Procedure for Trial of Warrant and Summons Cases — Local Practice

Every criminal trial before a Magistrate funnels into one of two channels — the elaborate warrant-case procedure for serious offences, or the streamlined summons-case procedure for lesser ones. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Chapters XIX and XX), now re-enacted as Chapters XX and XXI of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays down the skeleton; the State Criminal Rules of Practice put flesh on it — fixing how charges are read over, how plea and examination are recorded, and how diary entries are made. This chapter walks the two roads stage by stage, anchoring each to the controlling provision and the leading authority, and flagging the local-practice obligations that separate a clean trial record from one that unravels on appeal.

The Warrant–Summons Divide: Why Classification Comes First

The first procedural question in any trial is not guilt — it is category. Section 2(x) of the Code defines a warrant-case as one relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment exceeding two years; by elimination, section 2(w) defines a summons-case as everything else. Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the definitions migrate to sections 2(1)(ee) and 2(1)(za) but the two-year fault-line is preserved unchanged. The classification is not cosmetic. It decides whether a formal charge must be framed, whether the accused can be discharged before evidence, and how rigorously the evidence must be recorded. A magistrate who tries a warrant offence by the lighter summons procedure commits an illegality that ordinarily vitiates the trial, because the accused is denied the structured safeguards — pre-charge scrutiny, a written charge, and a defined defence stage — that the graver punishment demands.

Chapter XIX of the Code (sections 238 to 250), now Chapter XX of the BNSS (sections 261 to 273), governs warrant trials; Chapter XX of the Code (sections 251 to 259), now Chapter XXI of the BNSS (sections 274 to 282), governs summons trials. Both chapters presuppose that cognizance has already been taken and process issued — matters covered in our note on issuance of summons, warrants and bailable / non-bailable warrants — so this chapter begins where the accused is already physically before the court. The Criminal Rules of Practice in most States require the magistrate, at the very first hearing, to enter in the order-sheet the category of case and the section under which the trial will proceed, so that the procedural track is fixed on the record from day one.

Warrant Cases on Police Report: Supply of Documents and the First Hearing

Within the warrant chapter the Code splits again, depending on how the case was instituted. Where a police report under section 173 launches the prosecution, the trial opens with section 238 (BNSS section 261), which simply directs the Magistrate to satisfy himself that the section 207 obligation has been discharged — that is, that copies of the police report, the FIR, the section 161 statements, the confessions and statements under sections 164, and the documents forwarded with the charge-sheet have been supplied to the accused. This supply is not a formality; it is the foundation of the accused's ability to seek discharge and to prepare a defence. The process by which those documents reach the file is traced in our note on filing of complaints, FIRs and charge-sheets.

The local Criminal Rules of Practice typically require the magistrate to obtain an acknowledgment, signed by the accused, that the section 207 copies have been received, and to note the date of compliance in the order-sheet. Where the documents are voluminous, many High Court rules permit furnishing copies in electronic form, a course the BNSS now expressly facilitates through its audio-video and digitisation provisions. Non-supply, or defective supply, is curable rather than fatal — the trial does not collapse automatically — but an accused who shows prejudice from the omission is entitled to have the defect set right before the charge is considered.

Discharge Under Section 239: The Prima-Facie Filter

Section 239 of the Code (BNSS section 262) is the warrant-case discharge stage. The Magistrate considers the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173, gives the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, and — if he considers the charge groundless — discharges the accused for reasons to be recorded. The threshold is deliberately low for the prosecution: the court does not weigh probabilities or conduct a mini-trial; it asks only whether, taking the material at its highest, a case fit for trial is disclosed.

Although sections 227 and 239 sit in different chapters, the Supreme Court's exposition of the discharge test for Sessions trials in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4, supplies the governing standard for warrant cases too. The Court held that the Judge may sift and weigh the material for the limited purpose of deciding whether a prima-facie case exists; where the material discloses grave suspicion not properly explained, a charge must be framed, but where it raises only suspicion that is not grave, or two views are equally possible, the accused is to be discharged. The companion principle from State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, is that proceedings ought not to be allowed to continue where the material, even if unrebutted, would not warrant a conviction — sparing the accused a pointless ordeal. At this stage the accused cannot import documents of his own beyond the charge-sheet to manufacture a discharge; the enquiry is confined to the prosecution material.

Framing the Charge Under Section 240 and Its Local Mechanics

If the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming the accused committed an offence triable as a warrant-case which he is competent to try, section 240 of the Code (BNSS section 263) commands him to frame a charge in writing. The standard — "ground for presuming" — is a notch above bare suspicion but well below the proof required for conviction; it mirrors the grave-suspicion threshold of Prafulla Kumar Samal. The charge having been framed, it must be read and explained to the accused, who is then asked whether he pleads guilty or claims to be tried.

The mechanics of how a charge is drafted, what particulars it must contain, and how the reading-over and explanation are to be recorded are governed in detail by the form and recording rules examined in our note on charge framing — form, recording and reading over. The local Criminal Rules of Practice almost invariably require the magistrate to record, in his own hand or under his signature, that the charge was read over and explained in a language the accused understands, and to note the accused's plea verbatim. An omission to read over the charge does not by itself vitiate the trial under the curative provisions, but a failure that occasions a failure of justice will. Where the warrant case began on a private complaint rather than a police report, charge-framing is instead governed by section 246 (BNSS section 269), which permits the charge to be framed at any stage after the pre-charge prosecution evidence under section 244 has been recorded.

Plea of Guilty, Prosecution Evidence and the Defence Stage

If the accused pleads guilty, section 241 (BNSS section 264) permits the Magistrate, in his discretion, to convict him — but the plea must be unequivocal and recorded as nearly as possible in the accused's own words, and the local rules require the magistrate to satisfy himself that the plea is voluntary and that the accused understands its consequences. Where the accused claims to be tried, section 242 (BNSS section 265) opens the prosecution-evidence stage: the Magistrate fixes a date, takes all such evidence as may be produced, and may issue process to compel witnesses. The discipline of how that evidence is recorded — depositions, the cross-examination, and the magistrate's certificate — is the subject of our note on recording of evidence in criminal trials.

After the prosecution closes, the accused is examined under section 313 on the incriminating circumstances, and then section 243 (BNSS section 266) gives him his defence: he may enter on his defence and produce evidence, and the Magistrate must compel the attendance of his witnesses unless the application is made for vexation, delay or defeating the ends of justice — and even then the refusal must be reasoned in writing. The local practice obliges the magistrate to record, against each defence-witness application, whether it is allowed or refused and the reason, so that a wrongful refusal is visible on the face of the record for the appellate court.

Warrant Cases Instituted Otherwise Than on Police Report

Where a warrant-triable offence comes to court on a private complaint rather than a charge-sheet, sections 244 to 247 of the Code (BNSS sections 267 to 270) prescribe a front-loaded variant. Section 244 (BNSS section 267) requires the Magistrate first to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution — the so-called pre-charge evidence — before any charge is even contemplated. Only after this evidence is recorded does section 245 (BNSS section 268) permit discharge: if, upon taking that evidence and after hearing both sides, the Magistrate finds no case which, if unrebutted, would warrant conviction, the accused is discharged.

This sequencing matters because, as the Punjab and Haryana High Court has clarified, the complainant's obligation to adduce post-charge evidence under section 246(4)–(6) survives even where the accused declined to cross-examine the pre-charge witnesses; the two sets of evidence serve distinct functions. After the charge is framed under section 246, the accused may demand recall of the prosecution witnesses for cross-examination, and the defence then proceeds under section 247 (BNSS section 270) on the same footing as section 243. The local rules treat the pre-charge and post-charge depositions as separate parts of the record and require them to be paginated and indexed distinctly so that the appellate court can tell at which stage each witness spoke.

Summons Cases: Stating the Substance of the Accusation Under Section 251

The summons-case procedure dispenses with the formal charge altogether. Section 251 of the Code (BNSS section 274) directs that when the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence shall be stated to him and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence — "but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge." The dispensation is only with the formal document, not with the substance: the accused must still be told, in terms he can understand, exactly what he is alleged to have done.

In Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 5 SCC 424, the Supreme Court held that it is inherent in section 251 that, when the accused appears pursuant to a section 204 summons, it is the bounden duty of the trial court to go through the allegations in the complaint or charge-sheet and consider whether commission of an offence is disclosed; if it is, the Magistrate must state the substance of the accusation, and if not, the accused must be released. The Court was careful to add that the summoning order under section 204 itself needs no elaborate reasons, because the issuance of process presupposes application of mind to the materials. The local Criminal Rules of Practice require the magistrate to record that the substance of the accusation was stated and to note the plea — a record that, in cheque-bounce and other high-volume summons litigation, is the principal protection against later disputes about whether the accused was ever told the case against him.

The No-Discharge Rule in Summons Cases

A defining feature of the summons chapter is the absence of any discharge provision corresponding to section 239. The Supreme Court settled the point in Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 13 SCC 324, holding that Chapter XX does not contemplate a stage of discharge, and that once process has issued under section 204, the Magistrate has no power to recall, review or reconsider that order so as to drop the proceedings mid-stream. The accused who appears in a summons case must therefore either plead guilty or face trial; his only escape, short of acquittal, is to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under section 482 (BNSS section 528) to quash. This builds on the larger-Bench position in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, (2004) 7 SCC 338, which overruled the earlier view that a Magistrate could drop a summons-case complaint, restricting the remedy to quashing.

The observations in Bhushan Kumar suggesting that the Magistrate must "discharge" an accused at the section 251 stage have therefore been read down: properly understood, the duty is to satisfy oneself before stating the substance of the accusation, not to exercise a discharge power that the Chapter does not confer. For the practitioner, the practical consequence is that objections to a summons-case prosecution must be raised either before process issues or by way of a quashing petition — not by a discharge application that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to entertain.

Plea, Conviction and Petty-Case Pleas by Post

If the accused in a summons case pleads guilty, section 252 (BNSS section 275) requires the Magistrate to record the plea as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused and permits — but does not compel — conviction on it. For genuinely petty offences where the accused has been allowed to plead guilty in absentia under section 206, section 253 (BNSS section 276) lets him transmit his plea and the specified fine by post or messenger, sparing a personal appearance; the Magistrate may then convict and impose the fine. These provisions exist to clear the docket of trivial matters efficiently, but the local rules still require the magistrate to ensure the plea is intelligible and voluntary before acting on it.

If the accused does not plead guilty, section 254 (BNSS section 277) opens the trial proper: the Magistrate hears the prosecution, takes its evidence, then hears the accused and takes the defence evidence, with power to summon any witness. Section 255 (BNSS section 278) governs acquittal or conviction at the close, and permits the Magistrate to convict for any offence triable under the chapter that the facts disclose, even if it differs from the one originally stated, provided no prejudice results. The summons procedure is thus elastic — it tolerates a shift in the offence found, precisely because no formal charge locked the prosecution into a single legal pigeonhole at the outset.

Non-Appearance of the Complainant and Acquittal Under Section 256

Section 256 of the Code (BNSS section 279) addresses the recurring problem of the absent complainant. If, on the day fixed for the appearance of the accused, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate may acquit the accused — unless he thinks it proper to adjourn, or unless the complainant's personal attendance has been dispensed with and the case can proceed in his absence. The provision is a shield against a complainant who sets the criminal process in motion and then loses interest, leaving the accused under an indefinite cloud.

But the power is discretionary, not mechanical. In Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand, (1998) 1 SCC 687, the Supreme Court held that a Magistrate is not bound to acquit merely because the complainant is absent on a given date; the two in-built exceptions — adjournment where proper, and dispensing with personal attendance where unnecessary — must be considered before resorting to the drastic step of acquittal. The Court emphasised that where the complainant has already been examined as a witness, acquittal on the sole ground of his subsequent absence is ordinarily inappropriate, since the evidentiary purpose of his presence is spent. The decision also confirmed that section 256 applies where the complainant is a company or other juristic person, which must act through a natural representative who may be substituted with the court's leave. The local rules require the magistrate, when acquitting under section 256, to record specifically why neither exception was applied — a discipline that protects the order from reversal in revision.

Stopping Proceedings and Compensation for Frivolous Accusation

Section 258 of the Code (BNSS section 281) confers a power unique to summons cases instituted otherwise than upon complaint — that is, on police report. A Magistrate of the first class, or with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate any other Judicial Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded, stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing judgment. If the stoppage occurs after the principal witnesses have been examined, it operates as an acquittal; otherwise it amounts to a release that bars no fresh proceeding. This is a safety-valve for prosecutions that have become pointless, but its confinement to non-complaint summons cases means it cannot be used to abort a private complaint.

Running through both chapters is the deterrent of compensation for groundless accusation. Section 250 of the Code (BNSS section 273) empowers the Magistrate who discharges or acquits in a case instituted on complaint or to the police to order the complainant or informant to pay compensation to the accused where the accusation was made without reasonable cause. The provision recognises that the trial machinery can itself be weaponised, and that a vindicated accused deserves a remedy. The local Criminal Rules of Practice require the magistrate to issue notice and hear the complainant before awarding such compensation, and to record findings on the absence of reasonable cause — without which the order cannot stand.

Conversion: When a Summons Case Becomes a Warrant Case

Because the summons procedure is lighter, the Code provides a corrective where the offence turns out to deserve sterner treatment. Section 259 of the Code (BNSS section 282) empowers the Magistrate, in any summons case relating to an offence punishable with imprisonment exceeding six months, to convert it into a warrant case if he is of opinion that, in the interests of justice, it ought to be tried under the warrant procedure — recalling any witnesses already examined and proceeding afresh under Chapter XIX. The six-month floor confines conversion to the more serious end of the summons spectrum, and the "interests of justice" requirement keeps the power principled rather than routine.

Conversion is consequential because it retroactively imports the warrant-case safeguards — a written charge, a defined defence stage, and the fuller evidence-recording discipline. The local rules require the magistrate to record an express order of conversion, to note which witnesses are being recalled, and to ensure that the accused is furnished with whatever documents the warrant procedure would have entitled him to had the case begun on that track. For the overall map of how these trial chapters fit within the criminal courts' hierarchy and sittings, see our note on the constitution and sittings of criminal courts and the subject Criminal Rules of Practice hub.

Local Practice: Diaries, Order-Sheets and the Integrity of the Trial Record

The bare Code tells the magistrate what to do; the State Criminal Rules of Practice tell him how to leave a trace of having done it. Across States the rules converge on a common set of record-keeping duties that overlay both trial procedures: the order-sheet must show the category of case and the governing section; the date of section 207 compliance must be noted with the accused's acknowledgment; the framing, reading-over and explanation of the charge must be certified in the magistrate's hand; the plea must be recorded verbatim; every adjournment must carry a reason; and every grant or refusal of a witness summons — prosecution or defence — must be reasoned on the record.

These obligations are not bureaucratic ornament. They are the means by which an appellate or revisional court reconstructs whether the trial was fair without re-hearing it. A charge that was never read over, a plea that was never recorded, a discharge granted without reasons, an acquittal under section 256 entered without considering the statutory exceptions — each is detectable only because the local rules demanded a contemporaneous note, and each can unravel a verdict that the evidence might otherwise have supported. The disciplined trial record is therefore the connective tissue between the abstract procedure of Chapters XIX and XX and the concrete guarantee of a fair trial; it is where the Criminal Rules of Practice do their most important work. For the foundational architecture of the subject, see the introduction to the Criminal Rules of Practice.