Judgment — Form, Contents, Pronouncement, Language

Sections 392 to 406 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — previously Sections 353 to 365 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — lay down the law on the judgment of a criminal court. The chapter governs the closing act of every trial: how the judgment is pronounced, what it must contain, the special-reasons regime for death sentences, the alternative-sentencing routes of probation and admonition, the Code’s compensation architecture for victims, and the rules on copies, translation, and finality. The judgment is the pivot of the criminal process; everything before it is preparation, everything after it — appeal, revision, execution — is review.

The BNSS retains the substantive architecture but adds three calibrated reforms — a seven-day portal-upload obligation for judgments, audio-video pronouncement of judgment, and the alignment of the probation regime with the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 in place of the repealed 1960 Children Act.

Statutory anchor and scheme

The fifteen-section sweep falls into four blocks.

Pronouncement and contents (Sections 392 to 393 BNSS).

1. Section 392 BNSS (previously Section 353 CrPC) — modes and place of pronouncement; new BNSS proviso for portal upload within seven days; audio-video presence.
2. Section 393 BNSS (previously Section 354 CrPC) — language and contents; special reasons for death; reasons for short-term imprisonment; mode of execution.

Ancillary orders (Sections 394 to 400 BNSS).

1. Section 394 BNSS (previously Section 356 CrPC) — notifying address of previously convicted offender.
2. Section 395 BNSS (previously Section 357 CrPC) — order to pay compensation.
3. Section 396 BNSS (previously Section 357A CrPC) — victim compensation scheme.
4. Section 397 BNSS (previously Section 357B CrPC) — victim compensation in addition to fine in BNS sexual-offence cases.
5. Section 398 BNSS (previously Section 357C CrPC) — treatment of victims by hospitals.
6. Section 399 BNSS (previously Section 358 CrPC) — compensation for groundless arrest.
7. Section 400 BNSS (previously Section 359 CrPC) — order to pay costs in non-cognizable cases.

Probation routes (Sections 401 to 402 BNSS).

1. Section 401 BNSS (previously Section 360 CrPC) — release on probation of good conduct or after admonition; JJ Act 2015 substitution.
2. Section 402 BNSS (previously Section 361 CrPC) — special reasons to be recorded for not invoking probation.

Post-pronouncement procedure (Sections 403 to 406 BNSS).

1. Section 403 BNSS (previously Section 362 CrPC) — court not to alter judgment.
2. Section 404 BNSS (previously Section 363 CrPC) — copy of judgment to accused; new BNSS proviso for prosecuting-officer copies.
3. Section 405 BNSS (previously Section 364 CrPC) — translation; either party may require.
4. Section 406 BNSS (previously Section 365 CrPC) — Court of Session to send copy of finding and sentence to District Magistrate.

The chapter sits at the close of every trial track — sessions trial, warrant trial by Magistrate, summons-cases trial, and summary trial — and feeds directly into the appellate regime treated in the broader Code of Criminal Procedure notes.

Section 392 BNSS — pronouncement

Section 392 BNSS (previously Section 353 CrPC) requires every judgment in a criminal court of original jurisdiction to be pronounced in open court by the presiding officer — immediately after the termination of the trial, or at some subsequent time of which notice is given to the parties or their advocates. Three modes are recognised:

1. By delivering the whole of the judgment.
2. By reading out the whole of the judgment.
3. By reading out the operative part and explaining the substance in a language understood by the accused or his advocate.

Whichever mode is used, the judgment must be dated and signed in open court. Where the judgment is dictated under mode (a), the date of delivery in open court is what counts — even if the typed transcript is signed days later (Iqbal Ismail Sodawala v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1880). The substantive question is not the form of the entry but the integrity of the pronouncement.

The accused, if in custody, must be brought up to hear the judgment; if not in custody, he must attend, except where his personal attendance during trial has been dispensed with and the sentence is one of fine only or he is acquitted. Sub-section (7) of Section 392 BNSS preserves the rule that absence of any party or his advocate from the place notified for pronouncement does not invalidate the judgment — the public-pronouncement requirement is for the public, not for the parties’ presence.

The BNSS adds two innovations.

Audio-video presence. The accused may attend the pronouncement physically or through audio-video electronic means. The provision is part of the BNSS’s broader move towards remote presence in criminal procedure — the same architecture that enables audio-video evidence under Section 254 BNSS in sessions trials and remote charge-reading under Section 251 BNSS.

Seven-day portal upload. The court shall, as far as practicable, upload a copy of the judgment on its portal within seven days of pronouncement. The proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 392 BNSS is the BNSS’s nod to the open-court principle in the digital age. The qualifier ‘as far as practicable’ preserves the structural flexibility — courts that lack a working portal are not held to the deadline — but the direction is clear: judgment portal-upload is no longer optional.

The case law on judicial delay sits over the pronouncement question. In Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318, the Supreme Court held that ‘at some subsequent time’ under Section 353(1) CrPC contemplates pronouncement without undue delay, and that such delay should not extend beyond six weeks. The principle applies with greater force under the new portal-upload regime: a judgment held in reserve for months and then uploaded in fragments invites both Article 21 challenge and revisional intervention.

The death-of-the-judge problem is settled. In Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1954) SCR 330, the Supreme Court held that if one of a Bench of judges dies after signing the judgment but before it is delivered, the judgment is invalid and the appeal must be re-heard.

Section 393 BNSS — language and contents

Section 393 BNSS (previously Section 354 CrPC) sets the contents of every judgment. The judgment shall be written in the language of the court and shall contain (a) the point or points for determination, (b) the decision thereon, and (c) the reasons for the decision. It shall specify the offence (with the BNS section, replacing IPC) and the punishment imposed, or, on acquittal, state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct release.

The Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gowthu Ranganayakulu, AIR 1987 SC 40 read the requirements as mandatory. A judgment without reasons is no judgment; it must independently apply judicial mind to the facts and to the evidence (Niranjan v. State, 1978 CrLJ 636 (Cal); Aftab Ahmad Khan v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 SC 436). The trial court must summarise the evidence of material witnesses and appraise it (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jageshwar, AIR 1983 SC 349). A cryptic judgment is no judgment under Section 393 BNSS; the appellate court’s standard remedy is to set it aside and remand for fresh writing (Sashidhara v. Union of India, 1994 CrLJ 375 (Gau)).

The Supreme Court in Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka, AIR 2008 SC 1528 cautioned that judgments must confine themselves to the subject matter and issues; courts should not issue directions affecting executive or legislative policy unconnected with the case. The companion principle — that adverse remarks on parties or police should be avoided unless squarely necessary — was laid down in K.P. Tewari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1994 SC 1031.

Section 393(3) and (4) BNSS — sentencing-reason architecture

Two sub-sections carry the chapter’s most heavily litigated content — the special-reasons regimes that attach to the gravest sentences and to suspiciously short ones.

Sub-section (3) — special reasons for death. Where the conviction is for an offence punishable with death, or in the alternative with life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence, and in the case of a death sentence, the special reasons for it. The provision was the 1973 Code’s structural reversal of the pre-1955 position under which death was the rule and life an exception requiring reasons. After 1973 — carried forward into the BNSS — life imprisonment is the rule for murder, and the death sentence is the exception requiring ‘special reasons’ (Hardayal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 2055).

The Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898 read the ‘special reasons’ requirement as the ‘rarest of rare’ doctrine: the death sentence is to be imposed only where the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be weighed; the personality of the offender, the manner of commission, and the prospect of reformation count. Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1456 added the impact-on-community factor and made the separate sentencing hearing under Section 258(2) BNSS imperative in capital cases. Rammnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2012 SC 1357 distilled the doctrine into a five-step test that trial courts apply: rarest-of-rare threshold, inadequacy of life imprisonment, life as the rule, careful exercise of life-imprisonment option, and the planned-or-unplanned method-and-manner inquiry. The death sentence has been confirmed in cases of cold-blooded multiple murder of family members (Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420; Umashankar Panda v. State of MP, AIR 1996 SC 3011) and commuted in cases involving emotional disturbance, robbery-turned-violent without premeditation, or felonious propensity alone (Shamshul Kanwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1995 SC 1748; A. Devendran v. State of Tamilnadu, AIR 1998 SC 2821; Krishan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 2598).

Where the trial court awards death without reasons, the appellate court’s standard response is commutation to life (Hardayal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 2055).

Sub-section (4) — reasons for short imprisonment. Where the conviction is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of one year or more, but the court imposes a sentence of less than three months, it shall record reasons — unless it was a summary trial or the sentence was imprisonment till the rising of the court. The provision is the obverse of sub-section (3): the maximum penalty cannot be imposed without special reasons; the unusually low sentence cannot be imposed without ordinary reasons. The objective is to prevent the law being brought into contempt by routinely lenient sentencing of serious offences (Cf. Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ram Chandra Dange, AIR 1974 SC 228).

Sub-section (5) of Section 393 BNSS preserves the mode of execution rule: when sentenced to death, the accused shall be hanged by the neck till he is dead. The Supreme Court in Deena v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1155 upheld the constitutional validity of hanging.

Section 395 BNSS — victim compensation

Section 395 BNSS (previously Section 357 CrPC) is the Code’s primary victim-compensation provision. The court may order the whole or part of the fine recovered to be applied to (a) prosecution expenses, (b) compensation to the person who has suffered loss or injury, (c) Fatal Accidents Act compensation to dependents in death cases, (d) restoration to bona fide purchasers of stolen property. Sub-section (3) extends the power to cases where no fine is part of the sentence: the court may, when passing judgment, order the accused to pay such compensation as it specifies.

The leading decision is Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh, (1988) 4 SCC 551, on the under-utilisation of the compensation power, followed by Roy Fernandes v. State of Goa, AIR 2012 SC 1030 reiterating that criminal courts have not exercised this statutory power as freely as the section permits. Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1978 SC 1525 set the four-factor quantum test — nature of crime, injury, justness of claim, accused’s capacity to pay. K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, AIR 1999 SC 3762 confirmed that even a Magistrate of the first class can order compensation exceeding his statutory fine ceiling under Section 23 BNSS — the Section 395 power is not capped by the Magistrate’s sentencing limit.

Compensation under Section 395(3) BNSS — where no fine is imposed — carries default sentence by virtue of Vijayan v. Sadanandan K., (2009) 6 SCC 652. The recovery mechanism is treated as a deemed fine. The Supreme Court in R. Vijayan v. Baby, AIR 2012 SC 528 clarified the interaction with Section 138 NI Act fines: where fine is imposed, compensation must come out of fine; the separate Section 395(3) compensation route applies only where no fine forms part of the sentence.

Section 396 BNSS — victim compensation scheme

Section 396 BNSS (previously Section 357A CrPC) introduces, in statutory form, the Victim Compensation Scheme — a structural shift from accused-funded to State-funded victim relief. Every State Government, in coordination with the Central Government, shall prepare a scheme to provide funds for compensating victims of crime who require rehabilitation. The District or State Legal Services Authority decides quantum on the trial court’s recommendation, and may award compensation directly where the offender is not traced or identified.

The scheme’s constitutional rationale is that the accused-funded compensation under Section 395 cannot reach untraced-offender or insolvent-accused cases; the State must step in. The Supreme Court has repeatedly directed States to operationalise the scheme; the Code now treats the scheme as a substantive entitlement, not a discretionary welfare measure. Section 397 BNSS makes State compensation in BNS sexual-offence cases additional to any fine paid to the victim — the two are cumulative, not substitutional.

Section 401 BNSS — release on probation

Section 401 BNSS (previously Section 360 CrPC) is the probation gateway. Where an accused not under twenty-one years of age is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for seven years or less; or where any accused under twenty-one or any woman is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or life imprisonment; and where no previous conviction is proved, the court may direct release on probation of good conduct on a bond, instead of sentencing at once.

The BNSS makes two adjustments: it deletes the ‘with or without sureties’ phrase and adds ‘or bail bond’; and it replaces the reference to the repealed Children Act, 1960 with the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The substantive scheme is unchanged.

Section 402 BNSS (previously Section 361 CrPC) is the procedural twin: where the court could have invoked Section 401 or the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, but does not, it shall record special reasons. The peremptory language was read in Om Prakash v. State of Haryana, (2001) 10 SCC 477 as imposing a substantive duty — not a routine recital. Failure to record reasons is a substantive miscarriage; the appellate court will remand for fresh sentencing or substitute probation. The interplay with the broader sentencing architecture is mapped in the execution of sentences chapter and informs the bail discussion in the bail and bonds chapter.

Probation has been refused in habitual-rash-driving fatalities (Kulawant v. State, 1997 CrLJ 2055 (P&H)), in serious-injury attempt-murder cases (Sirish v. State, 1997 CrLJ 2617 (Gau)), in offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act on account of Section 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act (State v. Parthiban, AIR 2007 SC 51), and in cases of forcible house-trespass after eviction (Bimal v. State, 1997 CrLJ 2846 (Pat)). Probation has been granted in poverty-driven petty theft (Shivasamy v. Sub-Inspector, 1992 CrLJ 2041 (Mad)), in first-time hit-of-the-moment hurt cases (Rajesh v. State, 1996 CrLJ 376 (Raj)), and in juvenile offences (Sayed Ali v. State, 1989 CrLJ 2063 (Gau)).

Section 403 BNSS — functus officio rule

Section 403 BNSS (previously Section 362 CrPC) bars the criminal court from altering or reviewing its own judgment, except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. The provision is the Code’s functus officio rule: once the judgment is signed, the trial court is done. The constitutional remedy of review under Article 137 (for the Supreme Court) and the inherent power under Section 528 BNSS for High Courts are the structural exceptions; the trial court has no such review power.

The bar is read strictly. A trial court that purports to vary the sentence after signing the judgment, or to alter the conviction-acquittal architecture, has acted without jurisdiction. The remedy is appeal, revision, or constitutional jurisdiction — the trial court itself cannot revisit. Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang, (1995) 2 SCC 513 added the doctrinal point that a judgment is complete under Section 393 (and therefore subject to the Section 403 bar) only after conviction is recorded and sentence is awarded on hearing the accused; until then, the architecture is incomplete.

Section 404 BNSS — copy of judgment

Section 404 BNSS (previously Section 363 CrPC) requires a copy of the judgment to be given to the accused immediately, free of cost. The accused who has been sentenced to imprisonment is entitled to a copy without an application. The provision is procedurally substantive — the period of limitation for appeal under Section 469 BNSS (previously Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Article 115) runs from the date of the copy.

The BNSS adds a new proviso to sub-section (5): on application by the prosecuting officer, the court may provide the Government, free of cost, a certified copy of the judgment, order, deposition, or record. The provision answers a long-standing practical complaint that the State’s prosecuting machinery had no automatic copy of trial court judgments and had to apply through the regular certified-copy route. Section 405 BNSS (previously Section 364 CrPC) preserves the translation rule; the BNSS replaces ‘the accused so requires’ with ‘if either party so requires’, expanding the entitlement to translations on either side.

Common reversible errors in judgments

Five patterns recur and merit attention.

Cryptic judgment without reasons. A judgment that recites the conclusion without engagement with the evidence is no judgment under Section 393 BNSS. The standard remedy is remand for fresh writing (Niranjan v. State; Sashidhara v. Union of India).

Death sentence without special reasons. Sub-section (3) of Section 393 BNSS is mandatory. A death sentence pronounced without aggravating-and-mitigating analysis under Bachan Singh and Rammnaresh is liable to be commuted on appeal.

Probation declined without reasons. Section 402 BNSS is mandatory in language. Where the court was empowered to invoke Section 401 BNSS or the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, but did not, the absence of recorded reasons is reversible (Om Prakash v. State of Haryana).

Sentence varied after pronouncement. Section 403 BNSS bars alteration except for clerical or arithmetical errors. A trial court that purports to revise the conviction or sentence after signing the judgment has acted without jurisdiction.

Compensation not considered. Section 395 BNSS is permissive in language but read by Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh, Roy Fernandes, and the line of authorities as a duty to consider, especially in offences against the person and property. A judgment that records conviction without engaging Section 395 is procedurally incomplete in many fact-patterns.

BNSS comparison — what changed

The substantive architecture is unchanged. The BNSS additions are calibrated:

1. Section 392 BNSS — new proviso for portal upload of judgment within seven days; audio-video presence of the accused at pronouncement; ‘pleaders’ replaced by ‘advocates’.
2. Section 393 BNSS — references to IPC sections replaced with BNS equivalents; substantive scheme unchanged.
3. Section 401 BNSS — ‘with or without sureties’ deleted; ‘or bail bond’ added; Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 substitutes the repealed Children Act, 1960.
4. Section 402 BNSS — same JJ Act 2015 substitution.
5. Section 404 BNSS — new proviso for free certified copies to the prosecuting officer on application.
6. Section 405 BNSS — translation entitlement expanded from accused-only to either-party.

The case law on Sections 353 to 365 CrPC carries forward without amendment to Sections 392 to 406 BNSS.

Exam-angle takeaways

Five points exam-setters use without fail.

1. BNSS innovation — portal upload within seven days. The new Section 392 proviso. The most likely BNSS-versus-CrPC banker for this chapter.
2. Special reasons for death; ordinary reasons for short imprisonment. The two-limbed sentencing-reason architecture of Section 393(3) and (4) BNSS.
3. Probation reasons mandatory. Section 402 BNSS makes the not-invoking-Section-401 decision a recorded one. Om Prakash v. State of Haryana is the constant authority.
4. Functus officio under Section 403 BNSS. No alteration except clerical or arithmetical errors. The trial court is done after pronouncement.
5. Compensation under Section 395 BNSS is not capped by the Magistrate’s fine power. K. Bhaskaran is the constant authority.

The judgment chapter is the closing-act chapter of the criminal trial. A long-form mains answer should walk through pronouncement (Section 392), contents (Section 393), the special-reasons regimes (sub-sections 3 and 4), the compensation architecture (Sections 395 and 396), the probation gateway (Sections 401 and 402), and the post-pronouncement procedure (Sections 403 and 404). A prelims MCQ will pivot on the BNSS portal-upload proviso, the rarest-of-rare doctrine under Section 393(3), the functus officio rule of Section 403, or the Magistrate-can-exceed-fine-limit-by-compensation point. The companion procedural pieces — the death sentence confirmation chapter for capital cases and the appeals in criminal cases chapter for review — are the natural next stops after the judgment is pronounced; the reference and revision chapter handles the supervisory route where appeal is unavailable.

Frequently asked questions

What is the BNSS portal-upload requirement for judgments under Section 392?

Section 392 BNSS adds a new proviso to sub-section (4): the court shall, as far as practicable, upload a copy of the judgment on its portal within seven days of pronouncement. The proviso is the BNSS’s nod to the open-court principle in the digital age. The qualifier ‘as far as practicable’ preserves structural flexibility — courts that lack a working portal are not held to the deadline — but the direction is clear. A judgment held in reserve and then uploaded in fragments invites both Article 21 challenge (read with the Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318 six-week ceiling on judicial delay) and revisional intervention. The provision sits alongside the BNSS’s broader audio-video reforms in pronouncement, evidence, and accused presence.

What are the ‘special reasons’ required under Section 393(3) BNSS for a death sentence?

Sub-section (3) of Section 393 BNSS (previously Section 354(3) CrPC) requires the judgment, in capital cases, to state the reasons for the sentence; and where death is awarded, the special reasons for it. The Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898 read this as the ‘rarest of rare’ doctrine: death is to be imposed only where the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be weighed; the personality of the offender, the manner of commission, and the prospect of reformation count. Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1456 added the impact-on-community factor and made the separate sentencing hearing under Section 258(2) BNSS imperative in capital cases. Rammnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2012 SC 1357 distilled the doctrine into a five-step trial-court test.

Can a Magistrate award compensation under Section 395 BNSS in excess of his fine-imposing power?

Yes. The Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, AIR 1999 SC 3762 held that the compensation power under Section 357(3) CrPC (now Section 395(3) BNSS) is not capped by the Magistrate’s fine-imposing limit under Section 23 BNSS (previously Section 29 CrPC). Even a Magistrate of the first class, whose statutory fine ceiling was Rs. 5,000 (later Rs. 10,000), can award compensation exceeding that ceiling. The compensation power is structurally separate from the sentencing power and serves a distinct constitutional object — victim restitution. The Court further held in Vijayan v. Sadanandan K., (2009) 6 SCC 652 that the court may attach a default sentence to compensation orders, with the recovery mechanism treated as a deemed fine.

Can a criminal court alter its own judgment after pronouncement?

No, except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. Section 403 BNSS (previously Section 362 CrPC) is the functus officio rule: once the judgment is signed, the trial court is done. A trial court that purports to vary the sentence or alter the conviction-acquittal architecture after signing has acted without jurisdiction. The remedies lie elsewhere — appeal under Sections 415 to 421 BNSS, revision under Sections 442 to 444 BNSS, the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, or constitutional review (Article 137 for the Supreme Court). Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang, (1995) 2 SCC 513 clarified that a judgment is complete under Section 393 (and therefore subject to the Section 403 bar) only after conviction is recorded and sentence awarded on hearing the accused.

Is the court bound to record reasons for not granting probation under Section 401 BNSS?

Yes. Section 402 BNSS (previously Section 361 CrPC) requires the court, where it could have invoked Section 401 or the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, but did not, to record special reasons. The Supreme Court in Om Prakash v. State of Haryana, (2001) 10 SCC 477 read the language as peremptory and substantive — not a routine recital. Failure to record reasons amounts to gross miscarriage of justice; the appellate or revisional court will either remand for fresh sentencing or itself substitute probation. The duty applies even where neither side argued probation — the court must consider it suo motu where the statutory conditions are met. The BNSS replaces the reference to the repealed Children Act, 1960 with the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, but the substantive obligation is unchanged.