trapezium Zone (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1997), and protection of natural resources from irreversible damage. International environmental law that India has ratified has been treated as part of the domestic environmental law to the extent it is not inconsistent with municipal law (N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, 2004).

Article 49 — protection of monuments

Article 49 obliges the State to protect every monument or place or object of artistic or historic interest declared by or under law made by Parliament to be of national importance, from spoliation, disfigurement, destruction, removal, disposal or export. The Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 is the principal implementation. The Taj-pollution litigation under M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1997) is the leading judicial application: industries within the Taj Trapezium Zone using coke or coal were directed either to switch to natural gas or relocate.

Article 50 — separation of judiciary from executive

Article 50 requires the State to take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 implements the directive at the trial level by separating Judicial Magistrates from Executive Magistrates. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that the independence of the judiciary is an essential attribute of the rule of law and a basic feature of the Constitution (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, 1993; Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, 2010). Tribunals constituted to take over the powers of courts must satisfy these structural guarantees; otherwise the transfer of jurisdiction is open to challenge as offending the basic structure. Article 50 is sometimes described as the “conscience of the Constitution”.

Article 51 — promotion of international peace and security

Article 51 lists four endeavours for the State in the international sphere: to promote international peace and security, to maintain just and honourable relations between nations, to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations, and to encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration. The provision does not by itself convert international treaties into municipal law: legislation under Article 253 is required where a treaty provides for payment of money out of the Consolidated Fund, affects justiciable rights of citizens, requires taking of private property or life or liberty, imposes a tax, or otherwise alters the laws of a State. Where treaties are silent on these matters, executive power under Article 53 suffices to implement them. Indian courts respect rules of international law in the absence of contrary domestic legislation (Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, AIR 1984); ratified international covenants that elucidate Fundamental Rights are routinely relied upon to give content to those rights (People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 1997).

How the directives have actually been enforced

Article 37 says the directives are not enforceable; the case law tells a more nuanced story. The Supreme Court has not enforced the directives as such, but has used them in four overlapping ways. First, the directives have been read into Fundamental Rights to expand their content — most prominently into Article 21 (right to live with human dignity, right to legal aid, right to a clean environment). Second, restrictions imposed on Articles 19(1)(a)–(g) for the purpose of giving effect to the directives have been treated as reasonable restrictions under clauses (2) to (6). Third, the directives have been used as a guide to statutory interpretation: of the two possible constructions, the one that conforms to a directive is preferred (Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhoy, AIR 1976). Fourth, the directives have inspired wide-ranging directions to the executive in public-interest litigation — from minimum-wage notifications and joint committees to monitor exploitation of labour, to procedural safeguards for inter-country adoption (Lakshmi Kant Pandey), and to the operationalisation of Anganwadi centres (People’s Union for Civil Liberties, 2004).

Connection with Fundamental Duties and the basic structure

Part IV-A, inserted by the 42nd Amendment, runs in pair with Part IV. The Fundamental Duties in Article 51A correspond closely to the directives — environmental protection, scientific temper, abjuring violence, safeguarding public property, striving towards excellence — and several recent decisions read Article 48A with Article 51A(g) when expounding the right to a clean environment. The relationship of Part IV with the basic structure was finally settled in Minerva Mills (1980): the balance between the fundamental rights and the directive principles is itself a basic feature, and Parliament cannot, by a constitutional amendment, give either category absolute primacy over the other.

The exam takeaway

Five points are exam-critical. One: Part IV is not justiciable, but it is binding on the legislature and the executive and has been built into the interpretation of Part III. Two: Champakam said Part IV is subordinate to Part III; Kesavananda shifted to harmonious construction; Minerva Mills made the balance itself a basic feature. Three: Article 31C, in its original 39(b)/(c) form, survives — the 42nd-Amendment enlargement was struck down. Four: directives such as 39A, 41, 42, 47 and 48A have been routinely read into Article 21. Five: amendments after the original Constitution — 38(2), 39(f), 39A, 43A, 43B, 45 (substituted), 48A — reflect a steady deepening of the welfare-state vision over seven decades.

Frequently asked questions

Are the Directive Principles enforceable in court?

No. Article 37 expressly says the directives shall not be enforceable by any court. They are, however, fundamental in the governance of the country and the State is bound to apply them in making laws. Courts therefore cannot strike down a law merely because it offends a directive (Deep Chand v. State of U.P., AIR 1959), nor compel the State to legislate to give effect to one (U.P.S.E.B. v. Hari Shankar Jain, AIR 1979). The directives are still used to expand fundamental rights, judge the reasonableness of restrictions on Article 19, and guide statutory interpretation.

Can a Directive Principle override a Fundamental Right?

No. The position settled after Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) is that neither category can be given absolute primacy. Article 31C, in its restored form, immunises only laws giving effect to Article 39(b) or (c) from challenge under Articles 14 and 19. For all other directives, the courts apply the doctrine of harmonious construction laid down in Kesavananda Bharati (1973): a law that effectuates a directive is upheld provided it does not run in clear conflict with a fundamental right and is within legislative competence (State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, 2005).

How did Champakam Dorairajan affect the relationship between Parts III and IV?

In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951), the Supreme Court struck down a communal G.O. for engineering and medical seats and held that Article 29(2) was not controlled by Article 46. The directives, the Court said, must run subsidiary to the Fundamental Rights. Parliament responded with the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, inserting Article 15(4) to enable special provision for socially and educationally backward classes and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Champakam supremacy formula has since been refined into harmonious construction, but the basic point that a directive cannot by itself authorise a law breaching a fundamental right has not been displaced.

What was changed by the 42nd Amendment in Part IV?

The 42nd Amendment, 1976 made significant additions to Part IV. It inserted Article 39A (equal justice and free legal aid), Article 43A (workers participation in management of industries) and Article 48A (protection of environment, forests and wildlife). It also substituted clause (f) of Article 39 to focus on the development of children and protection of childhood and youth from exploitation, and enlarged Article 31C to immunise laws giving effect to all directives. The enlargement of Article 31C was struck down in Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980); the rest of these insertions remain in force.

Why is Article 44 (uniform civil code) called a dead letter?

The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that despite the framers placing Article 44 in Part IV, no government has enacted a uniform civil code applicable across communities. In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (AIR 1985), Jordan Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra (AIR 1985), Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995) and John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003), the Court regretted that Article 44 has remained a dead letter and urged Parliament to act. The framers placed it in Part IV precisely because they recognised the political difficulty of legislating common rules of marriage, divorce and inheritance across religious communities.

How does Article 50 relate to the basic structure of the Constitution?

Article 50 directs the State to take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State. The Supreme Court has held that the independence of the judiciary, of which separation is a structural component, is a basic feature of the Constitution (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, 1993). Even where Parliament transfers jurisdiction from courts to tribunals, the structural guarantees of independence and the principles of rule of law and separation of powers must be maintained, failing which the transfer is open to challenge (Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, 2010).