A sessions case is the gravest species of criminal trial an Indian trial court conducts — murder, dacoity, rape, offences punishable with death or life imprisonment — and the Code prescribes for it the most elaborate, most front-loaded procedure in the statute book. Chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (ss.225–237), now re-enacted with refinements as Chapter XIX of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (ss.248–260), lays down a near-mechanical sequence: commitment, opening, discharge or charge, plea, prosecution evidence, examination of the accused, defence evidence, arguments, judgment, and — on conviction — a separate hearing on sentence. Around this central nervous system every High Court has woven its own Criminal Rules of Practice: rules on how the committal record travels, how charges are drafted and read over, how the case diary and exhibits are marked, and how circuit or camp sittings of the Court of Session are held. This article maps the statutory spine first, then shows where the local rules quietly bend it.
What counts as a sessions case
A “sessions case” is one triable exclusively by the Court of Session because the offence is so grave that the legislature has withheld it from magisterial jurisdiction. The First Schedule to the Code marks such offences — most prominently murder under s.302 IPC (now s.103 BNS), culpable homicide, rape, dacoity, and a swathe of special-statute offences whose parent Acts declare them sessions-triable. The Court of Session cannot, however, take cognizance directly: s.193 forbids it from taking cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate. The committal under s.209 is therefore the indispensable gateway, and the sessions trial proper begins only once the accused appears “in pursuance of a commitment of the case under section 209”, the language with which s.226 opens. The exclusivity of sessions jurisdiction also explains why the procedure is so heavily front-loaded: because the lower judiciary is barred from trying these offences at all, the Code compensates with a graduated set of filters — committal, opening, discharge, charge — designed to ensure that no person is put to the ordeal of a sessions trial without the matter first passing through judicial scrutiny twice over, once before the committing Magistrate and again before the Sessions Judge. Understanding this jurisdictional architecture is the foundation for everything that follows; readers new to the structure should first consult the Criminal Rules of Practice hub and the chapter on constitution and sittings of criminal courts.
Committal under Section 209 — the gateway and its local rules
Where a case instituted on a police report or otherwise discloses an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session, s.209 obliges the Magistrate to commit the case after complying with s.207 or s.208 (supply of copies), remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial, send the record and the documents and articles to the Court of Session, and notify the Public Prosecutor. The committing Magistrate performs a largely ministerial function: post-1973 there is no committal inquiry on the merits, and the Magistrate does not weigh evidence or sift the charge — that sifting belongs to the Sessions Judge at the discharge stage. This is where the Criminal Rules of Practice of each High Court do their first work, prescribing the precise form of the committal order, the index and pagination of the committal record, the manner in which case property and exhibits are listed and transmitted, and the register in which committed cases are entered before being numbered as “S.C.” (Sessions Case) on the file of the Sessions Court. The order in which complaints, FIRs and charge-sheets reach this point is treated separately in the chapter on filing of complaints, FIRs and charge-sheets.
Section 225 — prosecution by a Public Prosecutor
Section 225 opens Chapter XVIII with a deceptively short command: “In every trial before a Court of Session, the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor.” This is not a formality. A sessions trial conducted by a private complainant's counsel alone, without a Public Prosecutor appointed under s.24, is irregular, and the rule reflects the principle that in grave offences the State — not a private interest — prosecutes. A private person aggrieved may, with the court's permission, instruct a pleader to assist the prosecution under s.301(2), but the conduct of the case remains with the Public Prosecutor, who owes a duty to the court and to fairness, not merely to securing a conviction. In Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey (2022) the Supreme Court underscored that even before a charge is framed the Public Prosecutor “owes a duty to give a fair idea to the Court as regards the case of the prosecution”, situating s.225 as the entry point of a fair, adversarial-yet-state-led process. The provision survives unchanged as s.248 BNSS.
Section 226 — opening the case for the prosecution
Once the accused appears pursuant to the s.209 committal, s.226 requires the prosecutor to open the case “by describing the charge brought against the accused and stating by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused.” The opening is a narrative, not evidence: the prosecutor outlines the prosecution story and the witnesses and documents by which it will be proved, enabling the court to apprehend the contours of the case before deciding whether a charge should be framed at all. The opening therefore feeds directly into the discharge-or-charge decision under ss.227–228. In practice the local Rules of Practice often require the opening to be recorded in brief in the order-sheet, and they govern how the list of prosecution witnesses and documents is filed and marked. Section 226 is re-enacted as s.249 BNSS.
Section 227 — discharge and the “prima facie” threshold
Section 227, a provision new to the 1973 Code, empowers the Judge, after considering the record and documents and hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution, to discharge the accused if he “considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”, recording his reasons. The scope of this power was authoritatively settled in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979), where the Supreme Court held that the Judge has the “undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out”; that where the material discloses grave suspicion not properly explained, a charge is justified; but that the Judge is not a mere post office for the prosecution and must apply a judicial mind. The companion decision in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) framed the test crisply: at this stage the court asks whether there is “sufficient ground for proceeding”, not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction, and a strong or grave suspicion is enough to put the accused on trial. The local Rules of Practice prescribe how a discharge order is drawn and entered, but the substantive standard is uniform across India.
The BNSS 60-day discharge window — a structural change
The most consequential change in the new Code lies precisely here. Under the old s.227 there was no time limit on when an accused could seek discharge, and applications were frequently filed and argued long after committal, contributing to delay. The corresponding provision, s.250 BNSS, now requires that an application for discharge be filed within sixty days from the date of commitment of the case, and the Judge must then decide it. Section 251 BNSS, mirroring old s.228 on framing of charge, similarly builds in timelines for proceeding once the discharge stage is crossed. Aspirants should note this carefully: the threshold of “not sufficient ground for proceeding” and the Prafulla Kumar Samal ‘prima facie’ gloss survive intact, but the procedural window has been disciplined. The case-law on the test (Ramesh Singh, Sajjan Kumar) continues to apply; what has changed is the clock.
Section 228 — framing the charge and its local form
If the Judge is not persuaded to discharge, s.228 requires him to frame a charge where he is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session (or, if not so triable, he may transfer or try it as a warrant case). Section 228(2) is procedurally vital: the charge “shall be read and explained to the accused, and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” The threshold for framing was elaborated in Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (2010), which distilled the principles from earlier authorities: the Judge may sift evidence only to find a prima facie case, must not conduct a roving enquiry into probative value, and may frame a charge on grave suspicion, conviction-grade proof being a trial-stage requirement. The exact form, language, particulars and the reading-over of the charge are heavily governed by the local Rules of Practice and the charge forms appended to them — the subject of the dedicated chapter on charge framing: form, recording and reading over. Section 228 corresponds to s.251 BNSS.
Section 229 — conviction on a plea of guilty
If, when the charge is read and explained under s.228(2), the accused pleads guilty, s.229 permits the Judge to record the plea and, in his discretion, convict him on it. The discretion is real: given the gravity of sessions offences, courts exercise great caution before convicting on a plea, satisfying themselves that the plea is voluntary, unambiguous and made with full understanding of its consequences, and that it admits all the ingredients of the offence charged. A qualified or equivocal plea is treated as a plea of not guilty. Where the offence carries a possible death sentence, courts are especially reluctant to act on a bare plea, and a conviction resting solely on an unsafe or misunderstood plea is liable to be set aside in appeal. The reason for this caution is structural: in a sessions case the consequences of conviction — long imprisonment or death — are so severe that the safeguard of a full trial is not to be surrendered lightly, and the Judge must be the guardian of the accused's interest even where the accused himself wishes to plead guilty. Section 229 is re-enacted as s.252 BNSS.
Sections 230–231 — fixing the date and recording prosecution evidence
If the accused refuses to plead, does not plead, claims to be tried, or is not convicted on his plea, the Judge under s.230 fixes a date for the examination of witnesses and may issue process to compel attendance or production of documents. Section 231 then governs the heart of the trial: on the date so fixed the Judge “shall proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution.” Sub-section (2) preserves judicial control over the order of cross-examination, allowing the Judge to permit cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until other witnesses have been examined, or to recall a witness for further cross-examination. The manner of recording this evidence — in the language of the court, in narrative or question-and-answer form, the marking of exhibits, and the reading-over of depositions to witnesses — is the province of the local Rules of Practice and is treated fully in the chapter on recording of evidence in criminal trials. Process to secure witness attendance overlaps with the law on issuance of summons and warrants. Sections 230–231 become ss.253–254 BNSS.
Examination of the accused and the power to add accused
Two important interludes punctuate the prosecution stage. First, after the prosecution evidence and before the defence is called, s.313 obliges the court to examine the accused so as to enable him personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him; this examination is not on oath and the answers may be used in the trial. It is a mandatory safeguard, and its omission on material circumstances can vitiate a conviction. Second, the Court of Session retains the power under s.319 to summon any person, not being the accused, who appears from the evidence to have committed an offence, and to try him together with the accused. In Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) a Constitution Bench clarified that this power may be exercised once the inquiry or trial has begun and continues until its conclusion, that even a person discharged or not charge-sheeted may be summoned, and that the test for summoning is more than a prima facie case but short of proof beyond reasonable doubt. These powers ensure that a sessions trial can capture the full criminal transaction even as it unfolds.
Sections 232–234 — acquittal, defence evidence and arguments
After the prosecution evidence, the s.313 examination, and hearing both sides, s.232 directs the Judge to record an order of acquittal if he “considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence.” This is a substantive judicial assessment — not merely whether the prosecution closed its case, but whether any evidence at all sustains the charge — and reasons must be recorded. If the accused is not acquitted under s.232, s.233 calls upon him to enter on his defence and adduce any evidence in support of it; any written statement he puts in is filed with the record, and he may apply for process to compel the attendance of defence witnesses or production of documents, which the Judge shall issue unless satisfied the application is made for vexation, delay or defeating the ends of justice. Section 234 then provides that when the defence evidence (if any) is complete, the prosecutor sums up the case and the accused or his pleader is entitled to reply, with a right of further reply to the prosecution on any point of law. These map onto ss.255–257 BNSS.
Section 235 — judgment and the mandatory hearing on sentence
Section 235(1) requires the Judge, after hearing arguments, to give a judgment of acquittal or conviction. The crucial innovation of the 1973 Code is s.235(2): “If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law.” This bifurcation of the verdict and the sentence is mandatory. In Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) the Supreme Court held that a breach of s.235(2) is not a mere procedural irregularity but a denial of natural justice; the trial Judge there had convicted and sentenced the accused to death in a single breath, and the Court set aside the death sentence and remanded for a proper sentence hearing. Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar reinforced that the hearing must be a real and effective opportunity, with the court obliged, where necessary, to grant an adjournment so that the accused can place mitigating material before it — particularly where a death sentence is in contemplation. Section 235 becomes s.258 BNSS.
Sentencing, special reasons and the rarest-of-rare rule
The sentence hearing under s.235(2) acquires its full weight in capital cases. Section 354(3) of the Code requires that when the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life, the judgment must state the special reasons for the sentence of death where that is awarded. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) a Constitution Bench upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty but confined it to the “rarest of rare” cases, holding that life imprisonment is the rule and death the exception requiring special reasons. The s.235(2) hearing is the procedural vehicle through which the aggravating and mitigating circumstances contemplated by Bachan Singh are placed before the court; a death sentence passed without a meaningful sentence hearing is therefore doubly vulnerable — under Santa Singh for the procedural breach and under Bachan Singh for want of recorded special reasons. The local Rules of Practice supply the form of the conviction warrant and, in capital cases, the procedure for submission of the record to the High Court for confirmation under s.366.
Sections 236–237 — previous convictions and defamation by public servants
Two residual provisions close the chapter. Section 236 deals with the case where the accused is charged as a previous offender under s.211(7): the previous conviction is not put to the accused, nor is evidence of it led, until after he has been convicted on the substantive charge; only then, if he does not admit the previous conviction, does the Judge take evidence of it and record a finding. This protects against the prejudice that prior-conviction evidence would otherwise cause during the main trial. Section 237 prescribes a special procedure for the trial by a Court of Session of certain defamation offences (under s.199(2)) against constitutional functionaries and public servants instituted on the complaint of the Public Prosecutor, including provision for compensation where the accusation is found false and the complaint frivolous. These correspond to ss.259–260 BNSS and are examined further in the introduction to the Criminal Rules of Practice series.
Where the local rules actually bite
It is worth being precise about what does and does not vary by State. The statutory skeleton — committal, prosecutor's opening, discharge/charge, plea, prosecution evidence, s.313 examination, acquittal/defence/arguments, judgment and bifurcated sentence — is national and now common to the CrPC and the BNSS. What varies under each High Court's Criminal Rules of Practice is the connective tissue: the form and indexing of the committal record; the numbering and registers for sessions cases; the drafting, language and reading-over of charges; the mode of recording depositions and marking exhibits; the maintenance of the order-sheet and case diary; the listing and preservation of material objects; the procedure for circuit, camp or additional sittings of the Court of Session in outlying places; and the format of judgments, warrants and the confirmation reference in capital cases. A judge who knows the Code but not the local rules will frame a valid charge on the wrong form; a judge who knows the rules but not the Code may discharge on the wrong test. For the examinee this distinction is worth internalising, because questions on sessions procedure frequently test the statutory stages, while questions on the Criminal Rules of Practice test the local form and record-keeping that surround those stages — the two are complementary, not interchangeable. Mastery of the sessions trial demands both, read together with the sittings and constitution of criminal courts.
Frequently asked questions
Can the Court of Session take cognizance of an offence directly?
No. Section 193 bars the Court of Session from taking cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under s.209. Committal is the indispensable gateway, which is why s.226 speaks of the accused appearing “in pursuance of a commitment of the case under section 209.”
What is the test for discharge under Section 227 CrPC?
The Judge asks whether there is “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.” Per Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) and State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977), he may sift and weigh evidence only to find a prima facie case; grave or strong suspicion suffices to frame a charge. The question is sufficient ground for proceeding, not for conviction.
Has the BNSS changed the discharge procedure in sessions cases?
Yes. Under the old CrPC there was no time limit for seeking discharge. Section 250 BNSS now requires a discharge application to be filed within sixty days from the date of commitment of the case. The substantive ‘prima facie / grave suspicion’ test from Prafulla Kumar Samal and Sajjan Kumar survives, but the application is now time-bound.
Why is the hearing on sentence under Section 235(2) treated as mandatory?
Because it embodies natural justice. In Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) the Supreme Court held that convicting and sentencing in one breath, without a separate hearing on sentence, vitiates the sentence; the death sentence was set aside and the case remanded. Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar added that the opportunity must be real, with adjournment granted where needed to place mitigating material.
Can additional accused be summoned during a sessions trial?
Yes. Section 319 lets the Court of Session summon any person, other than the accused on trial, who appears from the evidence to have committed an offence. In Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) a Constitution Bench held the power runs from the start of inquiry to the conclusion of trial, may reach even a discharged or non-charge-sheeted person, and requires more than a prima facie case but short of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
What exactly varies between States in a sessions trial?
The statutory sequence (committal, opening, discharge/charge, plea, evidence, s.313 examination, judgment, sentence) is uniform nationally and common to the CrPC and BNSS. What varies under each High Court's Criminal Rules of Practice is the form of the committal record, case numbering and registers, charge forms and reading-over, the mode of recording depositions and marking exhibits, and the procedure for circuit or camp sittings of the Court of Session.