Article-Wise Analysis — Suits Relating to Tort (Articles 72–91) →

Part VII of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 — Articles 72 to 91 — is the procedural map of the law of torts. It tells the plaintiff how long he has to bring an action for libel, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, trespass, conversion or a fatal accident, and the precise event from which that clock begins to tick. The scheme is deliberately graded: most personal and reputation torts attract a short one-year period, a small middle band of representative and perversion claims attract two years, and property-based torts attract the more generous three years. This chapter walks article by article through that band, anchoring each entry in the statutory text and explaining why the legislature chose the period and the starting point it did.

Suits relating to tort form the seventh of the ten classes into which suits are divided in the Schedule, sitting between suits relating to movable property (Articles 63 to 71) and suits relating to trusts and trust property (Articles 92 to 96). For a grounding in how the whole scheme fits together, read the introduction to the Limitation Act and the chapter on the bar of limitation under Section 3; for the mechanics of counting days, see computation of the period of limitation. The hub for the whole subject is the Limitation Act notes.

Where tort sits in the Schedule

The Schedule to the 1963 Act, read with Sections 2(j) and 3, is the operative engine of the statute: it is the Schedule that prescribes the period of limitation for every suit, appeal and application, and Section 3 that compels the court to dismiss anything filed beyond it, "although limitation has not been set up as a defence." Part VII is the tort block. Its twenty articles share a common architecture — column one describes the suit, column two fixes the period, and column three names the event from which time runs. The starting points are not uniform: some run from the wrongful act, some from the resulting damage, and some from the moment the plaintiff acquires knowledge.

The graded periods reflect a policy judgment. Personal torts — those touching liberty, reputation and bodily integrity — carry one year because the evidence (witnesses to an arrest, a defamatory publication, a prosecution) is fresh and perishable, and because such claims, if genuine, are felt and pursued quickly. Property torts carry three years because the injury is to a thing that endures, the evidence is more durable, and questions of title and possession take longer to crystallise. The two-year middle band is reserved for representative actions and the perversion of property to alien purposes, where the practical difficulties of constituting the claim justify a slightly longer runway.

Article 72 — acts done under an enactment

Article 72 prescribes one year for a suit "for compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment in force for the time being in the territories to which this Act extends," running from when the act or omission takes place. The article protects public officers and others acting, or purporting to act, under statutory authority by confining the window of liability to a single year. The short period is the counterpart of the broad immunity such officers enjoy: where the wrong is committed under colour of a statute, the legislature wants any challenge brought promptly while the propriety of the official act can still be tested on fresh material.

The phrase "alleged to be in pursuance of" is important. It is the plaintiff's characterisation of the defendant's conduct as done under an enactment that brings the suit within Article 72; the article applies even if the defendant ultimately turns out to have exceeded the statute, so long as the act was done in purported pursuance of it. Where the act has no statutory colour at all, Article 72 is displaced and the appropriate specific tort article (or the residuary Article 113) governs instead.

Article 73 — false imprisonment

Article 73 prescribes one year for a suit "for compensation for false imprisonment," running from when the imprisonment ends. The choice of the terminal event — the end of the imprisonment rather than its commencement — is deliberate and humane. False imprisonment is a continuing trespass to the person; the wrong subsists for the whole duration of the unlawful detention. Time therefore cannot sensibly begin while the plaintiff is still confined and unable to litigate. By fixing the starting point at the release, the article ensures the plaintiff has a full year of liberty within which to sue.

This drafting choice is a clean illustration of the Schedule's sensitivity to the nature of the wrong. Contrast Article 72, where time runs from the act itself; in false imprisonment the "act" is a state of affairs that persists, and the limitation clock waits for it to cease. The principle dovetails with Section 9, under which, once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability stops it — but here time has not even begun until the detention ends.

Article 74 — malicious prosecution

Article 74 prescribes one year for a suit "for compensation for a malicious prosecution," running from when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated. Again the starting point tracks the substantive law of the tort. Favourable termination of the impugned proceeding is an essential ingredient of malicious prosecution: a plaintiff cannot complain that he was maliciously prosecuted while the prosecution is still on foot and might yet end in his conviction. The cause of action is therefore incomplete — and the limitation clock cannot start — until the prosecution has ended in the plaintiff's favour, whether by acquittal, discharge, withdrawal or quashing.

The article rewards careful identification of the terminal event. Where a magistrate discharges the accused, time runs from the discharge; where an acquittal is recorded after trial, from the acquittal; where the prosecution is withdrawn, from the withdrawal. A plaintiff who waits to see the outcome of an appeal against acquittal must be alert: the year runs from the acquittal that constitutes the favourable termination, and a later abandoned appeal does not reset it. The interplay with knowledge and the accrual of the right to sue is part of the broader theme explored in the chapter on the bar of limitation.

Articles 75–76 — libel and slander

The two defamation articles sit side by side and repay comparison. Article 75 gives one year for a suit "for compensation for libel," running from when the libel is published. Article 76 gives one year for a suit "for compensation for slander," running from when the words are spoken, or, if the words are not actionable in themselves, when the special damage complained of results. The split mirrors the substantive distinction between libel and slander. Libel — defamation in a permanent form — is actionable per se, so the cause of action is complete on publication, and time runs from that fixed event.

Slander is more subtle. Spoken words are, as a rule, actionable only on proof of special damage; the exceptional categories of slander actionable per se aside, the cause of action is not complete until that damage results. Article 76 captures both situations: where the slander is actionable in itself, time runs from the speaking; where it is not, time runs from the later moment when the special damage materialises. This is one of the cleanest examples in Part VII of the column-three starting point bending to the substantive requirements of the tort, and a recurring favourite in objective-type questions.

Articles 77–78 — seduction and inducing breach

Article 77 prescribes one year for a suit "for compensation for loss of service occasioned by the seduction of the plaintiff's servant or daughter," running from when the loss occurs. The action is a historical one, framed around the master's or parent's loss of the services of the seduced person rather than the seduction as such — hence the gist of the claim, and the starting point, is the loss of service, not the seductive act. Article 78 prescribes one year for a suit "for compensation for inducing a person to break a contract with the plaintiff," running from the date of the breach.

Article 78 is the limitation counterpart of the economic tort of inducing breach of contract. The starting point is the breach induced, not the inducement itself, because it is the breach that consummates the plaintiff's loss; an inducement that never ripens into a breach causes no actionable harm. The article should be distinguished from a suit on the contract against the contracting party, which falls within the contract articles (Articles 6 to 55) and may carry a three-year period; Article 78 governs only the tort claim against the third-party inducer.

Articles 79–80 — distress and wrongful seizure

Article 79 prescribes one year for a suit "for compensation for an illegal, irregular or excessive distress," running from the date of the distress. Distress is the act of seizing goods, typically by a landlord, to compel payment of rent or another sum; the article confines a complaint that the distress was illegal, irregular or excessive to a single year from the date the goods were taken. Article 80 prescribes one year for a suit "for compensation for wrongful seizure of movable property under legal process," running from the date of the seizure.

Both articles target wrongful interference with movables effected through a process — distress in Article 79, legal process (such as attachment in execution) in Article 80. The short one-year period is the price of the public interest in the finality of process: where goods are taken under colour of legal or quasi-legal authority, any challenge must come quickly, before the underlying proceeding has moved on. Note the contrast with Article 91, which governs wrongful taking or detention of movables not effected through legal process and carries three years — a difference of period that turns precisely on whether a "legal process" was the vehicle of the seizure.

Articles 81–83 — representative suits

Three articles deal with suits by or against legal representatives under the two nineteenth-century survival-of-actions statutes. Article 81 prescribes one year for a suit "by executors, administrators or representatives under the Legal Representatives' Suits Act, 1855," running from the date of the death of the person wronged. Article 82 prescribes two years for a suit "by executors, administrators or representatives under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855," running from the date of the death of the person killed. Article 83 prescribes two years for a suit "under the Legal Representatives' Suits Act, 1855, against an executor, an administrator or any other representative," running from when the wrong complained of is done.

The cluster is a classic examination trap because the periods differ. Article 81, the representative's claim under the Legal Representatives' Suits Act, gets one year; Article 82, the fatal-accident claim under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, gets two years. The longer period under Article 82 recognises that a dependant pursuing a fatal-accident claim must constitute representation, identify dependants and quantify a loss of dependency — practical steps that justify additional time. Article 83, the claim against a deceased tortfeasor's estate, also carries two years, but its starting point is the doing of the wrong, not a death. Students should commit the trio — one year, two years, two years, with three different starting events — to memory as a unit. Note that the two-year Article 82 governs the civil suit under the 1855 Act; modern fatal motor-accident claims are pursued before a Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act, a separate regime.

Article 84 — perversion of property

Article 84 prescribes two years for a suit "against one who, having a right to use property for specific purposes, perverts it to other purposes," running from when the perversion first becomes known to the person injured thereby. The article addresses the situation where a person lawfully entitled to use property in a limited way exceeds that authority and diverts it to an unauthorised use — a breach of the terms on which the use was granted that injures the person entitled to insist on the limitation.

The column-three trigger is knowledge: time runs not from the perversion but from when it first becomes known to the injured person. This is a knowledge-based starting point analogous in spirit to the fraud-and-mistake rule under Section 17, which postpones the running of time until the plaintiff has discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have discovered, the fraud or mistake. A perversion of use may well be concealed or non-obvious, and it would be unjust to run time against a person who could not have known of it; Article 84 builds that fairness into the starting point itself.

Articles 85–90 — three-year property torts

From Article 85 the period lengthens to three years. Article 85 gives three years for a suit "for compensation for obstructing a way or a water-course," from the date of the obstruction. Article 86 gives three years "for compensation for diverting a water-course," from the date of the diversion. Article 87 gives three years "for compensation for trespass upon immovable property," from the date of the trespass. Article 88 gives three years "for compensation for infringing copyright or any other exclusive privilege," from the date of the infringement. Article 89 gives three years "to restrain waste," from when the waste begins. Article 90 gives three years "for compensation for injury caused by an injunction wrongfully obtained," from when the injunction ceases.

These six articles share a unifying theme: they protect interests in, or connected with, property — rights of way and watercourse, possession of land, intellectual-property privileges, and the value of property threatened by waste or by a wrongful injunction. The three-year period is the standard mid-length period of the Act, the same as that applied to contracts and to movable property. The starting points are mostly the date of the wrongful act, with two instructive exceptions. Article 89 (waste) runs from when the waste begins, fitting a remedy aimed at restraining a continuing course of conduct. Article 90 (wrongful injunction) runs from when the injunction ceases, because the injury the plaintiff complains of — being wrongly restrained — endures for as long as the injunction binds him, and his loss cannot be finally measured until it lifts.

Article 88 deserves a separate word. It governs a suit for compensation for infringing copyright or any other exclusive privilege. Where infringement is repeated or ongoing, the analysis intersects with the doctrine of continuing wrongs under Section 22, considered below; each fresh act of infringement may furnish a fresh cause of action, so a single three-year window measured from a first infringement does not necessarily bar a suit on later acts.

Article 91 — conversion and detinue

Article 91 closes Part VII and is the most heavily litigated of the tort articles because it captures conversion and detinue. It prescribes three years for a suit "for compensation," split into two clauses. Clause (a) covers "wrongfully taking or detaining any specific movable property lost, or acquired by theft, or dishonest misappropriation, or conversion," and runs from when the person having the right to the possession of the property first learns in whose possession it is. Clause (b) covers "wrongfully taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining any other specific movable property," and runs from when the property is wrongfully taken or injured, or when the detainer's possession becomes unlawful.

The bifurcation is elegant. Clause (a) deals with property that has passed out of the owner's reach through loss, theft, dishonest misappropriation or conversion — situations where the owner may not know who holds the thing. Justice requires that time run only from when the owner learns in whose possession the property is, because until then he cannot frame a suit against an identifiable defendant. Clause (b) deals with the more ordinary case of wrongful taking, injury or detention of other specific movable property, where the wrongdoer is known; time runs from the taking or injury, or from the moment a possession that began lawfully becomes unlawful (the classic detinue situation where a bailee refuses to return goods on demand).

Article 91 must be kept apart from the residuary Article 113, which gives three years from when the right to sue accrues but applies only where no other article fits. Because Article 91 squarely covers conversion and detinue, the residuary article cannot be pressed into service for those claims — the specific provision always prevails over the general. The distinction is a staple of judiciary prelims and is worth rehearsing alongside the wider scheme set out in the Limitation Act hub.

Section 22 — continuing torts

No article-wise treatment of tort limitation is complete without Section 22, which sits in the body of the Act and modifies the operation of every tort article. It provides that "in the case of a continuing breach of contract or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues." The section recognises that some wrongs are not spent in a single instant but are renewed from day to day, creating a continuing source of injury.

The pivotal distinction is between a wrong that is complete once and for all — where time runs from the single act even though the damage continues — and a continuing wrong that generates a fresh cause of action each day. If a wrongful act causes an injury that is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the consequential damage persists; but where the wrong itself subsists, Section 22 keeps the limitation clock perpetually fresh. In Bengal Waterproof Ltd v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co., AIR 1997 SC 1398, (1997) 1 SCC 99, the Supreme Court held that infringement of a trade mark and passing off are continuing wrongs, so that a second suit founded on fresh acts of infringement committed after an earlier suit is not barred by limitation and is not hit by the bar on splitting a cause of action.

The practical reach of Section 22 across Part VII is considerable. A continuing trespass under Article 87, a continuing obstruction of a way or watercourse under Articles 85 and 86, an ongoing infringement under Article 88, and an unlawful detention under Article 91(b) may each engage Section 22, with time running afresh so long as the wrong persists. The litigator's task is to characterise the wrong correctly — as a single completed act or a continuing one — because that characterisation, more than the bare period in column two, often decides whether the suit is in time.

Starting point and the bar of limitation

Two further principles bind the tort articles to the rest of the Act. First, the starting points in column three operate against the backdrop of Section 12(1), under which the day from which the period is to be reckoned is excluded in computing limitation. So a one-year period under Article 73 or 74 is counted excluding the very day on which the imprisonment ended or the acquittal was recorded. The reliefs available under Sections 4 to 24 — exclusion of the day a court is closed, exclusion of time spent bona fide in a wrong forum, and the rest — apply to tort suits as to any other.

Second, the bar that Section 3 imposes on a time-barred tort suit goes only to the remedy, not to the right. The Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328, confirmed the settled rule that when a claim becomes barred by limitation it does not become extinguished but only unenforceable in a court of law. The single exception in the Act is Section 27, which extinguishes the right itself — but Section 27 operates only on suits for possession of property founded on adverse possession, and has no application to the personal and property torts of Part VII. For a tort claim, therefore, the lapse of the one, two or three-year period bars the action without destroying the underlying legal injury.

Exam focus — the recurring distinctions

Several propositions from Part VII recur in judiciary and CLAT-PG papers with high frequency. First, the period bands: one year for Articles 72 to 81 (the personal and process torts, plus the Legal Representatives' Suits Act claim under Article 81); two years for Articles 82, 83 and 84 (the Indian Fatal Accidents Act claim, the suit against a representative, and perversion of property); and three years for Articles 85 to 91 (the property and conversion torts). Memorising the boundaries — that Article 81 is the last one-year article and Article 85 is the first three-year article — disposes of a large share of objective questions.

Second, the starting points that depart from the date of the act: Article 73 (release from imprisonment), Article 74 (favourable termination of the prosecution), Article 76 (resulting special damage, where slander is not actionable per se), Article 84 (knowledge of the perversion), Article 90 (cessation of the injunction) and Article 91(a) (knowledge of the possessor). Third, the Article 81 versus Article 82 trap — one year under the Legal Representatives' Suits Act against two years under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act. Fourth, the supremacy of the specific Article 91 over the residuary Article 113 for conversion and detinue. And fifth, the operation of Section 22, which can keep a continuing tort alive indefinitely, as Bengal Waterproof demonstrates. Carry these five clusters into the hall and Part VII becomes one of the most reliably scoring topics in the Limitation syllabus.

Frequently asked questions

What is the limitation period for a suit relating to tort under the Limitation Act, 1963?

There is no single period. Part VII of the Schedule (Articles 72 to 91) prescribes a graded scheme. Most personal-injury and reputation torts carry one year — Article 73 (false imprisonment), Article 74 (malicious prosecution), Article 75 (libel), Article 76 (slander) and Article 72 (acts done in pursuance of an enactment). Articles 82 to 84 carry two years, including the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 claim under Article 82. Property and conversion torts under Articles 85 to 91 carry three years — trespass to immovable property (Article 87), infringement of copyright or exclusive privilege (Article 88) and wrongful taking or detention of movable property (Article 91).

What is the limitation period for a suit for malicious prosecution and from when does it run?

Article 74 of the Schedule prescribes one year for a suit for compensation for a malicious prosecution. Time runs not from the institution of the malicious proceeding but from the date the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated in his favour — favourable termination being an essential ingredient of the tort itself. This deferred starting point reflects the rule that a cause of action in malicious prosecution is not complete until the criminal proceeding has ended in the plaintiff's favour.

Why does the Indian Fatal Accidents Act claim get two years under Article 82 while most torts get one year?

Article 82 prescribes two years for a suit by executors, administrators or representatives under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, computed from the date of death of the person killed. The longer period recognises that dependants pursuing a fatal-accident claim through a deceased's estate need additional time to constitute representation, ascertain dependency and quantify loss — practical difficulties that do not attend a living plaintiff suing for libel or assault. Note that this two-year period governs civil suits under the 1855 Act; claims before a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal are governed by the Motor Vehicles Act regime, not Article 82.

How does Section 22 affect the limitation period for a continuing tort?

Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that in the case of a continuing tort a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the tort continues. The distinction is between a wrong that is complete once and for all — where time runs from the single act, even if damage continues — and a continuing wrong that creates a fresh source of injury each day. In Bengal Waterproof Ltd v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co., AIR 1997 SC 1398, the Supreme Court held that passing off and infringement of a trade mark are continuing wrongs, so a second suit on fresh acts of infringement after an earlier suit is not barred.

What is the difference between Article 91 and Article 113 for a suit relating to movable property?

Article 91 is the specific tort article for wrongful taking, injuring or detaining specific movable property, and conversion — three years, running from when the right-holder learns whose possession the property is in (clause a) or when the taking, injury or unlawful detention occurs (clause b). Article 113 is the residuary article — three years from when the right to sue accrues — and applies only where no other article in the Schedule fits. Because Article 91 squarely covers conversion and detinue, the residuary Article 113 cannot be invoked for those claims; the specific article always prevails over the general.

Does the bar of limitation on a tort suit extinguish the right or only the remedy?

For tort suits under Articles 72 to 91, limitation bars only the remedy and does not extinguish the right. The Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328, confirmed that when a claim becomes time-barred it becomes unenforceable in a court of law but is not extinguished. This is the general rule under Section 3. The exception is Section 27, which extinguishes the right itself — but Section 27 operates only on suits for possession of property founded on adverse possession, not on the personal and property torts in Part VII.