Introduction — History, Object and Scheme of CrPC; Transition to BNSS, 2023

The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is the principal procedural statute governing the investigation, inquiry and trial of offences in India. It came into force on 1 July 2024 and replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), which had occupied the field for fifty years. Procedural law decides how the criminal-justice machinery moves: who registers the first information, who investigates, who arrests, who frames the charge, who tries, who sentences, who hears the appeal. The new Sanhita re-states that machinery in 531 sections across 39 chapters, retains the architecture of the 1973 Code where it worked, and overhauls it where it did not — most visibly through statutory timelines, audio-video recording of search and seizure, codification of Zero FIR, trial in absentia of proclaimed offenders, community service as a sentence, and a forensic-investigation mandate for offences punishable with seven years or more.

This chapter introduces the subject. It traces the legislative history of the Code from 1861 to 2024, states the object that procedural law serves, lays out the scheme of the Sanhita chapter-by-chapter, and explains exactly how the transition from the CrPC to the BNSS works for cases pending on 1 July 2024. The chapter also collects the BNSS innovations in one place, so that subsequent chapters in this CrPC and BNSS notes series can build on a settled vocabulary.

Legislative history — 1861 to 2024

The first all-India Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted in 1861. It was a colonial statute, drafted to give the Police, the Magistracy and the Sessions Courts a uniform procedure across British India. The 1861 Code was replaced by the Code of 1872, and that in turn by the Code of 1882. The Code of 1898 then consolidated the law and remained the operative statute for seventy-five years.

The First Law Commission of independent India submitted its Fourteenth Report on the Reform of Judicial Administration in 1958. It recommended changes to criminal procedure but did not undertake a section-by-section revision. The reconstituted Law Commission took up that revision and presented a comprehensive Forty-First Report in September 1969. Three considerations guided the Commission's recommendations: that the accused must get a fair trial in accordance with natural justice, that delay in investigation and trial must be avoided as far as possible, and that procedure must not become so complicated that it shut out the poorer sections of the community.

The Code of Criminal Procedure Bill, 1970, drafted on these lines, was referred to a Joint Select Committee whose report was presented to Parliament on 4 December 1972. The Bill lapsed with the dissolution of Parliament. After the next election, the Bill was re-introduced as the Code of Criminal Procedure Bill, 1972; the Rajya Sabha passed it on 13 December 1972, and the Lok Sabha passed it on 12 December 1973, with one hundred and twenty-five amendments which the Rajya Sabha adopted on 18 December 1973. The new Code came into force on 1 April 1974.

The 1973 Code was extensively amended by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1978, and by further Amendment Acts of 1988, 1990, 1991, 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2009. The 2008 amendment, in particular, introduced Section 41A — the notice-of-appearance procedure that the Supreme Court would later read as a mandatory check on arrest in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273.

The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, was passed by Parliament in December 2023, received Presidential assent on 25 December 2023, and was notified to come into force on 1 July 2024 by Notification S.O. 850(E) of the Ministry of Home Affairs, dated 23 February 2024. From that date, every fresh first information report and every fresh investigation has been governed by the BNSS. The CrPC, however, did not vanish — it continues to govern cases that were already pending on 1 July 2024, by virtue of the savings clause discussed later in this chapter.

Object of procedural law

The object of the Sanhita — like the object of the 1973 Code before it — is to provide the machinery for the punishment of offences against the substantive criminal law. Substantive law tells the citizen what conduct is forbidden and what punishment attaches to that conduct; procedural law tells the State and the citizen how a forbidden act is investigated, how the accused is brought before the Court, how guilt is proved, and how the sentence is executed. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — the new Indian Penal Code — defines the offences. The BNSS provides the mechanism for trying them.

The Supreme Court captured the basic principle in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116. Procedural law is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless technicalities. The object is to ensure that an accused person gets a full and fair trial along well-established lines that accord with our notions of natural justice. If he is tried by a competent Court, if he is told and clearly understands the nature of the offence for which he is being tried, and if he is afforded a full and fair opportunity of defending himself, then provided there is substantial compliance with the outward forms of the law, mere mistakes in procedure do not vitiate the trial unless the accused can show substantial prejudice. That principle survives the transition: the BNSS continues to be a procedural code grounded in fairness, not in form.

The Sanhita is, like its predecessor, both a consolidating and an amending Act. As a consolidating statute, it brings into one enactment the law previously contained in the 1973 Code and the case law decided thereunder. As an amending statute, it introduces material changes — new definitions, new procedures, new timelines. The presumption applicable to consolidating statutes — that the legislature did not intend to alter the law — is therefore rebuttable wherever the BNSS expressly adopts a new course. Old case law on the unaltered provisions remains good law; old case law on altered provisions must be re-read in the light of the change.

Scheme of the Sanhita

The BNSS contains 531 sections grouped into 39 chapters. The architecture, broadly speaking, mirrors that of the 1973 Code, with consolidation in places and rearrangement in others. The provisions can be grouped under the following heads.

Pre-trial and investigative provisions. Sections 173 onwards (previously Sections 154 onwards CrPC) govern information to the Police and their power to investigate, including the codification of Zero FIR and the introduction of e-FIR. Chapters dealing with arrest, processes to compel appearance, search and seizure, and security for keeping the peace prepare the ground for trial. The substantive law of FIR and Zero FIR, police investigation powers and arrest of persons is taken up in dedicated chapters of these notes.

Constitution and powers of Criminal Courts. The Sanhita opens with the classification of Courts — Sessions Courts, Magistrates of the First and Second Class, Executive Magistrates and the abolished Metropolitan Magistracy. It then prescribes the sentencing powers of each Court. The detailed treatment is in constitution of criminal courts and powers of courts and sentencing jurisdiction.

Initiation of proceedings. Conditions for cognizance, complaints to Magistrates, and the framing of charge form the next block. The Sanhita retains the threefold division of trials — sessions trials, warrant-case trials, summons-case trials and summary trials — and adds a hard outer limit of three years' imprisonment for cases triable summarily.

Trial, evidence, judgment, sentence. The middle of the Sanhita is occupied by the procedure for each type of trial, the recording of evidence, the writing of judgment, the confirmation of death sentences, and the execution of sentences. Plea bargaining survives in Chapter XXIII (previously Chapter XXIA CrPC).

Appeals, reference, revision and transfer. Post-judgment review is collected in dedicated chapters covering criminal appeals, references and revisions, and transfer of criminal cases.

Bail, bonds, disposal of property, irregular proceedings, limitation. The closing chapters preserve the framework of bail and bonds, prescribe limitation periods for taking cognizance of certain offences, and deal with the consequences of irregular proceedings.

Inherent powers of the High Court. Section 528 BNSS (previously Section 482 CrPC) preserves the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to make orders necessary to give effect to the Sanhita, to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The treatment of inherent powers of the High Court is one of the most important chapters in the Sanhita and is discussed separately.

Although the Sanhita is concerned principally with adjective or procedural law, certain of its provisions are substantive in nature. Maintenance of wives, children and parents under Section 144 BNSS (previously Section 125 CrPC) is the most prominent example. Disputes regarding immovable property under Sections 164 to 167 BNSS (previously Sections 145 to 148 CrPC) are another. The Sanhita is therefore not exclusively procedural; it is the procedural code of the Indian criminal-justice system, with substantive enclaves where the legislature considered that quick civil-style relief was needed.

The transition — how the CrPC gives way to the BNSS

The transition from the 1973 Code to the 2023 Sanhita is not a clean substitution. Section 531 of the BNSS is the savings clause and it does three things. First, it repeals the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Second, it provides that any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending immediately before 1 July 2024 shall be disposed of, continued, held or made under the CrPC as if the Sanhita had not come into force. Third, it preserves anything done or any action taken under the CrPC that is consistent with the Sanhita, treating it as having been done under the corresponding BNSS provision.

The practical consequence is that for several years the criminal courts of India will be running two parallel procedural regimes. An FIR registered on 30 June 2024 — and every step that flows from it — is governed by the CrPC. An FIR registered on 1 July 2024 is governed by the BNSS. Bail jurisprudence under both Codes therefore continues to be relevant; arrest-without-warrant doctrine under Arnesh Kumar applies to Section 35 BNSS (previously Sections 41 and 41A CrPC) without any break; and the Section 482 jurisprudence on quashing FIRs continues to govern Section 528 BNSS proceedings. The transition is doctrinal continuity with statutory renumbering.

The High Court of Delhi, in early proceedings under the BNSS, has confirmed that orders passed under the CrPC during a pending case retain their force after 1 July 2024 and are to be treated as orders under the corresponding BNSS provision. The Supreme Court too, in matters arising from FIRs registered before 1 July 2024, has continued to apply the CrPC as the governing procedural law, expressly relying on Section 531 BNSS.

BNSS innovations — what is genuinely new

The BNSS retains the bone-structure of the 1973 Code but adds a series of provisions that have no real predecessor. These innovations are exam-bankers, and a separate chapter is devoted to each. Here they are listed in one place so that the reader has a map.

Zero FIR and e-FIR. Section 173 BNSS codifies Zero FIR — the obligation of any police station to register an FIR irrespective of the territorial jurisdiction in which the offence was committed, and to transfer it thereafter to the station having jurisdiction. The same provision permits the registration of an FIR through electronic communication, subject to the informant signing the FIR within three days. The detailed treatment is in Zero FIR, e-FIR and trial timelines under the BNSS.

Statutory timelines. The BNSS prescribes statutory timelines that the 1973 Code lacked. A Magistrate must record the prima facie satisfaction for taking cognizance within fourteen days. The judgment in summons-case trials must ordinarily be pronounced within thirty days of the conclusion of arguments, extendable to forty-five days for reasons recorded. The bail application of an accused who is in custody must be decided within stipulated outer limits. These timelines are designed to fix the long-criticised problem of indefinite drift in criminal trials.

Audio-video recording of search and seizure. Section 105 BNSS makes it mandatory for the police to record the search and seizure operation by audio-video means, preferably on a mobile phone, and forward the recording to the Magistrate without delay. The provision is meant to address the perennial complaint that recoveries are stage-managed; it is the subject of the audio-video recording of search and seizure chapter.

Trial in absentia of proclaimed offenders. Section 356 BNSS introduces, for the first time in Indian procedural law, a fully-fledged trial-in-absentia procedure for proclaimed offenders. The accused is given thirty days to appear after due publication; on failure, the trial proceeds in his absence and a judgment of conviction can be recorded. The detail is in trial in absentia of proclaimed offenders.

Community service as sentence. Section 23 BNSS, read with explanation appended thereto, recognises community service as a form of sentence for petty offences. This is a clean break from the 1973 Code, which had no such provision. The mechanics are taken up in community service as a sentence.

Forensic investigation in serious offences. Section 176(3) BNSS makes it mandatory for forensic experts to visit the scene of an offence punishable with seven years' imprisonment or more, and to record evidence forensically. The provision is taken up in forensic investigation in serious offences.

Attachment of proceeds of crime. Sections 107 to 111 BNSS empower the Court, on the report of the police, to order attachment of the proceeds of crime. This was earlier confined to special statutes such as the Prevention of Money Laundering Act; the BNSS brings the power into the general procedural code.

Comparative box — CrPC ↔ BNSS at a glance

Topic	CrPC, 1973	BNSS, 2023
Total sections	484	531
Total chapters	37	39
FIR provision	Section 154	Section 173 (Zero FIR + e-FIR codified)
Arrest without warrant	Sections 41, 41A	Section 35 (Sections 41 and 41A merged, new sub-section (7) for arrest of infirm or 60+)
Maintenance	Section 125	Section 144
Anticipatory bail	Section 438	Section 482
Inherent powers of High Court	Section 482	Section 528
Plea bargaining	Chapter XXIA	Chapter XXIII
Trial in absentia	Not provided	Section 356 (new)
Audio-video recording of search	Not mandatory	Section 105 (mandatory)
Community service	Not a sentence	Section 23 explanation (new)
Forensic visit for 7+ year offences	Not mandatory	Section 176(3) (mandatory)
Metropolitan Magistrates	Recognised	Abolished
Assistant Sessions Judges	Recognised	Abolished

A complete row-by-row map between the two statutes is collected in the dedicated CrPC and BNSS section mapping chapter.

Constitutional overlay

Procedural law in India is read against the backdrop of Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Article 20 protects the accused against double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and ex post facto criminalisation. Article 21 — as elaborated in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, and Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369 — guarantees a procedure that is fair, just and reasonable, and reads into Article 21 the right to a speedy trial and the right to free legal aid. Article 22 prescribes the safeguards on arrest and detention — the right to be informed of grounds, the right to legal counsel, the twenty-four-hour production rule.

The BNSS, like the 1973 Code, is the statutory machinery through which these constitutional guarantees are made operational. Where a BNSS provision falls short of the constitutional standard, the constitutional standard prevails. The Supreme Court, in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610, laid down arrest guidelines that have been substantially absorbed into Section 36 BNSS (previously Section 41B CrPC). The Arnesh Kumar safeguards on arrest in offences punishable with up to seven years' imprisonment apply with equal force to Section 35 BNSS. The reading-up of procedural law into a constitutional procedure is, therefore, ongoing.

Code is exhaustive — but not airtight

The BNSS, like the 1973 Code, is an exhaustive procedural Code in the sense that it provides a complete machinery to investigate, try and execute sentences in respect of offences. Where the Code itself provides a remedy, that remedy must ordinarily be pursued; the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 528 BNSS (previously Section 482 CrPC) cannot be used to bypass an express provision. This was the rule laid down in Popular Muthiah v. State, (2006) 7 SCC 296, and it continues unaltered.

However, where the matter is not specifically dealt with in the Sanhita, the High Court's inherent power can be invoked to correct errors of subordinate Courts and to prevent abuse of the process. The Bhajan Lal categories — laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 — for quashing an FIR continue to govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS. So do the principles in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, on the contours of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction.

For the Section 156(3) jurisdiction of a Magistrate to direct registration and investigation of an FIR — now Section 175(3) BNSS — the binding three-judge decision in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 17 SCC 1, continues to govern. The CrPC and BNSS regime on Magistrate-supervised investigation, in other words, is the same regime, with a new section number.

How to read this series

The chapters that follow take up each block of the Sanhita in turn. They are written under one settled convention: every provision is anchored first to its BNSS section and then, in parentheses, to its CrPC counterpart. Doctrine decided under the 1973 Code is restated in BNSS terms. Statutory text quoted verbatim is the BNSS text; the CrPC text is reproduced only where the change is material, and is labelled as the predecessor provision. Cases retain their original names — Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1, is still Lalita Kumari; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51, is still Satender Antil — but the doctrine each lays down is read into the new section to which it now attaches. The series is built to be the working procedural reference of a magistrate, a clerk and a candidate alike.

Frequently asked questions

When did the BNSS come into force, and what happened to cases pending under the CrPC on that date?

The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, came into force on 1 July 2024 by Notification S.O. 850(E) of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 23 February 2024. Section 531 BNSS — the savings clause — provides that any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending immediately before 1 July 2024 shall continue to be disposed of under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as if the Sanhita had not come into force. So an FIR registered on 30 June 2024 and every step flowing from it remain governed by the CrPC; an FIR registered on or after 1 July 2024 is governed by the BNSS.

Is the BNSS a codifying statute or a consolidating statute?

It is both consolidating and amending. Like the 1973 Code, the BNSS gathers the law of criminal procedure into one enactment, and like a consolidating statute it carries with it the body of decisional law decided under its predecessor. Where the BNSS expressly departs from the CrPC — for instance by codifying Zero FIR or by introducing trial in absentia — the consolidating presumption against legislative change is rebutted. The general rule is that case law on unaltered provisions remains good law; case law on altered provisions must be re-read in the light of the change.

Does case law decided under the CrPC survive the transition to the BNSS?

Yes, with one qualification. Where the BNSS provision is materially identical to its CrPC predecessor — for instance the inherent-power provision in Section 528 BNSS, which mirrors Section 482 CrPC — the case law applies without break. Decisions like Bhajan Lal on quashing of FIRs and Arnesh Kumar on arrest in offences punishable with up to seven years' imprisonment continue to govern. Where the BNSS introduces a substantive change — new timelines, mandatory forensic visits, audio-video recording of search — the doctrine attached to the old provision must be re-read in the light of the new text.

What does it mean to say the BNSS is exhaustive?

A procedural Code is exhaustive when it supplies, by itself, the complete machinery to investigate, try and execute sentences in respect of offences. The Supreme Court explained this in Popular Muthiah v. State, (2006) 7 SCC 296. Where the BNSS provides a remedy, that remedy must be pursued; the High Court's inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (previously Section 482 CrPC) cannot be used to bypass an express provision. Where the matter is not specifically dealt with, the inherent power steps in to prevent abuse of process.

Why did the BNSS abolish the Metropolitan Magistracy?

The 1973 Code distinguished between Metropolitan areas — initially the four Presidency towns and later other big cities — and other areas. Metropolitan Magistrates exercised the powers of a Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class within the Metropolitan area. Over the decades that distinction had ceased to do useful work; the powers of a Metropolitan Magistrate were no different in substance from those of a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class outside Metropolitan areas. The BNSS therefore collapses the categories. Sections 8, 11, 12, 14, 17, 22, 29, 113, 196, 214, 320, 321, 415, 422 and 436 of the BNSS reflect the consequential renumbering.

How are constitutional rights under Articles 20, 21 and 22 read into the BNSS?

Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution set the floor below which procedural law cannot fall. Article 21 — as elaborated in Maneka Gandhi and Hussainara Khatoon — requires a procedure that is fair, just and reasonable, and reads into the right to life the right to a speedy trial and the right to free legal aid. Article 22 prescribes the right to be informed of grounds of arrest, the right to legal counsel and the twenty-four-hour production rule. The BNSS provisions on arrest, bail, fair trial and appeal are read alongside these constitutional guarantees; where a BNSS provision falls short, the constitutional standard prevails.