Landmark Cases — Macchi Singh, Bachan Singh, Joseph Shine, Navtej Singh Johar, Vishaka

The substantive law of crimes in India — re-codified by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — rests on roughly a century and a half of Supreme Court and High Court decisions interpreting the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The case-law accumulated under the IPC continues to operate under the BNS: doctrines are re-stated in BNS section numbers but ingredient-structure is unchanged. This chapter is a granular case-survey organised by doctrinal topic, with cases attached to the BNS sections they now operate under. The chapter sits within the wider IPC and BNS notes series.

A. Preliminary and General Principles

The Code's preliminary chapters supply the territorial reach, the definitions, the punishment framework under Sections 4 to 13 BNS, and the general exceptions under Sections 14 to 33 BNS. The case-law in this section interprets those scaffolds — and continues to govern Sections 1 to 44 BNS without doctrinal change.

A.1. Extra-territorial application — Section 1 BNS

Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay (1957) AIR 857. The accused, a Pakistani national, defrauded a Bombay merchant from Karachi by misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held that Section 4 IPC (now Section 1(4) BNS) extends jurisdiction to a person who, though physically outside India, causes the criminal act to take effect within India. Forms the basis of the long-arm jurisdiction now contained in Section 1(4) BNS.

Central Bank of India v. Ram Narain (1955) AIR 36. A pre-Constitution offence was sought to be tried in India after Partition. The Court read Section 4 IPC as not applying to acts committed outside India by a person who became an Indian citizen only later. Section 1(4) BNS preserves the same prospective-only rule on citizenship-based extra-territorial jurisdiction.

A.2. Mens-rea framework — Section 2 BNS

Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217. The Supreme Court parsed the meaning of "voluntarily" under Section 39 IPC (now Section 2(38) BNS), holding that a person causes an effect "voluntarily" when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it or by means which he knew or had reason to believe were likely to cause it. The dual mental state — intention or knowledge — is the doctrinal hinge of mens rea across the Code.

A.3. Capital sentencing — Sections 4 to 13 BNS

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684. The Constitution Bench upheld the death penalty under Section 302 IPC and laid down the rarest-of-rare doctrine. Death is to be imposed only when life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed; aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be weighed individually. The framework governs capital sentencing under Section 103(1) and Section 103(2) BNS today.

Macchi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470. The Court operationalised Bachan Singh through a five-factor test: manner of commission, motive, anti-social nature, magnitude, and personality of the victim. The five-factor test continues to govern murder sentencing under Section 103(1) BNS and informs the life-versus-death choice under Section 103(2) BNS.

Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 277. The Court struck down Section 303 IPC's mandatory death sentence on a life-convict who commits murder, as violative of Articles 14 and 21. Section 104 BNS was redrafted to give the trial court discretion between death and remainder-of-natural-life imprisonment.

Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1. The Court held that inordinate delay in disposing of a mercy petition is a ground for commutation of death to life imprisonment. The decision operates as a constitutional backstop on the execution of death sentences passed under Sections 103, 109, and 113 BNS.

Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767. The Court created the special category of life imprisonment without remission — a sentence beyond the ordinary 14-year remission floor but short of death. The category fills the gap between life-with-remission and death and is now routinely applied in Section 103 BNS sentencing.

A.4. Mistake of fact — Sections 14 and 17 BNS

State of Orissa v. Bhagaban Barik (1987) 2 SCC 498. A police officer who shot a thief in the bona fide but mistaken belief that the thief was a tiger was acquitted under Section 79 IPC (now Section 17 BNS). Mistake of fact in good faith negates mens rea provided the mistaken belief is reasonable.

A.5. Insanity — Section 22 BNS

Bapu v. State of Rajasthan (2007) 8 SCC 66. The Court drew the line between legal insanity and medical insanity. Every person suffering from a mental disease is not ipso facto exempt; the accused must establish that his cognitive faculties were so impaired that he was incapable either of knowing the nature of the act or of knowing it was wrong. The McNaughten test as preserved in Section 22 BNS.

Ratan Lal v. State of MP (1970) 3 SCC 533. The burden of proving insanity lies on the accused under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act (now Section 109 BSA), but the burden is to establish on a preponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt.

Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand (2011) 11 SCC 495. The Court reaffirmed that the relevant point in time for assessing legal insanity is the moment of the act; pre-act and post-act mental states are relevant only as circumstantial evidence.

A.6. Intoxication — Section 23 BNS

Basdev v. State of Pepsu (1956) AIR 488. Voluntary intoxication is no defence to an offence requiring a specific intention unless the intoxication was so deep that the accused was incapable of forming the intent. Sections 85 and 86 IPC (now Sections 23 and 24 BNS) preserve the rule and the case-law continues to govern.

A.7. Private defence — Sections 34 to 44 BNS

The cases below should be read alongside the dedicated chapter on the right of private defence under Sections 34 to 44 BNS.

Yogendra Morarji v. State of Gujarat (1980) 2 SCC 218. The Supreme Court laid down six conditions for invoking private defence: reasonable apprehension of harm, no time to seek state protection, force proportionate to the threat, the right ceases when threat ceases, no aggressor's right, and reasonable belief. The six-factor test governs Sections 34 to 44 BNS.

Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) 2 SCC 333. The Court restated and extended the Yogendra Morarji principles, emphasising that the right of private defence is a defensive right, not punitive, and is to be assessed from the perspective of the person facing the threat, not from a calm post-incident review.

Jaidev v. State of Punjab (1963) AIR 612. Per Gajendragadkar J — the common-law rule of retreat is not part of Indian law. A person attacked has every right to stand his ground if there is no time to seek official help. Carries forward to Section 38 BNS.

Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration (1968) AIR 702. The Court held that a true owner in possession can use force to repel a trespasser; the right of private defence of property under Section 97 IPC (now Section 34 read with Section 41 BNS) is real and effective even against a person claiming colour of title.

A.8. Abetment — Sections 45 to 60 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the dedicated chapter on abetment.

Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn) (1988) 3 SCC 609. The Indira Gandhi assassination case. The Court analysed the three forms of abetment under Section 107 IPC (now Section 45 BNS) — instigation, conspiracy, intentional aid — and applied the conspiracy limb to convict the conspirator who was not present at the scene.

Faguna Kanta Nath v. State of Assam (1959) AIR 673. The Court held that abetment by intentional aid requires both knowledge of the principal's intent and an act facilitating the offence; mere presence with knowledge is insufficient. The rule governs Section 45 BNS.

A.9. Criminal conspiracy — Sections 61 to 62 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the dedicated chapter on criminal conspiracy.

Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay (1961) AIR 1762. The Court held that the agreement is the gist of conspiracy under Section 120A IPC (now Section 61 BNS); an overt act is not required for conspiracies to commit serious offences. Section 61(2) BNS preserves the distinction.

State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600. The Parliament-attack case. The Court restated the elements of criminal conspiracy and held that direct evidence of agreement is rare; circumstantial inferences from co-ordinated conduct suffice.

Yashwant Singh v. State of Bihar (1958) AIR 124. The Court held that the agreement element of conspiracy is independent of the substantive offence; conspirators are liable even if the substantive offence is not eventually committed, provided the agreement itself is unlawful.

A.10. Attempt — Section 62 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the dedicated chapter on attempt to commit offence.

Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar (1961) AIR 1698. The Court drew the line between preparation and attempt, holding that an act amounts to attempt when it is moved beyond the stage of preparation and the accused has done all that is necessary to commit the offence so far as he is concerned.

State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub (1980) 3 SCC 57. The proximity test — an act is an attempt if it is so proximate to the offence that, but for an extraneous interruption, the offence would have been completed. Section 62 BNS preserves the test.

B. State, Public Tranquillity, Public Servants

This cluster covers offences against the State, the law of unlawful assembly and rioting, and offences by public servants. The constitutional jurisprudence on sedition is the most consequential — and the BNS legislative response is Section 152.

B.1. Sedition / Section 152 BNS

The cases below should be read alongside the dedicated chapter on Section 152 BNS.

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) AIR 955. The Constitution Bench upheld Section 124A IPC by reading it down to require incitement to violence or public disorder; mere strong criticism of Government is not sedition. The narrowed reading carries forward to Section 152 BNS, which now contains explicit textual carve-outs.

Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab (1995) 3 SCC 214. Two persons shouted pro-Khalistan slogans hours after Indira Gandhi's assassination. The Court acquitted, holding that mere slogan-shouting without proof of incitement to violence does not satisfy Section 124A. The threshold governs Section 152 BNS prosecutions.

S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India (2022) — interim order. The Court stayed all pending Section 124A IPC prosecutions and directed the Government not to register fresh sedition cases pending re-examination of the provision. The order accelerated the Section 152 BNS reform.

B.2. Common intention — Section 3(5) BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on common intention versus common object.

Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor (1945) AIR PC 118. The foundational restatement: common intention implies a pre-arranged plan; mere similar intention is not enough; the burden of proving the pre-arranged plan lies on the prosecution. Governs Section 3(5) BNS without change.

Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad (1955) AIR 216. Per Vivian Bose J — common intention may develop on the spur of the moment, but the development must be sufficiently clear to indicate that the participants were acting together. Warned against inferring common intention from mere shared presence.

Suresh v. State of UP (2001) 3 SCC 673. Contemporary restatement: the meeting of minds may be inferred from the manner of attack, choice of victim, weapons brought, and post-incident conduct. Each case turns on its concrete circumstantial facts.

Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King-Emperor (1925) AIR PC 1. The "even if he stood and did nothing" principle of joint liability — a person who joins in the criminal enterprise with shared intention is liable even if his role at the scene was non-active. Carries forward verbatim.

B.3. Common object — Section 191(2) BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on offences against public tranquillity under Sections 189 to 197 BNS.

Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) AIR 174. The Constitution Bench dissolution rule — where some accused are acquitted and the remaining number falls below five, the unlawful assembly dissolves and Section 149 IPC (now Section 191(2) BNS) cannot be invoked. Section 34 fallback (now Section 3(5) BNS) becomes available.

Bhanwar Singh v. State of MP (2008) 16 SCC 657. Common object need not be the product of prior concert; it may form on the spur of the moment. Determined by the nature of the assembly, the arms carried, and the behaviour of the members. Governs Section 191(2) BNS.

Masalti v. State of UP (1965) AIR 202. The anti-conviction-by-association rule — fixed-number tests cannot substitute for individual proof; each accused's role and knowledge must be established. The rule applies with full force to Section 103(2) BNS for mob lynching.

Mizaji v. State of UP (1959) AIR 572. The Court applied the second limb of Section 149 IPC (now Section 191(2) BNS) — the "knew to be likely" formulation — where the assembly went armed and the members must have foreseen the offence eventually committed.

B.4. Public servants and bribery

Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64. The Court held that a competent authority must decide on a request for sanction to prosecute a public servant within four months. The decision drives sanction-related prosecutions under Sections 198 to 205 BNS read with the Prevention of Corruption Act.

B.5. False evidence and public justice

Mahila Vinod Kumari v. State of MP (2008) 8 SCC 34. The Court held that false statements made under oath in a court attract Section 193 IPC (now Section 229 BNS) and that the trial court has the power to launch perjury proceedings suo motu under Section 340 CrPC (now Section 379 BNSS).

Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370. The Constitution Bench limited the bar in Section 195 CrPC (now Section 215 BNSS) to forgeries committed during a judicial proceeding; pre-proceeding forgeries can be prosecuted on a private complaint without the bar.

C. Public Health, Religion, Body

The third cluster covers offences against public health, against religious sentiments, and against the human body. The case-law on the murder-versus-culpable-homicide boundary is the densest and most-tested in state-judiciary papers.

C.1. Adulteration — Sections 274 to 278 BNS

Joseph Kurian v. State of Kerala (1995) AIR 1909. The Court restated the noxious-rendering test for Section 272 IPC (now Section 274 BNS) — the offence is complete on introduction of the adulterant into food meant for sale, provided the adulteration renders the article noxious as food or drink.

Mahesh Ramchandra Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra (1999). The Court held that there is no provision in the food-safety legislation that nullifies Sections 272 and 273 IPC (now Sections 274 and 275 BNS); concurrent prosecution is permitted. The rule governs FSSA-BNS overlap today.

C.2. Religion — Sections 298 to 302 BNS

Ramji Lal v. State of UP (1957) AIR 620. The Constitution Bench upheld Section 295A IPC (now Section 299 BNS) by reading it to require deliberate and malicious intention to outrage religious feelings; mere insult or unintentional offence is outside the section. The narrowed reading governs Section 299 BNS.

C.3. Culpable homicide vs murder — Sections 100 to 101 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on the distinction between culpable homicide and murder.

Reg. v. Govinda (1876) ILR 1 Bom 342. Per Melvill J — the classical comparative-table reading of Section 299 against Section 300 IPC (now Sections 100 and 101 BNS). Every textbook on substantive criminal law has used the framework since.

Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958) AIR 465. Per Vivian Bose J — the four-fold test for the third clause of Section 300 IPC (now Section 101(c) BNS): bodily injury present; nature proved; injury intended; injury sufficient to cause death in ordinary course. The fourth element is matter of inference.

State of AP v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC 382. The Court approved the Govinda comparative table and added the comparative gradient — Section 300 is a graver form of Section 299; both share the actus reus but differ in the mental element's intensity.

Anda v. State of Rajasthan (1966) AIR 148. Application of the Virsa Singh four-fold test in a fact-pattern with multiple injuries; the Court held that intent for any one fatal injury suffices for Section 300(3) IPC (Section 101(c) BNS).

C.4. Exceptions to murder — Section 101 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on exceptions to murder.

K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1962) AIR 605. The classic Exception 1 case — grave and sudden provocation. The Court held that the test is the standard of a reasonable man of the same class, that the provocation must not be self-induced, and that there must be no cooling-off period.

Manke Ram v. State of Haryana (2003) 11 SCC 238. The Court applied Exception 4 (sudden fight) where two participants in a quarrel exchanged blows and one was killed; the absence of pre-meditation and the heat-of-passion element triggered the exception.

Dauvaram Nirmalkar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2022) 9 SCC 808. Recent restatement of Exception 1 — sustained provocation over a period of time, where the accused finally snaps, can satisfy the grave-and-sudden test even though the immediate trigger was minor.

C.5. Mob lynching — Section 103(2) BNS

See the chapter on Section 103(2) BNS for the full doctrinal exposition.

Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018) 9 SCC 501. The Court catalogued identity-motivated lynching incidents and recommended that Parliament create a separate offence with appropriate punishment. The legislative response is Section 103(2) BNS — five-or-more, identity grounds, mandatory life or death.

C.6. Hurt and grievous hurt — Sections 114 to 125 BNS

State of Karnataka v. Shivasharanappa (2013) 8 SCC 152. The Court applied the eight-clause definition of grievous hurt under Section 320 IPC (now Section 116 BNS), holding that fracture of any bone — however small — counts toward the grievous-hurt threshold.

C.7. Wrongful restraint and confinement — Sections 126 to 127 BNS

State of Gujarat v. Keshav Lal Maganbhai (1968) AIR 22. The Court held that wrongful restraint under Section 339 IPC (now Section 126 BNS) does not require physical contact; obstruction of free passage by threat or by closing a door suffices, provided the obstructed person had a right to proceed.

C.8. Criminal force and assault — Sections 128 to 134 BNS

Ramesh Chotalal Dalal v. State of Maharashtra (1988) 1 SCC 668. The Court analysed Section 354 IPC (now folded into Section 74 BNS) on outraging modesty and held that the test is the woman's reaction interpreted through the prism of social context.

C.9. Kidnapping and abduction — Sections 137 to 146 BNS

S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras (1965) AIR 942. The Court drew the line between "taking" and "going" — a minor who voluntarily leaves the lawful guardian's custody is not taken within Section 361 IPC (now Section 137 BNS); active solicitation by the accused must be proved.

Thakorlal D. Vadgama v. State of Gujarat (1973) 2 SCC 413. The minor's consent is irrelevant; the offence is against the lawful guardian, not against the minor. The rule governs Sections 137 to 144 BNS.

D. Sexual Offences, Marriage, Defamation

This cluster contains the most constitutionally consequential reforms of the past decade — the deletion of Sections 377 and 497 IPC, the raising of the marital-rape exception age, the BNS innovation of Section 69, and the codification of the workplace harassment regime.

D.1. Rape — Sections 63 to 64 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on rape and aggravated rape.

Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra (1979) 2 SCC 143. The Mathura case. The Supreme Court acquitted on absence-of-resistance reasoning that triggered the 1983 IPC amendment introducing Section 376(2) (custodial rape) and the reverse-burden presumption. The amendments now sit in Section 63 read with Section 116 BSA.

State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384. The Court restated rules on victim credibility — a rape victim's testimony stands on the same footing as that of an injured witness; corroboration is not required as a matter of law.

Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2017) 6 SCC 1. The Nirbhaya case. The Court confirmed death sentences for the gang-rape and murder, applying the Bachan Singh-Macchi Singh rarest-of-rare doctrine to a fact-pattern of extreme brutality. The case drove the 2013 Criminal Law Amendment Act now reflected in Sections 63 to 73 BNS.

D.2. Marital rape exception

Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 800. The Court read down Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC to raise the marital-rape exception age from 15 to 18, in conformity with the POCSO Act. Exception 2 to Section 63 BNS now codifies the age-18 rule.

D.3. Sexual harassment — Sections 75 to 79 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on sexual harassment, voyeurism, and stalking.

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241. Per Verma CJ — workplace sexual harassment is a violation of Articles 14, 15, and 21. The Court read CEDAW into Indian law and laid down binding guidelines until Parliament codified them in the 2013 Workplace Act. The criminal-law layer is now Section 75 BNS.

Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra (1999) 1 SCC 759. The Court applied the Vishaka framework to a service-jurisprudence dispute, confirming that physical contact is not necessary for harassment; verbal and gestural conduct suffices.

State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar (1991) 1 SCC 57. The Court held that even an unchaste woman has a right to privacy; a police officer who broke into her home was guilty of trespass and sexual misconduct. The privacy-and-bodily-autonomy reasoning underlies Section 75 BNS prosecutions.

D.4. Sexual intercourse by deceitful means — Section 69 BNS

See the chapter on Section 69 BNS for the full doctrinal exposition.

Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46. The Court drew the line between misconception of fact (rape) and breach of promise (no offence). A genuine but failed promise of marriage is not rape; a false promise made with no intention of fulfilment is. Section 69 BNS now codifies the false-promise category as a stand-alone offence.

Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608. The Court refined the Uday test — for the false-promise category, the falsity must exist at the time the promise was made; subsequent change of heart is not enough.

Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh (2019) 13 SCC 1. The Court convicted on a false-promise-of-marriage fact-pattern where the accused knew at the time of the promise that he was already engaged to another. The fact-pattern is now the paradigm Section 69 BNS case.

D.5. Section 377 IPC — the deletion arc

See the chapter on unnatural offences post-Navtej Singh Johar for the doctrinal gap and how courts address it.

Naz Foundation v. NCT of Delhi (2009) 160 DLT 277. The Delhi High Court read down Section 377 IPC to exclude consensual same-sex relations between adults, on Article 14, 15, and 21 grounds. The decision was reversed in 2014 but ultimately vindicated by the Supreme Court in 2018.

Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1. The Supreme Court reversed the Delhi High Court, holding that the issue was a legislative question. The decision was widely criticised and was itself reversed in 2018.

Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1. The Constitution Bench unanimously read down Section 377 to exclude consensual same-sex relations between adults. The BNS does not re-enact Section 377; non-consensual sodomy on adults now travels under Section 117 BNS.

D.6. Cruelty and dowry death — Sections 80, 85, 86 BNS

Shanti v. State of Haryana (1991) 1 SCC 371. The Court applied Section 304B IPC (now Section 80 BNS) and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act (now Section 117 BSA) — the deeming fiction and reverse burden. Death within seven years of marriage in connection with dowry demand triggers the presumption.

Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273. The Court laid down arrest safeguards for Section 498A IPC (now Section 85 BNS) prosecutions — police must record reasons under Section 41A CrPC (now Section 35 BNSS) before arrest in offences punishable up to seven years.

Rajesh Sharma v. State of UP (2017) 10 SCC 472. The Court reinforced Arnesh Kumar with directions on family welfare committees to screen Section 498A complaints. The directions were later revisited but the underlying due-process concern continues to govern Section 85 BNS prosecutions.

D.7. Marriage offences — Sections 81 to 84 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on offences relating to marriage.

Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 635. The Court held that conversion to Islam to contract a second marriage does not validate the second marriage if the first marriage subsists; the second marriage attracts Section 494 IPC (now Section 82 BNS). The bigamy framework continues unchanged.

Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224. The Court extended Sarla Mudgal, holding that no person can profess a religion of convenience to evade penal liability for bigamy. Governs Section 82 BNS prosecutions.

Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39. The Constitution Bench struck down Section 497 IPC (adultery) as violative of Articles 14, 15, and 21. The decision overruled Sowmithri Vishnu (1985), Yusuf Abdul Aziz (1954), and V. Revathi (1988). The BNS does not re-enact Section 497.

D.8. Defamation — Section 356 BNS

Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221. The Court upheld the constitutional validity of criminal defamation under Sections 499 and 500 IPC (now Section 356 BNS). Reputation is part of the right to life under Article 21; criminal defamation is a reasonable restriction on free speech.

D.9. Criminal intimidation — Sections 351 to 355 BNS

Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka (2015) 7 SCC 423. The Court held that a threat to do a lawful act suffices for criminal intimidation under Section 503 IPC (now Section 351 BNS) provided the threat is intended to cause alarm.

Vikram Johar v. State of UP (2019) 14 SCC 207. The Court refined the intent-threshold — the intent to cause alarm must be a real, not theoretical, intent. Casual threats made in the heat of an argument do not satisfy the section.

E. Property Offences

The property chapters are the most extensively reorganised in the BNS. Sections 303 to 334 BNS fold seventy-plus IPC sections into thirty-two BNS sections through aggressive consolidation. The case-law accumulated under the IPC continues to govern the BNS provisions.

E.1. Theft — Section 303 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on offences against property and the law of theft.

Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (1963) AIR 1094. The Court restated the five ingredients of theft under Section 378 IPC (now Section 303(1) BNS): dishonest intention, movable property, possession of another, without consent, and moving the property. All five must be present.

K.N. Mehra v. State of Rajasthan (1957) AIR 369. The temporary-taking rule — the intent to deprive permanently is not required; even a temporary deprivation with dishonest intent suffices for theft. Governs Section 303 BNS.

Charanjit Singh Chadha v. Sudhir Mehra (2001) 7 SCC 417. The Court applied the theft definition to a hire-purchase repossession, holding that the financier's dispossession of the hirer involved theft because the temporary-taking rule satisfied the intent element.

E.2. Snatching — Section 304 BNS

Dhananjay v. State of UP (2007) 14 SCC 768. The Court addressed the boundary between theft and robbery in a snatching context, holding that "force" under Section 390 IPC requires something beyond the snatch itself. The reasoning is now the doctrinal precursor of Section 304 BNS — the BNS innovation that fills the gap.

E.3. Extortion — Section 308 BNS

Karipi Rasheed v. State of AP applied the non-compoundable rule and the seven-year ceiling under Section 384 IPC (now Section 308(2) BNS, raised to seven years from the IPC's three-year ceiling). The decision sets the benchmark for extortion sentencing.

E.4. Robbery and dacoity — Sections 309 to 313 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on robbery and dacoity.

Joseph Mingel Koli v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 580. The Court restated the five-element analysis of robbery under Section 390 IPC (now Section 309 BNS), emphasising the "for that end" requirement — the force must be offered for the end of committing theft, of carrying away the property, or of attempting theft.

Phool Kumar v. Delhi Administration (1975) 1 SCC 797. The Court read "deadly weapon" under Section 397 IPC (now folded into Section 311 BNS) broadly — any weapon capable of causing death qualifies, even an unloaded firearm displayed as a threat.

Rafiq Ahmed v. State of UP (2011) 8 SCC 300. The Court held that Section 396 IPC (now Section 310(3) BNS) incorporates the Section 300 IPC test of murder; conviction for dacoity-with-murder requires proof that the killing satisfied the murder definition.

E.5. Misappropriation and breach of trust — Sections 314 to 316 BNS

Bhagiram Dome (1888) ILR 15 Cal 388. The classical distinction between theft and misappropriation — theft is dishonest taking from the start; misappropriation is honest possession that becomes dishonest. Governs Section 314 BNS.

Velji Raghavji v. State of Maharashtra (1965) AIR 1433. The partner rule — a partner who appropriates partnership property does not commit criminal breach of trust under Section 405 IPC (now Section 316 BNS) because each partner has a present interest in every part of the partnership property.

J.M. Desai v. State of Bombay (1960) AIR 889. The burden-shifting rule — once the prosecution establishes entrustment and dishonest dealing, the burden shifts to the accused to explain. The rule governs Section 316 BNS.

E.6. Receiving stolen property — Section 317 BNS

Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (1983) 2 SCC 330. The recent-possession rule — possession of stolen property soon after the theft, without satisfactory explanation, supports an inference of involvement in the theft itself or in receiving. Governs Section 317 BNS.

Mir Naqvi Askari v. CBI (2009) 16 SCC 788. The Court restated the three-element test for receiving — knowledge or reason to believe of stolen origin, dishonest receipt or retention, and the property must be stolen within Section 410 IPC (now Section 317(1) BNS).

E.7. Cheating — Sections 318 to 319 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on cheating.

Hridya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168. The two-part architecture of cheating — fraudulent or dishonest inducement (first limb) versus intentional inducement causing damage (second limb). Each limb has distinct ingredients.

Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. (2011) 1 SCC 74. The Court held that a corporation can be prosecuted for cheating; mens rea is attributable to the corporation through its directing minds. Governs corporate-fraud prosecutions under Section 318 BNS.

E.8. Forgery — Sections 335 to 344 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on forgery and property marks.

A.K. Khosla v. T.S. Venkatesan (1994) 1 SCC 462. The Court drew the critical distinction — a document that contains a false statement is not the same as a document that is itself false. For forgery, the document must "tell a lie about itself". Governs Section 335 BNS.

Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of Bihar (2009) 8 SCC 751. The Court restated the three pathways to a false document — false authorship, tampering after execution, or obtaining by deception. Each pathway is independently sufficient under Section 335 BNS.

Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj (2018) 7 SCC 581. The Court held that for a forgery prosecution under Section 464 IPC (now Section 335 BNS), the false document must be made by the accused himself; an accused who merely uses a document forged by someone else is liable under Section 471 IPC (Section 340 BNS), not Section 463.

E.9. Mischief — Sections 324 to 328 BNS

Gopinath Nayak v. Lepa Majhi (1996). The legal-right test — no loss is wrongful within Section 425 IPC (now Section 324(1) BNS) unless it invades a legal right. Damnum sine injuria does not constitute mischief.

State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan (1988) 4 SCC 655. The Court held that the offence under Section 429 IPC (now Section 325 BNS) and the offence under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, are substantially the same; the bar of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) does not, however, operate.

E.10. Criminal trespass — Sections 329 to 334 BNS

The cases below operate alongside the chapter on criminal trespass and house-breaking.

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545. Per Chandrachud CJ — pavement-dwellers facing demolition had not committed criminal trespass under Section 441 IPC (now Section 329(1) BNS). Their act was the dictate of moral right to survive; the four intents were absent.

Md. Sahabuddin v. Sayed Monowar Hussain (1999) 6 SCC 287. The Court held that mere unauthorised retention of property does not constitute criminal trespass; the prosecution must prove one of the four intents — to commit an offence, to intimidate, to insult, or to annoy.

State of Karnataka v. Richard (2008) 17 SCC 705. The Court held that a police station, being a place where property is kept in custody, is a "building" within Section 442 IPC (now Section 329(2) BNS); criminal trespass on a police station is house-trespass.

F. Procedural Constitutional Backstops

The substantive law of the BNS operates against a backdrop of procedural constitutional jurisprudence developed under the CrPC and now carried forward into the BNSS. Three landmark decisions deserve particular attention.

F.1. FIR registration

Lalita Kumari v. Government of UP (2014) 2 SCC 1. The Constitution Bench held that registration of an FIR under Section 154 CrPC (now Section 173 BNSS) is mandatory whenever the information discloses a cognizable offence; preliminary inquiry is permitted only in narrow categories. The rule is foundational to BNS prosecution.

T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181. The Court limited the registration of a second FIR for the same incident — successive FIRs on the same set of facts are barred. Governs the BNSS framework on multiple-information situations.

F.2. Quashing jurisprudence

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335. The Court laid down seven categories of cases in which the High Court may quash an FIR or criminal proceeding — including where allegations do not prima facie disclose an offence, where allegations are absurd or improbable, and where allegations are mala fide. Governs Section 528 BNSS.

F.3. Procedural due process

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248. The Court read procedural due process into Article 21 — any procedure depriving a person of life or personal liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. The decision is the constitutional anchor of every BNS prosecution.

D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416. The Court laid down eleven custodial-arrest safeguards — including notification to a relative, medical examination, and arrest memo. Now substantially incorporated into the BNSS arrest provisions.

How to use this case-survey

Three preparation strategies are useful. First, learn each case by its proposition rather than its facts — examiners typically test the doctrinal proposition. Second, anchor each case to its BNS section using the official correspondence table; the case-law was decided under the IPC but operates under the BNS. Third, master the constitutional cases — Bachan Singh, Joseph Shine, Navtej Singh Johar, Vishaka, Tehseen Poonawalla, Lalita Kumari — because they explain why the BNS is what it is. The chapter-by-chapter articles in the subject hub for the Indian Penal Code and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita provide the substantive doctrinal coverage.

Frequently asked questions

Why does pre-BNS case-law continue to govern under the BNS?

The BNS preserves the substantive ingredient-structure of the IPC across most sections. Section 101 BNS preserves Section 300 IPC's four-fold test of murder; Section 309 BNS preserves Section 390 IPC's robbery test; Section 318 BNS preserves Section 415 IPC's two-part architecture of cheating. The case-law accumulated under the IPC therefore governs the corresponding BNS provisions; doctrines are simply re-stated in BNS section numbers. The official BNS-IPC correspondence table is authoritative on the section-mapping.

Which BNS sections genuinely break with IPC case-law?

The wholly new BNS provisions have no direct IPC predecessor and therefore no inherited case-law: Section 4(f) on community service, Section 69 on sexual intercourse by deceitful means, Section 103(2) on mob lynching, Section 106(2) on hit-and-run with failure to report, Section 111 on organised crime, Section 112 on petty organised crime, Section 113 on terrorist act, Section 304 on snatching, and Section 152 replacing colonial sedition. Pre-BNS doctrinal precursors exist for most but the formal case-law will need to develop after 1 July 2024.

How should state-judiciary aspirants prioritise these cases?

Three strategies. First, master the constitutional landmarks — Bachan Singh, Joseph Shine, Navtej Singh Johar, Vishaka, Tehseen Poonawalla, Lalita Kumari — because they explain the BNS reform agenda. Second, master the doctrinal-anchor cases for each major offence — Virsa Singh on murder, Mahbub Shah on common intention, Joseph Mingel Koli on robbery, A.K. Khosla on forgery, Pyare Lal Bhargava on theft. Third, learn each case by its proposition rather than its facts; examiners typically test the doctrinal rule rather than the underlying narrative.