Right to Freedom of Religion (Articles 25–28)

Articles 25 to 28 of the Constitution form a tightly drafted quartet that translates the Preambular promise of liberty of belief, faith and worship into enforceable fundamental rights. Article 25 secures the conscience and worship of every person; Article 26 secures the autonomy of every religious denomination; Article 27 forbids any compulsory tax whose proceeds are specifically appropriated to promote a particular religion; and Article 28 keeps religious instruction out of educational institutions wholly maintained out of State funds. Read together, they describe the Indian model of secularism — neither anti-God nor confessional, but committed to equal regard for every faith.

The architecture matters for the exam-aspirant. The four Articles do not stand in isolation. They feed back into Article 14 and 15 equality guarantees, into the expressive liberties of Article 19, and into the cultural and educational rights of Articles 29 and 30. They also delimit the permissible reach of the State: where personal law, denominational ritual, religious endowments and conscience-based dissent meet the State, the answer is almost always sought first in this chapter.

Article 25 — freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation

Article 25(1) provides that, subject to public order, morality and health, and to the other provisions of Part III, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. Clause (2) preserves the State’s power to (a) regulate or restrict any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice, and (b) provide for social welfare and reform or for throwing open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Two Explanations clarify that the wearing and carrying of kirpans is included in the profession of the Sikh religion, and that for clause (2)(b) the reference to Hindus includes Sikhs, Jainas and Buddhists.

The first textual point to lodge is the breadth of the bearer. The right is conferred on all persons, not merely citizens within the meaning of Part II. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388, the Supreme Court held that the freedom extends to aliens as well as to those exercising the right through institutions, and to members of religious minorities equally with the majority — a point reaffirmed in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1.

Conscience, profession, practice and propagation

Conscience. Freedom of conscience has no necessary connection with belief in God or with any particular religion. It includes, as the Madhya Pradesh High Court observed and the Supreme Court approved on appeal in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., AIR 1977 SC 908, the right of a person not to be converted into another person’s religion. Conscience is the inner sphere; profession and practice are its outward expression.

Profession and practice. Freedom to profess is the right to declare one’s creed in public; freedom to practise is the right to give it expression in public and private worship and to perform rituals and ceremonies which are integral to the religion. The right may be acquired by custom and, once acquired, the customary religious rites, observances and ceremonies of a community attract Article 25 protection (Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 2198). It also founds the right to take out a religious procession, subject to restrictions to prevent breach of the peace or obstruction of the highway.

Propagation. The Supreme Court in Rev. Stainislaus read ‘propagate’ narrowly. It means the right to communicate one’s beliefs to another or to expose the tenets of one’s faith for the edification of others. It does not include the right to convert another person, because the second person is equally entitled to freedom of conscience — and those words in fact precede ‘propagate’ in the Article. State Acts penalising conversion brought about by force, fraud or allurement were therefore upheld. A person remains free to adopt another religion through the free exercise of conscience.

The essential religious practices doctrine

Article 25 protects not only matters of faith and belief but also rituals and observances which are integral parts of a religion (Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770). It does not, however, protect every practice that a community happens to follow. The constitutional protection runs only to those parts and practices that are essential or integral.

The classical formulation comes from the temple-entry decision in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282. Religion, the Court held, is not merely a matter of doctrine; it has its outward expression in acts as well, and the question whether a given practice is integral must be decided by reference to the tenets of the religion itself. In subsequent cases this hardened into the essential practices test: would the nature of the religion be fundamentally changed if the practice were taken away? If yes, the practice is essential and protected; if no, it is mere embellishment and is open to legislative regulation.

In Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta the Supreme Court applied the test to the public performance of the tandava dance with skulls and live human bones by the Ananda Margis. It held that the dance was not an essential part of the religion of the Ananda Margis and could be regulated in the interest of public order. Similarly, in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731, sacrifice of a cow on Bakr-Id was held not to be an obligatory overt act of the Muslim religion. By contrast, in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853, the Supreme Court treated the power of the Dai-ul-Mutlaq of the Dawoodi Bohra community to excommunicate on religious grounds as part of the essential religious practice of that community and struck down the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949 to that extent.

The doctrine also saw a major application in Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615. Three Jehovah’s Witness children who stood respectfully but did not sing the national anthem in school were expelled. The Supreme Court held that genuine, conscientiously held religious belief that prevented active participation attracted the protection of Article 25(1) (read with Article 19(1)(a)) and that the expulsion was unconstitutional. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India, WPC No. 118 of 2016, the majority of a Constitution Bench held that the practice of talaq-e-biddat (instantaneous triple talaq) is not integral to the religious denomination of Sunni Muslims and therefore not protected under Article 25(1); a regulatory enactment followed.

Restrictions in Article 25(1) — public order, morality, health

The freedom of conscience and worship under Article 25(1) is, on the face of the text, made subject to public order, morality and health, and to the other provisions of Part III. These limits do real work. Thus, a competent legislature may prohibit deleterious practices done in the name of religion — for example, sacrifice of human beings, or the tandava dance with skulls in public streets — and the police may be required to guard a shrine without that amounting to interference with worship (Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramdassji Varu v. State of A.P., AIR 1970 SC 181).

The phrase ‘subject to the other provisions of this Part’ is also load-bearing. Because Part III includes Article 19, the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 25 is in turn subject to the reasonable restrictions allowed by Article 19(2)–(6) and to the rights guaranteed to other citizens by Article 19(1) (Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 2098). And because Part III includes Article 17, religious practice cannot rest on untouchability — a textual link to the right against exploitation chapter.

The Supreme Court has used these limits with care, often borrowing the test of reasonableness from the jurisprudence on Article 19. In Church of God (Full Gospel) in India v. K.K.R. Majestic Colony Welfare Association, (2000) 7 SCC 282, it held that no religion prescribes that prayers should be performed by disturbing the peace of others through loudspeakers or beating of drums; in Re Noise Pollution (V), (2005) 5 SCC 733, it upheld the time-band restrictions on bursting fireworks during Diwali on the same reasoning. The constitutional inquiry remains balanced rather than absolutist.

Article 25(2)(a) — secular activity associated with religious practice

Article 25(2)(a) is one of the most exam-tested clauses in this chapter. It saves State laws that regulate or restrict any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice. The decisive distinction, drawn in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi, is between the religious practice itself — protected — and the secular envelope around it — regulable.

The case law gives a workable map. The management of a temple, control of its staff and payment of remuneration to sevaks are secular and may be regulated (Shri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee v. Chintamani Khuntia, (1997) 8 SCC 422). The act of appointment of a priest is a secular matter, even though the worship that the priest performs is religious; legislation may therefore empower a trustee to appoint a priest in accordance with the tenets of the denomination, regardless of the usage of hereditary succession (N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board, (2002) 8 SCC 106). On the other hand, in the name of regulating the secular envelope, the State cannot prohibit the religious practice itself, nor can it appoint as administrator someone who is constitutionally ineligible (Saifuddin).

Article 25(2)(b) — social welfare, reform and temple-entry

Clause (2)(b) preserves the State’s reformist competence. It saves laws providing for social welfare and reform or for throwing open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Explanation II expands ‘Hindu’ for this clause to include Sikhs, Jainas and Buddhists; Explanation I separately recognises the wearing and carrying of kirpans as part of the profession of the Sikh religion (Masud Alam v. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1956 Cal. 9).

The leading authority is Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255, decided shortly after the foundational Part III scheme took shape. The Court read clause (2)(b) harmoniously with Article 26(b): the right of a denomination to manage its own religious affairs is genuine, but where temple entry is concerned the State may, by law under Article 25(2)(b), open a public temple to all classes of Hindus even if denominational management would otherwise have excluded them. The harmonisation works because Article 26 itself does not give a denomination the right to deny entry on religious grounds where the temple is dedicated to the Hindu public; what it preserves is only the religious right to determine forms of worship.

‘Social reform’ has been used to justify other modernising statutes too, dovetailing with the directive principles in Part IV on uniform civil law and social justice. The State may prohibit bigamy among Hindus; abolition of sati and the devadasi system rests on the same clause; abolition of hereditary succession to the office of archaka is not a violation of Article 25(2)(b) (A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P., (1996) 9 SCC 548).

Article 26 — freedom of denominational affairs

Article 26 is the collective companion to Article 25, sitting alongside the equality cluster discussed in the right to equality chapter. Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof has the right (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property, and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. Two structural points should be noted at the outset: Article 26 is conferred on the denomination, not on the individual; and unlike Article 25, it is not expressly subject to the other provisions of Part III, although it is in fact subject to Articles 17 and 25(2)(b).

The classic test of a religious denomination comes from the Shirur Mutt case. Three conditions must concur: a collection of individuals with a common system of beliefs or doctrines regarded as conducive to spiritual well-being; a common organisation; and designation by a distinctive name. A math is a denomination; the Ramakrishna Mission has been recognised as a denomination (Bramchari Sidheswar Shai v. State of W.B., (1995) 4 SCC 646); the Ananda Margis qualify too (Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, (1983) 4 SCC 522). On the other hand, the Aurobindo Society has been held not to be a religious denomination (S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1).

26(a) — to establish and maintain religious and charitable institutions

The words ‘establish’ and ‘maintain’ are read conjunctively. The right to maintain — and the right to administer that flows from it — vests in a denomination only where the institution has been brought into existence by that denomination (S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 662). Article 26(a) is also a textual source for the right of religious denominations to establish educational institutions of a charitable character — a right confirmed in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 — though the more developed minority-rights jurisprudence on schools and colleges sits under Article 30(1).

26(b) — to manage own affairs in matters of religion

This sub-clause is the constitutional shelter for denominational autonomy in religious matters. The State cannot, except on the grounds of public order, morality or health (and the limits already noted), interfere with the religious affairs of a denomination. The denomination decides for itself which rites and ceremonies are essential according to its tenets — although the question whether a particular practice is integral remains, as in Shirur Mutt, ultimately a matter for the courts to determine on evidence as the constitutional arbiter (Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2016) 2 SCC 725).

Three working principles emerge. First, ‘matters of religion’ extend beyond doctrine to ritual and even to matters of food and dress (Ratilal Panachand Gandhi). Second, complete autonomy in religious matters does not extend to administration of property, which falls under clause (d) and is regulable. Third, where a religious community has by long custom enjoyed the right to perform a ceremony in a particular manner — for example, the right to take out a religious procession — that right is protected under both Articles 25(1) and 26(b), and it cannot be defeated merely because another community objects (Gulam Abbas).

26(c) and 26(d) — property and administration

Clause (c) preserves the right of a denomination to own and acquire movable and immovable property; clause (d) preserves the right to administer such property in accordance with law. The italicised words are critical. The State may, by validly enacted law, regulate the administration of trust properties; what it cannot do is take administration away from the denomination altogether and vest it in a secular authority (Shirur Mutt; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi). An Executive Officer may be appointed for the management of a temple administered by a denomination only if the conditions for such appointment are properly prescribed and only so long as the maladministration sought to be remedied subsists; a permanent take-over would be unconstitutional (Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2014) 5 SCC 75); the aggrieved denomination would have a remedy by way of writ proceedings.

Articles 26(c) and (d) also do not create rights that the denomination never had. If the management vested historically in officers appointed by and answerable to the State, the denomination cannot claim a right of management after the Constitution; the Constitution does not operate retrospectively to re-invest such rights (Durgah Committee v. Hussain Ali Syed, AIR 1961 SC 1402).

Article 27 — no taxation for promotion of any particular religion

Article 27 declares that no person shall be compelled to pay any taxes the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. The provision is the financial counterpart of Indian secularism: the State may not draw on the public exchequer to favour one religion over another.

Three points define its scope. First, the prohibition is on a tax whose proceeds are specifically appropriated to a particular religion. A regulatory fee for the secular administration of religious institutions is outside Article 27, since it does not favour any religion (Commissioner, H.R.E. v. Lakshmindra Thiratha Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282). Second, expenditure for non-religious purposes — even where the beneficiary happens to be a religious institution — does not breach Article 27. Reconstruction of religious and educational institutions damaged by communal riots is an example of permissible spending. Third, in Prafull Goradia v. Union of India, (2011) 2 SCC 568, the Supreme Court held that Article 27 is breached only if a substantial part of a tax collected in India is appropriated for one religion or denomination; the Court gave the illustrative figure of 25 per cent of income tax. Modest support for facilities or concessions to a religious community — including, on the facts, support to Haj pilgrims — does not transgress the constitutional bar.

Article 27 thus marks one boundary of the relationship between the secular State and religion, intersecting with the financial relations chapter through provisions like Article 290A. The complementary boundary on the educational side is drawn by Article 28.

Article 28 — religious instruction in educational institutions

Article 28 has three operative clauses and a shelter clause:

1. Clause (1) bars the provision of any religious instruction in an educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds.
2. Clause (2) carves out an exception for an institution administered by the State but established under an endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted there.
3. Clause (3) provides that no person attending an institution recognised by the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required, without consent (or guardian’s consent if a minor), to take part in religious instruction or to attend religious worship in or attached to the institution.

The crucial conceptual move is the distinction between religious instruction and the academic study of religion. In D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 1737, the Supreme Court held that the academic study of the teachings and philosophy of Guru Nanak — and, by parallel reasoning, of any great Indian saint — is not religious instruction. The reasoning was extended in Aruna Roy v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 368: there is a thin but real line between teaching rituals, observances and modes of worship (forbidden in Clause (1) institutions) and teaching the moral and spiritual philosophy of religions for value-based citizenship. Education built on ‘religious pluralism’ is consistent with the constitutional ethos and, indeed, with the broader scheme that runs through Articles 25 to 28.

The four-fold typology of institutions is worth memorising for the exam: institutions wholly maintained out of State funds (no religious instruction at all under Clause (1)); institutions administered by the State but with an endowment requirement (religious instruction permitted by Clause (2)); institutions recognised by the State and institutions receiving aid (religious instruction may be imparted but is voluntary, by Clause (3)); and purely private unaided institutions (outside Article 28 altogether, but subject to other constitutional limits).

Secularism, basic structure and the inter-Article scheme

Articles 25 to 28 are the working content of Indian secularism. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918, a nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court treated secularism as a feature within the basic structure doctrine and read its content out of, among other provisions, Articles 25 to 28 and 30. Indian secularism is not anti-God or atheist; it requires the State to refrain from establishing or favouring any religion and to accord equal status to all religions and denominations. Where a State Government departs from this mandate, action under the emergency provisions of Part XVIII (notably Article 356) was held to be available.

The four Articles, situated within the larger Part III architecture explored in the Article 21 chapter on personal liberty, work as a coherent scheme: Article 25 is the individual right; Article 26 is the collective right of denominations; Article 27 keeps public finance neutral between religions; Article 28 keeps State-funded education neutral between religions. The reformist clause in Article 25(2)(b), and the harmonisation it requires with Article 26(b) under Venkataramana Devaru, demonstrate that this scheme is not frozen — the State may reform religious practice provided it respects what is essential and does not single out one community for hostile treatment.

Drawing the boundaries — when religious freedom yields

Three recurring exam patterns deserve attention, each ultimately enforceable through the right to constitutional remedies under Article 32. First, the public-order and morality limits in Article 25(1) and Article 26 are not a licence to suppress unpopular religious expression; they require a real connection to public order, not mere offence to another community’s sentiments. Once the right of a community to take out a procession is established, opposing community sentiment is not a ground to interfere (Gulam Abbas).

Second, the essential-practices test gives the courts the final word on what is integral to a religion. This is reconciled with Article 26’s denominational autonomy by treating the courts not as an outside ecclesiastical authority but as a constitutional arbiter (Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam). Where a custom or usage falls outside the protective umbrella of Articles 25 and 26, ordinary law — including criminal law — applies in the usual way.

Third, the constitutional protection of personal law is filtered through Article 25 and the essential-practices test. Where, as in Shayara Bano, a practice is held not to be essential, it loses Article 25(1) protection and is open to legislative regulation; where it is held essential, regulation must rest on the saving clauses of Article 25(2) or on the public-order, morality and health limits.

This connects the chapter to the broader fundamental-rights architecture: the essential-practices doctrine, the reformist competence under Article 25(2)(b), the denominational autonomy under Article 26 and the secularism reading of Bommai together fix the place of religion within the scheme of Part III as a whole. The chapter sits within the wider study of the Constitution of India notes on this site.

Exam-angle distinctions

Five distinctions repay close memorisation:

1. Article 25 v. Article 26. Article 25 protects all persons; Article 26 protects every religious denomination. Article 25 is subject to ‘the other provisions of Part III’; Article 26 is not, although it is in fact controlled by Articles 17 and 25(2)(b) — see Venkataramana Devaru.
2. Profession, practice and propagation v. conversion. ‘Propagate’ in Article 25(1) means communicating belief; it does not include the right to convert another person — Rev. Stainislaus.
3. Essential practice v. mere embellishment. Only practices fundamental to the religion attract Article 25/26 protection; the test is whether removal would change the religion’s character (Shirur Mutt; Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta).
4. Tax v. fee under Article 27. A tax specifically appropriated to a religion is barred; a regulatory fee for secular administration of religious institutions is not (Lakshmindra; Prafull Goradia).
5. Religious instruction v. study of religion under Article 28. The bar is on instruction in rituals and modes of worship in wholly State-funded schools; academic study of the philosophy of religions is permitted and may be encouraged (D.A.V. College; Aruna Roy).

The doctrinal centre of gravity in this chapter — the line between protected belief and regulable practice, between religious affairs and their secular envelope, between public funding and confessional preference — is what makes Articles 25 to 28 a perennial favourite for State judiciary mains and CLAT PG comprehension passages alike. A careful reader should be able to take a fact-pattern, identify the bearer of the right (person or denomination), classify the State action (regulation, social reform, taxation, education), apply the essential-practices test where relevant, and arrive at a structured conclusion grounded in Shirur Mutt, Stainislaus, Saifuddin, Bijoe Emmanuel, Bommai, Aruna Roy, Prafull Goradia and Shayara Bano.

Frequently asked questions

Does the right to propagate religion in Article 25 include the right to convert another person?

No. In Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., AIR 1977 SC 908, the Supreme Court held that the right to propagate means the right to communicate one’s beliefs to another or to expose the tenets of one’s faith. It does not include the right to convert another person, because that other person is equally entitled to freedom of conscience—which words precede ‘propagate’ in Article 25(1). The Court therefore upheld State Acts punishing forcible or fraudulent conversion. A person remains free to adopt another religion through the free exercise of conscience, but no one has a fundamental right to convert another.

Who decides whether a practice is an essential or integral part of a religion?

The court ultimately decides, applying the essential-practices test. In Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta (2004) 12 SCC 770, the Supreme Court held that essential parts of a religion are the core beliefs and practices on which the religion is founded; their removal would fundamentally change the religion’s character. The court determines the question with reference to doctrines, tenets, historical background and the conscience of the community. Mere embellishments or additions are not protected by Article 25 even if practised by the followers.

Can the State regulate the secular activities of a religious institution under Article 25(2)(a)?

Yes. Article 25(2)(a) saves any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388, the Supreme Court held that Cl. (2)(a) targets activities of a commercial, economic or political character and not religious practices as such. The management of a temple, payment of remuneration to staff and disciplinary control over servants are secular and may be regulated; what is essentially religious cannot be touched under this head.

Is triple talaq protected as an essential religious practice under Article 25(1)?

No. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India, WPC No. 118 of 2016, the Constitution Bench held that the practice of talaq-e-biddat (instantaneous triple talaq) is not integral to the religious denomination of Sunni Muslims and does not form part of essential religious practice. It therefore enjoys no protection under Article 25(1). The Court reasoned that what the Holy Quran ordains is talaq for reasonable cause, preceded by reconciliation through arbiters; an instant, irrevocable pronouncement falls outside that scheme.

Does Article 27 forbid every State expenditure on a religion?

No. Article 27 forbids only the compulsory payment of a tax whose proceeds are specifically appropriated for the promotion or maintenance of a particular religion or denomination. A regulatory fee for the secular administration of religious institutions is outside its bar, as held in Commissioner, H.R.E. v. Lakshmindra Thiratha Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282. Further, in Prafull Goradia v. Union of India (2011) 2 SCC 568, the Court held that Article 27 is breached only when a substantial portion of a tax is appropriated for one religion; small support of pilgrimage or facilities does not violate it.

Can a State school teach the philosophy of religion without breaching Article 28(1)?

Yes. The bar in Article 28(1) is on ‘religious instruction’ in institutions wholly maintained out of State funds, not on the academic study of religion. In Aruna Roy v. Union of India (2002) 7 SCC 368, the Supreme Court held that there is a thin line between imparting religious instruction—teaching of rituals, observances and modes of worship—and teaching the moral and spiritual philosophy of religions. Study of religion based on ‘religious pluralism’ is consistent with secularism and may even be desirable. Earlier, D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 1737, held that academic study of a saint’s teachings is not religious instruction.