Sections 415 to 435 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — previously Sections 372 to 394 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — collect the entire criminal-appeal architecture in one chapter. The chapter answers four operational questions: when does an appeal lie at all, to which forum, on whose initiative, and with what powers. The starting rule is restrictive — no appeal lies from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided by the Code or any other law in force. Every appellate route in the criminal process is therefore a statutory creation, traced back to a specific section of the Sanhita.

The BNSS retains the structural sequence of the CrPC chapter and adds limited textual changes — the deletion of “Metropolitan Magistrate” and “Assistant Sessions Judge” references (the BNSS court hierarchy is now flat), reduction of the petty-case imprisonment threshold from six months to three months in Section 417 BNSS, replacement of “pleader” with “advocate” throughout, and the express addition of “or bail bond” in Section 430 BNSS on suspension of sentence pending appeal. The substantive doctrine — victim’s right of appeal under the proviso to Section 415 BNSS, leave-of-court requirement for State appeals against acquittal, the appellate court’s power to reverse, alter, or remand, and the constitutional appeal routes under Articles 134 and 136 — carries forward without alteration.

Statutory anchor and scheme

The chapter divides into four blocks.

  1. Right of appeal — the threshold rule. Section 415 BNSS (previously Section 372 CrPC) declares that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided by the Code or any other law for the time being in force. The proviso, inserted in 2009 in the CrPC and carried into the BNSS, gives the victim a right to prefer an appeal against acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or imposition of inadequate compensation.
  2. Convict’s appeals — Sections 415 to 417 BNSS (previously Sections 374 to 376 CrPC) set out the forum tiers and the bars. Appeal lies as of right against conviction, subject to the bars on plea-of-guilty appeals and petty-case appeals.
  3. State and victim appeals — Sections 418 to 421 BNSS (previously Sections 377 to 380 CrPC) deal with State appeals on inadequate sentence, State and Central Government appeals against acquittal, the Supreme Court’s enlarged jurisdiction in life-imprisonment cases, and the joint-trial right of appeal.
  4. Appellate procedure and powers — Sections 422 to 435 BNSS (previously Sections 381 to 394 CrPC) contain the procedural machinery: form of appeal, summary dismissal, hearing, the operative powers under Section 427 BNSS (previously Section 386 CrPC), suspension of sentence and bail under Section 430, additional evidence under Section 432, equally divided benches under Section 433, finality under Section 434, and abatement under Section 435.

The chapter sits at the apex of the trial process. The trial that produced the impugned judgment was governed by the procedure in the trial before a Sessions Court chapter, the warrant trial by Magistrate chapter, the summons trial by Magistrate chapter, or the summary trials chapter; the judgment that follows is governed by the judgment form and contents chapter; and where a death sentence is passed, the death-sentence confirmation chapter operates in parallel with the appeal route. The full procedural map is in the Code of Criminal Procedure and BNSS notes.

Right of appeal — nature and incidents

The right of appeal is a substantive right, not a procedural one. It is a creature of statute and exists only where the legislature provides for it (Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 SC 2145). There is no inherent right to appeal, and no inherent power in a court to entertain an appeal where the Code does not provide one. The right is also a vested right: once it accrues at the date of institution of proceedings, it can be taken away only by express statutory provision or necessary intendment (Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540). An appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding (Manu Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2147), with the consequence that, on conviction in appeal, the conviction and sentence are substituted for and have retroactive effect from the date of the trial court’s judgment.

The forum is determined by the law in force at the date of cognizance, not at the date of filing of the appeal (Bhavsar v. State of Gujarat, (1976) CrLJ 84 Guj). The grounds of appeal are open: in the absence of any specific bar, an appeal lies on questions of law as well as fact (Govinda Kadtuji Kadam v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 SC 1976). And the onus on appeal is unlike a civil appeal: in a criminal appeal, the presumption of innocence subsists at the appellate stage and is not weakened by conviction in the trial court — the prosecution must establish that the trial court’s judgment was right, the appellate court must assess the entire evidence, and a conviction must be supported by a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt at the appellate stage too (Anama v. Trilochan, AIR 1969 Or 75; Digendra v. State of Assam, (1968) 2 SCWR 155).

Section 415 BNSS — victim’s right of appeal

The proviso to Section 415 BNSS (previously the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 with effect from 31 December 2009) gives the victim a right to prefer an appeal against any order of acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or imposition of inadequate compensation. Such appeal lies to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of that court — that is, the same forum to which the convict could have appealed. The victim’s appeal does not require leave of the High Court, even where the State’s appeal under Section 419 BNSS would.

The Supreme Court in National Commission for Women v. State of Delhi, (2010) 12 SCC 599 held that the proviso has no retrospective effect: the victim’s right cannot be invoked in cases where cognizance was taken before 31 December 2009. The victim’s right is an autonomous right, exercisable independently of the State; it gives concrete form to the rights of the victim recognised in victim-protection jurisprudence and the constitutional architecture of Article 21.

Section 415 BNSS — forum tiers for appeal from conviction

Section 415 BNSS (previously Section 374 CrPC) sets out the three-tier forum architecture for appeals against conviction. Read with Section 28 BNSS (previously Section 28 CrPC) on sentencing powers explained in the powers and sentencing jurisdiction chapter, the rule is:

  1. High Court → Supreme Court. Conviction on a trial held by a High Court in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction is appealable to the Supreme Court under Section 415(1) BNSS.
  2. Sessions Judge or sentence above seven years → High Court. Conviction on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge, or on a trial held by any other court where the sentence of imprisonment exceeds seven years, is appealable to the High Court under Section 415(2) BNSS.
  3. Magistrate or sentence up to seven years → Court of Session. Conviction by a Magistrate of the first or second class, or sentence under Section 364 BNSS (previously Section 325 CrPC) on the Magistrate’s reference, or an order under Section 401 BNSS (previously Section 360 CrPC) for probation, is appealable to the Court of Session under Section 415(3) BNSS.

The BNSS removes the references to “Metropolitan Magistrate” and “Assistant Sessions Judge” that the CrPC carried — the BNSS court hierarchy is uniform across all states and union territories, and the Metropolitan/non-Metropolitan distinction has been abolished. Where the Assistant Sessions Judge structure existed under the CrPC, sentences below seven years went to the Sessions Judge and sentences above seven years to the High Court (Chunnu v. State of U.P., (1990) CrLJ 1057 All); under the BNSS, the threshold continues to be the seven-year line, but the lower-court reference is to the Magistrate, not the Assistant Sessions Judge.

Sections 416 and 417 BNSS — bars on appeal

Section 416 BNSS (previously Section 375 CrPC) bars appeal where the accused has pleaded guilty and been convicted on such plea — absolutely, if the conviction is by a High Court; and except as to the extent or legality of the sentence, if the conviction is by a Court of Session or a Magistrate. The bar applies only where the conviction is based purely on the plea of guilt; where the conviction rests on evidence as well as a plea, the bar does not apply (Emperor v. Yakub Ali, 31 CrLJ 122). A plea must be a proper, absolute plea of guilt; a qualified plea is no plea at all (Thippeswamy v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1983 SC 747). And a plea induced by plea bargaining on a promise of fine alone, where a substantive sentence later follows, violates Article 21 and is set aside (State v. Lakshman, 1998 CrLJ 2161).

Section 417 BNSS (previously Section 376 CrPC) bars appeal in petty cases. Under the BNSS, the High Court’s petty-case ceiling is six months and one thousand rupees fine; the Court of Session’s ceiling is reduced from six months to three months under the BNSS — a textual change with operational consequences for short-term sentences. Magistrate of the first class fines up to one hundred rupees and summary-trial fines up to two hundred rupees are also barred. The proviso preserves appealability where any other punishment is combined — for example, an order to furnish security for keeping the peace, a default-imprisonment direction, or multiple fines aggregating beyond the limit. Forfeiture of property combined with a non-appealable fine, or a compensation order combined with a non-appealable fine, retains appealability (Lal Chand v. K.E., AIR 1948 All 107).

Section 418 BNSS — State appeal against inadequate sentence

Section 418 BNSS (previously Section 377 CrPC) is the State Government’s appeal route against inadequate sentence. The State Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal — to the Court of Session if the sentence was passed by a Magistrate, and to the High Court if the sentence was passed by any other court. The Central Government has a concurrent power under sub-section (2) where the offence was investigated by a Central agency — the BNSS removes the specific reference to the Delhi Special Police Establishment but retains the concurrent jurisdiction over Central-Act investigations.

The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 (with effect from 23 June 2006) was the structural change that gave the Sessions Judge the appellate jurisdiction over inadequate-sentence appeals against Magistrates’ orders — the Joint Committee’s original architecture had vested the power exclusively in the High Court. The BNSS continues the post-2005 structure. Sub-section (3) is the procedural safeguard: the appellate court shall not enhance the sentence except after giving the accused a reasonable opportunity of showing cause; while showing cause, the accused may plead for acquittal or for reduction of sentence (U.J.S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633; Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1177). The opportunity is not separately required where the accused has already had it — for instance, where his own appeal against conviction is heard along with the State’s appeal for enhancement (Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 267).

The High Court’s revisional power under Section 442 BNSS (previously Section 401 CrPC), explained in the reference and revision chapter, runs alongside the appeal route. Even where the State has not preferred an appeal under Section 418, the High Court may, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, suo motu call for the records and enhance the sentence in proper cases, after notice and opportunity to the accused (Sahab Singh v. State of Haryana, (1990) CrLJ 1202; Nadir Khan v. State, AIR 1976 SC 2205). The Supreme Court’s power under Article 136 to enhance is wider still (Sham Sunder v. Puran, (1990) CrLJ 2600).

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Section 419 BNSS — appeal in case of acquittal

Section 419 BNSS (previously Section 378 CrPC) is the most heavily litigated provision in the chapter. The architecture is two-tiered:

  1. Magistrate’s acquittal in cognizable, non-bailable offence. The District Magistrate may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of Session under Section 419(1)(a) BNSS. No leave of the High Court is required.
  2. Acquittal by Court of Session or High Court (other than HC original). The State Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court under Section 419(1)(b) BNSS, but only with the leave of the High Court under sub-section (3).
  3. Complainant’s appeal in complaint case. Where the case was instituted on complaint, the complainant may present an appeal to the High Court under sub-section (4), with special leave of the High Court. Limitation under sub-section (5) is six months for public-servant complainants and sixty days for private complainants. If special leave is refused under sub-section (4), no appeal lies under sub-section (1) or (2).

The leave requirement under sub-section (3) is the threshold safeguard. The High Court must apply its mind to the trial court’s reasons and record its own reasons for granting or refusing leave (Chandra Kanta Debnath v. State of Tripura, AIR 1986 SC 606). A cryptic refusal of leave, without examining the trial court’s appreciation of evidence, is liable to be set aside (State of Haryana v. Ram Pal, AIR 2005 SC 1552; State of Rajasthan v. Sohal Lal, (2004) 5 SCC 573; Sugaram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2006 SC 3258).

The substantive standard for interference with acquittal is the controlling doctrine of the chapter. The presumption of innocence is reinforced by acquittal, and the appellate court should be slow to disturb the trial court’s findings unless they are perverse, contrary to evidence, or vitiated by manifest error of law (Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 55; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2007 SC 1106). Where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence, the view favouring acquittal must be preferred (Tota Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1083; Murugesan v. State, AIR 2013 SC 274). The High Court’s power to interfere with acquittal is no less than its power on appeal against conviction — it may re-appreciate the entire evidence and reverse on its own appraisal — but the threshold of interference is higher (Bajwa v. State of U.P., AIR 1973 SC 1204; Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 1051).

The accused’s death pending appeal against acquittal abates the appeal against him; against a mere abettor, the appeal also abates (State of Maharashtra v. Eknath Yeshwant Pagar, AIR 1981 SC 1571). The complainant’s death does not abate his appeal under sub-section (4); a competent legal representative may continue (Bhageerathi v. Jeevan Kumar, 1982 CrLJ 91 Ker).

Constitutional appeals to the Supreme Court — Articles 134 and 136

The Code’s appeal architecture runs alongside two constitutional channels.

Article 134. An appeal lies as of right to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order, or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court if the High Court (a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal and sentenced the accused to death, (b) has withdrawn the case for trial before itself and convicted and sentenced the accused to death, or (c) certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal. Section 420 BNSS (previously Section 379 CrPC) gives an appeal as of right where the High Court, on reversal of acquittal, has imposed life imprisonment or imprisonment for ten years or more (Kishore Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 1977 SC 2267) — a statutory expansion under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 carried into the Code.

Article 136. Special leave to appeal lies in the Supreme Court’s discretion. It is not a court of appeal under the Code; it is a constitutional jurisdiction exercised sparingly, only where exceptional and special circumstances exist or where substantial and grave injustice has been done (Pritam Singh v. The State, AIR 1950 SC 169; Mohinder Singh v. State, AIR 1953 SC 415). The Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact only on grounds such as violation of natural justice, manifest error of law, improper reception or rejection of evidence, or misreading of vital evidence (Saravanabhan v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1273). It will not reweigh evidence as a third court of fact (Pala v. State of Punjab, (1972) 2 SCC 640).

Section 421 BNSS — special right of appeal in joint trials

Section 421 BNSS (previously Section 380 CrPC) gives a corollary right: when more persons than one are convicted in one trial, and an appealable judgment has been passed in respect of any of them, all or any of the convicted persons have a right of appeal — the right of one extends to all, regardless of whether the sentence individually crosses the petty-case threshold. The provision prevents the anomaly of unequal appellate access among co-accused tried together.

Section 427 BNSS — powers of the appellate court

Section 427 BNSS (previously Section 386 CrPC) is the operative powers section. The appellate court, after perusing the record and hearing the parties, may dismiss the appeal or:

  1. In an appeal from acquittal — reverse the order, direct further inquiry, order retrial or commitment, or find the accused guilty and pass sentence according to law.
  2. In an appeal from conviction — (i) reverse and acquit or order retrial, (ii) alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or (iii) alter the nature or extent of the sentence (without enhancement).
  3. In an appeal for enhancement — reverse and acquit or order retrial, alter finding maintaining sentence, or alter sentence to enhance or reduce.
  4. In an appeal from any other order — alter or reverse the order.
  5. Make any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper.

Two provisos govern. First, the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause — the same safeguard that Section 418(3) applies to State appeals. Second, the appellate court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence than the trial court could have imposed for that offence — the appellate court is bound by the trial court’s ceiling.

The Supreme Court in Shankar Kerba Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 840 framed the principle: subject to the strictness of statutory construction, the appellate court may do what the trial court could do and cannot do what the trial court could not do, because it is a court of error. The court of appeal cannot dismiss for default; it must adjudicate on the merits even if the appellant or counsel does not appear (Shyam Deo Pandey v. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1606; Bani Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1996 SC 2439). It must give a reasoned judgment even where it agrees with the lower court (Alijan Nanhe Pehalwan Qureshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 645). A cryptic order without discussion of evidence is set aside on that ground alone (State of M.P. v. Makhmal Khan, (2005) 8 SCC 8; State of M.P. v. Rakesh, AIR 2005 SC 4319).

Section 430 BNSS — suspension of sentence pending appeal

Section 430 BNSS (previously Section 389 CrPC) lets the appellate court order suspension of execution of the sentence and release of the appellant on bail or, where appellant is not on bail, on his own bond — the BNSS expressly adds “or bail bond” to the modes of release. The power is discretionary; the court must record reasons. Where the convict was on bail during trial and the sentence is short or appealable, suspension is more liberally granted; where the offence is grave and the conviction is for life or death, suspension is exceptional and requires strong reasons (Akhilesh Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2010) 12 SCC 357; Atul Tripathi v. State of U.P., AIR 2014 SC 2547).

The bail jurisdiction under Section 430 operates alongside the bail regime treated in the bail and bonds chapter, but is structurally distinct: bail under Section 430 is post-conviction, bail under Section 480 BNSS (previously Section 437 CrPC) is pre-conviction. The standards of grant differ accordingly — the presumption of innocence has been displaced by the conviction, and the appellate court asks whether the conviction is prima facie sustainable, whether the convict is likely to abscond, and whether the sentence is short enough that the appeal would be infructuous if not stayed.

Section 432 BNSS — additional evidence

Section 432 BNSS (previously Section 391 CrPC) lets the appellate court take additional evidence or direct it to be taken. The provision is a power to expand the record, but it is not a power to retry: the additional evidence must be necessary to a just decision of the appeal, and the reasons must be recorded. The Supreme Court in Rambhau v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2001 SC 2120 held that the power is exercised sparingly and only where the additional evidence is essential to the determination of the issue. The convict’s evidence not led at trial because of mistake or inadvertence may be admitted; the prosecution’s gap-filling evidence is admitted with greater caution.

Section 433 BNSS — equally divided benches

Section 433 BNSS (previously Section 392 CrPC) handles the case where a Bench of the High Court is equally divided in opinion on a criminal appeal. The appeal, with their opinions, shall be laid before another Judge of that court, who delivers his opinion, and the judgment or order shall follow that opinion. Where there is no other Judge available, the Chief Justice shall lay the matter before such other High Court Bench as he may direct. The provision mirrors the third-judge mechanism of Section 411 BNSS (previously Section 370 CrPC) for capital-confirmation references in the death-reference architecture.

Section 434 BNSS — finality

Section 434 BNSS (previously Section 393 CrPC) declares the finality of judgments and orders on appeal: judgments and orders passed by an appellate court on appeal shall be final, except in the cases provided for in the appeal chapter, in the revisional remedy, and in the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The finality is therefore qualified by the residual remedies: revision under Section 442 BNSS, reference to the High Court under Section 436 BNSS, and the High Court’s inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (previously Section 482 CrPC).

Section 435 BNSS — abatement

Section 435 BNSS (previously Section 394 CrPC) deals with abatement. Every appeal under Section 418 (inadequate sentence) or Section 419 (acquittal) abates finally on the death of the accused. Every other appeal under the chapter (other than an appeal from a sentence of fine alone) shall abate on the death of the appellant. The proviso lets a near relative apply, within thirty days of the death of the appellant, for leave to continue the appeal — the explanation defines “near relative” as parent, spouse, lineal descendant, brother, or sister.

Practical doctrine on interference with acquittal

The Supreme Court has summarised the principles governing interference with acquittal across multiple decisions. The appellate court has all the powers of the appellate court hearing an appeal against conviction; it may reconsider the whole issue, re-appraise the evidence, and arrive at its own findings. But the presumption of innocence is fortified by acquittal; where two reasonable views are possible, the view favouring the accused must be adopted; the trial court’s advantage of seeing witnesses must be respected; and interference is justified only where the trial court’s conclusions are perverse, contrary to evidence, vitiated by manifest illegality, or shocking to the sense of justice (State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram, AIR 2012 SC 1; K. Venkateshwarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2012 SC 2955; Shyam Babu v. State of U.P., AIR 2012 SC 3311; Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 280).

The grounds on which an acquittal will be set aside are not exhaustive but include: conclusions not based on any evidence; conclusions perverse or unreasonable; conclusions contrary to broad probabilities; overlooking important evidence corroborating the prosecution; discarding eye-witness evidence on untenable grounds; manifest error of law (Satbir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1294; Umedbhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1978 SC 424; Ramesh Vithal Patil v. State of Karnataka, 2014 (4) SCALE 438). The grounds where an acquittal will be sustained are equally important: trial court’s benefit-of-doubt finding on weak prosecution; inconsistencies between witness statements and medical evidence; failure of the prosecution to examine material witnesses (Salim Khan v. Sardar Khan, (1985) 4 SCC 234; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; V.N. Ratheesh v. State of Kerala, AIR 2006 SC 2667).

BNSS comparison — what changed

The architecture is unchanged; the textual changes are limited:

  1. Section 415 BNSS (previously Section 374 CrPC) — references to “Metropolitan Magistrate” and “Assistant Sessions Judge” deleted; the BNSS court hierarchy is uniform.
  2. Section 417 BNSS (previously Section 376 CrPC) — the Court of Session’s petty-case threshold reduced from six months to three months.
  3. Section 418 BNSS (previously Section 377 CrPC) — references to the Delhi Special Police Establishment removed, but Central-Act investigation jurisdiction retained.
  4. Section 423 BNSS (previously Section 382 CrPC) — “pleader” replaced with “advocate”.
  5. Section 425 BNSS (previously Section 384 CrPC) — “pleader” replaced with “advocate”.
  6. Section 430 BNSS (previously Section 389 CrPC) — “or bail bond” added to the modes of release pending appeal.
  7. Section 432 BNSS (previously Section 391 CrPC) — “pleader” replaced with “advocate”.

The case law on Sections 372 to 394 CrPC carries forward without amendment to Sections 415 to 435 BNSS. The doctrinal language is now anchored in the BNSS sections, but Akalu Ahir, Garikapati Veeraya, National Commission for Women, Pritam Singh, Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, Chandrappa, Shankar Kerba Jadhav, Shyam Deo Pandey, Bani Singh, Rambhau — all good law.

Exam-angle takeaways

Five points exam-setters use without fail.

  1. The right of appeal is statutory, vested, and substantive. No appeal lies except as provided by the Code or other law (Section 415 BNSS). The forum is fixed at the date of cognizance, not at the date of filing (Garikapati Veeraya).
  2. The victim’s right of appeal under the proviso to Section 415 BNSS is autonomous, requires no leave, and lies to the same forum to which the convict could have appealed. Not retrospective (National Commission for Women).
  3. Leave of the High Court is mandatory for State appeals against acquittal under Section 419(3) BNSS — except for the District Magistrate-directed appeal to the Court of Session in cognizable, non-bailable Magistrate-acquittal cases. Cryptic refusal of leave is set aside (State of Haryana v. Ram Pal).
  4. The standard of interference with acquittal is the chapter’s controlling doctrine. Two reasonable views → the view favouring acquittal prevails (Chandrappa; Shivaji Genu Mohite). Interference only where the trial court’s conclusions are perverse or vitiated by manifest illegality.
  5. The appellate court’s power under Section 427 BNSS is wide but bounded by the trial court’s sentencing ceiling and by the “opportunity to show cause” safeguard before enhancement. No dismissal for default; reasoned judgment mandatory even on affirmance (Shyam Deo Pandey; Alijan; Bani Singh).

The appeals chapter is the doctrinal hinge of the criminal process. A long-form mains answer should walk through the four-block architecture — threshold rule, convict appeals, State and victim appeals, procedure and powers — and finish with the constitutional appeal channel under Articles 134 and 136. A prelims MCQ will pivot on the victim’s-proviso forum, the seven-year threshold for High Court versus Sessions Judge appeals, the leave-of-court requirement under Section 419(3), the “opportunity to show cause” before enhancement, or the abatement rule under Section 435. The companion chapters — the residual reference jurisdiction, the transfer of criminal cases regime that operates alongside the appellate forum, and the Section 528 BNSS safety valve — complete the post-trial procedural map. The substantive lifecycle of a sentence runs through to the execution of sentences chapter and, in capital cases, through the parallel confirmation route under Sections 407 to 412 BNSS.

Frequently asked questions

Does the victim have an independent right of appeal against acquittal or inadequate sentence?

Yes. The proviso to Section 415 BNSS (previously the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, inserted by the 2008 Amendment Act with effect from 31 December 2009) gives the victim a right to appeal against acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or imposition of inadequate compensation. The appeal lies to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of that court — the same forum to which the convict could have appealed. The victim’s appeal does not require leave of the High Court, even where the State’s appeal under Section 419 BNSS would. The Supreme Court in National Commission for Women v. State of Delhi, (2010) 12 SCC 599 held that the proviso has no retrospective effect — it cannot be invoked in cases where cognizance was taken before 31 December 2009.

What forum does an appeal from a Sessions Judge’s conviction lie to?

Under Section 415(2) BNSS (previously Section 374(2) CrPC), conviction on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge — or by any other court where the sentence of imprisonment exceeds seven years — is appealable to the High Court. Where the sentence is below seven years and the conviction is by a court other than a Sessions Judge, appeal lies to the Court of Session under Section 415(3) BNSS. The seven-year threshold is the controlling line. The BNSS removes references to “Metropolitan Magistrate” and “Assistant Sessions Judge” that the CrPC carried — the BNSS court hierarchy is uniform across states. Conviction on a trial held by a High Court in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction is appealable to the Supreme Court under Section 415(1) BNSS.

Is leave of the High Court mandatory for the State’s appeal against acquittal?

Yes for High Court appeals; no for Sessions Court appeals against Magistrates’ acquittal. Section 419(3) BNSS (previously Section 378(3) CrPC, as amended by the 2005 Act with effect from 23 June 2006) requires that no appeal to the High Court under sub-section (1) or (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. The District Magistrate-directed appeal under Section 419(1)(a) BNSS to the Court of Session against a Magistrate’s acquittal in a cognizable, non-bailable offence does not require leave. The High Court must record reasons for granting or refusing leave; a cryptic refusal without examining the trial court’s appreciation of evidence is set aside (State of Haryana v. Ram Pal, AIR 2005 SC 1552; State of Rajasthan v. Sohal Lal, (2004) 5 SCC 573).

What is the standard for an appellate court interfering with an order of acquittal?

The presumption of innocence is fortified by acquittal, and the appellate court should be slow to disturb the trial court’s findings. The Supreme Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 summarised the rule: the appellate court has all the powers of the appellate court hearing an appeal against conviction and may reconsider the whole issue and re-appraise the evidence, but where two reasonable views are possible on the record, the view favouring the accused must be adopted. Interference is justified only where the trial court’s conclusions are perverse, contrary to evidence, vitiated by manifest illegality, or shocking to the sense of justice (Tota Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1083; Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 280; Shyam Babu v. State of U.P., AIR 2012 SC 3311).

Can a criminal appeal be dismissed for default of appearance?

No. The Supreme Court in Shyam Deo Pandey v. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1606 and reinforced in Bani Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1996 SC 2439 held that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default. Once the appeal is admitted and the records are before the court, the appellate court must dispose of the appeal on the merits, after perusing the record and after hearing the parties or their advocates if they appear. If the appellant or counsel does not appear, the court may adjourn to enable appearance, or may appoint an amicus curiae or a State-cost counsel under Ram Naresh Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 1500, or may dispose of the appeal on the merits after perusing the record — but it cannot dismiss for default. A cryptic affirmance order without discussion of evidence is also set aside on the same principle (Alijan Nanhe Pehalwan Qureshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 645).