Haryana's 2010 Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy promised farmers whose land the State acquired that, if they bought replacement agricultural land in Haryana within two years, they would pay no stamp duty or registration fee up to the amount of their compensation. In January 2011 the Governor gave that promise legal effect by two Gazette notifications, under Section 9(1)(a) of the Stamp Act and Sections 78 and 79 of the Registration Act. Farmers bought land between 2014 and 2021 on certificates issued by the Land Acquisition Collectors.
Then came two departmental letters, signed by an Under Secretary for the Additional Chief Secretary. The first, of 23 October 2019, "clarified" that no R&R Policy benefits applied to awards made on or after 1 January 2014, when the 2013 land acquisition Act came into force. The second, of 19 April 2021, ordered a special audit of three years' deeds and suo motu proceedings under Section 47-A(3) of the Stamp Act to recover the duty. On 31 October 2026 Justice Kuldeep Tiwari quashed both letters and every recovery notice issued under them, in a batch of 113 writ petitions.
Three instruments, three ranks
The case turns on placing each document correctly in the hierarchy of state action. Once that is done, the result follows.
| Instrument | Source and form | What it can do |
|---|---|---|
| R&R Policy, 9 Nov 2010 | Executive policy approved by the Council of Ministers, notified in the Gazette in the Governor's name | Promises benefits; by its own Clause 13, the stamp exemption needed a separate notification |
| Two notifications, 3 Jan 2011 | Statutory: Section 9(1)(a) Stamp Act; Sections 78–79 Registration Act; Gazette; Governor | Actually remit duty and fees, on stated conditions; never amended or withdrawn |
| Letters of 2019 and 2021 | Departmental memos; no statute cited; not in the Governor's name; not gazetted | Internal directions to field officers, nothing more |
Clause 13 of the Policy is the detail to notice. The Policy itself admitted that an executive decision could not alter a statutory liability to pay duty, and promised a separate notification. That admission defined the rest of the case: the exemption existed because of the 2011 notifications, and only an act under the same statutory power could take it away.
Why the letters failed: four independent reasons
1. Equal solemnity. A decision taken by the Council of Ministers and notified in the Gazette can be amended or rescinded only by an act of the same legal rank. The Court found this rule in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act: a power to issue a notification includes a power to amend or rescind it in the same manner and subject to the same conditions. Article 166(1) adds that executive action of a State must be expressed to be taken in the Governor's name, and these letters were not.
2. Executive action is subordinate to statute. The executive may act by instruction where a statute is silent. Once the field is covered by a statutory notification, a circular cannot add a restriction the notification does not contain. The 2019 letter added a cut-off date, awards before 1 January 2014, that appears nowhere in the 2011 notifications.
3. The source of the exemption was never the 1894 Act. The State argued that the R&R Policy fell with the repeal of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court disagreed. The land acquisition statutes only identify who qualifies, as the "factual trigger". The exemption itself comes from the Stamp Act and the Registration Act, which were not repealed. A repeal of the triggering statute does not repeal a notification under a different Act.
4. Power to remit retrospectively is not power to withdraw retrospectively. Section 9(1)(a) lets the Government "reduce or remit, whether prospectively or retrospectively" the duty, by rule or order in the Official Gazette. The Court read the words carefully. They allow a retrospective benefit. They say nothing about retrospectively taking a remission back, so any withdrawal can operate only from the date it is properly notified.
The power to grant retrospective remission is not the power to withdraw a remission retrospectively.
On the fourth point the Court relied on Union of India v. G.S. Chatha Rice Mills, (2021) 2 SCC 209, and ITO v. M.C. Ponnoose, AIR 1970 SC 385. A delegate cannot make a rule with retrospective effect unless the parent statute authorises it expressly or by necessary implication. Neither the Stamp Act nor the Registration Act gives the executive any power to issue retrospective circulars.
Section 47-A was the wrong tool, and legitimate expectation closed the door
The recovery notices were issued under Section 47-A(3) of the Stamp Act as it applies in Haryana. The Court held that the provision does something different. It lets the Collector examine, within three years of registration, whether an instrument was correctly valued and the right duty paid on the date of registration. On that date these deeds were exempt. Section 47-A cannot be used to apply a withdrawal that came years later.
The Court added legitimate expectation, a doctrine the Supreme Court has located in Article 14. The farmers had changed their position on the strength of the State's notifications and certificates, by putting their compensation into farmland when they might have invested it elsewhere. The State may change stamp duty policy for the future in the public interest. It cannot penalise completed transactions made under the earlier regime. The deeds were executed and registered, and the remission had become a vested right.
What the State can still do
The judgment does not freeze the exemption for ever. The Court said the State keeps the power to rescind the remission through the proper channel: a fresh decision and a Gazette notification under Section 9, operating prospectively. The State's argument that compensation under the 2013 Act (two to four times market value, with its own rehabilitation award under Chapter V) makes the old benefits unnecessary may be good policy. It must be implemented by notification, not by an audit memo.
Mains frame: "Can an executive instruction override a statutory notification?"
- Hierarchy: statute → statutory rule or notification → executive instruction. A lower instrument cannot contradict a higher one.
- Form: Article 166(1) (Governor's name), Section 21 General Clauses Act (amend or rescind in the same manner), publication in the Gazette where the statute requires it.
- Retrospectivity: a delegate cannot act retrospectively without express or necessary authority (M.C. Ponnoose; G.S. Chatha Rice Mills); a power to remit retrospectively does not include a power to withdraw retrospectively (Khushhal).
- Fairness: legitimate expectation under Article 14 protects completed transactions.
MCQs on executive instruments
- Valid, since the Government may remit duty retrospectively
- Valid, if issued by the Additional Chief Secretary
- Invalid, as a notification can be undone only by an act of equal solemnity, and only prospectively
- Valid, because Section 47-A permits reassessment within three years
Answer
(c). Khushhal v. State of Haryana (2026), relying on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, Article 166, and the rule against retrospective delegated action.
- Add to, amend, vary or rescind it in the like manner and subject to the like conditions
- Withdraw it by any departmental order
- Give it retrospective effect in every case
- Delegate it to any subordinate officer
Answer
(a). "In the like manner" is the key phrase; a memo is not the like manner for a Gazette notification.
- Always, as it has the force of the parent statute
- Never, under any circumstances
- Only if published in the Gazette
- Only if the parent statute authorises it expressly or by necessary implication
Answer
(d). ITO v. M.C. Ponnoose (1970); G.S. Chatha Rice Mills (2021).
