Definitions and Key Concepts (Section 2 BNSS / Section 2 CrPC)

Section 2 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is the dictionary of the Sanhita. It collects the meaning of every recurring expression used in the rest of the Code — from "bailable offence" and "complaint" to "investigation", "police report", "summons-case" and "warrant-case". The corresponding provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) was Section 2 of that Code, and a great many of the BNSS definitions are carried over without change. But the BNSS adds a fresh set of expressions that the older Code did not need — "audio-video electronic means", "electronic communication", "bail", "bail bond" and "bond" — and removes a small handful that the new dispensation has discarded, principally "Metropolitan Magistrate" and "Metropolitan area". Reading Section 2 BNSS therefore demands a side-by-side comparison with Section 2 CrPC, and that is what this chapter offers.

Why does the definition section matter so much in procedural law? Because every later section refers back to it. When Section 173 BNSS (previously Section 154 CrPC) speaks of information relating to a "cognizable offence", it is the Section 2 definition that decides whether the offence in question falls in or falls out. When Section 223 BNSS (previously Section 200 CrPC) speaks of a "complaint", it is the Section 2 definition that decides whether the document the Magistrate has received is a complaint at all. When the Sanhita speaks of an "investigation" by the Police, it is the Section 2 definition that demarcates investigation from inquiry. The whole architecture of the Code rests on these few clauses. Read them with care; the rest of the CrPC and BNSS notes presupposes them.

Architecture of Section 2 BNSS

Section 2 BNSS opens with twenty-six lettered clauses defining the principal expressions, followed by sub-section (2) which adopts the meanings of words and expressions used but not defined in the Sanhita from the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the Information Technology Act, 2000. The drafting therefore knits the BNSS together with the substantive penal Code on the one hand and with the law of electronic records on the other.

Five expressions are entirely new. Sub-clause (a) defines "audio-video electronic means" — the medium through which a great deal of evidence-gathering, deposition and even examination of accused persons is now to be conducted under the Sanhita. Sub-clause (b) defines "bail" itself, which the older Code curiously did not bother to define. Sub-clauses (d) and (e) define "bail bond" and "bond", filling a gap in the old text. Sub-clause (i) defines "electronic communication", a term required for Section 173 BNSS where electronic registration of an FIR is now permitted.

Four expressions used in the 1973 Code are dropped. The CrPC defined "Metropolitan Magistrate" at Section 2(f) and "metropolitan area" at Section 2(k); the BNSS abolishes the Metropolitan Magistracy altogether and therefore has no occasion to retain those two definitions. The CrPC definition of "pleader" at Section 2(q) is dropped, the field being entirely covered by the Advocates Act, 1961, since 1961. The CrPC definition of "rules" at Section 2(t) is dropped as redundant. These are housekeeping changes; they do not affect the substance of any rule of procedure.

Cognizable and non-cognizable offence

A "cognizable offence" — defined in Section 2(1)(g) BNSS (previously Section 2(c) CrPC) — is an offence for which a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant. A "non-cognizable offence" is, by contrast, one in respect of which the police officer has no authority to arrest without warrant. The classification is the master switch of the police-power architecture in the Code. From it follows whether an FIR can be registered under Section 173 BNSS (previously Section 154 CrPC), whether the police can investigate without a Magistrate's order, and whether the prima facie test for an arrest is the police officer's own satisfaction or the cumulative compliance with the Section 35 BNSS (previously Sections 41 and 41A CrPC) machinery. The detailed treatment of the categories belongs to the chapters on FIR and Zero FIR and police investigation powers.

Two propositions are worth stating up-front. The First Schedule classification is not the only source of the cognizable / non-cognizable label; any other law for the time being in force may declare a particular offence cognizable, and the Schedule itself includes a residual classification for offences against laws other than the BNS, by reference to the punishment prescribed. The Supreme Court held in Pravin Chandra Mody v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1185, that where the same information discloses both a cognizable and a non-cognizable offence, the entire case is to be treated as cognizable for the purposes of investigation. Section 175(4) BNSS (previously Section 155(4) CrPC) makes this expressly so.

Bailable and non-bailable offence — and the new bail / bond definitions

A "bailable offence" is one shown as bailable in the First Schedule, or made bailable by any other law for the time being in force; a non-bailable offence is any other offence (Section 2(1)(c) BNSS, previously Section 2(a) CrPC). In a bailable offence, the right to be released on bail is a right; in a non-bailable offence, bail is a matter of judicial discretion under Section 480 BNSS (previously Section 437 CrPC) and Section 481 BNSS (previously Section 439 CrPC). The substantive treatment is in the dedicated chapter on bail and bonds.

The BNSS adds — for the first time — a definition of "bail" itself. Section 2(1)(b) defines bail to mean the release of a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence from the custody of law upon certain conditions imposed by an officer or Court on the execution by such person of a bond or a bail bond. Sub-clauses (d) and (e) then define "bail bond" and "bond". The drafting consolidates concepts the older Code had used without defining and removes an old source of avoidable litigation about whether a particular instrument was a bond or a bail bond. The Supreme Court's two recent statements of bail jurisprudence — in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273, on arrest in offences punishable with up to seven years' imprisonment, and in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51, on bail as the rule and jail as the exception — apply with equal force to the BNSS regime.

Complaint — Section 2(1)(h) BNSS / Section 2(d) CrPC

A "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Sanhita, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. The Explanation appended to the clause provides that a report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint, and the police officer making the report shall be deemed to be the complainant.

The ingredients of a complaint, as the Supreme Court has restated them in Bhimappa v. Laxman, AIR 1970 SC 1153, and again in Mohammed Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan, AIR 2006 SC 705, are these. There must be an allegation, oral or written, in any form. The allegation must be of the fact that some person, whether named or unnamed, has committed an offence as defined in Section 2(1)(q) BNSS (previously Section 2(n) CrPC). It must be made to a Magistrate, not to the police or some other authority. It must be made with a view to the Magistrate's taking action under the Code. And the allegation, if proved, must lead to a conviction; a complaint that does not disclose any offence is liable to be dismissed under Section 226 BNSS (previously Section 203 CrPC). Reference to a wrong section of the law does not invalidate the complaint, as the Supreme Court held in Maya Ram v. Surjit (1967), and again in Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, AIR 1999 SC 1216 — it is the facts alleged that decide cognizance.

The deeming provision in the Explanation matters in practice. Where the police initiate investigation believing a case to be cognizable but on conclusion find that it is non-cognizable, the report becomes a complaint and the officer becomes the complainant. The Supreme Court explained the consequences in Keshav Lal Thakur v. State of Bihar, (1996) 11 SCC 557 — the Magistrate then proceeds under Section 223 BNSS (previously Section 200 CrPC) and the procedure for a complaint case applies. The detailed mechanics are in the complaint procedure chapter.

Police report — Section 2(1)(t) BNSS / Section 2(r) CrPC

A "police report" means a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-section (2) of Section 193 BNSS (previously Section 173 CrPC). The definition is deliberately narrow. Only the final report on completion of investigation, in the form prescribed by the State Government, qualifies as a police report. A preliminary report under Section 175(1) BNSS, an intermediate report under Section 190 BNSS while forwarding an arrested accused, or a report by an officer under a special law that does not authorise submission of a charge-sheet — none of these is a police report within the definition. The Supreme Court in State of W.B. v. Falguni, (1993) 3 SCC 288, and earlier in Surajmani v. State of Orissa, (1980) Cr LJ 363, drew the line clearly. Magistrates take cognizance under Section 210(1)(b) BNSS (previously Section 190(1)(b) CrPC) only on a final report so defined.

The point becomes important when one looks at the inverse case — a report by a public servant under a special law. A Customs Officer, an officer under the Foreign Exchange Regulation regime, or a Drug Inspector cannot, by submitting a report, automatically attract the police-report procedure. Such a report is treated as a complaint under Section 2(1)(h) BNSS unless the special law expressly deems the officer to be an officer-in-charge of a police station for the purposes of Section 187 BNSS (previously Section 156 CrPC) — as the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act did in Raja Ram v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 828.

Investigation, inquiry and trial — three successive stages

The Sanhita uses three terms in close succession: "investigation", "inquiry" and "trial". They are not synonyms; they denote the three successive stages of a criminal proceeding. Section 2(1)(l) BNSS (previously Section 2(h) CrPC) defines investigation to include all the proceedings under the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person other than a Magistrate who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf. The hallmark of an investigation is that its purpose is the collection of evidence and that it ends with the formation of an opinion as to whether there is a case to send the accused to trial — typically expressed in the police report under Section 193 BNSS. The Supreme Court's classic statement is in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196, and the principle has been restated, most recently for present purposes, in Union of India v. P.P. Hinduja, AIR 2003 SC 2612, and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 17 SCC 1.

Section 2(1)(k) BNSS (previously Section 2(g) CrPC) defines "inquiry" to mean every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under the Code by a Magistrate or a Court. The object of inquiry is not the collection of evidence but the determination of the truth or falsity of certain facts with a view to taking further action. Inquiry encompasses proceedings as diverse as a security-for-keeping-the-peace inquiry under Chapter VIII, a maintenance proceeding under Chapter IX, an inquiry into the cause of unnatural death under Section 196 BNSS (previously Section 174 CrPC), and the pre-charge stage of a warrant-case trial.

The Code does not define "trial". The omission is deliberate; the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh, AIR 1957 SC 389, held that the term must be construed according to the context of each section. As a general matter, a trial is a judicial proceeding which ends in conviction or acquittal — anything else is an inquiry. In a sessions case the trial commences on the framing of the charge under Section 251 BNSS (previously Section 228 CrPC); in a warrant-case the trial begins with the charge under Section 263 BNSS (previously Section 240 CrPC); in a summons-case the trial begins as soon as the accused is brought before the Magistrate and the particulars of the offence are stated, since no formal charge is framed at all. The detailed mechanics are in trial of warrant cases by magistrates, trial of summons cases by magistrates, and summary trials.

Judicial proceeding — Section 2(1)(m) BNSS / Section 2(i) CrPC

A "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. The definition is non-exhaustive — the verb is "includes" — and the Supreme Court has accepted that proceedings under laws other than the Code can also qualify, provided the lawful taking of oath is permitted. Inquiries under Section 164 BNSS (previously Section 144 CrPC), inquiries into unnatural death, proceedings for maintenance, search-warrant proceedings under Section 102 BNSS (previously Section 97 CrPC), and bail-grant or bail-discharge proceedings have all been held to be judicial proceedings. Recording of statements by a Magistrate under Section 183 BNSS (previously Section 164 CrPC) during investigation, on the other hand, is not a judicial proceeding because it is part of the investigative function. The line is drawn by reference to whether the power being exercised is judicial in character or merely executive.

Offence — Section 2(1)(q) BNSS / Section 2(n) CrPC

An "offence" means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force, and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under Section 20 of the Cattle-trespass Act, 1871. The definition is wider than the corresponding definition in Section 2(38) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and wider still than the BNS definition in Section 2(28) BNS (previously Section 40 IPC), because the Sanhita definition picks up offences under any law in force in the territory of India, not only the BNS. The Supreme Court has held that the test is punishability in a Court of law: where punishment is recoverable as a fine by the executive without judicial determination, the act is not an "offence" within Section 2(1)(q) BNSS. An offence is constituted as soon as the act or omission is committed; that the prosecution may require sanction or a particular complainant goes to the trial-ability of the offence, not to its existence — a proposition the Supreme Court restated in Sethi v. Kapur, AIR 1967 SC 528.

Summons-case and warrant-case — the two-year line

A "warrant-case" — Section 2(1)(z) BNSS (previously Section 2(x) CrPC) — means a case relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. A "summons-case" — Section 2(1)(x) BNSS (previously Section 2(w) CrPC) — is a case relating to an offence and not being a warrant-case. The two-year line is the classification fulcrum of the Code. Below the line, a Magistrate adopts the lighter summons-case procedure under Sections 274 to 282 BNSS (previously Sections 251 to 259 CrPC); above the line, the Magistrate adopts the warrant-case procedure under Sections 261 to 273 BNSS (previously Sections 238 to 250 CrPC). The principal difference is that a charge must be framed in a warrant-case and need not be in a summons-case.

Two practical points follow. First, the classification is determined at the commencement of the trial; a warrant-case cannot be split up and tried piecemeal under the summons procedure, and a summons-case which on examination turns out to be a warrant-case must be tried de novo under the warrant procedure. Second, where a warrant-case offence and a summons-case offence are charged together arising out of the same transaction, the warrant procedure is to be followed.

Victim — Section 2(1)(y) BNSS / Section 2(wa) CrPC

The definition of "victim" was inserted into the CrPC for the first time by the 2008 Amendment Act, and the BNSS now carries it forward in Section 2(1)(y) with a small textual change — the words "for which the accused person has been charged" are replaced by the simpler formulation "of the accused person". A victim, then, is a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission of the accused person, and the expression includes the victim's guardian or legal heir.

The definition has substantive consequences. Section 18(8) BNSS (previously Section 24(8) CrPC) entitles the victim to engage an advocate of choice to assist the prosecution. Section 396 BNSS (previously Section 357A CrPC) requires every State Government to formulate a victim-compensation scheme. The proviso to Section 415 BNSS (previously the proviso to Section 372 CrPC) confers on the victim a right of appeal against an order of acquittal, against conviction for a lesser offence, or against the imposition of inadequate compensation. The expansion of victim-rights jurisprudence under Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752, on the right to appeal under the proviso, applies fully to the BNSS provision.

The new BNSS terms — audio-video electronic means and electronic communication

The two new definitions in Section 2(1)(a) and Section 2(1)(i) BNSS reflect the Sanhita's central commitment to digitisation. "Audio-video electronic means" includes any electronic mode through which a recording, communication or examination can take place — used for recording the search and seizure operation under Section 105 BNSS, for the deposition of public servants and police officers, for the examination of accused persons in absentia under Section 356 BNSS, and for the recording of statements of victims of certain offences. The treatment of audio-video recording of search and seizure picks up this term in detail. "Electronic communication" is the medium through which a Zero FIR can be registered under Section 173(1) proviso BNSS, subject to the informant signing the FIR within three days. The chapter on Zero FIR and e-FIR takes the analysis forward.

Definitions excluded from the BNSS — and why

The BNSS abolishes the Metropolitan Magistracy. There are no Metropolitan Magistrates and no Metropolitan areas in the new Code. Sections 8, 11, 12, 14, 17, 22, 29, 113, 196, 214, 320, 321, 415, 422 and 436 of the BNSS reflect the consequential renumbering. The class of "Assistant Sessions Judges" too has been abolished, the position of criminal courts being re-graded. The CrPC definition of "pleader" is dropped; the Advocates Act, 1961, is the exclusive code for the right of audience. The CrPC definition of "rules" — for an expression that bears its ordinary meaning — is also dropped. Of these, only the abolition of the Metropolitan Magistracy has had real practical consequences in the early months of the new regime, and these are noted in the chapter on powers of courts and sentencing jurisdiction.

Construction-of-references and the link to the BNS and the IT Act

Section 2(2) BNSS provides that words and expressions used in the Sanhita but not defined therein shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 3 BNSS reproduces, with simplifications, the construction-of-references provision of Section 3 CrPC, mapping references to Magistrates of various classes. Both provisions are mechanical in operation but indispensable in interpretation; an undefined term in the BNSS — say "culpable homicide" or "voluntarily" — receives its meaning from the substantive Code, not from a free-standing exercise in lexicography.

Read as a whole, Section 2 BNSS is the door through which every later provision of the Sanhita is approached. A magistrate who reads it carelessly will misclassify cognizable cases, mis-treat police reports as complaints, and misapply the warrant procedure to summons-cases. A candidate who reads it carelessly will fail every fact-pattern question that turns on the difference between investigation and inquiry, or between a complaint and a police report, or between a bailable and a non-bailable offence. The chapters that follow this one assume — and rely on — fluency with these definitions.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between an investigation and an inquiry under Section 2 BNSS?

An investigation, defined in Section 2(1)(l) BNSS (previously Section 2(h) CrPC), is conducted by a police officer or by a person authorised by a Magistrate in that behalf, and its object is the collection of evidence. An inquiry, defined in Section 2(1)(k) BNSS (previously Section 2(g) CrPC), is conducted by a Magistrate or a Court — never by the police — and its object is to determine the truth or falsity of certain facts with a view to taking further action. The Supreme Court drew the contrast in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196: investigation precedes inquiry, inquiry precedes trial, and the three are successive stages.

When is a report by a police officer treated as a complaint and not as a police report?

Under the Explanation to Section 2(1)(h) BNSS (previously the Explanation to Section 2(d) CrPC), a report by a police officer in a case which, after investigation, discloses the commission of a non-cognizable offence is deemed to be a complaint, and the officer is deemed to be the complainant. This applies where the police initially treated the case as cognizable but on completion of investigation found it non-cognizable. It also applies where the police investigated a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate required by Section 175(2) BNSS (previously Section 155(2) CrPC). In both cases the procedure is the complaint procedure under Section 223 BNSS.

Does the BNSS define 'bail'? The CrPC did not.

Yes. Section 2(1)(b) BNSS, for the first time in Indian procedural law, defines 'bail' to mean the release of a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence from the custody of law upon certain conditions, on execution by such person of a bond or a bail bond. Sub-clauses (d) and (e) define bail bond and bond. The 1973 Code used these terms throughout but did not define them, and the BNSS now plugs that gap. The substantive bail-grant rules in Sections 478 to 496 BNSS continue to follow the framework of Sections 436 to 450 CrPC, and the bail jurisprudence of the Supreme Court — Arnesh Kumar and Satender Antil — continues to govern.

Why does the warrant-case / summons-case classification matter?

The classification decides which procedural chapter governs the trial. A warrant-case — an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment exceeding two years — is tried under the warrant-case procedure in Sections 261 to 273 BNSS, with a formal charge framed under Section 263 BNSS. A summons-case — anything else — is tried under the lighter summons-case procedure in Sections 274 to 282 BNSS, with no charge framed; the particulars of the offence are merely stated to the accused. The classification is fixed at the commencement of trial and a warrant-case cannot be tried piecemeal under the summons procedure.

What does 'judicial proceeding' include under Section 2(1)(m) BNSS, and what is excluded?

A judicial proceeding includes any proceeding in which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. The definition is non-exhaustive. Inquiries under Section 164 BNSS, inquiries into unnatural death, proceedings for maintenance under Chapter X, search-warrant proceedings, and bail-grant or bail-discharge proceedings are all judicial proceedings. The recording of a statement by a Magistrate under Section 183 BNSS (previously Section 164 CrPC) during the course of police investigation is not a judicial proceeding, because the Magistrate is then assisting the investigative function rather than exercising judicial power.

Why has the BNSS dropped the definitions of 'Metropolitan Magistrate' and 'pleader'?

The BNSS abolishes the Metropolitan Magistracy. With no Metropolitan Magistrates left to recognise, there is no occasion to retain definitions of 'Metropolitan Magistrate' or 'metropolitan area'. The powers earlier exercised by Metropolitan Magistrates are now exercised by Judicial Magistrates of the First Class. The definition of 'pleader' has been dropped because the field has been entirely covered by the Advocates Act, 1961, since that Act came into force; there is no longer any class of 'pleader' separate from the advocates regulated under that Act.