Section 94-A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 lets the State regularise certain cases of unauthorised occupation of Government land, through a Committee for each Assembly constituency. Sub-section (2-A) allows "additional committees" when the State Government "is of the opinion that it is necessary". In December 2023 the State used it in Byndoor, Udupi district, and put the sitting MLA's defeated rival in the chair. On 2 November 2026 a Division Bench set the notification aside. The ground was not bias but something cleaner to test: the State never formed the opinion the section demands.
One letter, one list, one notification
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2023 election; 2 Nov 2023 | Gantihole wins Byndoor, defeating K. Gopal Poojary (respondent no. 4), and is made Chairman of the principal Committee |
| Before 4 Dec 2023 | Respondent no. 4 writes to the Revenue Minister: about 33,000 applications pending, recommends himself as Chairman and names three members. A second Minister writes on 24 Nov 2023 asking the same. The Revenue Minister endorses |
| 4 Dec 2023 | Additional Committee notified under Section 94-A(2-A) and Rule 108-EE, with exactly the proposed chairman and members |
| 26 Dec 2023 | Jurisdictions demarcated: 12,313 applications to the MLA's Committee, 23,983 to the Additional Committee |
| 4 Aug 2026 | Single Judge dismisses the writ petition, relying on a Tahsildar's affidavit of 29 July 2026 |
The precondition the State never recorded
The statute gives three things to read, in this order: the State must form an opinion; the opinion must be that an Additional Committee is necessary; and the necessity must relate to grant of land under Section 94-A(4). The Bench called the opinion a condition precedent to the power.
For the standard of review the court used two Supreme Court decisions. Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295, holds that "subjective satisfaction" still needs existing circumstances capable of supporting it. Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 4 SCC 144, adds that the opinion cannot rest on imaginary grounds or wishful thinking, and that the material must have a rational connection with the opinion. The court weighs relevance, not sufficiency.
An affidavit can describe the files as they stand on the day it is sworn. It cannot say what the Government considered nearly three years earlier.
Why the 2026 affidavit could not rescue a 2023 notification
The Single Judge accepted pendency figures from the Tahsildar's July 2026 affidavit as proof of necessity. The Division Bench disagreed, citing Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, which in turn quotes Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR 1952 SC 16). A public order is judged by the reasons on record when it was made. (Both as quoted in the judgment.)
The figures were awkward for the State anyway. Of 36,975 applications, only 4,581 were shown as pending, against the proposer's claim of about 33,000. The letters carried no supporting data, so the court treated them as the views of their authors.
Where bias fits, and why the court did not use it
An aspirant reading the facts will reach for nemo judex in causa sua at once. The judgment never uses the word "bias", and an answer saying "quashed for bias" would be wrong.
The rule has two limbs in the standard account. A decision-maker with a direct personal or proprietary interest in the outcome is disqualified, strictly. Short of that, the question is likelihood, and the courts have used two formulations: a "real likelihood" of bias and a "reasonable suspicion" of it. The Supreme Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, held that suspicion alone, even if reasonable, is not enough.
| Case | Who was interested | Result |
|---|---|---|
| A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 | A candidate sat on the selection board | Selection set aside; actual bias need not be shown |
| Tata Cellular | A member's son was a bidder | Not made out: remote link, recommendatory body |
Now compare the Byndoor facts. In Kraipak the interested candidate was inside the decision-making body. Here the interested man was outside it. The decision-maker was the State Government, and the proposer was the beneficiary who wrote the notification's operative paragraph. That is nearer to improper influence than to a judge hearing his own case, and no adjudication had yet happened in which the chairman could be disqualified. The court instead asked the earlier question, whether the State had independently applied its mind at all.
A defeated rival's wish for office is not "relevant material"
The strongest passage is about purpose. Having lost the election, respondent no. 4 appears to have pursued through an indirect route what the ballot had denied him. A person's desire for authority, it held, is not relevant material for forming an opinion under Section 94-A(2-A).
This is improper purpose and irrelevant considerations. The books on discretion treat a power used for a purpose foreign to the statute as ultra vires, whether called colourable or mala fide in the wide sense. It found no dishonest intent. That restraint matters: bias needs only a real likelihood, while mala fides demands specific proof of actual prejudice, a heavy burden that "no relevant material considered" does not carry.
Rule 108-EE: not struck down, but the State must write guidelines
The petitioner also attacked Rule 108-EE, which says the State nominates "a person" as Chairman of the Additional Committee with no qualification. By contrast, Rule 108-E makes the constituency's MLA a member of the principal Committee and relevant to the choice of its Chairman.
The Bench decided not to invalidate the rule. It held that the appointee should have competence comparable to an MLA, and directed the State to frame guidelines with objective criteria: legal knowledge, administrative ability, relevant experience, integrity, confidentiality and conduct beyond reproach. The process must be fair, transparent and non-arbitrary. The doctrinal link is Article 14: unguided discretion is suspect, as in Himmat Lal v. Police Commissioner, AIR 1973 SC 87. Here the court preferred adding guidance to striking the rule down.
Mains frame: "Can a subjective-satisfaction power be exercised on a private request?"
- Precondition: where the section says "if the Government is of the opinion", the opinion is a jurisdictional fact. Record it at the time.
- Standard: subjective, but on relevant material with a rational nexus (Barium Chemicals; Bhikhubhai). The court asks about relevance, not sufficiency.
- Timing: reasons are judged as of the order; affidavits cannot supplement (Mohinder Singh Gill).
- Purpose: personal ambition is extraneous to the statute.
Left open, and worth thinking about
- Nothing forbids the State from forming a proper opinion on fresh material and constituting an Additional Committee again.
- Whether a defeated rival can chair a body deciding land applications in the same constituency is where a bias argument would have been available. The Bench did not need to decide it.
MCQs on opinion, bias and purpose
- Any Member of the Legislative Assembly of the constituency requests it
- More than half the applications in the constituency are pending
- The State Government forms the opinion, on relevant material, that it is necessary for grant of land under sub-section (4)
- The Deputy Commissioner recommends it after a hearing
Answer
(c). The opinion is a condition precedent. Gururaj Gantihole v. State of Karnataka (Karnataka HC, 2026) quashed the notification because the record disclosed none when it was issued.
- A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India
- Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner
- Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. APSRTC
- Tata Cellular v. Union of India
Answer
(b). Mohinder Singh Gill (1978), which the High Court applied to reject the Tahsildar's 2026 affidavit.
- Actual bias must first be proved by evidence of the member's conduct
- The rule against bias applies only to judicial bodies, not administrative ones
- A mere surmise of unfairness is enough
- A real likelihood of bias exists, and proof of actual bias is not necessary
Answer
(d). The question is whether a reasonable and informed person would apprehend real likelihood of bias, not whether the decision was in fact tainted. Surmise alone is not enough.
