Sample Criminal Judgment — Acquittal Order

An order of acquittal is not a blank page where a judge simply writes the word “acquitted.” It is a reasoned judicial document that must trace the prosecution case, weigh every material circumstance, identify precisely where the proof falls short of the standard of “beyond reasonable doubt,” and only then record the operative direction. For judiciary aspirants, the acquittal judgment is the harder of the two model judgments to master: a conviction can lean on positive proof, but an acquittal must explain an absence — and explain it so well that no appellate court can call it perverse. This chapter builds a complete sample acquittal order, head by head, and grounds each head in the statutory framework of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the governing case law on benefit of doubt and appreciation of circumstantial evidence.

What an acquittal order is — and what it is not

An acquittal is the formal judicial finding that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused to the standard the criminal law demands. The power to acquit at the close of a sessions trial flows from Section 248 read with Section 258 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — corresponding to Sections 232 and 235 of the now-repealed Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Section 255 BNSS (old Section 232 CrPC) permits the Sessions Judge, after hearing the parties, to record an order of acquittal where there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence; and Section 258 BNSS (old Section 235 CrPC) governs the final judgment of acquittal or conviction at the end of a full trial. In a warrant-case trial before a Magistrate, the parallel power lies in Section 271 BNSS (old Section 248 CrPC).

Crucially, an acquittal is not the same as a finding of innocence as a positive fact. The accused walks free because the prosecution did not discharge its burden, not necessarily because the court is satisfied he did nothing. This distinction, drawn classically in Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, governs the tone of the judgment: the writing must be sober, must avoid moral exoneration where the evidence merely falls short, and must rest the conclusion on the gap in proof rather than on sympathy. For the foundational framework on how every criminal judgment is built, see structure of a criminal judgment.

The statutory skeleton: BNSS provisions an acquittal must satisfy

The form and contents of every criminal judgment, whether it ends in conviction or acquittal, are dictated by Section 393 BNSS (old Section 354 CrPC). The provision requires that the judgment be written in the language of the court, that it contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for the decision. Where the judgment is one of acquittal, Section 393 specifically requires the court to state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and to direct that he be set at liberty. A bare “accused acquitted” without reasons is not a judgment at all and is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.

Two further provisions shape the reasoning. Section 351 BNSS (old Section 313 CrPC) requires the court to examine the accused on every incriminating circumstance; circumstances not put to the accused under this section must be excluded from consideration, and the resulting gaps frequently push a case toward acquittal. And the appellate provisions — Section 419 onwards BNSS, mirroring the appeal-against-acquittal framework of Section 378 CrPC — mean that a poorly reasoned acquittal invites reversal. The judgment must therefore be written defensively, anticipating appellate scrutiny. The opening segments of the order — cause-title, parties, and the prosecution narrative — follow the same template covered in cause-title, court, case number and parties and statement of the prosecution case.

The standard the prosecution had to meet

Before drafting the operative part, the model judgment must articulate the standard against which the evidence is measured. The cardinal rule is the presumption of innocence: an accused is presumed innocent until the prosecution proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The classic statement is Viscount Sankey’s in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, where the House of Lords held that “throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt.” Indian courts adopted this “golden thread” wholesale.

In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the Supreme Court explained the corollary: where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence — one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence — the view favourable to the accused must be adopted. The Court also cautioned that the doubt entitling an accused to acquittal must be a reasonable doubt, not the doubt of a vacillating or timid mind, and not a fanciful or imaginary doubt. A well-written acquittal order reproduces this standard early, because the entire reasoning that follows is an application of it: the judge is not asked whether the accused is probably guilty, but whether any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence survives the evidence.

Sample head 1: cause-title and introduction

The model order opens exactly as a conviction would. A specimen cause-title reads: “In the Court of the Sessions Judge, [District] / Sessions Case No. 142 of 2025 / State (through P.S. [Name], Crime No. 88 of 2024) … Prosecution / Versus / AB, son of CD, aged 34 years, resident of … … Accused.” The introductory paragraph then states the charge: “The accused stands charged for the offence punishable under Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (murder), for having on the night of 12 March 2024 caused the death of the deceased EF by administering poison.” Note that the introduction merely records the charge as framed; it does not pre-judge it. The discipline of stating the charge neutrally is covered in charge framed against the accused, and the recording of the accused’s response in plea of the accused.

For an acquittal, the introduction should also flag, in a single sentence, that the prosecution relies wholly on circumstantial evidence (if so), because that single fact sets the analytical framework — the five-fold test of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra — that the rest of the judgment will apply. Signalling the framework early makes the judgment read as a structured application of law rather than an ad hoc list of doubts.

Sample head 2: statement of the prosecution case

The order next sets out the prosecution version as a connected narrative, not as a list of witnesses. A specimen runs: “The prosecution case, in brief, is that the deceased EF, wife of the accused, was found dead in the matrimonial home on the morning of 13 March 2024. The post-mortem (Ex. P-9) opined death by potassium cyanide poisoning. The prosecution alleges that the accused, who was unhappy in the marriage, procured the poison, was last seen with the deceased on the night in question, and thereafter raised a false plea of suicide.” This mirrors the discipline of the statement of the prosecution case: the narrative is attributed to the prosecution (“it is alleged”, “the prosecution case is”) and carries no judicial endorsement.

The judgment then catalogues the chain of circumstances the prosecution seeks to prove — typically (i) motive, (ii) procurement of poison, (iii) opportunity / last seen together, (iv) medical cause of death, and (v) conduct of the accused. Listing the chain at this stage is essential: in a circumstantial case the acquittal will turn on whether each link is independently established and whether the links together form a complete chain. The structure here deliberately tracks the prosecution’s own theory so that the court can later test it link by link.

Sample head 3: points for determination

Section 393 BNSS makes the “points for determination” a mandatory head. In a circumstantial murder trial heading toward acquittal, the points are framed to expose the weak links. A specimen formulation: “(1) Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the death of EF was homicidal and not suicidal? (2) Whether the prosecution has proved that the accused procured potassium cyanide? (3) Whether the chain of circumstances is so complete as to exclude every hypothesis except the guilt of the accused? (4) What order?”

Framing the points sharply is itself a craft. Each point is a question of proof, phrased so that a “no” answer leads naturally to acquittal. The fourth point — “what order?” — is the operative hinge. Compare the framing of issues in a civil judgment: in a criminal acquittal the burden never shifts to the accused (save for statutory exceptions such as Section 105 of the old Evidence Act, now the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam), so every point is silently prefixed with “whether the prosecution has proved.” This is why the standard-of-proof head discussed above must precede the points: it explains why the burden lies where it does.

A practical drafting tip: the number of points should track the number of contested links, not the number of witnesses. In a five-link circumstantial case the court need not frame five points; it can collapse the links into two or three composite points so long as the reasoning later addresses each link. What the court must avoid is a vague single point such as “whether the accused is guilty,” which conceals rather than reveals the analysis. Sharp, proof-oriented points are what make an acquittal legible to the appellate court and demonstrate that the trial judge applied his mind to each ingredient and each circumstance separately, as the structure of a criminal judgment requires.

Sample head 4: appreciation of evidence and the panchsheel test

This is the analytical core of the acquittal. Where the case is circumstantial, the court must apply the five “golden principles” — the panchsheel — laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra: (i) the circumstances from which guilt is inferred must be fully established; (ii) the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt; (iii) the circumstances must be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (iv) they must exclude every possible hypothesis except guilt; and (v) the chain of evidence must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for any conclusion consistent with innocence. The Court in Sarda stressed the legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” — the circumstances must be established to the latter standard.

The model judgment applies each principle to the record. On procurement of poison: “PW-4, the chemist, did not identify the accused; the alleged purchase register (Ex. P-12) bears no signature attributable to the accused. The circumstance of procurement is therefore not fully established within the meaning of the first principle in Sarda.” On last-seen: “The interval between the last-seen point and the death is too wide to exclude the intervention of a third person or the hypothesis of suicide.” The earlier authority of Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh is the fountainhead of this test and is routinely cited alongside Sarda for the proposition that the chain must be complete. Where even one link fails, the chain breaks and the benefit must go to the accused.

The appreciation head is also where the court grapples with hostile witnesses, contradictions, and the weight of medical and forensic evidence. A model order does not simply discard a hostile witness; it explains that the portion of his testimony that survives cross-examination, if any, is still available to either side, but that here the hostility of the key eyewitness leaves the prosecution without direct proof of the crucial last link. Equally, the court must resist the temptation to convert suspicion into proof. However grave the suspicion — an unhappy marriage, a convenient death, a beneficiary husband — suspicion is not a substitute for legal proof, and Sarda itself was a death-sentence case reversed precisely because the courts below had allowed grave suspicion to harden into a finding of guilt. The model judgment names this danger expressly, recording that “the cumulative effect of the circumstances, taken at their highest, raises a strong suspicion but does not complete the chain,” and that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Sample head 5: benefit of doubt and the two-views rule

Having tested each link, the judgment crystallises the doubt. The reasoning paragraph reads: “Two views are reasonably possible on this evidence — that the deceased was poisoned by the accused, and that she committed suicide by self-administration of the poison to which the household had access. The prosecution having failed to exclude the latter, the chain of circumstances is incomplete. Following Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted.”

The judgment must be careful to articulate that the doubt is reasonable, not fanciful — the very caution Kali Ram sounded. It should pin the doubt to identified gaps in the evidence (unproved procurement, unexplained interval, plausible suicide) rather than to a generalised unease. This is what distinguishes a sustainable acquittal from a perverse one. The defensive value is real: under the appeal-against-acquittal framework (Section 378 CrPC / Section 419 BNSS), an appellate court will not interfere merely because another view is possible — a principle reinforced in Babu v. State of Kerala — so an acquittal that honestly identifies two reasonable views is appellate-proof on its own logic.

Sample head 6: the accused’s examination and defence evidence

A complete acquittal order accounts for the accused’s statement under Section 351 BNSS (old Section 313 CrPC) and any defence evidence. The model paragraph records: “In his examination under Section 351 BNSS the accused denied procurement of poison and asserted that the deceased was depressed and had threatened self-harm. This explanation is not improbable on the record and dovetails with the medical possibility of suicide.” The Section 351 statement is not substantive evidence and cannot found a conviction by itself, but it can be used to test the prosecution evidence and to lend support to a probable defence — here, by reinforcing the suicide hypothesis.

The judgment must also note any circumstance the prosecution relied on that was not put to the accused under Section 351; such a circumstance is excluded from consideration. Where exclusion of an un-put circumstance dismantles a link in the chain, the acquittal follows almost mechanically. The model order should make this exclusion explicit so that the appellate court can see the link was disregarded for a sound legal reason, not overlooked.

Sample head 7: findings on each point

The judgment now answers, in order, every point framed earlier. A specimen findings block: “Point 1: The homicidal nature of death is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; suicide is a live hypothesis. Answered in the negative. Point 2: Procurement of poison by the accused is not established. Answered in the negative. Point 3: The chain of circumstances is incomplete and does not exclude every hypothesis except guilt; the panchsheel test of Sarda is not satisfied. Answered in the negative.”

Answering each point separately is not a formality — it is what Section 393 BNSS demands and what makes the judgment legible to an appellate court. Each negative answer is tethered to the appreciation already done, so the findings read as conclusions rather than fresh assertions. A common drafting error is to compress the findings into a single sentence (“the prosecution has failed”); the disciplined approach answers each point with a one-line conclusion and a back-reference to the reasoning. This mirrors the per-issue findings discipline that runs through the entire structure of a criminal judgment.

Sample head 8: the operative order

The operative paragraph is short, precise, and unconditional. A specimen: “In the result, the prosecution having failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt, the accused AB is acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, under Section 248 read with Section 258 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. He shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case.”

Several mandatory directions follow. The court must address bail bonds: under the BNSS, the bonds of an acquitted accused remain in force for a period after acquittal to cover a possible appeal, and the order should so record. The court must pass orders on the disposal of property and material objects (the muddamal) — weapons, seized articles, case property — directing destruction, return, or confiscation as the law requires. Finally, the order should direct that a copy of the judgment be supplied to the accused free of cost, as the BNSS requires. Omitting these ancillary directions is the most common defect in student answers; a complete acquittal order disposes of liberty, bonds, and property in the same breath.

Tone, defensibility and common pitfalls

An acquittal judgment is read by an appellate court that begins with a double presumption in favour of the accused — the original presumption of innocence, reinforced by the trial court’s acquittal. The model order should therefore be written to survive that scrutiny. The appellate court will not reverse merely because it could take a different view; it interferes only where the acquittal is perverse, based on a misreading of evidence, or where the only reasonable conclusion is guilt. Babu v. State of Kerala catalogues the factors an appellate court weighs — the trial judge’s advantage in seeing the witnesses, the presumption of innocence, the benefit of doubt, and the reluctance to disturb findings of fact. Writing the trial judgment with these factors in mind makes it robust.

The recurring pitfalls are: (i) recording “acquitted” without reasons, violating Section 393 BNSS; (ii) shifting the burden onto the accused by demanding that he prove the suicide rather than requiring the prosecution to exclude it; (iii) basing the acquittal on sympathy or on the accused’s social standing rather than on identified gaps in proof; (iv) ignoring the Section 351 BNSS statement; and (v) forgetting the ancillary directions on bonds and property. A judgment that names the standard (Woolmington, Kali Ram), applies the framework (Sarda, Hanumant), answers each point, and disposes of every ancillary matter is a model acquittal order. The same architectural logic underlies the introduction, importance and statutory basis of judgment writing as a whole.

A drafting checklist for the acquittal order

Reduced to a checklist, a model acquittal order under the BNSS contains: (1) cause-title with court, case number, and parties; (2) introduction stating the charge neutrally and flagging whether the case is direct or circumstantial; (3) statement of the prosecution case with the chain of circumstances listed; (4) the plea of the accused; (5) the points for determination, each framed as “whether the prosecution has proved”; (6) the standard of proof, with Woolmington and Kali Ram; (7) appreciation of evidence applying the panchsheel of Sarda and Hanumant where circumstantial; (8) the Section 351 BNSS statement and defence evidence; (9) the benefit-of-doubt / two-views reasoning; (10) point-wise findings, each answered in the negative with reasons; (11) the operative order of acquittal under Sections 248 and 258 BNSS; and (12) ancillary directions on bonds, property, and free copy.

Mastering this template means an examinee can convert any fact pattern into a structured acquittal in the allotted time. The discipline is transferable: the heads do not change between a poisoning case and a dacoity case — only the evidence under the “appreciation” head differs. Pair this chapter with the companion model conviction order and with the foundational chapters on the criminal judgment writing hub to build a complete answer-writing toolkit.