Mithilesh Kumar, a Railway employee, asked the Family Court for a decree of restitution of conjugal rights in 2013. His wife Rita Devi did not appear, and the court decreed the petition ex parte on 11 November 2016. In April 2019 he sued for divorce, saying she had never returned. On 5 November 2026 the Jharkhand High Court dismissed his first appeal. The bench held that he had not proved she knew of the decree, or that she meant to end the marriage.
Three years between a petition and a decree
- 2013 The husband files the Section 9 petition (M.T.S. 197/2013). The wife files a complaint at Dhanbad under Sections 498A, 323 and 506 IPC.
- 24 June 2015 Mediation at JHALSA in the husband's anticipatory bail matter (A.B.A. 708/2014). The couple agree to live together, and she goes to Ranchi with the younger son.
- 10 June 2016 Dhanbad Family Court grants her maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.
- 11 Nov 2016 The Section 9 petition is decreed ex parte.
- 29 Apr 2019 Divorce suit (O.S. 270/2019) under Section 13(1A)(ii).
- 1 July 2020 His revision against the maintenance order is dismissed; he starts paying.
- 19 Mar 2025 / 5 Nov 2026 Family Court dismisses the suit; the High Court dismisses the appeal.
The calendar matters more than the cause title. The decree came about 17 months after the mediation settlement, and the judgment records (para 55) that the decree shows no sign that this settlement, or the stay together, was disclosed to the Family Court. The husband says the wife went back to her parents in August 2015, after the mediation. She says he threw her out a second time. The High Court did not decide who was right, because, as we shall see, it did not need to.
What the ground actually requires, and what it does not
Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act lets either spouse petition for divorce when there has been no restitution of conjugal rights for one year or upwards after a decree for it "in a proceeding to which they were parties". The wording came in with the 1964 amendment, which gave two years, and the 1976 amendment cut the period to one year. Haryana Judiciary Prelims 2013 asked for exactly this period.
Three features of the text matter here. The ground belongs to either spouse, so the decree-holder can use it. The period starts at the decree. And the text speaks of non-restitution, and says nothing of fault or intention. The Supreme Court read it this way in Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar, AIR 1977 SC 2213, where the husband had lost the restitution petition and the wife was the divorce petitioner. Our chapter on restitution of conjugal rights sets this out.
The High Court quoted the provision and agreed (paras 44-45) that it gives an independent right, whoever got the decree. Then it applied a different test. It asked whether the husband had shown that the wife, knowing of the decree, refused to resume cohabitation, and whether she had animus deserendi, the intention to end cohabitation for good. Since he had pleaded desertion, that second test is explicable. The first is the real ratio.
The wife said she had no idea the decree existed. The husband produced nothing to show she did.
The silence of a decree that nobody served on its subject
The Family Court had noted, and the High Court endorsed, three findings of fact. There was no material that she had ever been told of the ex parte decree (paras 56-57). She said in evidence that she was willing to live with him (para 58). And he had not tried to execute the decree or enforce it in any way, though he waited more than two and a half years before suing (paras 53-54). The bench put her separate residence down to years of litigation and strained relations, and not to a decision to abandon the marriage (para 59).
A mains answer should say where the decision sits. It did not hold the decree void, and it did not set it aside, since nobody asked it to. The decree stood. What the court refused was to treat the passing of time since a decree she had never heard of as proof of a wilful refusal to comply with it. That is a point about proof, not about the validity of an ex parte decree.
Could she have simply had the decree set aside?
The judgment does not say that she tried. The procedure is Order IX Rule 13 CPC, which allows an ex parte decree to be set aside if the summons was not duly served or if the defendant shows sufficient cause for non-appearance. As our chapter on appearance and default records, the application is made within thirty days of the decree under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and where the summons was not duly served the period runs from the date she learnt of the decree. A wife who first hears of a 2016 decree through a 2019 divorce summons would be inside that window, subject to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. So her ignorance cuts two ways. It defeats the husband's claim in the divorce suit, and it would also have opened the door to undoing the decree itself.
The door the judgment did not open: Section 23
The bench did not mention Section 23(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, which bars relief to a petitioner who takes advantage of his own wrong. In a divorce case about a restitution decree it is the obvious gate to check, and this is the part of the article that is ours rather than the court's.
Two Supreme Court decisions in our books pull in opposite directions. In Dharmendra Kumar the Court held that a spouse who does not insist on the decree he or she obtained is not taking advantage of a wrong merely by petitioning, and that a "wrong" under Section 23(1)(a) must be misconduct serious enough to justify denying relief, not just a refusal to accept an offer of reunion. In Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar v. Sunanda, AIR 2001 SC 1285, a case under Section 13(1A)(i) after judicial separation, the Court held that Section 23 does apply to a petition under sub-section (1A). It refused the husband relief because he had defied a maintenance order and was waiting for the statutory year to run. The Court added that no general rule exists and the answer turns on the facts.
| Question | Where the law stood | On these facts |
|---|---|---|
| Who may use Section 13(1A)(ii)? | Either spouse, including the decree-holder (Dharmendra Kumar) | The husband was entitled to sue |
| Is the right absolute once a year has passed? | No; Section 23(1)(a) still applies (Hirachand) | Not discussed by the court |
| What counts as a "wrong"? | Serious misconduct, not mere reluctance to reunite (Dharmendra Kumar) | Maintenance paid only after 2020, no disclosure of the 2015 settlement (paras 52, 55) |
| Who proves what? | Husband must prove non-restitution after a decree in a proceeding to which both were parties | He could not show she knew of the decree (para 61) |
Two findings in the judgment sit close to Hirachand. The husband began paying maintenance only after his revision failed in July 2020, and the court said (para 52) that this showed a lack of concern for his wife and sons. His Section 9 judgment also contained no mention of the JHALSA settlement (para 55). The court used these facts in the narrative but never labelled them as a Section 23 "wrong". For an answer-writer the safe course is to give the court's ground first, and then note that Section 23(1)(a) offers an alternative route that Hirachand keeps open, without saying the High Court took it.
Why a decree-holder rarely tests the other side
The case also shows why restitution decrees end so often as a prelude to divorce. Physical return cannot be forced. After Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha, AIR 1984 SC 1562, which upheld Section 9, the notes record that Order XXI Rule 32 allows attachment of property or periodic payments, and arrest and physical return are ruled out. A decree-holder who is not serious about reunion therefore has nothing to do after the decree but wait out the year. In para 54 the High Court noted, with approval, the Family Court's observation that Mithilesh had taken no step to enforce his decree in good faith. That is the court's way of saying that the decree was treated as a ticket and not as a remedy.
For DJS and state mains students, this is the usable idea. The ground is "no restitution for a year", but in practice the court asks who was supposed to restore what, and whether the decree ever reached the person it bound. Our chapter on divorce places the ground among the fault grounds and the ones that are not.
How the court read its own jurisdiction
The appeal came under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, which allows an appeal on facts and on law, and the bench treated this as the counterpart of a first appeal under Section 96 CPC. Our chapter on first appeals covers the powers of a first appellate court. The bench cited Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497, for the proposition that the High Court may re-assess the whole evidence, and Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206, and Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016) 14 SCC 197, for the meaning of perversity. It cited A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22, for the point that proof in matrimonial cases is by preponderance and not beyond doubt (paras 30-40; these authorities are cited as quoted in the judgment).
That choice of standard explains the result. A court that can re-weigh everything chose to ask only whether the Family Court's reading was perverse. With a wife who said in the witness box that she wanted to return, the husband was never going to show it was.
What the judgment leaves open
Loose ends for a careful answer
- It does not say whether a divorce decree under Section 13(1A)(ii) may be refused outright where the decree-holder never served notice of the decree, or only whether he proved her refusal on the evidence.
- It did not apply Section 23 and did not cite Dharmendra Kumar or Hirachand, though both are about this precise ground.
- It was not asked whether the ex parte decree should be set aside, and the record shows no Order IX Rule 13 application by the wife.
- The husband's counsel argued perversity only in general terms (paras 5-7); the judgment records no argument that the 2016 decree was proof of a refusal by itself.
Then and now: the provisions in this case
- Matrimonial: Hindu Marriage Act ss.9, 13(1A)(ii) and 23(1)(a) unchanged; Family Courts Act s.19(1).
- Civil procedure: s.96 CPC, Order IX Rule 13 and Order XXI Rule 32 unchanged; Limitation Act Art. 123.
- Criminal side proceedings: IPC s.498A → BNS s.85; CrPC s.125 → BNSS s.144.
Practise the subject on the CPC mock test, and read our chapter on maintenance for the Section 125 CrPC order that runs through this case.
Three questions on the ground, the proof and the procedure
1. Under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a petition for divorce may be presented:
- only by the spouse who obtained the decree for restitution of conjugal rights
- only by the spouse against whom the decree was passed
- by either spouse, after two years from the decree
- by either spouse, where there has been no restitution for one year or upwards after a decree in a proceeding to which both were parties
Answer
(d) The ground is open to either spouse, as Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar held, and the period has been one year since the 1976 amendment.2. In Mithilesh Kumar v. Rita Devi (Jharkhand High Court, 2026) the husband's appeal against refusal of a divorce under Section 13(1A)(ii) failed principally because:
- an ex parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights is a nullity
- he did not prove, by cogent evidence, that the wife knew of the decree and yet refused to resume cohabitation
- the one-year period had not expired when he presented the petition
- Section 13(1A)(ii) is open only to the spouse against whom the decree was passed
Answer
(b) The High Court agreed that the right under the section is independent. It upheld the Family Court because there was no reliable evidence of her knowledge, and because her separate residence did not show an intention to end cohabitation for good.3. A wife says that the summons in a restitution petition was never served on her and that she first learnt of the ex parte decree from a later divorce summons. Her remedy and its limitation period are:
- an appeal under Section 96 CPC only, within 30 days of the decree
- a review under Order XLVII CPC, within 90 days of the decree
- an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, within 30 days, counted from her knowledge of the decree where the summons was not duly served
- a revision under Section 115 CPC, within 90 days of the decree