Section 22 of the Telangana Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 is the final tier of the statutory ladder. After the Rent Controller decides and the appellate authority hears an appeal under Section 20, the aggrieved party may invite the High Court to examine the record - but only to test its legality, regularity or propriety, never to re-try the dispute. Understanding where that supervisory line is drawn, and why concurrent findings of fact are almost untouchable, is the difference between a maintainable revision and a dismissed one.
The statutory text of Section 22
Section 22(1) provides that the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceeding taken under the Act by the Controller in execution under Section 15, or by the appellate authority on appeal under Section 20, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. Section 22(2) leaves the costs of and incidental to all revision proceedings to the discretion of the High Court.
Two structural features stand out. First, the revisional forum is the High Court itself - not a Board of Revenue or a Tribunal - which signals that the legislature intended a court of superior record to supervise the rent-control hierarchy. Second, the triple test of legality, regularity or propriety is deliberately broader than the language of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, yet, as the courts have repeatedly held, that breadth does not convert the revision into a rehearing. The relationship of this section to the rest of the scheme is best understood by first revisiting the structure of the Act and its key definitions.
Which orders are revisable
The revisional net under Section 22 catches two distinct classes of order. The first is an order of the appellate authority passed on appeal under Section 20 - typically an eviction order, a fair-rent fixation, or a refusal of relief that has already survived one appellate scrutiny. The second is an order of the Controller made in execution under Section 15. This second limb is significant because an execution order is expressly not appealable under Section 20; the only remedy against it is a revision to the High Court. A litigant who mistakes the route - filing an appeal against an execution order, or a revision against a first-instance order that should have gone in appeal - risks losing the matter on maintainability alone.
It follows that a Section 22 revision ordinarily presupposes that the appellate remedy under Section 20 has already been exhausted (save for the execution exception). The High Court is the apex of a self-contained statutory hierarchy, and the section makes its decision the terminal point: under Section 20 the appellate authority's decision, and subject to it the Controller's order, is declared final and not liable to be questioned in any court of law except as provided in Section 22.
The triple test: legality, regularity, propriety
The phrase legality, regularity or propriety is the engine of the section, and each word does separate work. Legality targets errors of law - misconstruction of a statutory ground of eviction, application of the wrong provision, or a finding with no legal foundation. Regularity addresses procedural compliance - whether the lower authority observed the mandatory steps, gave a hearing, or recorded reasons. Propriety is the most elastic, allowing the High Court to intervene where the conclusion, though not strictly illegal, is so unreasonable or unjust that it offends the conscience of the court.
In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC 259, the Supreme Court, construing the materially identical revisional clause of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, held that while such a widely worded power is wider than Section 115 CPC, the word "propriety" does not authorise the revisional court to reassess evidence and substitute its own view of facts. The breadth lies in the court's freedom to correct manifest injustice, not in a licence to re-decide the case.
Revision is not a second appeal
The defining limitation of Section 22 is that it does not clothe the High Court with appellate powers. The locus classicus is Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval, (1975) 2 SCC 246, where the Supreme Court drew the bright line: appellate jurisdiction ordinarily involves a rehearing, whereas revisional jurisdiction - even when expressed in the generous "legality, regularity or propriety" formula - does not make the High Court a second court of first appeal. The revisional court should not interfere with findings of fact merely because, on the same material, it would have reached a different conclusion.
This distinction matters acutely in rent-control litigation, where the contested questions - bona fide requirement, wilful default in payment, sub-letting, or the statutory grounds of eviction - are overwhelmingly questions of fact. Once the Controller and the appellate authority have spoken on such matters, Section 22 leaves the High Court with a narrow corridor of intervention.
The Constitution Bench settles the scope: Dilbahar Singh
The conflicting strands of authority on how far a revisional court may reappraise evidence were finally resolved by a five-Judge Bench in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78. The Court held that the expressions "legality and propriety" (and cognate phrasing across the various State Rent Acts) confer a power that is supervisory, not appellate. The High Court in revision is not entitled to reassess and reappreciate the evidence as if it were sitting in appeal, and it cannot substitute its own finding for that of the fact-finding authority merely because another view is possible.
The Bench did, however, preserve a limited window: where the finding of fact is perverse - that is, based on no evidence, or on a misreading of material evidence, or one that no reasonable person could have reached - the revisional court may interfere, because such a finding is itself an illegality. The judgment expressly approved the Rukmini line of cases over the contrary Ram Dass view, confirming that re-appreciation of evidence is permissible only to test perversity, never to re-weigh competing inferences.
Concurrent findings of fact
The practical consequence of Dilbahar Singh is that concurrent findings of the Controller and the appellate authority enjoy a strong presumption of correctness in revision. Where both lower authorities have, on an appraisal of the evidence, found (for instance) that the landlord's requirement is bona fide or that the tenant committed wilful default, the High Court will not disturb that conclusion unless the revisionist demonstrates that it is vitiated by perversity, a jurisdictional error, or an obvious misreading of the record.
This is why, before filing a revision, counsel must frame the challenge in the language of legality and perversity rather than as a complaint about the weight of evidence. A revision pleaded as though it were a regular appeal - inviting the court to prefer one set of testimony over another - is almost invariably dismissed at the threshold. The discipline of the section forces the litigant to isolate a genuine error of law or a finding that no reasonable authority could have made.
"At any time": limitation and laches
Unlike the appeal under Section 20, which must be filed within thirty days of the Controller's order, Section 22 contains no fixed period of limitation - it empowers the High Court to call for the record at any time. That phrase does not, however, confer an indefinite right. Courts have consistently read it as subject to the doctrines of reasonable time, delay and laches: a revisionist who sleeps on the remedy and approaches the High Court after an unexplained, prolonged delay may find the petition rejected on that ground, particularly where the successful party has altered its position or sought to enforce the order.
The expression "at any time" therefore serves a different purpose - it preserves the High Court's supervisory competence to intervene whenever a serious illegality surfaces, including in execution proceedings - rather than abolishing the requirement of diligence. In practice, revisions are filed promptly after the appellate order, and a litigant should not rely on the open-ended wording to excuse avoidable delay.
Who may invoke it - and may the court act on its own
Section 22 is set in motion "on the application of any aggrieved party." The right is thus tied to a grievance: a landlord or tenant prejudiced by the impugned order, and in appropriate cases a person whose rights are directly affected by it, may apply. A stranger to the proceedings with no legal injury cannot maintain a revision merely because the order interests him.
Because the section opens with "The High Court may, at any time," some argue it permits suo motu action. The dominant reading, however, anchors the jurisdiction to the application of an aggrieved party; the words "at any time" qualify when the record may be examined, not whether the court may act without any party invoking it. The safer course for a litigant is always to file a formal revision rather than to hope the court will intervene on its own motion.
Section 22 revision and Article 227 supervision
Because Section 22 already vests supervisory power in the High Court, a separate petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is ordinarily unnecessary and discouraged where the statutory revision is available. The two jurisdictions are conceptually close: both are supervisory, and both forbid the High Court from acting as an appellate court. In Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj, (2008) 9 SCC 1, the Supreme Court reiterated that while exercising supervisory jurisdiction the High Court does not sit as a court of appeal and interferes only to keep the inferior tribunal within the bounds of its authority - a principle that maps directly onto the discipline of Section 22.
Where the Act provides the revision, a litigant should pursue it rather than bypass the statute by invoking the constitutional remedy; the High Court's certiorari or superintendence powers are reserved for the rare case of patent jurisdictional excess or gross miscarriage of justice that the statutory route cannot reach.
Powers of the High Court on revision
Once satisfied that the order suffers from an illegality, irregularity or impropriety, the High Court may "pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit." This is a wide remedial power: the court may set aside the order, modify it, or - more commonly where a perversity or procedural lapse is found - remit the matter to the Controller or the appellate authority for fresh consideration in accordance with law, rather than itself recording a substituted finding of fact. Remand respects the supervisory character of the jurisdiction by returning the fact-finding to the designated authority.
The court's power over costs under Section 22(2) is fully discretionary. In rent matters touching fair-rent determination or the revision of fair rent, where the dispute often turns on valuation methodology, the High Court will scrutinise whether the lower authority applied the correct statutory formula - an error of method being a question of legality squarely within Section 22 - while leaving the arithmetical appreciation of evidence to the Controller. The overarching scheme of the Act, including how revisions sit within it, is mapped on the subject hub.
Frequently asked questions
Which authority exercises revisional jurisdiction under the Telangana Rent Control Act?
The High Court. Under Section 22, the High Court may call for and examine the records of any order passed by the Controller in execution under Section 15 or by the appellate authority on appeal under Section 20, to satisfy itself as to the order's legality, regularity or propriety.
Is a revision under Section 22 the same as a second appeal?
No. As held in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao, (1975) 2 SCC 246, revisional jurisdiction - even with the wide words "legality, regularity or propriety" - does not make the High Court a second court of first appeal. It is supervisory, not a rehearing on facts.
Can the High Court reappreciate evidence in a Section 22 revision?
Only to a limited extent. The Constitution Bench in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, held the power is supervisory; the High Court may examine the evidence only to test whether a finding is perverse, not to re-weigh it as an appellate court would.
Is there a limitation period for filing a revision under Section 22?
The section says the High Court may act "at any time" and prescribes no fixed period, unlike the 30-day window for a Section 20 appeal. Courts nonetheless apply the principles of reasonable time and laches, and an unexplained, prolonged delay can defeat a revision.
Can an order passed in execution under Section 15 be appealed?
No. An execution order under Section 15 is not appealable under Section 20; the only remedy against it is a revision to the High Court under Section 22. Choosing the wrong remedy can result in dismissal on maintainability.
Should a litigant file a revision under Section 22 or a petition under Article 227?
Where the statutory revision under Section 22 is available, it should be pursued; both jurisdictions are supervisory. Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj, (2008) 9 SCC 1, confirms the High Court does not sit as a court of appeal in supervisory matters, so the constitutional remedy is reserved for exceptional jurisdictional errors.