Practice Directions of High Courts — Maharashtra, Karnataka, Telangana, Kerala (Examples)

Every working day, a Magistrate in Mumbai, a Sessions Judge in Bengaluru, a trial court in Hyderabad and a Munsiff-Magistrate in Kochi reach for two books, not one. The first is the procedural Code — the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, now succeeded by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The second is a thick volume of Criminal Rules of Practice, circular orders and practice directions issued by their own High Court. The Code tells the judge what to do; the practice rules tell the judge how to do it — how a charge is typed, how an accused is examined, in what language a judgment is explained, how an exhibit is marked, how a remand is recorded. This chapter maps the four leading state regimes — Maharashtra, Karnataka, Telangana and Kerala — explains the constitutional and statutory source of the power, and shows how appellate courts treat a breach of these rules. It is the connective tissue that turns the abstract Code into a uniform, day-to-day courtroom discipline.

What practice directions are — and what they are not

A practice direction is not a statute passed by Parliament or a State Legislature. It is subordinate, court-made regulation: a body of rules framed by a High Court, in exercise of its supervisory and statutory authority, to govern the conduct of business in the criminal courts subordinate to it. In several States the consolidated compilation is styled the Criminal Rules of Practice (Kerala, 1982; Andhra Pradesh/Telangana, 1990; Karnataka, 1968); in Maharashtra the equivalent compendium is the Criminal Manual issued by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. Whatever the label, the function is identical — to standardise procedure that the Code leaves to the discretion or silence of the trial court.

The distinction matters because it fixes the legal weight of these rules. A provision of the Code is law; a practice rule is, at most, delegated legislation and, at the margins, mere administrative guidance. The further a rule sits from an express statutory peg, the more readily a court will treat its breach as a curable irregularity rather than a fatal illegality. That sliding scale runs through everything that follows. For the foundational vocabulary of criminal procedure that these rules operationalise, see the introduction to this series and the hub page at Criminal Rules of Practice notes.

The source of the power: Article 227 and Section 477 CrPC

Two pegs anchor every set of state Criminal Rules of Practice. The first is constitutional — Article 227, which vests in every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout its territory. That superintendence is not merely judicial review of individual orders; it carries a regulatory dimension, allowing the High Court to settle uniform procedure for the courts below. The second is statutory — the rule-making power conferred by the Code itself. Under the 1973 Code, Section 477 empowered every High Court, with the previous approval of the State Government, to make rules regarding petition-writers and ancillary matters in subordinate criminal courts, with all such rules published in the Official Gazette. The broader power to frame rules of practice flowed from Article 227 read with the general rule-making provisions of the Code.

The preambles of the state compilations make this lineage explicit. The Criminal Rules of Practice, Kerala, 1982 and the Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1990 (Andhra Pradesh, now Telangana) each recite that they are made in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution and Section 477 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, with the previous approval of the Governor, for the guidance of all criminal courts in the State. The Karnataka Criminal Rules of Practice, 1968 trace to the same supervisory power. Under the new Sanhita the petition-writer rule-making power re-appears as Section 529 of the BNSS, 2023, the direct successor to Section 477, so the architecture survives the recodification intact.

Maharashtra: the Bombay High Court Criminal Manual

In Maharashtra the governing compilation is the Criminal Manual issued by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay for the guidance of the criminal courts and officers subordinate to it. Unlike the codified "Rules of Practice" of the southern High Courts, the Bombay Manual is a layered document: it gathers circulars, standing orders and rules accreted over decades and reissued with periodic amendments. Its reach is wide — it folds in process-service rules, the Maharashtra Victim Compensation Scheme, 2014 framed under Section 357A of the Code, contempt-proceeding rules under Article 215 and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the procedure under the Maharashtra Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1971.

For the trial judge, the operative chapters are those dealing with the day-to-day mechanics: registers to be maintained, the manner of recording evidence and depositions, the marking and custody of material objects and exhibits, remand and custody warrants, and the drawing up of charges and judgments. These chapters supply the granular detail that the bare Code presupposes but does not spell out. A Magistrate in the Bombay jurisdiction who departs from the Manual's prescribed form for, say, a non-bailable warrant exposes the resulting process to challenge, even though the Code itself is satisfied by substantial compliance.

Karnataka: the Criminal Rules of Practice, 1968

The Karnataka Criminal Rules of Practice, 1968 are among the older surviving codifications, framed by the High Court of Karnataka in exercise of its power of superintendence for the guidance of all criminal courts in the State. They were drawn under the 1898 Code and have been read forward into the 1973 Code and now the BNSS, with the courts treating the rules as continuing in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the governing procedural statute.

The Karnataka rules are detailed on the matters that recur in every trial: the language of the court and of records, the form and contents of the charge, the procedure for examination of the accused, the recording of evidence, the contents and authentication of judgments, and the maintenance of registers and returns. Karnataka case law has repeatedly invoked specific numbered rules — for instance on how exhibits are to be marked and how the deposition is to be read over to the witness — to test whether a trial was conducted regularly. The rules thus function as a checklist against which the High Court, on appeal or revision, audits the trial court's record. For the mechanics they govern in depth, compare this chapter with recording of evidence in criminal trials and charge framing — form, recording, reading over.

A point of construction worth noting is that the Karnataka rules, like their southern counterparts, are not exhaustive of procedure. They presuppose the Code and supplement it; they do not displace it. Where the rules are silent, the trial court falls back on the Code and on first principles of fair procedure. Where the rules speak, they bind to the extent of their statutory backing. This is why the Karnataka High Court, when faced with an alleged breach, characteristically asks two questions in sequence — first, does the Code or the rule require the step at all; and second, if it was omitted, did the omission cause prejudice? Only an affirmative answer to both unsettles the verdict. The approach mirrors the appellate discipline imposed everywhere by Section 465 of the Code, to which the rules remain firmly subordinate.

Telangana: the Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1990

Telangana inherited, on the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh in 2014, the Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1990. These rules were framed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Article 227 and Section 477 of the 1973 Code to amend, consolidate and bring up to date the earlier Criminal Rules of Practice and Orders, 1966, in line with the new Code, and to incorporate the orders, notifications and administrative instructions issued by the Government and the High Court in the interim. After bifurcation, the High Court for the State of Telangana continues to administer the same body of rules, subject to its own amendments and additions — for example, the insertion of new Rule 35-E by Government notification.

The 1990 compilation is comprehensive, ranging across court hours and vacations, the institution and numbering of cases, bail and bond procedure, remand and custody, the examination and recording of witnesses, the framing of charges, the contents of judgments, and the disposal of property. Because it merges "Rules of Practice" with "Circular Orders," it captures both the binding procedural rules and the softer administrative directions in a single volume — a structure that itself signals the dual legal status discussed below. For the institutional architecture these rules presuppose, see constitution and sittings of criminal courts.

Kerala: the Criminal Rules of Practice, 1982

The Criminal Rules of Practice, Kerala, 1982 were made by the High Court of Kerala in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution and Section 477 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, with the previous approval of the Governor, for the guidance of all criminal courts in the State. They replaced the older Travancore-Cochin and Madras-derived rules that had operated in the composite State.

The Kerala rules are frequently litigated because they are precise on points that go to the fairness of the trial. They prescribe how the charge is to be framed and read over and explained to the accused, how the substance of the accusation is to be stated, how depositions are to be recorded and read back, and how the judgment is to be written, pronounced and translated. Kerala High Court decisions routinely cite numbered rules of the 1982 compilation — for example on the form of the charge and on the examination of the accused — when deciding whether a conviction can stand. The rules sit directly on top of the statutory scheme for filing of complaints, FIRs and charge-sheets and give it operational shape.

Binding rule or mere guidance? The directory–mandatory line

The recurring litigated question is whether a breach of a practice rule vitiates the trial. The answer turns on the now-classic distinction between an illegality that strikes at the root of jurisdiction and a curable irregularity that does not occasion a failure of justice. The Supreme Court drew this line authoritatively for charge-related defects in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116, holding that the omission to frame a charge, or a defect in it, does not by itself invalidate a conviction unless it has in fact prejudiced the accused and occasioned a failure of justice. The same logic governs breaches of practice rules: where the rule merely prescribes a form or a manner, and the substance required by the Code is achieved, the irregularity is curable.

That curative principle is statutory. Under the 1973 Code, Section 465 (now mirrored in the BNSS) directs that no finding or sentence is to be reversed on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings unless a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned. A High Court practice rule, being subordinate to the Code, cannot enlarge the grounds for setting aside a verdict beyond what Section 465 allows. So a rule about, say, the colour of ink or the layout of a register is plainly directory; a rule that embodies a fair-trial safeguard already guaranteed by the Code partakes of the Code's own mandatory character.

Where the rules bite: examination of the accused

The strongest illustration of practice rules carrying mandatory force is the examination of the accused. The Code's command in Section 313 (Section 351 of the BNSS) — that every incriminating circumstance be put to the accused so that he may explain it — is amplified by practice rules in each State requiring that the circumstances be put separately and intelligibly rather than rolled into a single omnibus question. This is not pedantry. In Tara Singh v. State, 1951 SCR 729, the Supreme Court set aside a conviction where the examination of the accused under the predecessor provision (Section 342 of the 1898 Code) was perfunctory and amounted to a grave defect causing a failure of justice.

The modern Court has gone further. In Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289, it held that Section 313 confers a valuable right that rises to a constitutional dimension as part of the fair-trial guarantee under Article 21, and that the trial court is duty-bound to consider the accused's explanation and either accept or reject it with reasons. A practice rule that operationalises this — by directing that each circumstance be put separately — is therefore not a dispensable formality. Its breach, if it deprives the accused of a real opportunity to explain, will be treated as going to the root of the trial, not as a trivial slip.

The qualification, equally settled, is that not every imperfection in the examination is fatal. Where the accused was in substance confronted with the case against him and given a real chance to respond, a deviation from the precise form a practice rule prescribes is curable. The line, drawn again from the failure-of-justice test, asks whether the imperfection actually prejudiced the defence — whether some material circumstance was never put, leaving the accused convicted on evidence he was never invited to explain. A clumsy but complete examination survives; an elegant but incomplete one may not. The practice rule's insistence on separate, intelligible questions exists precisely to keep trial courts on the safe side of that line.

Where the rules bite: language, pronouncement and translation of judgment

A second area where practice rules carry real force is the language of the proceedings and of the judgment. The Code (Section 354 of the 1973 Code; the corresponding BNSS provision) requires that a judgment be written in the language of the court and pronounced in open court, with its operative part read out and its substance explained in a language the accused understands. State practice rules expand this into concrete duties: the charge must be read over and explained to the accused in a language he understands; depositions must be recorded and, where required, read back; and the judgment must be pronounced and, if necessary, translated for the accused.

These rules are not ornamental. An accused who never understood the charge against him, or the basis of his conviction, has not had a fair trial in any meaningful sense. Courts have consistently insisted that the duty to explain the accusation and the verdict in a comprehensible language is substantive. Where the record shows the accused did understand, a deviation in the precise form prescribed by the practice rule is curable; where it shows he did not, the breach contaminates the verdict. The practice rules thus convert the Code's general fair-trial direction into auditable, on-the-record steps.

The translation regime is especially live in the multilingual southern States. In Karnataka the court's working language sits alongside Kannada records; in Kerala, Malayalam; in Telangana, Telugu alongside English and Urdu in pockets. The practice rules in each State accordingly direct that the charge and the substance of the judgment be conveyed to the accused in a language he follows, and that where the judgment is written in English the operative part be explained in the vernacular. The Code's own text — that the judgment be pronounced and its substance explained in a language understood by the accused or his pleader — is the floor; the state rules build the staircase, prescribing who translates, when, and how it is recorded. A conviction pronounced to a bewildered accused in a language foreign to him, with no compliant translation on the record, is the paradigm case the rules are designed to prevent.

Sentencing, special reasons and the discipline of the record

Practice rules also discipline the sentencing stage and the keeping of the record. They require the trial court to record the conviction and sentence with precision, to set out reasons, and — in capital cases — to comply with the Code's demand for special reasons under Section 354(3). The Supreme Court's insistence on a principled, individualised sentencing record in Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452, where it deprecated the mechanical "balance-sheet" approach and commuted death sentences for want of a properly reasoned sentencing exercise, shows why the form prescribed by practice rules matters: an appellate court can only review what the trial court has bothered to record.

The mundane register-keeping rules serve the same end. Rules prescribing how cases are numbered, how exhibits are marked and listed, how material objects are kept and disposed of, and how returns are filed, exist so that the record is intelligible to the court that reviews it years later. A trial may be perfectly just yet unreviewable if the record is a shambles; the practice rules guard against precisely that. They are, in this sense, the connective tissue between the trial and the appeal.

How practice rules interlock with the Code and the BNSS

Practice rules can never contradict the Code; they can only fill its interstices. Where a rule is inconsistent with an express provision of the governing procedural statute, the statute prevails and the rule is read down or treated as inoperative pro tanto. This is why the transition from the CrPC to the BNSS, 2023 did not sweep the state rules away: the rules continue in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the Sanhita, and the High Courts have begun issuing amendments and fresh circulars to align numbering and terminology with the new Code. The petition-writer rule-making power simply migrated from Section 477 to Section 529 of the BNSS, and the broader supervisory power under Article 227 is untouched by the recodification.

For the student, the safe synthesis is this: identify the statutory provision first, then ask what the practice rule adds. If the rule merely prescribes a form, treat its breach as a curable irregularity under Section 465 (and its BNSS successor). If the rule operationalises a fair-trial safeguard that the Code itself mandates — examination of the accused, comprehensible explanation of charge and judgment, recording of special reasons — treat its breach with the gravity the Code attaches to the underlying right.

A comparative snapshot of the four regimes

Read together, the four regimes share a common DNA and differ mainly in form and vintage. Maharashtra's Bombay High Court Criminal Manual is the most omnibus — a layered compendium of circulars and standing orders rather than a single dated code. Karnataka's 1968 Rules are the oldest of the four, drawn under the 1898 Code and carried forward. Telangana's 1990 Rules and Circular Orders are the most explicitly consolidatory, having been framed to replace the 1966 rules and absorb a generation of administrative instructions. Kerala's 1982 Rules are the most frequently litigated on fair-trial points such as the form of the charge and the examination of the accused.

Yet all four rest on the same twin pegs — Article 227 superintendence and the Code's rule-making power — and all four perform the same function: converting a national procedural Code into uniform local courtroom practice. For the judiciary or CLAT-PG aspirant, the examinable proposition is not the rule number in any one State but the structural relationship: the Code is supreme, the practice rules are subordinate, and a breach is judged by whether it caused a failure of justice. Master that relationship and the State-specific detail becomes a matter of looking up the right compilation.