Limitation for Taking Cognizance of Offences

Sections 513 to 519 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — re-enacting Sections 467 to 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — bring the law of limitation into the criminal courtroom. Until the 1973 Code, criminal prosecution in India ran on the common-law principle that statutes of limitation did not extend to offences. The Joint Committee on the Code rejected that principle for petty offences. Memory fades, evidence weakens, the deterrent effect of punishment dulls, and the social retribution that drives the criminal law loses its edge. The chapter answers the policy choice with a graded bar — six months, one year or three years — beyond which a court cannot take cognizance of certain offences without a special order of condonation.

The architecture is compact. Section 513 BNSS defines 'period of limitation'. Section 514 BNSS sets the graded bar and now carries a BNSS-specific explanation that codifies a long-settled rule of practice. Section 515 BNSS fixes when the period begins. Section 516 BNSS lists what is excluded from computation. Section 517 BNSS protects the litigant against court closures. Section 518 BNSS treats continuing offences as continuously committed. Section 519 BNSS is the discretionary catch-all — the court may take cognizance after the period of limitation if the delay has been properly explained or if the interests of justice so require. Together, these sections set the procedural clock that runs alongside the Code of Criminal Procedure and BNSS.

Why a limitation regime in criminal procedure

The Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1054, set out the rationale. The provision is meant to prevent abuse of court process by belated and vexatious prosecutions long after material evidence may have disappeared. The Court returned to the theme in Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas, AIR 1999 SC 2071, holding that Parliament classified offences into two categories: grave offences punishable with more than three years are kept entirely outside the limitation regime, and minor offences punishable up to three years are placed within it, subject to the discretionary cushion of Section 473 CrPC (now Section 519 BNSS). The chapter does not soften criminal accountability — it draws a line between the offences for which delay can fairly be tolerated and those for which it cannot.

Section 514 BNSS — Bar to cognizance after the limitation period

Section 514(1) BNSS (previously Section 468(1) CrPC) bars a court from taking cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation, except as otherwise provided by the Code. Sub-section (2) sets the three-tier scale.

1. Six months — if the offence is punishable with fine only.
2. One year — if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.
3. Three years — if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.

Sub-section (3), inserted in 1998, provides that where several offences may be tried together, the period of limitation is determined by reference to the offence punishable with the more severe punishment. The Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Tara Dutt, AIR 2000 SC 297, applied this rule to hold that limitation must be measured by the offence charged in the framing of charge, not the offence on which the accused is finally convicted. A person charged with a major offence and convicted of a lesser one cannot escape on the limitation period applicable to the lesser offence.

The BNSS-specific clarification

Section 514 BNSS adds an Explanation that the CrPC did not carry. It now states that, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date shall be the date of filing of a complaint under Section 223 BNSS or the date of recording information under Section 173 BNSS. The Explanation codifies the settled holding in Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., (2003) 8 SCC 559: limitation operates on the act of the prosecutor, not on the act of the court. A complaint filed within the limitation period cannot be defeated by a delay in the court's own process. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit — an act of court shall prejudice no man — supplies the underlying logic. The Explanation now puts that logic into the text, removing any residual argument that the date of cognizance is the relevant date. The same discipline runs alongside the chapter on complaints to Magistrates and the FIR and Zero FIR mechanism.

Effect of contravention — proceedings void ab initio

If a court takes cognizance of an offence beyond the period of limitation under Section 514 BNSS without an order condoning the delay under Section 519 BNSS, the proceeding is void ab initio. Surinder Mohan Vikal v. Ascharj Lal Chopra, AIR 1978 SC 986, settled the rule. The conviction must be set aside on appeal, and the accused released. Sarwan Singh (above) restates the position. Srinivas Pal v. Union Territory, AIR 1988 SC 1729, holds that an order taking cognizance without condonation, where condonation is required, is itself without jurisdiction. The bar in Section 514 BNSS is not a procedural inconvenience — it is a jurisdictional limit.

Section 515 BNSS — Commencement of the period

Section 515 BNSS (previously Section 469 CrPC) anchors the start of the limitation clock. The period commences from one of three dates, whichever applies on the facts.

1. Date of the offence — the default rule. Where the commission of the offence is known both to the aggrieved person and to the police, the clock starts from the day the offence was committed.
2. Date of knowledge — where the commission of the offence was not known to the aggrieved person or to any police officer, the clock starts from the first day the offence comes to the knowledge of either.
3. Date of identification — where the offence is known but the offender's identity is not, the clock starts from the first day the identity is known to the aggrieved person or to the investigating police officer.

Sub-section (2) excludes the day from which the period is computed. The Supreme Court in P.D. Jambhekar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1973 SC 309, held that 'comes to the knowledge' refers to actual knowledge, not constructive notice. The contrast is sharp: Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, uses 'could with reasonable diligence have discovered' — Section 515 BNSS does not. The date of receipt of an audit report disclosing embezzlement, for example, is the date of knowledge for a charge of misappropriation against the accountant (State of Karnataka v. Vedavati, (1978) CrLJ 1375). The same rule was applied in State of Rajasthan v. Sanjay Kumar, AIR 1998 SC 1919, where the Government Analyst's report under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act was held to be the trigger date — not the earlier date of sample collection. The investigative chronology that builds these knowledge dates is the subject of the chapter on the power of police to investigate.

Section 516 BNSS — Exclusion of time

Section 516 BNSS (previously Section 470 CrPC) lists the exclusions that compress the period actually counted against the prosecution. The four heads matter for fact-pattern questions every year.

Sub-section (1) — time spent in a defective prosecution

The time during which a person was prosecuting another prosecution against the same offender, whether in a court of first instance or in appeal or revision, is excluded. The proviso imposes three conditions: the prosecution must relate to the same facts; it must have been pursued in good faith; and the earlier court must have been unable to entertain it owing to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. Surinder Mohan Vikal (above) applied this rule strictly: where the previous prosecution was an unrelated complaint, the exclusion is not available. The phrase 'good faith' is borrowed from Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and is interpreted in line with that provision. The burden of proof lies on the prosecutor seeking the extension.

Sub-section (2) — stay or injunction

Where the institution of the prosecution has been stayed by an injunction or order, the period of continuance of the stay — including the days the order was made and withdrawn — is excluded. The exclusion runs only for the period of an actual operative order; an apprehended stay does not stop the clock.

Sub-section (3) — notice and sanction

Where a notice of prosecution has been given, the notice period is excluded. Where the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required, the time required to obtain it is excluded. The Explanation makes the exclusion symmetrical: both the date of application and the date of receipt of the order are excluded. The Supreme Court has read this provision with care. In N. Veeraswami v. State, 1985 CrLJ 572, where the Public Prosecutor was bound to file the complaint within six months and the Government's delay in sanctioning was not part of the limitation, the exclusion was refused — the sanction was not a condition precedent under that statute. The authorisation of an officer under Section 34(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has been held not to be 'consent' or 'sanction' within the meaning of the section (Wagh v. State of Maharashtra, (1991) CrLJ 1243).

Sub-section (4) — absence and absconding

Where the offender has been absent from India or from any territory under the administration of the Central Government, or has avoided arrest by absconding or concealing himself, the time of such absence or absconding is excluded. The provision aligns with the Code's broader scheme of processes to compel appearance — summons, warrants, proclamation and attachment: an offender who places himself beyond the court's reach cannot then claim the benefit of the limitation that ran while he was absent.

Section 517 BNSS — Court closed on the last day

Section 517 BNSS (previously Section 471 CrPC) protects the litigant against the calendar. Where the period of limitation expires on a day when the court is closed, cognizance may be taken on the day the court reopens. The Explanation defines a court as 'closed' if, during its normal working hours, it remains closed. The section is modelled on Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and decisions under that section apply. The Supreme Court in Amar Chand Inani v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 313, clarified an important rider — 'court' means the proper court where the case should have been instituted, not a wrong court without jurisdiction. A complainant who runs to a court without jurisdiction on the last day cannot rely on Section 517 BNSS.

Section 518 BNSS — Continuing offences

Section 518 BNSS (previously Section 472 CrPC) provides that, in the case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. The provision is modelled on Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Whether an offence is 'continuing' is a question of substantive law. The Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of M.P., AIR 1984 SC 1688, held that non-payment of the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund before the due date is a continuing offence — fresh limitation runs each day the default continues. State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, AIR 1973 SC 908, set the test: an offence is continuing where the law not only creates an offence for non-compliance but also provides that the liability for the prescribed punishment shall continue until the requirement is complied with.

The Court has, on the same logic, held the following to be continuing offences: trespass under common law; obstruction to water supply under Section 430 IPC (now its BNS counterpart); refusal to vacate company-allotted premises after retirement under Section 630(1)(b) of the Companies Act (Gokak v. P.G. Hirenemeth, (1991) 2 SCC 141); non-implementation of an industrial settlement or award. By contrast, every demand of dowry under Sections 3–4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act has been treated as a separate offence with its own limitation, not a continuing offence (Harbans v. Gurcharan, (1990) CrLJ 1591). Failure to submit a return under the Mines Act, 1952, is also not continuing — the act of non-submission completes on the due date (Deokaran Nenshi, above). Criminal breach of trust is not a continuing offence (Dinabandhu v. Nandini, (1994) CrLJ 422).

Section 519 BNSS — Extension of the period in the interests of justice

Section 519 BNSS (previously Section 473 CrPC) is the chapter's discretionary safety valve. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 514 to 518 BNSS, any court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied, on the facts and circumstances of the case, that the delay has been properly explained or that taking cognizance is necessary in the interests of justice. The two limbs are independent. The Supreme Court in K.C. Pandu Ranga Rao v. Secretary, 1985 CrLJ 176, made the point clearly: even where the explanation offered for the delay is rejected, the court can still take cognizance if the interests of justice so require. The parameter is always the interests of justice.

Liberal construction, but principled exercise

The Court in Bhagirath Kanoria (above) and again in Arun Vyas (above) has held that Section 473 CrPC is in the nature of an overriding provision and should be applied whenever the interests of justice require. The discretion is to be exercised judicially. State of H.P. v. Tara Dutt (above) requires the court to record reasons in a speaking order. The provision differs from Section 5 of the Limitation Act in one important respect: under Section 5, the burden is on the appellant to show sufficient cause; under Section 519 BNSS, the court has an active duty to examine not only the explanation but also whether the interests of justice require condonation (Radhamanohari v. Reddy, (1993) 3 SCC 4).

Notice to the accused — natural justice

Section 519 BNSS does not, on its text, require notice to the accused before condonation. But the Supreme Court has read in the principle of audi alteram partem. State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre, 1995 SCC (Cri) 16, held that an order condoning delay must be a speaking order passed after hearing the accused. Daleep v. Magan, 1996 CrLJ 190, set aside an order made without notice to the accused, treating it as a violation of natural justice. The Calcutta High Court has refined the rule: where the accused is not yet before the court at the stage of cognizance, an initial order condoning delay is not invalid for want of hearing, but the accused, on appearance, may take objection and the question must then be re-decided after hearing both sides, the decision relating back to the date of cognizance.

When condonation has been refused — and when it has been granted

The case law has accumulated a working sense of the limits. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Sharaful Haque, AIR 2005 SC 9, a complaint under Section 418 IPC filed seven years after the offence, with no explanation, could not be saved by condonation. T.J. Stephen v. Parle Bottling Co., AIR 1995 SC 994, held that it would not be in the interests of justice to allow a prosecution twenty years after the offence. By contrast, in Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2005 SC 1989, where the FIR for an offence under Section 498A IPC was filed within three years but the police took until 2006 to submit the chargesheet, the delay between investigation and cognizance was condoned — the complainant had done what was in her control. A delay of three days condoned suo motu by the trial court should not be interfered with in revision (Madan v. State, 1990 CrLJ 1046). The remedy of revision is available where the trial court has exercised its discretion improperly — particularly where no application for condonation was made and yet the court took cognizance, or where reasons for condonation were not recorded.

Where Section 514 BNSS does not apply — the four exceptions

Section 514 BNSS opens with the words 'except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code'. Four categories of cases sit outside the chapter altogether and must not be confused in an MCQ.

1. Offences punishable with more than three years. The chapter applies only to offences punishable up to three years. Offences such as Section 494 IPC for bigamy (seven years — see Radhamanohari v. Reddy, above) and Section 306 IPC for abetment of suicide (ten years) are entirely outside the limitation regime. In P. Krishnamurthi v. State, 1994 CrLJ 506, the Supreme Court held that an offence under Sections 306 and 498A IPC together is not hit by Section 468 CrPC because Section 306 is punishable with ten years.
2. Special Codes that prescribe their own limitation. Where a special law fixes a different period, the special law prevails. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, with its one-month limitation from receipt of notice, is the most familiar example. Section 142 of the Act provides for condonation, separately from Section 519 BNSS.
3. Economic offences listed in the Schedule. The Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974, takes a long list of statutes — the Income-tax Act, the Customs Act, the Wealth-tax Act, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, the Companies Act surtax provisions, among others — entirely outside Chapter XXXVI of the CrPC and now outside Chapter XXXVIII of the BNSS. An offence under those statutes can be taken cognizance of at any time. State amendments add further enactments to the carve-out.
4. Continuing offences under Section 518 BNSS. Where an offence is continuing, fresh limitation runs each day; the bar in Section 514 does not bite until the offence ceases.

BNSS innovations — what changed

The BNSS keeps the chapter substantively intact and tightens it in one focused way.

1. Section 514 BNSS — a new Explanation. The Explanation now codifies the holding of Bharat Damodar Kale (above): the relevant date for limitation is the date of filing of a complaint under Section 223 BNSS or the date of recording information under Section 173 BNSS — not the date of cognizance. This is the most significant change in the chapter. It removes the residual argument that a complaint filed within time can be defeated by delay in court process. It also speaks directly to the discipline of the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings: the prosecutor controls the limitation timeline; the court does not.
2. Section 514(1) BNSS — drafting clean-up. The word 'elsewhere' has been excluded from sub-section (1). The substantive reach of the section is unchanged.
3. Cross-references to BNSS analogues. The opening words 'except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code' continue to operate, with reference now to BNSS sections, including Section 175 BNSS (information to police and investigation) and Section 144 BNSS (maintenance of wife, children, parents). The provisions on maintenance under Section 125 CrPC / Section 144 BNSS retain their special limitation under their own subsection (3) proviso.

The BNSS leaves Sections 515 to 519 substantively unchanged. Decisions interpreting Sections 469 to 473 CrPC — Bharat Damodar Kale, Sarwan Singh, Surinder Mohan Vikal, Bhagirath Kanoria, Arun Vyas, Tara Dutt, Sanjay Kumar, Vedavati — continue to govern. Their reasoning has not been disturbed.

Comparative table — CrPC ↔ BNSS

Subject	CrPC, 1973	BNSS, 2023	Change
Definition of 'period of limitation'	Section 467	Section 513	No change
Bar to taking cognizance	Section 468	Section 514	New Explanation: relevant date is filing/recording date, not cognizance date
Commencement of period	Section 469	Section 515	No change
Exclusion of time	Section 470	Section 516	No change
Court closed on last day	Section 471	Section 517	No change
Continuing offence	Section 472	Section 518	No change
Extension in interests of justice	Section 473	Section 519	No change

Exam-pointer pitfalls

Five recurring distinctions drive the MCQ design in this chapter every year. The errors that most candidates make sit on each one.

1. Filing vs. cognizance. Section 514 BNSS bars cognizance, but the BNSS Explanation now makes clear that the relevant date is the date of the complaint or the date of recording information — not the date the Magistrate signs the cognizance order. Bharat Damodar Kale is now in the text.
2. Three years is the ceiling. Section 514 BNSS does not apply to offences punishable with more than three years. A common MCQ pitfall is to apply the three-year limit to a Section 306 IPC charge. The chapter does not bite there.
3. Knowledge means actual knowledge. Section 515 BNSS uses 'comes to the knowledge', not 'could with reasonable diligence have discovered'. Constructive notice does not start the clock. Jambhekar is the authority.
4. Continuing offence test. An offence is continuing only where the law makes the liability continue until compliance. Failure to file a return on a fixed date is not continuing. Refusal to vacate after retirement is. Deokaran Nenshi and Bhagirath Kanoria are the touchstones.
5. Section 519 BNSS — two grounds. Properly explained delay is one ground. Interests of justice is the other, and it is independent. The court can condone delay even where the explanation is unsatisfactory. The order must be speaking, made after notice to the accused, and is open to the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS if exercised without principle.

The chapter is short, but it does heavy lifting. It tells the court when not to convict — not because the accused did not do the act, but because the State took too long to bring the act to trial. Sections 513 to 519 BNSS sit at the boundary between fairness and accountability, and the calibration matters in every case where the offence is petty and the delay long. The exam asks the student to know the periods, the exclusions, the exceptions, and the reach of the discretionary cushion. The court asks the Magistrate to apply them with reasons.

Frequently asked questions

Does Section 514 BNSS apply to all offences?

No. Section 514 BNSS applies only to offences punishable with fine only, or with imprisonment up to three years. Offences punishable with more than three years are entirely outside the limitation regime. The Supreme Court in Radhamanohari v. Reddy, (1993) 3 SCC 4, applied this rule to Section 494 IPC (bigamy, seven years), and in P. Krishnamurthi v. State, 1994 CrLJ 506, to Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide, ten years). Special statutes that fix their own limitation, the offences listed in the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974, and continuing offences under Section 518 BNSS are also outside its reach.

What is the BNSS innovation in Section 514?

The BNSS adds an Explanation to Section 514 stating that, for computing the period of limitation, the relevant date shall be the date of filing of a complaint under Section 223 BNSS or the date of recording information under Section 173 BNSS — not the date of cognizance. This codifies the Supreme Court's holding in Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., (2003) 8 SCC 559, that limitation operates on the act of the prosecutor, not on the act of the court. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit underlies the rule. The CrPC did not carry this Explanation; the BNSS now does.

When does the limitation clock start under Section 515 BNSS?

From one of three dates — whichever applies on the facts. First, the date of the offence, where the offence is known to the aggrieved person and to the police. Second, the date of knowledge — where the commission of the offence was not known to the aggrieved person or to any police officer, the period starts on the first day either comes to know. Third, the date of identification — where the offence is known but the offender's identity is not, the period starts on the first day the identity is known. Section 515(2) BNSS excludes the day from which the period is computed. The Supreme Court in P.D. Jambhekar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1973 SC 309, held that 'comes to the knowledge' refers to actual knowledge — constructive notice does not start the clock.

What is the difference between Section 519 BNSS and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

Both empower a court to condone delay, but the burden differs. Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the appellant or applicant must show sufficient cause for the delay. Under Section 519 BNSS, the court has an active duty to examine not only the explanation for the delay but also whether the interests of justice require condonation, even where the explanation is unsatisfactory. The Supreme Court drew the distinction in Radhamanohari v. Reddy, (1993) 3 SCC 4. The two limbs of Section 519 — properly explained delay, or interests of justice — are independent. Either is sufficient.

Must the accused be heard before delay is condoned?

In principle, yes. Section 473 CrPC (now Section 519 BNSS) does not on its text require notice, but the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre, 1995 SCC (Cri) 16, held that an order condoning delay must be a speaking order passed after hearing the accused, in line with natural justice. Daleep v. Magan, 1996 CrLJ 190, set aside an order made without notice. Where the accused is not before the court at the stage of cognizance, an initial condonation order is not invalid for want of hearing, but the question must be re-decided after the accused appears and raises objection — the decision relating back to the date of cognizance.

What happens if a court takes cognizance after the limitation period without condoning the delay?

The proceeding is void ab initio. The Supreme Court in Surinder Mohan Vikal v. Ascharj Lal Chopra, AIR 1978 SC 986, settled the rule. Srinivas Pal v. Union Territory, AIR 1988 SC 1729, holds that an order taking cognizance, where condonation under Section 519 BNSS is required and not granted, is itself without jurisdiction. The conviction must be set aside on appeal and the accused released. The bar in Section 514 BNSS is jurisdictional, not procedural — a court that ignores it is not merely irregular; it is acting without authority.