Sample Charges — Theft, Robbery, Dacoity

Theft, robbery and dacoity form an ascending ladder of property offences: each rung adds an ingredient to the one below it, and the charge must capture that extra ingredient with precision. A charge that calls robbery "theft", or that books a single accused for dacoity, misdescribes the very offence the prosecution must prove. This chapter sets out model charges for each offence under the Indian Penal Code (and its Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita equivalents), explains the ingredients the charge must spell out, and shows — through verified Supreme Court authority — when a defective charge is a fatal illegality and when it is a curable irregularity. Read it alongside Particulars to be Stated and Specifying the Thing Stolen, and return to the Framing of Charges hub for the full sequence.

The Ladder: Theft, Robbery, Dacoity

The three offences are not independent silos; they are concentric. Theft is the base — a dishonest taking of movable property out of another's possession without consent. Robbery is aggravated theft (or aggravated extortion): theft plus force or fear of instant harm, applied to commit the theft, in committing it, or in carrying away the property. Dacoity is aggravated robbery: robbery committed or attempted by five or more persons acting conjointly. Because each offence absorbs the one below it, the charge for the higher offence must allege every ingredient of the lower offence and the aggravating ingredient that lifts it up the ladder.

Under the Indian Penal Code the relevant provisions are Sections 378 and 379 (theft and its punishment), Sections 390 and 392 (robbery and its punishment), Section 397 (robbery or dacoity with a deadly weapon), and Sections 391 and 395 (dacoity and its punishment). The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the same scheme forward: theft is Section 303, robbery and dacoity are defined in Sections 309 and 310, and the dacoity-related provisions formerly scattered across IPC Sections 391, 395, 396, 399, 400 and 402 are consolidated within the BNS dacoity framework. A charge drafted today should cite the governing statute for the date of the offence; this chapter flags both. The discipline of pinning each ingredient to the charge is the same discipline explored in Manner of the Alleged Offence.

Ingredients of Theft the Charge Must Allege

Section 378 IPC defines theft as the intention to take dishonestly any movable property out of the possession of any person without that person's consent, and the moving of that property in order to such taking. Five ingredients emerge: (i) dishonest intention; (ii) movable property; (iii) the property being in the possession of another; (iv) absence of consent; and (v) a moving of the property to effect the taking. The charge for theft must, in substance, allege each of these — most importantly the dishonest intention and the want of consent — even if the bare section number carries much of the load.

Two ingredients repay close attention in the charge. First, the property must be movable and taken from possession, not ownership; a person can commit theft of property he himself owns if it is in another's lawful possession. Second, the intention must be dishonest — to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss — but it need not be an intention of permanent deprivation. In Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1094, a Superintendent had a Secretariat file removed, took it home overnight so that a friend could tamper with documents, and returned it the next day. The Supreme Court held that even a temporary dispossession, with intention to return the property, amounts to theft, because the temporary deprivation itself causes wrongful loss to the person entitled to possession. A charge that describes the taking as "borrowing" or that omits the dishonest-intention element invites acquittal on the ground that an ingredient was never put to the accused.

Model Charge for Theft (s.378 / s.303 BNS)

A specimen charge framed under Section 379 IPC reads:

"I, [Name], Magistrate of the [ ] Court, hereby charge you, [accused], as follows: That you, on or about the [ ] day of [month], 20[ ], at [place], dishonestly took [describe the movable property — e.g. one gold chain weighing about 20 grams] out of the possession of [complainant] without his consent, and thereby committed theft punishable under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance. And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge."

The charge names the date, place, the property (described with enough particularity to identify it), the possessor, the want of consent, and the dishonest taking. Where the offence is post-1 July 2024 the provision cited would be Section 303 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which is the BNS counterpart of theft. The need to describe the thing stolen with precision — "a gold chain" rather than "some ornaments" — is treated in detail in Specifying the Thing Stolen, Cheated or Misappropriated; a vague description can defeat the charge by failing to give the accused notice of what he must meet.

When Theft Becomes Robbery: the Aggravating Ingredient

Section 390 IPC tells us that in all robbery there is either theft or extortion, and that theft is robbery if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death, hurt, or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death, instant hurt, or instant wrongful restraint. The added ingredient is therefore force or fear, applied for the end of the theft, at any of three stages.

The "carrying away" stage is often decisive. In State of Maharashtra v. Vinayak Tukaram Utekar the accused snatched gold buttons from a victim's shirt on a railway platform and, when caught, gave a knife blow. The court held that the knife blow was not merely to escape but to ensure the carrying away of the stolen property, so the act fell within clause (c) of Section 390 and amounted to robbery, not bare theft. The lesson for the charge is that it must allege the force or fear and link it to one of the three stages — "in order to commit", "in committing", or "in carrying away". A robbery charge that omits the connective purpose risks being read down to theft, just as a charge framed at the wrong altitude is discussed in Manner of the Alleged Offence.

Robbery can also be built on extortion rather than theft. Section 390 IPC provides that extortion is robbery if the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, puts him in fear of instant death, hurt, or wrongful restraint, and thereby induces the delivery of the property then and there. The distinction matters for the charge because theft-based robbery and extortion-based robbery allege different core conduct: in the first the offender takes the property; in the second the victim is compelled by instant fear to deliver it on the spot. A drafter must decide which species the facts support and frame the charge accordingly — alleging either the dishonest taking or the fear-induced delivery — rather than reciting both indiscriminately. Where the facts are genuinely equivocal, the alternative-charge device allows both to be pleaded, but each alternative must still allege its own ingredients in full.

Model Charge for Robbery (s.392 / s.309 BNS)

A specimen charge under Section 392 IPC reads:

"That you, on or about the [ ] day of [month], 20[ ], at [place], in committing theft of [describe property] from the possession of [complainant], voluntarily caused [or attempted to cause] to him [hurt / fear of instant hurt] by [describe the act — e.g. striking him with a knife / threatening him with a knife] for the end of committing the said theft, and thereby committed robbery punishable under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance."

Where the offender was armed with, or used, a deadly weapon, Section 397 IPC is attracted, prescribing a minimum sentence of seven years. Section 397 is not a substantive offence but a sentencing provision; it must be charged as Section 392 (or 395) read with Section 397. In Phool Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1975 SC 905, the accused raided a petrol pump after midnight armed with a knife to terrorise the attendants; the Supreme Court held that where a deadly weapon is within the victim's vision and capable of creating terror, the offender is deemed to have "used" it, attracting Section 397, and that the section fastens only on the individual offender who so uses the weapon. The corresponding BNS robbery provision is Section 309. A charge invoking the minimum-sentence aggravation must spell out the weapon and the individual accused who carried or used it, because liability under it is personal, not constructive.

The point in Phool Kumar bears emphasis for the drafter. The appellant's associates were acquitted, yet his own conviction under Section 397 stood because the section attaches to the offender's individual conduct in being armed with and brandishing the knife. Two consequences follow for the charge. First, where several accused commit a robbery together but only one is armed, Section 397 should be charged only against the armed offender, and the charge sheet should not import it against the rest by way of common intention. Second, mere recovery of a weapon is not the test; what matters is whether the weapon was within the victim's vision and capable of creating terror, so the charge should plead the manner in which the weapon was displayed or used, not merely its possession. A charge that asserts "the accused were armed with deadly weapons" without individuating who carried what blurs precisely the personal liability that Section 397 demands.

When Robbery Becomes Dacoity: the Number Ingredient

Section 391 IPC provides that when five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or where the whole number of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery — together with persons present and aiding — amounts to five or more, every one of them is said to commit dacoity. The defining ingredient is therefore the number: five or more persons acting conjointly. Dacoity cannot exist as a one-man or two-man offence; it is an aggravated, collective form of robbery, and the BNS preserves this in Section 310.

The five-person threshold is jurisdictional to the offence, not a mere matter of degree. In Ram Lakhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the accused were tried for dacoity under Section 395, the FIR having named nine participants; successive acquittals at trial and appeal left only the appellant convicted. The Supreme Court held that because the presence of at least five offenders is a mandatory component of dacoity, a conviction under Section 395 cannot be sustained where fewer than five participants stand established. A dacoity charge must therefore allege that five or more persons conjointly committed the robbery, and where the prosecution cannot prove five, the proper course is to fall back on a robbery charge — which is why the charge sheet should keep the lesser count alive.

The word "conjointly" carries weight in the charge. It is not enough that five persons happened to be present; the charge must allege that they acted in concert, with a shared purpose, in committing or attempting the robbery. The provision expressly brings within the count persons "present and aiding" the commission or attempt, so a charge may legitimately include those who, without themselves taking the property, were present and aided the robbery, provided the total of perpetrators and aiders reaches five. Where the prosecution names more than five but anticipates that some may not be brought to trial or may be acquitted, the prudent course — borne out by Ram Lakhan — is to plead the dacoity count and, in the alternative, robbery, so that the failure of the number ingredient does not collapse the prosecution entirely.

Model Charge for Dacoity (s.395 / s.310 BNS)

A specimen charge under Section 395 IPC reads:

"That you, [accused 1], [accused 2], [accused 3], [accused 4] and [accused 5], on or about the [ ] day of [month], 20[ ], at [place], conjointly committed [or attempted to commit] robbery of [describe property] from [complainant], you being five or more persons so acting together, and thereby committed dacoity punishable under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance."

The charge must (i) name or otherwise identify five or more persons; (ii) allege that they acted conjointly; and (iii) allege the robbery — which in turn imports theft (or extortion) plus force or fear. Where the dacoity was committed with a deadly weapon, Section 397 is added against the specific armed offender; where murder is committed in the course of dacoity, the IPC scheme attracts the dacoity-with-murder provision (Section 396), consolidated within Section 310 of the BNS. Because dacoity charges routinely run alongside robbery and theft counts, drafters should heed the joinder discipline in Form and Contents of the Charge and the particulars rules in Particulars to be Stated.

Particulars: Sections 221–222 CrPC / BNSS

The contents of any charge are governed by the procedural code. Section 211 CrPC (Section 234 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) requires the charge to state the offence with which the accused is charged and the specific name of the offence, if any. Section 212 CrPC (BNSS Section 235) requires particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence and the person against whom, or the thing in respect of which, it was committed. For theft, robbery and dacoity, the "thing" particular — the property taken — and the "person" particular — the victim in possession — are central.

In Birichh Bhuian v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1120, the Supreme Court read these sections together and held that the requirement to state the offence and its particulars is satisfied where the accused has had notice of what he is to meet; a defect in the time-and-place particulars under Section 222 was treated as an irregularity, not an illegality, where the acts formed part of the same transaction and no failure of justice resulted. The case is a reminder that the property and victim particulars exist to give notice — the object of the charge explored in Object of the Charge: Notice to the Accused — and that their omission is judged by the prejudice it causes.

Conviction for the Minor Offence Without a Separate Charge

Because theft, robbery and dacoity are concentric, the procedural code allows conviction for the lesser offence even when only the greater was charged. Section 222 CrPC (BNSS Section 245) provides that when a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars, a combination of some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence, and that combination is proved while the remaining particulars are not, he may be convicted of the minor offence though he was not charged with it. Thus an accused charged with dacoity may be convicted of robbery if the five-person ingredient fails but the robbery is proved; an accused charged with robbery may be convicted of theft if the force ingredient fails.

The safeguard is notice: the minor offence must be a cognate offence whose ingredients were necessarily put to the accused by the charge for the major offence. Courts apply the test of whether the accused had notice of the ingredients of the minor offence and whether any prejudice results. This is why, in practice, prosecutors charging dacoity will often add robbery and theft counts in the alternative — a precaution consistent with the alternative-charge mechanism discussed in Form and Contents of the Charge.

Defective Charge: Illegality or Curable Irregularity?

Not every error in a theft, robbery or dacoity charge is fatal. The governing authority is Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116, where the Constitution Bench drew the line between an illegality that vitiates the trial and an irregularity that is curable where no prejudice is shown. In Slaney the accused was convicted under Section 302 IPC simpliciter although only a charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 had been framed; the Court held that the omission to frame the separate charge was, in the circumstances, a curable irregularity, because the accused knew the case he had to meet and suffered no prejudice. Substantial compliance with the forms of the law, the Court held, suffices unless the accused demonstrates real prejudice.

Applied to property offences, Slaney means that a misdescription — booking robbery as theft, or omitting the section number while alleging all the ingredients — will often be curable if the accused had fair notice and a fair opportunity to defend. But the principle has limits: where an essential ingredient is never alleged (no allegation of the five-person element in a dacoity case, or no allegation of force in a robbery case), the accused has no notice of that ingredient, and conviction for the higher offence cannot stand. The dividing question is always notice and prejudice, the theme running through Object of the Charge.

Common Drafting Errors in Property-Offence Charges

Several recurring errors defeat charges for these offences. First, omitting the dishonest intention in a theft charge — describing the act as a mere taking — leaves out the mental element that distinguishes theft from an innocent removal. Second, failing to anchor the force in a robbery charge to one of the three stages of Section 390, so that the charge reads as theft with an unconnected assault. Third, charging a single accused, or fewer than five, with dacoity, contrary to the mandatory number ingredient confirmed in Ram Lakhan. Fourth, invoking Section 397 against all the accused as though it were a substantive constructive-liability offence, when Phool Kumar confines it to the individual offender who used or carried the deadly weapon.

Fifth, describing the stolen property too loosely. A charge that says "valuable articles" without identifying them deprives the accused of the particular he most needs to meet, and may not survive the particulars test of Sections 211–212 CrPC. The cure is to describe the property concretely and, where the property's identity is itself disputed, to plead it with the precision urged in Specifying the Thing Stolen. Each of these errors is, at bottom, a failure of notice — and whether it proves fatal turns on the Slaney prejudice test.

IPC to BNS Mapping for the Drafter

For offences committed before 1 July 2024 the Indian Penal Code governs; for those on or after that date the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 applies, and the charge must cite the statute in force on the date of the offence. The core mapping is straightforward: theft moves from IPC Section 378 (punishment Section 379) to BNS Section 303; robbery and dacoity are defined within BNS Sections 309 and 310, the BNS counterparts of IPC Sections 390 and 391. The cluster of dacoity-related IPC provisions — Sections 391, 395, 396, 399, 400 and 402 — is consolidated within the BNS dacoity framework, while the deadly-weapon aggravation continues in substance.

The substantive ingredients are unchanged, so the case law on theft, robbery and dacoity — Pyare Lal Bhargava, Vinayak Tukaram Utekar, Phool Kumar, Ram Lakhan — continues to guide what the charge must allege. The procedural rules on particulars and curable defects likewise carry over from CrPC Sections 211, 212, 215 and 464 to their BNSS counterparts, and Slaney's distinction between illegality and curable irregularity remains good law. Drafters should therefore reproduce the ingredient-by-ingredient discipline regardless of the code, and consult the Framing of Charges hub for the statutory cross-references in full.