Mitakshara teaching begins with a sentence every student can recite: a son acquires an interest in joint family property by the fact of his birth. In J. Rajesh v. M. Kumaran a boy born on 6 January 1994 relied on exactly that sentence to claim half of a Chennai plot. His father had received the plot under a family compromise decree on 3 February 1994, four weeks after the birth, and sold it in April 1997. On 6 November 2026 the Supreme Court dismissed the boy's appeal. Its reason was a statute that came after the sentence: section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
A plot, a compromise and two sales
The land measured 1,811 sq ft and had belonged to N. Ramakrishnan. In 1993 his daughter G. Lalitha sued the boy's father for partition of the family property (C.S. No. 1728 of 1993). It ended in a compromise decree on 3 February 1994 under which the father took the plot. On 3 and 17 April 1997 he sold it to two purchasers. His son, through his mother, then filed O.S. No. 1698 of 1997 against the father and the buyers for half the plot, on the footing that it was ancestral. The plaint did not challenge the compromise decree or either sale deed. It asked only for a share.
- 1993: Lalitha's partition suit is filed; the plaintiff's parents had married on 1 March 1993
- 6 Jan 1994: the plaintiff is born
- 3 Feb 1994: compromise decree gives the plot to the father
- Apr 1997: two sale deeds; the minor's suit follows the same year
- 11 Aug 2010: High Court upholds the first appellate court's reversal of the trial court's preliminary decree
- 2024: the father, ex parte at every stage, dies
- 6 Nov 2026: Supreme Court dismisses Civil Appeal No. 7020 of 2012
The birthright argument was not frivolous
Counsel for the boy built three steps. A Mitakshara son becomes a coparcener at birth. When coparceners partition, what each takes stays coparcenary as against the taker's own son (he cited Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 419 and Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur, (2020) 14 SCC 436). So the father could sell only for legal necessity, which he never tried to show. He added section 29-A of the Tamil Nadu amendment of 1989, which made daughters coparceners. The old law did say what he said: property a son took from his father or other lineal ancestors up to the third degree was ancestral in his hands, and his own sons shared in it by birth. The question was whether the Hindu Succession Act left that rule standing.
Section 8 turned an heir into an owner
The Court answered through Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Chander Sen, (1986) 3 SCC 567, which asked whether a son inheriting from his father takes as karta of his own family or in his individual right. The reasoning is statutory. The 1956 Act codifies and amends, and section 4 overrides the older text and usage. Class I of the Schedule names the son and the son of a predeceased son, but not the son's son. If the inheriting son held as karta of a family that included his own sons, the grandson would get by birth what the Schedule withholds from him, and the Class I heirs would split into two kinds. So the words of section 8 prevail and the son takes individually. Section 19(b) adds that heirs succeeding together take as tenants in common, with no survivorship. Bhanwar Singh v. Puran, (2008) 3 SCC 87 and Radha Bai v. Ram Narayan, (2020) 19 SCC 513 were set out as applications of the same rule.
| Old Mitakshara law | After the 1956 Act (this ruling) | |
|---|---|---|
| Father inherits from his own father | Ancestral in his hands; his sons share by birth | Taken under s.8 as a Class I heir, individually |
| Several Class I heirs | Joint tenancy with survivorship | Tenants in common (s.19(b)); each can alienate his share |
| Share allotted at partition | Stays coparcenary against the allottee's son | The allottee's separate property |
| Son's son | Coparcener with the father | Not in Class I; no birthright in that property |
The four weeks that did not matter
The headline invites a calendar reading: the boy was born before the decree, so he should have been heard. The Court treated a different date as decisive, the death of N. Ramakrishnan, because it decides which rule governed devolution and whether the boy then existed. That date was never disclosed. The Court held that succession "evidently" opened before the boy's birth, since the partition suit was filed in 1993. It followed (paragraphs 36 and 39) that nothing devolved on him, that the unamended section 6, which deals with survivorship among surviving coparceners, did not help because he was not one, and that section 29-A, which speaks of daughters, had no application.
Two rules an examiner may mix in deserve separating. Section 20 HSA treats a child in the womb at an intestate's death as born before it, but only for a person who is an heir, and a son's son is not a Class I heir. The Mitakshara after-born son takes his father's share after a partition between the father and his sons; here the partition was between the father and his siblings, over property that, on the Court's analysis, was never coparcenary in the father's hands.
Why the buyers kept the plot
The decree stood. The plaint pleaded the compromise as the source of the father's share but never attacked it, a point the respondents pressed in paragraph 25. Order XXIII rule 3A CPC bars a separate suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise was unlawful. Our library commentary notes that Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh (2020) applied the bar even to a stranger to the decree, who can claim only what his predecessor could. The Rajesh bench decided on title and did not rely on rule 3A, so treat it as backdrop. A minor sues through a next friend under Order XXXII rule 1; that lets him plead, but gives him no right the substantive law denies.
The buyers took what the seller could give. Section 7 TPA makes competent to transfer anyone entitled to the property and competent to contract. Section 8 passes the whole interest the transferor is then capable of passing. The appellant argued that buyers get no more than the vendor; the holding that the vendor was absolute owner of his allotted share turned that argument against him. Legal necessity never arose, because it is the test for a karta dealing with coparcenary property.
Lis pendens is the question the judgment does not reach. Section 52 TPA binds a transferee pendente lite to the decree, and the commentary notes that a consent decree does not exclude it. Lalitha's suit ended in the compromise before the 1997 sales, so it could not catch them. The boy's own suit was filed in 1997, but the judgment does not say whether before or after the April deeds. Even then the buyers would be bound only to the extent he won, and he had no title to win.
What the judgment leaves open
- The missing date. The grandfather's death was inferred, not found. A fuller record could change the analysis for another family.
- Rohit Chauhan and Arshnoor Singh. They appear in the appellant's submissions (paragraph 18) but not in the reasoning. How they sit with Chander Sen where the property really was coparcenary at partition is not decided.
- Property that is still coparcenary. The ruling concerns property that came under section 8. Where an interest devolves by survivorship, or after 2005 is deemed partitioned (the commentary notes that the amendment made daughters coparceners and abolished survivorship for later deaths), the answer can differ.
- He succeeds, because property from a paternal ancestor is always ancestral in the heir's hands
- He succeeds only if his father cannot show legal necessity for any sale
- He succeeds if he was born before the heirs partitioned the property
- He fails, because the father takes under section 8 in his individual capacity and a son's son is not a Class I heir
Answer
(d). This is the ratio of Chander Sen, applied in Rajesh. Section 8 and section 19(b) make the heirs tenants in common, and the allotted share is the father's separate property.
- a separate suit to set aside the decree on the ground that the compromise was unlawful is barred, and the Supreme Court has applied the bar to a stranger to the decree as well
- such a suit lies only for a party to the compromise
- a minor may bring it within three years of attaining majority
- the suit lies if the allotment prejudices a coparcener, whatever the ground
Answer
(a). Rule 3A bars the separate suit; Triloki Nath Singh (2020) extended it to strangers. The aggrieved person claims only the remedies his predecessor had. In Rajesh the Court decided on title, not on this bar.
- They hold subject to the minor's share, because the property was joint when the sale was made
- The sale is voidable at the minor's option for want of legal necessity
- They acquired the whole interest that the father, as absolute owner of the allotted share, was competent to transfer
- The sale is void because a minor was a member of the family
Answer
(c). A transferee gets what the transferor can pass. Once the Court held the share to be the father's separate property, he could sell all of it, and the necessity question did not arise.