The Rent Controller is the engine room of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968. Almost every right the statute creates - fair rent, protection from eviction, possession for repairs - is enforced not in an ordinary civil court but before this specialised, quasi-judicial authority. Sections 41 to 50 of the Act, read with the 1969 Rules, lay down a self-contained procedural code: who the authorities are, what powers they wield, how an application is moved, the conditions on which a tenant may contest, and the ladder of appeal and revision that follows. This note maps that procedure from filing to execution, anchoring each step in the bare section and in the case law that governs it.
The authorities and their jurisdiction
Section 41 lets the Administrator constitute, for any local area, an Appellate Board and a Rent Tribunal, and appoint an Authorised Officer, a Controller and as many Additional Controllers as he thinks fit. An Additional Controller exercises the same powers and discharges the same duties as a Controller. The Controller is thus the court of first instance for the bulk of landlord-tenant litigation - applications for fixation of standard rent, recovery of possession on the grounds in sections 22 and 23, and possession for repairs or reconstruction under section 30. The Authorised Officer handles the government-building stream under section 31. Crucially, section 56 bars the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts: save as provided in the Act, no court may entertain a matter which a Controller is empowered to decide. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that where a rent statute supplies its own forum and remedies, the civil court's jurisdiction stands ousted, so a landlord cannot bypass the Controller by filing a possession suit. For the statutory architecture this procedure serves, see the introduction and object of the Act and the key definitions that fix who counts as a landlord, tenant and building.
Powers of the Controller: a civil court in substance
Section 43 invests the Controller, the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Board with the same powers as a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when trying a suit or appeal, in respect of: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; and (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses, besides any other prescribed matter. The same section deems every proceeding before these authorities a judicial proceeding within sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code - so false evidence before the Controller is perjury - and deems the Controller a civil court within sections 480 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, enabling it to deal with contempt in the face of the tribunal. The Controller is therefore quasi-judicial, not administrative. In Achutananda Baidya v. Prafulla Kumar Gayen (1997) 5 SCC 76 the Supreme Court confirmed that such rent authorities are tribunals subject to the High Court's supervisory power under Article 227, which keeps them within the bounds of their authority.
Procedure to be followed and the duty to act fairly
Section 44(1) provides that, subject to the Act, the procedure in all inquiries, appeals and proceedings shall be such as may be prescribed by the 1969 Rules; section 44(2) requires every decision to be recorded as a reasoned order stating the grounds. Because the Act and Rules supply only a skeleton, the Controller fills the gaps with the broad principles of the CPC and, above all, with natural justice. The classic statement is Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah AIR 1955 SC 425, where the Supreme Court held that a code of procedure is designed to facilitate justice, not to punish parties for technical default, and that no order may be passed without giving an affected party a real opportunity to be heard. For the Controller this means notice to the respondent, a genuine chance to file a reply and lead evidence, and a speaking order. The requirement of reasons under section 44(2) is not a formality: an unreasoned eviction order is liable to be set aside in appeal or under Article 227, because reasons are the link between the material and the conclusion and the only basis on which the appellate authority can test the decision.
Instituting an application and the inquiry
Proceedings begin with an application to the Controller in the prescribed form - for example, a landlord seeking eviction must apply under section 22 or 23 setting out the statutory ground relied on, and the Controller under section 25 then decides the right to possession and, if satisfied, directs the tenant to put the landlord in possession. The Controller issues notice to the opposite party, frames the points in dispute, takes evidence and hears argument before passing a reasoned order. Where a landlord seeks possession for repairs, demolition or reconstruction under section 30, the Controller must additionally secure the statutory undertaking to re-offer the rebuilt premises to the displaced tenant before any order issues. The inquiry is summary in spirit but adversarial in form: parties may be represented, documents are proved, and witnesses are examined on oath under section 43. The grounds the Controller must test are set out in our notes on grounds for eviction and on eviction for bona fide need.
Deposit of rent: a condition precedent to contesting
Section 32 is the most consequential procedural lever in eviction litigation. Sub-section (1) bars a tenant against whom eviction proceedings have been instituted from contesting before the Controller, or any appellate or revisional authority, or from preferring any appeal or revision, unless he has paid to the landlord or deposited all arrears of rent up to the date of payment and continues to deposit rent as it falls due until the proceedings end. Where the amount is disputed, section 32(3) lets either party apply and the authority then determines the rent summarily after such inquiry as it deems necessary. The teeth are in section 32(4): if the tenant fails to pay or deposit, the Controller must, unless sufficient cause is shown, stop all further proceedings and order the tenant to put the landlord in possession. The provision protects the landlord's revenue during litigation and prevents a defaulting tenant from prolonging occupation by contesting on the merits. The landlord may withdraw the deposited rent under section 32(5). Practitioners treat compliance with section 32 as the threshold every defending tenant must clear before the merits are even reached.
Vexatious proceedings, costs and dismissal
The Act guards against abuse from the landlord's side too. Section 28 empowers the Controller, where satisfied that a landlord's eviction application is frivolous or vexatious, to direct the landlord to pay the tenant compensation not exceeding two months' rent. Section 29 protects the tenant after a failed eviction bid: where an application under section 22 or 23 is rejected by the Controller or in appeal or revision, the tenancy is deemed to continue on the same terms and is not terminable except on a statutory ground - the dismissal cannot be circumvented by simply re-letting on fresh terms. Costs of and incidental to all proceedings are, under section 48, in the discretion of the authority, which may determine by whom and out of what property they are to be paid. Any compensation awarded or fine imposed is recoverable, on default, as an arrear of land revenue under section 49. These provisions together make the Controller a forum that can discipline both speculative eviction claims and obstructive defences.
Appeal: from the Controller to the Administrative Tribunal
Section 45 builds the first rung of the appellate ladder. Under section 45(2), from every order - other than an interim order - passed by the Authorised Officer under section 31 or by the Controller, an appeal lies to the Administrative Tribunal; under section 45(1), from every non-interim order of the Rent Tribunal an appeal lies to the Appellate Board. The carve-out for interim orders is important: a party aggrieved by an interlocutory direction cannot ordinarily appeal at once but must await the final order. The limitation period under section 45(3) is thirty days from the date of the order appealed against, with a proviso allowing the Tribunal or Board to condone delay if satisfied the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause. The appeal is a rehearing on facts and law within the section 47 powers, but the appellant tenant remains bound by the section 32 deposit obligation throughout. The hierarchy mirrors the structure discussed in our notes on standard rent fixation and revision.
Revision: the Administrative Tribunal's supervisory check
Section 46 confers a revisional power on the Administrative Tribunal, exercisable only in exceptional circumstances and on the application of a party. The Tribunal may call for and examine the record of any order passed under the Act by the Authorised Officer, Controller, Rent Tribunal or Appellate Board, to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of that order, and may pass such order as it thinks fit. The power is hedged by time: no record may be called for after ninety days from the date of the order, and the cost of the proceeding lies in the Tribunal's discretion under section 46(2). Revision is narrower than appeal - it tests jurisdiction, legality and propriety rather than reopening every finding of fact - so it is the remedy where the period to appeal has lapsed or where the grievance is one of jurisdictional or legal error rather than appreciation of evidence. A party who has an appeal available will normally be expected to exhaust it before invoking the exceptional revisional jurisdiction.
Powers of appellate and revisional authorities; finality
Section 47 defines what the appellate and revisional authorities may do: confirm, modify or rescind the order in appeal or revision or its execution, remand the case for disposal with directions, or pass any other order that is legal and in accordance with the Act. A proviso protects natural justice - no order may be varied without giving the interested parties an opportunity to appear and be heard. The second proviso supplies the finality clause: every order of the Authorised Officer, Controller or Rent Tribunal is final unless varied in appeal or revision, and every order passed in appeal or revision is itself final. There is no statutory second appeal or further revision to the High Court. That deliberate finality is what channels aggrieved parties into the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction, and it is also why the courts treat that jurisdiction as a sparing remedy rather than a routine third tier.
High Court supervision under Articles 226 and 227
Because the Act stops at the Administrative Tribunal, the only route beyond it is the High Court's writ and supervisory jurisdiction. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai AIR 2003 SC 3044, (2003) 6 SCC 675 the Supreme Court explained that supervision under Article 227 is to be exercised sparingly, only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority - where the tribunal assumes a jurisdiction it lacks, fails to exercise one it has, or acts in flagrant disregard of law or natural justice occasioning failure of justice - and not to correct mere errors of fact or law. Achutananda Baidya v. Prafulla Kumar Gayen (1997) 5 SCC 76 had already held that Article 227 supervision over rent tribunals extends to judicial review for jurisdictional error, perverse findings and patent procedural error, precisely because the special Act gives finality and provides no further appeal. The Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court routinely applies this restraint to orders under the Act; in Abdul Sattar Kulli v. Aisham Bi Mamlekar it held, on a challenge to a Controller's eviction order affirmed by the Appellate Board, that section 34's requirement of a written lease deed is directory and its absence does not defeat the Controller's jurisdiction - reinforcing that procedural irregularity short of jurisdictional failure will not invite interference.
Execution of the Controller's order
An order is only as good as its enforcement, and section 50 makes the Controller's order self-executing. An order made under the Act by any original, appellate or revisional authority directing the taking over of possession of a building or the eviction of any person in occupation is executable by that authority as a decree of a civil court, and for that purpose the authority has all the powers of a civil court. The successful landlord therefore need not file a fresh execution suit elsewhere; the same forum that passed the eviction order executes it, with the coercive machinery of the CPC at its disposal. Section 51 reinforces the reach of the order by binding sub-tenants - any eviction order binds all sub-tenants whether or not they were parties, unless obtained by fraud or collusion, though a sub-tenant inducted with the landlord's written consent must be made a necessary party. Section 52 allows proceedings to be continued by or against the legal representatives of a deceased party, ensuring that death does not abate the litigation. Together these provisions close the loop from filing to delivery of possession within a single, self-contained code. For the substantive rent rights ultimately vindicated through this procedure, see our notes on lawful increases in rent and the Goa Rent Control Act hub.
Frequently asked questions
Is the Rent Controller a civil court?
Not strictly, but in substance it functions as one. Section 43 gives the Controller the same powers as a civil court under the CPC for summoning witnesses, examining them on oath, compelling discovery and production of documents, and issuing commissions. It also deems proceedings before the Controller to be judicial proceedings under IPC sections 193, 219 and 228, and deems the Controller a civil court under the old CrPC. It is best described as a quasi-judicial tribunal.
Can a tenant facing eviction simply contest on the merits?
No - section 32 imposes a condition precedent. The tenant cannot contest before the Controller or any appellate or revisional authority unless he pays or deposits all arrears of rent and keeps depositing rent as it falls due until the proceedings end. If the amount is disputed, the authority fixes it summarily under section 32(3). On failure to deposit, section 32(4) requires the Controller to stop the proceedings and order the tenant to deliver possession.
Where does an appeal from the Controller lie, and within what time?
Under section 45(2) an appeal from a Controller's order (other than an interim order) lies to the Administrative Tribunal; appeals from the Rent Tribunal go to the Appellate Board under section 45(1). The limitation under section 45(3) is thirty days from the date of the order, though the Tribunal or Board may condone delay for sufficient cause.
What is the difference between appeal and revision under the Act?
An appeal under section 45 is a rehearing on facts and law, available against most final orders within thirty days. Revision under section 46 is exercised by the Administrative Tribunal only in exceptional circumstances, on a party's application, to test the correctness, legality or propriety of an order, and no record may be called for after ninety days. Revision is the narrower, supervisory remedy, generally invoked where appeal is unavailable or the error is jurisdictional or legal.
Can the High Court interfere with a Controller's order?
Yes, but sparingly. Since the Act gives finality at the Administrative Tribunal with no further appeal, the only route is Article 226 or 227. As held in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Achutananda Baidya v. Prafulla Kumar Gayen, the High Court interferes only for jurisdictional error, perverse findings, patent procedural error or denial of natural justice causing failure of justice - not to correct mere errors of fact or law.
How is an eviction order enforced under the Act?
Section 50 makes the order self-executing: an order directing taking over of possession or eviction is executable by the same authority as a decree of a civil court, and the authority has all the powers of a civil court for that purpose. The landlord need not file a separate execution suit. Under section 51 the order also binds sub-tenants, subject to fraud or collusion and to a consensual sub-tenant being made a necessary party.