Limitation for Appeals and Applications (Articles 114–137) →

The Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is divided into three Divisions. The First Division covers suits (Articles 1 to 113), the Second Division a single article for the production of documents, and the Third Division covers appeals and applications — Articles 114 to 117 for appeals and Articles 118 to 137 for applications. This chapter takes up that Third Division: how long a litigant has to carry a decree upstairs in appeal, how long to move an application to set aside, restore, review or execute, and what happens when the residuary Article 137 is the only article that fits. Throughout, the governing command is Section 3 — the bar of limitation: every appeal preferred and every application made after the prescribed period must be dismissed, whether or not limitation is set up as a defence.

The scheme of the Third Division

The Limitation Act prescribes, by the third column of the Schedule, both the length of the period and the point from which it runs for each class of proceeding. For suits the periods are long — three to thirty years; for appeals and applications they are short — thirty days to twelve years. The brevity is deliberate. An appeal or an application is a continuation of, or an attack on, a concluded judicial process; the policy of the law, captured in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, is that such proceedings must be launched promptly while the record and the memory are fresh. As the Supreme Court observed in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties but to ensure that they pursue their remedies with diligence rather than dilatory tactics.

The Third Division must be read alongside the general provisions in Sections 3 to 24. Section 3 supplies the mandatory bar; Section 4 extends the period where the court is closed on the last day; Section 5 permits condonation of delay for appeals and applications (but not suits); and Sections 12 to 15 supply the exclusions that effectively lengthen the period. For appeals the most important of these is Section 12 — the exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order — examined in detail in our chapter on the computation of the period of limitation. The reader who has internalised those provisions will find the Schedule itself comparatively mechanical: the difficulty in this branch of the law lies almost entirely in identifying the correct article and the correct starting point.

Appeals — Articles 114 to 117

Four articles govern appeals. Article 114 deals with appeals from an order of acquittal: ninety days for an appeal under sub-section (1) or (2) of the relevant provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, running from the date of the order appealed from, and thirty days for an appeal under the special-leave route, running from the date of the grant of special leave. Article 115 governs appeals under the Code of Criminal Procedure other than acquittals: an appeal from a sentence of death passed by a Court of Session or by a High Court in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction must be filed within thirty days from the date of the sentence; an appeal from any other sentence or order to a High Court within sixty days, and to any other court within thirty days, in each case from the date of the sentence or order.

Article 116 governs civil appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. An appeal from a decree or order to a High Court must be filed within ninety days; an appeal to any other court within thirty days; in both cases time runs from the date of the decree or order. Article 117 supplies a special, shorter period for an appeal from a decree or order of a High Court to the same High Court — the intra-court or Letters Patent appeal — which must be filed within thirty days from the date of the decree or order. The reduction from ninety to thirty days reflects the assumption that a litigant already before the High Court, with counsel on record, needs no extended period to mount an internal appeal. The following table consolidates the appeal periods.

Article	Nature of appeal	Period	Time runs from
114	From an order of acquittal (CrPC)	90 days / 30 days (special leave)	Date of order / grant of leave
115	Death sentence (Sessions / HC original)	30 days	Date of sentence
115	Other sentence or order to a High Court	60 days	Date of sentence or order
116	Civil appeal to a High Court (CPC)	90 days	Date of decree or order
116	Civil appeal to any other court (CPC)	30 days	Date of decree or order
117	From a High Court decree to the same court	30 days	Date of decree or order

Computing the appeal period — Sections 4, 5 and 12

The bare period in the Schedule is never the whole story, because Section 12 mandates exclusions that materially extend the time available. Section 12(1) excludes the day from which the period is to be reckoned — the date of the decree or order. Section 12(2) excludes both the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from; Section 12(3) adds the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree is founded. The leading authority is Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel, AIR 1964 SC 1099, where the Supreme Court held that the time requisite for obtaining the copy must be excluded even where the appellant already had a copy, and applied Section 12 to an election appeal carried under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 by force of Section 29(2). The word "requisite" means properly required; the time lost through the appellant's own negligence in applying for or collecting the copy is not excluded.

The interval between the pronouncement of judgment and the drawing up and signing of the decree is a recurring trap. The Explanation to Section 12 makes clear that any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy is made shall not be excluded. In other words, only the time that would have been required had the application been made can be claimed as "time requisite". Section 4 then supplies a separate, narrower concession: where the prescribed period expires on a day when the court is closed, the appeal may be preferred on the day the court reopens. Section 4 does not add to the period of limitation; it merely saves the litigant who is caught out by a court holiday on the very last day.

Condonation of delay under Section 5

Where the appeal or application is filed beyond the prescribed period even after the Section 12 exclusions, the only escape is Section 5 — the power to admit an appeal, or an application other than one under any provision of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, after the prescribed period if sufficient cause for the delay is shown. Section 5 does not apply to suits; no court can condone delay in instituting a suit. The phrase "sufficient cause" is left undefined, and the case law swings between a strict and a liberal pole. The strict pole is marked by Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361, where the Court held that proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent to the exercise of the discretion, and that even after sufficient cause is shown the party is not entitled to condonation as of right — the court may still consider the party's bona fides and diligence.

The liberal pole is marked by Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353, where the Court held that the expression "sufficient cause" is elastic enough to enable courts to do substantial justice, and that refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the threshold, defeating the cause of justice, whereas condoning it at worst allows the case to be decided on merits. The reconciliation came in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, where the Court held that the length of the delay is immaterial and the acceptability of the explanation is the sole criterion: a delay of a single day may be uncondonable if unexplained, while a delay of years may be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and free of mala fides or dilatory design. The State, because of its impersonal and file-bound decision-making, is given a degree of latitude, as recognised in G. Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142, but a false averment in the condonation application — as in Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 — is itself sufficient to reject it.

Dismissal as time-barred is an appealable order

A question that recurs in both prelims and mains is whether an order refusing to condone delay, and dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation, is itself an order made "in appeal" and therefore open to a further appeal. The Supreme Court answered this affirmatively in Mela Ram and Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 367. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner had declined to condone delay and dismissed the appeal as time-barred; the Court held that the only provision for the hearing and disposal of the appeal was the section dealing with appellate orders, so an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation must fall within it and is therefore an order passed in appeal — and consequently appealable to the next forum. The principle generalises: rejection of an appeal on the ground of limitation is an adjudication on the appeal, not a refusal to entertain it.

The same reasoning has an important consequence for execution. Where an appeal is dismissed solely because the delay in filing it was not condoned, the appellate forum never reaches the merits, and so the doctrine of merger does not operate — the trial decree does not merge in any appellate decree, because there is no appellate decree on the merits. This qualification was spelt out in Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724, discussed below in connection with Article 136 and the running of limitation for execution. The litigant who treats a limitation-dismissal as if it had reset the execution clock will find that it did no such thing.

Applications — Articles 118 to 137

Articles 118 to 137 govern applications. The earlier articles are specific: Article 118 (ten days, leave to appear and defend a summary suit), Articles 119 and 120 (arbitration applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940 — thirty days to file or to set aside an award), Article 121 (sixty days, setting aside an abatement), Article 122 (thirty days, restoration of a suit, appeal or application dismissed for default), Article 123 (thirty days, setting aside a decree passed ex parte or for a rehearing), Article 124 (thirty days, review of judgment), Article 125 (thirty days, a suit by a person dissatisfied with an order under a specific decree), Article 126 to 131 (various execution and revision applications), and so on. Articles 132 to 135 deal with miscellaneous applications, and Article 136 — the longest period in the entire Schedule — governs the execution of decrees. Article 137 is the residuary article. The unifying feature is that every one of these periods is measured from a defined event — refusal, dismissal, knowledge, enforceability, or the accrual of the right to apply — and the precision of that starting point usually decides the case.

Setting aside an ex parte decree — Article 123

Article 123 prescribes thirty days for an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside a decree passed ex parte, and for an application under Order IX Rule 13 for a rehearing. The default starting point is the date of the decree. But the article contains a vital alternative: where the summons or notice was not duly served, time runs from when the applicant had knowledge of the decree. The Explanation, inserted to put the matter beyond doubt, provides that for this purpose substituted service under Order V Rule 20 of the Code shall not be deemed to be due service. The practical effect is that a defendant who was served only by affixation or newspaper publication, and who genuinely had no notice of the proceeding, can apply within thirty days of acquiring actual knowledge, even years after the decree — provided he proves both the want of due service and the date of his knowledge.

The distinction matters because it interacts with the substantive law on setting aside ex parte decrees. Where the defendant was duly served and simply stayed away, the thirty-day clock runs from the decree and is rarely saved; where service was defective, the knowledge rule reopens the door. A court entertaining a belated Order IX Rule 13 application must therefore first decide the factual question of service before it decides limitation. The interplay between the bar of limitation and the right to be heard is one of the cleaner illustrations of the principle, developed in our note on the objects and scheme of the Limitation Act, that the statute bars the remedy without destroying the right to a fair adjudication where the litigant was never truly before the court.

Restoration and review — Articles 122 and 124

Article 122 prescribes thirty days for an application to restore a suit, appeal, or application for review or revision that has been dismissed for default of appearance, for want of prosecution, or for failure to pay the costs of service of process or to furnish security for costs. Time runs from the date of the dismissal. The article covers the common situation where a suit is dismissed under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code for the plaintiff's non-appearance, and the plaintiff moves under Order IX Rule 9 to set aside the dismissal; the limitation for that restoration application is governed by Article 122. Where, however, the application that the litigant wishes to restore is itself one not specifically provided for — for example, a second restoration application, to restore a dismissed restoration application — the courts have held that the residuary Article 137 applies, since Article 122 in terms covers only the first-tier proceedings it enumerates.

Article 124 prescribes thirty days for an application for review of a judgment by a court other than the Supreme Court, running from the date of the decree or order. Review under Section 114 and Order XLVII of the Code is a narrow remedy — confined to error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new evidence that could not with due diligence have been produced earlier, or any other sufficient reason of like kind — and the short thirty-day window reinforces its exceptional character. Both Article 122 and Article 124, being applications, attract Section 5: delay in moving for restoration or review can be condoned on sufficient cause, in contrast to the rigidity of the suit periods in the First Division.

Execution of decrees — Article 136

Article 136 is the keystone of the Third Division and the longest period in the Schedule: twelve years for an application for the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court. Time runs from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable; and where the decree directs the payment of money or the delivery of property at a certain date or at recurring periods, from the date of the default in respect of which execution is sought. A crucial proviso removes one class of decree from the regime altogether: an application to enforce or execute a decree granting a perpetual injunction is not subject to any period of limitation. Article 136 thus replaced the old scheme under the 1908 Act, which prescribed a shorter period and allowed fresh starting points through successive steps-in-aid of execution; the 1963 Act fixes a single, generous twelve-year period running from enforceability.

The doctrine of merger determines when a decree "becomes enforceable" after appeal. In Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724, a final decree in a partition suit was passed by the trial court, a second appeal was decided by the High Court, and a formal decree was drawn up pursuant to the High Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that once an appeal is entertained and disposed of on the merits — whether the decree below is confirmed, modified, or reversed — the decree of the trial court merges in the decree of the appellate court, which becomes the only operative decree. Limitation for execution under Article 136 therefore runs from the date of the appellate decree, and the execution application filed within twelve years of that date was held to be in time. The Court was careful to add the qualification already noted: where the appeal is dismissed only because delay was not condoned, there is no merger, and the trial decree remains the operative one. The full reasoning on enforceability and merger is developed in our chapter on the computation of the period of limitation.

The residuary provision — Article 137

Article 137 is the residuary article for applications: three years for "any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division", running from when the right to apply accrues. Its reach was the subject of a celebrated reversal of judicial opinion. Under the 1908 Act, the corresponding residuary article (Article 181) had been read down by a long line of authority to apply only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. That narrow construction was carried into the 1963 Act in Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1970 SC 209, where the Supreme Court held that Article 137 contemplated only applications to courts, and that applications under provisions other than the Code — there, applications under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act to a Labour Court — were outside its scope.

That position was decisively widened the following year. In Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282, a three-Judge Bench held that the words of Article 137 are not confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure; the article governs any petition or application made to a civil court, whatever the statute under which it is made. The change in language between the 1908 and 1963 Acts — the 1963 Schedule speaks simply of "any other application" without limiting it to the Code — was held to have enlarged the article's scope. The result is that Article 137 now supplies the default three-year period for the great mass of statutory applications to courts for which no specific article exists, computed from the accrual of the right to apply. The "right to apply accrues" not when the cause of action arises in the abstract, but when the applicant becomes entitled to seek the particular relief from the court.

What counts as a "court" for Article 137

The enlargement worked by Kunhaliumma is real but not unlimited. The article still requires that the application be made to a court. The reasoning in Nityananda M. Joshi, though overruled on the Code-versus-other-statute point, retains its force on this narrower question: the Court there pointed out that the machinery of the Limitation Act — Section 4 (the court being "closed"), Section 5 (a "court" condoning delay), the whole apparatus of computation — presupposes that the forum is a court. An application to a body that is a tribunal but not a court does not attract Article 137 at all, and limitation, if any, must be found in the special statute that creates the tribunal. This is why labour and industrial adjudication, much arbitration practice, and many regulatory filings are governed by their own limitation regimes rather than by Article 137; the residuary article fills gaps only within the universe of applications to courts.

The point connects to Section 29(2), which governs the interaction between the Limitation Act and special or local laws. Where a special law prescribes a period different from the Schedule, that period prevails, and Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply only so far as they are not expressly excluded by the special law. Article 137 therefore operates as a true residuary only where the special law is silent and the forum is a court; where the special law speaks, or where the forum is a non-court tribunal, the analysis shifts to Section 29(2) and to the special statute itself.

Order XXI and the exclusion from Section 5

One exclusion deserves separate emphasis because it is a perennial examination favourite. Section 5 admits "any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure". Execution applications and the cluster of objection, sale-setting-aside and related applications that live in Order XXI are therefore outside the condonation power entirely. The policy is that the execution stage, already governed by the generous twelve-year period of Article 136, should not be further elongated by discretionary extensions; finality in execution is valued highly. A litigant who misses a thirty-day or sixty-day Order XXI deadline cannot rescue the application by pleading sufficient cause under Section 5 — though the distinct, mandatory exclusions under Section 14 for time spent prosecuting bona fide in a court without jurisdiction may still be available, because Section 14 operates by exclusion rather than by discretionary condonation.

This is the key structural contrast between Section 5 and Section 14. Section 5 is discretionary and confined to appeals and non-Order-XXI applications; Section 14 is mandatory and applies wherever its conditions are met, including to execution proceedings, since an execution proceeding is itself a civil proceeding. The two provisions are not alternatives so much as different tools: Section 14 subtracts the time genuinely lost in the wrong forum, and Section 5 then condones whatever delay remains, where condonation is permitted at all. A well-pleaded application in a borderline case will invoke both.

MCQ angle — the recurring traps

Five propositions recur with high frequency. First, the appeal periods: ninety days to a High Court and thirty days to any other court under Article 116; thirty days for an intra-High-Court appeal under Article 117. Candidates routinely confuse the two — the trap is to assume ninety days applies to every appeal touching a High Court, when an appeal from the High Court to the same High Court is only thirty days. Second, Article 137 applies to any application to a civil court under any statute (Kunhaliumma), but not to applications to non-court tribunals (the surviving core of Nityananda Joshi). Third, the starting point for setting aside an ex parte decree under Article 123 is the date of the decree, but the date of knowledge where service was not due — and substituted service is expressly not due service.

Fourth, execution under Article 136 is twelve years from enforceability, with no limitation at all for executing a perpetual injunction, and the date of enforceability shifts to the appellate decree where the doctrine of merger applies (Chandi Prasad). Fifth, Section 5 condones delay in appeals and applications but never in suits, and never in Order XXI applications; proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent (Ramlal), the approach is liberal (Katiji), and the acceptability of the explanation — not the length of the delay — is the test (N. Balakrishnan). A sixth, subtler point worth carrying: an order dismissing an appeal as time-barred is itself an appealable order made in appeal (Mela Ram), but such a dismissal does not produce merger for execution purposes.

Practical takeaways for the practitioner

Three points for the drafting practitioner. First, when computing an appeal period, always work the Section 12 exclusions before deciding whether delay exists at all: the day of pronouncement, the time requisite for the decree copy, and the time requisite for the judgment copy can together convert an apparently late appeal into a timely one, as Vidyacharan Shukla shows. Apply for certified copies the moment judgment is pronounced, because only the time that would have been required had the application been promptly made counts as "requisite". Second, identify the correct article before identifying the period — the difference between Article 116 and Article 117, or between a specific application article and the residuary Article 137, is the difference between a maintainable and a barred proceeding.

Third, match the remedy to the nature of the order and the forum. Where an ex parte decree is attacked under Article 123, plead and prove the want of due service to unlock the knowledge rule; where execution is sought under Article 136, anchor the starting point in the date the decree became enforceable and, after appeal, in the appellate decree; and where no specific article fits, fall back on Article 137 only after confirming that the forum is a court. The discipline of the Third Division rewards precision: the next steps in the subject are the effect of an acknowledgment in writing under Section 18, which can furnish a fresh starting point for many of these very applications, and the broader scheme of the Limitation Act notes hub, which ties the Schedule back to the general provisions in Sections 3 to 24.

Frequently asked questions

What is the limitation period for an appeal to a High Court under the Code of Civil Procedure?

Article 116 of the Schedule prescribes ninety days for an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, from a decree or order to a High Court, and thirty days for such an appeal to any other court. Article 117 prescribes thirty days for an appeal from a decree or order of a High Court to the same court (an intra-court or Letters Patent appeal). In each case time runs from the date of the decree or order appealed from, but under Section 12(2) the day of pronouncement and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree and judgment are excluded — the principle confirmed in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel, AIR 1964 SC 1099.

Does Article 137 of the Limitation Act apply only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure?

No. The earlier view, taken in Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation, AIR 1970 SC 209, was that Article 137 (and its predecessor Article 181 of the 1908 Act) governed only applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. That position was overruled by a three-Judge Bench in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282, which held that Article 137 applies to any petition or application made to a civil court, whether under the Code or under any other statute. The application must, however, be to a court — applications to tribunals that are not courts fall outside Article 137.

When does limitation begin to run for an application to execute a decree under Article 136?

Article 136 prescribes twelve years for the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of a civil court, running from when the decree or order becomes enforceable. Where an appeal has been carried to a higher forum, the doctrine of merger applies: the trial decree merges in the appellate decree, and limitation runs from the date of the appellate decree, as held in Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724. An application to execute a decree granting a perpetual injunction is not subject to any period of limitation.

What is the limitation for setting aside an ex parte decree, and from when does it run?

Article 123 prescribes thirty days for an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside a decree passed ex parte. Time runs from the date of the decree; but where the summons or notice was not duly served, time runs from when the applicant had knowledge of the decree. The Explanation to Article 123 makes clear that substituted service under Order V Rule 20 is not 'due service' for this purpose, so a defendant served only by substituted service may take the benefit of the knowledge rule.

Can the delay in filing an appeal or application be condoned, and on what test?

Yes. Section 5 empowers a court to admit an appeal, or an application other than one under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant shows sufficient cause. Section 5 does not extend to suits. The proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent to the exercise of discretion, as held in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields, AIR 1962 SC 361; the approach is to be liberal so that meritorious matters are not thrown out at the threshold, as held in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, the Court held that the length of delay is immaterial; the acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion.

Is an order dismissing an appeal as time-barred itself an appealable order?

Yes. Where an appellate authority refuses to condone delay and dismisses the appeal as barred by limitation, that dismissal is treated as an order made in the appeal and is itself appealable to the next forum, as held by the Supreme Court in Mela Ram and Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1956 SC 367. A corollary follows for execution: where an appeal is dismissed solely on the ground that delay was not condoned, the doctrine of merger does not apply, because the appellate forum never dealt with the merits — a point reiterated in Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724.