Sample Charges — Murder, Culpable Homicide

No part of charge-framing tests a judicial officer more than homicide. The Penal Code packs the entire moral spectrum of unlawful killing into a handful of sections, and the difference between a charge under Section 302 and one under Section 304 Part II can be the difference between the gallows and a few years' rigorous imprisonment. A charge that blurs that line, or that recites the wrong clause of Section 300, fails the accused's right to know precisely what he must meet. This chapter shows how to convert a homicide case into a watertight charge — the exact words, the clause to cite, the alternatives to keep open, and the case law that polices every choice.

Why Homicide Charges Demand Special Care

A charge is the formal notice of accusation that crystallises a vague police narrative into a precise legal proposition the accused must answer. As explained in the chapter on the object of the charge — notice to the accused, the entire institution exists so that a person is not condemned for something he never had a chance to defend. Homicide makes that principle acute. The same physical act — a man dies at another's hand — can found a conviction for murder under Section 302, for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under either part of Section 304, for causing death by negligence under Section 304A, or even an acquittal on a plea of private defence. The legal consequences diverge wildly, yet the underlying facts are often identical.

Because the gradations turn on fine distinctions of intention and knowledge, the charge must commit the prosecution to a definite theory while leaving room, where the evidence is genuinely two-sided, for a lesser alternative. The drafting judge therefore needs to understand not only the bare sections but the relationship between them. That relationship was authoritatively mapped in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382, where the Supreme Court called culpable homicide the genus and murder its species — all murder is culpable homicide, but not all culpable homicide is murder.

The Statutory Architecture: Sections 299 and 300

The starting point is the text itself, verified against the bare Act. Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code defines culpable homicide: whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits culpable homicide. Section 300 then carves murder out of culpable homicide through four numbered clauses — "Firstly", "Secondly", "Thirdly" and "Fourthly" — and immediately qualifies them with five Exceptions that pull an act back down to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the substance is preserved with renumbering: culpable homicide is now Section 100 BNS, murder is Section 101 BNS (the four clauses re-lettered (a) to (d)), punishment for murder is Section 103 BNS, and culpable homicide not amounting to murder is Section 105 BNS. A drafting officer in 2026 must cite the BNS provisions for offences committed on or after 1 July 2024 while remaining fluent in the IPC numbering that still governs older cases and almost all the case law. The clause-by-clause structure of the charge — discussed in form and contents of the charge — maps directly onto this statutory architecture.

The Workhorse Clause: Section 300 'Thirdly' and Virsa Singh

Most murder charges in practice rest on "Thirdly" of Section 300 — death caused by an act done with the intention of causing bodily injury intended to be inflicted, and that injury being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The classic exposition is Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, where Vivian Bose J. laid down four propositions the prosecution must establish: first, the presence of a bodily injury must be established objectively; second, the nature of that injury must be proved; third, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury — that is, it was not accidental, unintentional, or that some other injury was intended; and fourth, it must be proved that the injury of that type, so intended, was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

The crucial holding is that the fourth element is a matter of purely objective inference for the court; the accused need not intend death, nor even know that the injury he intended was fatal. A charge under "Thirdly" should therefore allege the intention to cause the specific injury actually inflicted, not an intention to kill — recording an intention the prosecution cannot prove only hands the defence an opening. The precision Virsa Singh demands is exactly the kind of particularity discussed in particulars to be stated in the charge.

The practical consequence for the framing judge is that the third and fourth elements must be kept analytically separate. Whether the accused intended the injury is a question of fact turning on the manner of the attack — a deliberate thrust to a vital part of the body will ordinarily support the inference, whereas a stray blow may not. Whether that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is then a matter for medical and objective evidence, on which the accused's state of mind is irrelevant. A charge that fuses the two, or that leans on the seriousness of the injury to imply an intention to kill, blurs precisely the distinction Virsa Singh was at pains to preserve. The safest course is to plead the intended injury and its objective sufficiency as the two limbs they are.

The Three Degrees and the Choice of Section

Rayavarapu Punnayya remains the cleanest guide to choosing the operative section. The Court identified three degrees of culpable homicide. The first degree — the gravest — is murder under Section 300, punishable by Section 302. The second degree is culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under the first part of Section 304, which applies where the act is done with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The third and lowest degree falls under the second part of Section 304, where the act is done only with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, without any intention to cause death or fatal injury.

This taxonomy directly drives drafting. A charge must commit to whether the case is one of intention (Part I) or mere knowledge (Part II), because the two attract different punishments — up to life imprisonment under Part I, up to ten years under Part II. Where the evidence supports the higher murder theory, the principal charge is Section 302; the Part I and Part II possibilities are reserved as alternatives only if an Exception or a genuine gap in proof of intention is in play.

The Five Exceptions and How They Affect Drafting

The five Exceptions to Section 300 — grave and sudden provocation, exceeding the right of private defence, a public servant exceeding lawful power, a sudden fight without premeditation, and consent of an adult — do not create new offences. They reduce what would otherwise be murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. As a matter of pleading, the prosecution does not charge an Exception; it is for the accused to bring his case within one. But the framing judge must be alive to the evidence pointing toward an Exception, because that is what justifies keeping a Section 304 alternative open alongside the main murder charge.

The leading authority on Exception 1 is K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605, where the Supreme Court held that grave and sudden provocation must be such that the fatal act is traceable to passion not yet cooled — a lapse of time allowing premeditation defeats the plea. Nanavati's conviction under Section 302 was upheld precisely because the interval between the provocation and the killing gave room for calculation. For the drafter, Nanavati is a reminder that the presence of provocation on the record does not automatically mandate a lesser charge; the timing must fit.

The Procedural Rules That Govern the Charge

The form of the charge is governed by Sections 211 to 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — now Sections 234 to 237 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Section 211 CrPC (S.234 BNSS) requires the charge to state the offence and, where the law gives it a specific name, to describe it by that name. "Murder" and "culpable homicide not amounting to murder" are such named offences, so the charge may use the statutory label coupled with the section. Section 212 CrPC (S.235 BNSS) requires particulars of time, place and person — indispensable in homicide, where the identity of the deceased, the date, and the locus must be unambiguous.

Section 213 CrPC (S.236 BNSS) requires the manner of committing the offence to be stated where the name and bare particulars do not give sufficient notice. In a contested homicide the manner — the weapon, the blows, the part of the body struck — is usually essential, a point developed in the manner of the alleged offence. Section 214 CrPC (S.237 BNSS) directs that words in the charge are read in the sense given to them by the law under which the offence is punishable, so "culpable homicide" carries its Section 299 meaning, not a lay one.

Model Charge — Murder under Section 302 IPC

A standard murder charge, drawn to satisfy Virsa Singh and the procedural sections, reads along these lines:

"I, [name], Sessions Judge, [district], hereby charge you, [accused], as follows: That you, on or about the [date] day of [month, year], at [village/place] within the jurisdiction of this Court, did commit murder by intentionally causing the death of [deceased], by inflicting upon him with a [weapon, e.g. knife] an injury, namely [describe injury and site], which injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code [Section 103 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023], and within my cognizance. And I hereby direct that you be tried by this Court on the said charge."

Note that the charge alleges the intention to cause the specific injury and pleads its sufficiency to cause death in the ordinary course of nature — the language of "Thirdly" — rather than baldly asserting an intention to kill the prosecution may be unable to prove. The deceased is named, the date and place are fixed, and the weapon and injury supply the manner. These elements satisfy Sections 211 to 214 CrPC in a single recital.

Model Charges — Section 304 Part I and Part II

Where the case is culpable homicide of the second degree, the charge tracks the intention limb: "...did commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder by causing the death of [deceased] with the intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, namely [describe], thereby committing an offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code [Section 105 BNS]..."

For the third degree — knowledge only — the charge omits intention and pleads knowledge: "...did cause the death of [deceased] by an act, namely [describe], done with the knowledge that you were likely by such act to cause death, but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, thereby committing an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code [Section 105 BNS]..."

The deliberate difference in wording between the two parts is not cosmetic. It reflects the Punnayya distinction between the intention degree and the knowledge degree, and it governs the maximum sentence the court may impose. A charge that recites both intention and knowledge indiscriminately invites confusion and undercuts the notice the accused is entitled to.

Framing Alternative Charges Where the Evidence Is Two-Sided

Homicide is the paradigm setting for alternative charges. Where the evidence could support either murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder — for instance, because an Exception such as a sudden fight under Exception 4 is plausibly in play — the prudent course is to frame a principal charge under Section 302 with an alternative under Section 304. This keeps both theories live and allows the court to convict on whichever the evidence ultimately supports, without the defect of having tried the accused on a theory the charge never disclosed.

The leading caution comes from Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116, a Constitution Bench decision. There, an alternative charge under Section 302 simpliciter was not framed, yet the conviction was sustained. The Court held that an omission or error in the charge is not by itself fatal; what matters is whether the accused was misled and whether a failure of justice resulted. While Slaney is forgiving of defects, the safer practice — and the one that avoids litigation over prejudice altogether — is to frame the alternative expressly at the outset rather than rely on the appellate court's indulgence.

Errors, Omissions and the Prejudice Test

The forgiving regime Slaney applies is rooted in Section 215 CrPC (now Section 238 BNSS), which provides that no error in stating the offence or the particulars, and no omission to state them, is material unless the accused was in fact misled and it occasioned a failure of justice. Read with Section 464 CrPC (S.510 BNSS), the scheme is that irregularities in framing are curable; only real prejudice vitiates a trial. This is the doctrine that lets an appellate court convert a Section 302 conviction into one under Section 304 Part I or II without retrial where the facts found support the lesser offence.

But the prejudice test is a safety net, not a drafting standard. The accused's right to a fair trial — affirmed as far back as Tara Singh v. State (1951), where the Supreme Court stressed procedural fairness to the accused in a capital case — is best protected by a charge that is right the first time. A drafter who relies on Section 215 to rescue a sloppy charge gambles with the very failure of justice the section exists to prevent. The statutory basis for this exacting standard is traced in the chapter on the introduction, importance and statutory basis of the charge.

Common Drafting Errors in Homicide Charges

Several recurring mistakes deserve flagging. First, citing the wrong clause of Section 300 — for example invoking "Fourthly" (the imminently-dangerous-act clause) where the facts are a targeted injury squarely within "Thirdly". Second, pleading an intention to cause death where the evidence supports only an intention to cause the specific injury; this overreaches and gives the defence room to argue the charge was not made out. Third, conflating Section 304 Part I and Part II by reciting both intention and knowledge, which muddies the degree of culpability the accused must answer.

Fourth, failing to identify the deceased, date or place with the precision Section 212 CrPC demands — fatal in a multi-victim or multi-incident case. Fifth, omitting the manner of the offence where it is genuinely required under Section 213, leaving the accused without notice of how he is said to have killed. Each of these is the kind of defect that, while sometimes curable under Section 215, is far better avoided by careful drafting at the framing stage.

Joinder, Section 34 and Group Homicide

Many homicide trials involve several accused acting together, which brings in Section 34 IPC (constructive liability for acts done in furtherance of common intention, now Section 3(5) BNS). The charge against each accused should specify the substantive offence read with Section 34 — for instance, "...did commit murder in furtherance of the common intention of you and your co-accused, an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code..." The common intention must be pleaded so the accused has notice that he is sought to be made liable not only for his own act but for the shared design.

Where the prosecution case is that some accused inflicted fatal blows and others merely participated, the charges may legitimately differ in degree across the accused. Willie Slaney itself arose from precisely such a configuration — a charge under Section 304 read with Section 34 against two persons, the acquittal of one, and conviction of the other under Section 302 simpliciter. The case underscores that the framing judge must think individually about each accused's role rather than apply one undifferentiated charge to the group.

A Practical Checklist for the Framing Judge

Before signing a homicide charge, the officer should run through a short discipline. Is the correct section — and under the BNS regime, the correct re-numbered section — cited, with the precise clause of Section 300 identified where murder is alleged? Does the charge plead the Virsa Singh elements: the specific injury, the intention to inflict it, and its sufficiency to cause death in the ordinary course of nature? Has the case been classified by reference to the Punnayya degrees so that, if it is not murder, the choice between Section 304 Part I and Part II is deliberate rather than accidental?

Are the particulars of time, place and the deceased's identity stated with certainty, and is the manner of the killing set out where the bare label gives insufficient notice? Where the evidence is genuinely two-sided, has an alternative charge been framed so the court is not later forced to rely on the prejudice test? And is each accused charged according to his own role, with Section 34 pleaded where constructive liability is invoked? Working through this list, with the hub on framing of charges as a reference, converts a difficult body of law into a reliable drafting routine.

A final word on tone and economy. A homicide charge is not the place for narrative; it is a legal proposition the accused must answer, and every surplus word is a potential ground of confusion. The discipline the framing judge brings — citing the right section and clause, pleading the Virsa Singh elements with precision, classifying the degree by reference to Punnayya, and stating only the particulars the law requires — is the same discipline that, on appeal, will let the conviction withstand scrutiny under Section 215 CrPC and Slaney. The charge is the foundation of the trial; build it carefully, and the structure that rests on it is sound.