At about one in the morning on 1 February 1996, Ramkishan Jadhav told his wife's brother Narayan that Vimalbai was having convulsions and was being taken to Naigaon for treatment. The family followed and found her lifeless on a bullock cart, with blood at her nostrils and fingers. She had been married less than nine months. By eight that morning Ramkishan had given the police a different account. On 2 November 2026 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal, and the life sentence the High Court imposed after reversing his murder acquittal stands.
The Sessions Court at Biloli had convicted the husband, his father and his brother of cruelty and dowry death, but acquitted all six accused of murder. The High Court reversed that acquittal for the husband alone. The father died during the appeal, so his appeal abated.
One night, three accounts, one medical answer
| Stage | What Ramkishan said | What met it |
|---|---|---|
| About 1 a.m., to Narayan | Convulsions; being taken to Naigaon | Body found on a cart; declared brought dead at the hospital |
| 8 a.m., police application | Sudden giddiness, jaws locked, died during intercourse | Autopsy: haemorrhage over the larynx, bruised thyroid cartilages, fractured left cornua of the hyoid; "asphyxia due to throttling" |
| In court | An epileptic seizure during intercourse | Medical jurist: no locked jaw, no displaced tongue, and a fit cannot cause these neck injuries |
His own application is the quiet hinge of the case. By reporting an accidental death he placed himself alone with Vimalbai when she died, and set an inquest and autopsy in motion.
What a fractured hyoid does to a defence
The doctor did not stop at "asphyxia". He named the mechanism and the injuries behind it. That matters because asphyxia alone says only that air stopped reaching the lungs; Ratan Lal's commentary on s.304B notes a ruling that the doctor must say whether it was strangulation or hanging, homicidal or suicidal. A named mechanism turns the first element of dowry death, a death "otherwise than under normal circumstances", from inference into finding.
The defence made a medical claim, and the medical evidence answered it.
Section 106 asks a question; it does not supply a conviction
Section 106 of the Evidence Act, now Section 109 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, puts the burden of proving a fact on the person to whose knowledge it is "especially" confined. The commentary fixes three limits that every answer should state.
- "Especially" means pre-eminently. No application where others could equally know the fact (Razik Ram v. J.S. Chouban, AIR 1975 SC 667).
- It does not shift the burden of proving the crime. It covers a fact known only to the accused, which the prosecution can hardly prove (Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404).
- It works only after the prosecution has led evidence that, if believed, makes out a case (Ram Tahal v. State of U.P., AIR 1972 SC 254).
The anchor was Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681: for a crime committed in secrecy inside a house, the prosecution's burden is "comparatively lighter", and the inmates cannot simply stay silent. Here the prosecution had first proved an unnatural death within nine months, homicidal injuries inside the home, and consistent evidence of cruelty. Only then did "how did she die?" fall to the man who had volunteered an answer.
The house was full, so why does the burden sit with him alone?
The father, brother and the women of the household were all in the house, which under Razik Ram would normally weaken Section 106. Yet the Court spoke of the husband's "exclusive company" and left the murder acquittals of Accused 2 to 6 undisturbed. The judgment does not say why, but the facts do: Ramkishan himself said he was alone with his wife. The burden attaches to the person whose own account or proved opportunity places him alone with the deceased. Presence in the building does not make everyone a Section 106 accused.
A false defence completes a chain; it cannot build one
The Court treated the failed explanation and the false plea as an additional link completing the chain. In Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725, quoted in Chetan Dashrath Gade v. State of Maharashtra (2026 INSC 522, May 2026), the Court said that if the prosecution's chain is not established, failure to explain is "not relevant at all". So the order matters. First the links must be proved under Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra: circumstances fully established, consistent only with guilt, conclusive, excluding every other hypothesis, forming a chain with no gap. Only then can the accused's silence or lie be added.
| Link | Proof here |
|---|---|
| Unnatural death within seven years | Married 12 May 1995; died 1 February 1996; undisputed |
| Homicidal cause | Throttling, with hyoid fracture and laryngeal injuries |
| Opportunity | His own report; no accused denied being in the house |
| Cruelty for dowry | Demands for ₹50,000, a television, a tape deck and a plot; beating, starvation; five prosecution witnesses, two of them neighbours |
| Conduct | A medically refuted explanation, treated as the closing link |
Contrast Chetan Gade, another strangled wife in Maharashtra: the trial court acquitted of cruelty and dowry death for want of proof, yet murder was sustained on a similar chain. Section 302 does not wait for a dowry finding.
Murder, dowry death and cruelty on one set of facts
The husband stands convicted under Section 302 (life, fine ₹5,000), and he and his brother under Sections 304B and 498A read with Section 34, on concurrent seven-year and one-year terms. The Court held the Section 113B presumption unrebutted; the three women were acquitted of everything.
Four propositions from the commentary reconcile the combination. Sections 304B and 498A are not mutually exclusive (Shanti v. State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226). Section 304B applies whether the death is homicide or suicide (Bhagwan Das v. Kartar Singh, (2007) 11 SCC 205), so proof of strangling does not displace it. Section 113B arises only once cruelty for dowry soon before death is shown. And Rajbir v. State of Haryana, AIR 2011 SC 568, told courts to add Section 302 to a 304B charge where the evidence permits. Here murder was charged first and 304B added later.
Section 304B lets the law presume what Section 302 requires it to prove.
What the judgment leaves open
- It does not say how Section 302 and 304B convictions of the same husband are reconciled for sentence.
- It dismisses the brother's "no specific role" plea in a paragraph, without sifting each man's part. Compare our 31 October edition on Jharkhand.
Then and now: the provisions in this case
- Offences: IPC s.302 → BNS s.103(1); IPC s.304B → BNS s.80; IPC s.498A → BNS s.85 (cruelty defined in s.86); IPC s.34 → BNS s.3(5).
- Evidence: IEA s.106 → BSA s.109; IEA s.113B → BSA s.118.
MCQs on the husband who must explain
- He must give a credible explanation, and a false one can strengthen the prosecution's chain
- The burden of proving murder shifts wholly to him
- The prosecution need prove nothing
- It applies only to a Section 304B charge
Answer
(a). The prosecution proves the foundation first; Section 106 then calls for an explanation (Trimukh, applied in Ramkishan).
- Is by itself enough to convict
- Is never relevant
- Can be an additional link only if the prosecution has otherwise proved its chain
- Must be ignored because the accused may stay silent
Answer
(c). If the chain is incomplete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict (Nagendra Sah).
- Death within seven years of marriage
- Dowry demanded at the marriage
- The accused was seen causing the injuries
- Cruelty by the accused, soon before death, for or in connection with dowry demand
Answer
(d). Death within seven years is not enough; cruelty for dowry "soon before death" is the foundational fact.
