Trial of Summons Cases by Magistrates

Sections 274 to 282 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — previously Sections 251 to 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — lay down the procedure for the trial of summons cases by Magistrates. A summons case is one which relates to an offence not being a warrant case (Section 2(x) BNSS, previously Section 2(w) CrPC); in practical terms it covers offences punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. The chapter is short, sequential, and pragmatic — built for speed, on the premise that lighter offences do not need the full warrant-trial scaffolding of formal charge, evidence, and judgment.

The BNSS makes three calibrated changes — a new proviso to Section 274 enabling a groundless-accusation discharge, a thirty-day waiting period before acquitting an absent complainant under Section 279, and the customary ‘pleader’ to ‘advocate’ replacement — while leaving the rest of the chapter untouched.

Statutory anchor and scheme

The chapter unfolds in nine sections.

1. Section 274 BNSS (previously Section 251 CrPC) — substance of accusation to be stated; new proviso for release on groundless accusation.
2. Section 275 BNSS (previously Section 252 CrPC) — conviction on plea of guilty.
3. Section 276 BNSS (previously Section 253 CrPC) — conviction on plea of guilty in absence of accused in petty cases.
4. Section 277 BNSS (previously Section 254 CrPC) — procedure when not convicted: prosecution evidence, defence evidence.
5. Section 278 BNSS (previously Section 255 CrPC) — acquittal or conviction.
6. Section 279 BNSS (previously Section 256 CrPC) — non-appearance or death of complainant; new thirty-day notice.
7. Section 280 BNSS (previously Section 257 CrPC) — withdrawal of complaint.
8. Section 281 BNSS (previously Section 258 CrPC) — power to stop proceedings (police cases only).
9. Section 282 BNSS (previously Section 259 CrPC) — power to convert summons-case into warrant-case.

The chapter is the lighter of the two Magistrate-trial tracks; the heavier warrant trial by Magistrate handles offences exceeding two years, and the eight-stage sessions trial handles the gravest offences.

The summons-case / warrant-case divide

The two-year threshold under Section 2 BNSS draws the line. Below it, summons procedure applies; above it, warrant procedure. The structural consequences of being on the lighter side of the line are four.

1. No formal written charge is framed; the Magistrate only states the ‘particulars of the offence’.
2. There is no pre-trial discharge gate — the trial proceeds to its logical end (acquittal or conviction).
3. A complainant in a summons case may withdraw the complaint with the Magistrate’s leave; in a warrant case he may not.
4. The trial of summons cases by Magistrates is the procedural template for summary trials as well — Section 285 BNSS (previously Section 262 CrPC) imports it wholesale.

The classification matters even at the appellate stage. Trial of a warrant case as a summons case is void; the converse, trial of a summons case as a warrant case, is a curable irregularity (Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 986).

Section 274 BNSS — substance of accusation

Section 274 BNSS (previously Section 251 CrPC) is the opening procedural step. When the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make. No formal charge need be framed.

The duty is real, not formal. The Magistrate must state the facts that constitute the offence in language the accused understands; a mere reference to the section of the penal statute, without describing the facts, is not compliance (State of Kerala v. Raman, AIR 1962 Ker 78). The Supreme Court in Bharat K. Gupta v. Arun Kumar, (2000) 10 SCC 658 explained the scope: the Magistrate must incorporate the ‘substance of the accusation’ — not the details — when stating the particulars. The reading must take place the moment the accused appears, not after months of adjournments.

Two safeguards travel with this step. First, before asking whether the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate should inform him of his right to legal assistance (Hiralal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1988) CrLJ 457). Second, where personal appearance has been dispensed with under Section 226 BNSS (previously Section 205 CrPC), the plea may be taken from the accused’s advocate; the Magistrate cannot insist on personal appearance merely to comply with Section 274 (Sinha v. L.E.O., 1976 CrLJ 76).

The BNSS innovation in Section 274 is the new proviso: if the Magistrate considers the accusation groundless, he shall, after recording reasons in writing, release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of discharge. This is the first time a discharge gate has been introduced in summons trials. Until 2024, the settled position — S. Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 4711 and Kumar v. Perumal, 1997 CrLJ 907 (Mad) — was that no discharge was contemplated under Chapter XX of the CrPC; the Magistrate had to take the trial to its logical end. The BNSS proviso changes that. The threshold is high — the accusation must appear groundless on the face of the materials — but the procedural escape route now exists.

Failure to comply with Section 274 does not, by itself, vitiate the trial. The Supreme Court has read this through Section 510 BNSS (previously Section 465 CrPC) — the irregularity-curable provision — so the question is whether failure of justice has been occasioned (Bidyadhar v. Daitari, AIR 1959 Or 121; Bibhuti Bhushan Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1969 SC 381). Where the accused has cross-examined witnesses fully, examined defence witnesses, or filed a written statement replying paragraph by paragraph, no prejudice arises. Where vital circumstances were never put to him, prejudice is presumed (S. Harnam Singh v. State, 1976 CrLJ 913).

Section 275 BNSS — conviction on plea of guilty

Section 275 BNSS (previously Section 252 CrPC) requires the Magistrate to record the plea of guilty as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused, and gives him discretion to convict on the plea. The discretion is real, not formal — the word is ‘may’, not ‘shall’.

The plea must be recorded in the accused’s own words so the appellate court can verify that what was said amounted to a confession of guilt in law (Mahant Kaushalya v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 22). A perfunctory record — ‘the accused pleaded guilty’ — is liable to be set aside, as is a conviction on a qualified plea where the accused admits the act but justifies it (State of Gujarat v. Dinesh, 1994 CrLJ 1393).

Conviction on plea is improper in several settled situations: where the accused is deaf and dumb and could not understand the proceedings (State of Gujarat v. Pandya, AIR 1970 Guj 234); where the facts admitted do not constitute the offence charged (Sarsibala v. State, AIR 1962 Pat 244); where the Magistrate framed the question in a way that signalled to the accused that pleading guilty would secure leniency (State v. Lakshman, 1998 CrLJ 2161 (Guj)) — the High Court there read the proceeding as an instance of illicit plea bargaining outside Chapter XXIA. With the express plea-bargaining mechanism now codified in Sections 289 to 299 BNSS, the line between informal sentence-discount and statutory plea bargaining is harder to blur.

Section 276 BNSS — petty cases by post

Section 276 BNSS (previously Section 253 CrPC) is the postal-plea provision, designed for the petty cases under Section 227 BNSS (previously Section 206 CrPC). Where a special summons has been issued and the accused desires to plead guilty without appearing before the Magistrate, he may transmit by post or messenger a letter containing his plea and the amount of fine specified in the summons. The Magistrate may convict the accused in his absence on such plea and adjust the transmitted amount towards the fine. The advocate authorised by the accused may, alternatively, plead guilty on his behalf.

The BNSS replaces ‘pleader’ with ‘advocate’ throughout the section. The substantive scheme — conviction in absentia on a postal plea in petty cases — is unchanged.

Section 277 BNSS — procedure when not convicted

Section 277 BNSS (previously Section 254 CrPC) governs the case where the accused does not plead guilty, or the Magistrate exercises his discretion not to convict on the plea. The Magistrate proceeds to hear the prosecution and take all evidence in support of the prosecution, then to hear the accused and take all evidence he produces in defence. The Magistrate may, on the application of either side, issue a summons to any witness directing attendance or production of documents, subject to the deposit of reasonable expenses.

The provision tracks Section 277 closely on the warrant-trial counterpart, but with two important differences. There is no formal charge; the ‘particulars of the offence’ under Section 274 do the work of the charge. And the evidence need not be recorded in extenso — Section 309 BNSS (previously Section 274 CrPC) permits a memorandum of the substance of the evidence, rather than a full deposition.

The Section 351 BNSS (previously Section 313 CrPC) examination of the accused is mandatory in a summons trial as in any other; its omission, where vital circumstances were never put to the accused, vitiates the trial subject to the prejudice test (S. Harnam Singh v. State, 1976 CrLJ 913). The accused’s right to enter upon defence and to summon witnesses is the procedural mirror of his right in warrant trials by Magistrates, although the lighter quantum of punishment compresses the practical importance of the defence stage.

Section 278 BNSS — acquittal or conviction

Section 278 BNSS (previously Section 255 CrPC) is the dispositive section. If the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty, he records an order of acquittal. If he finds the accused guilty — and does not proceed under Section 364 BNSS (referring the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for higher punishment) or Section 401 BNSS (probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958) — he passes sentence according to law.

Sub-section (3) preserves the calibrated exception of conviction for a different offence on facts admitted or proved, where the Magistrate is satisfied that no prejudice would be caused to the accused. The 1973 Code added the prejudice qualifier to circumscribe the wider conviction-for-different-offence power that the 1898 Code allowed. The Magistrate cannot convict the accused of an offence totally unconnected with the offence the particulars of which were stated under Section 274, or one committed on a date never referred to in the complaint or summons.

Unlike Section 258(2) BNSS in sessions trials, there is no separate-hearing-on-sentence requirement built into Section 278. The Magistrate hears arguments and passes the sentence in one sitting, unless the case attracts the probation regime under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Section 279 BNSS — non-appearance or death of complainant

Section 279 BNSS (previously Section 256 CrPC) is the absent-complainant provision and the most litigated section in this chapter. If the summons has been issued on a complaint and the complainant does not appear on the appointed day or any subsequent date to which the hearing is adjourned, the Magistrate shall acquit the accused, unless he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing.

The proviso opens three doors: (i) where the complainant is represented by an advocate or by the officer conducting the prosecution, or (ii) where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with attendance and proceed with the case. Sub-section (2) extends the same regime to the death of the complainant.

The Supreme Court in Sivaraman v. Agarwall, 1978 CrLJ 1376 read the section, with its proviso, as leaving three courses open: acquit, adjourn, or dispense with attendance. The discretion must be exercised judicially — not as a routine short-cut for clearing the docket. Where the complainant has been diligent throughout and is absent on a single day, the High Courts have set aside acquittals as too quick (Mohammed Azeem v. Venkatesh, (2002) 7 SCC 726; Moreswar v. Nana, (1989) 3 Crimes 88). Where the complainant has been chronically absent, an acquittal stands (Laxmi Steel Industries v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1197 (Raj); S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2066). The fact-pattern matters more than the rule.

The death of the complainant in a private complaint does not lead to ipso facto termination. The Magistrate may permit the legal representatives to continue with the case where the materials justify it (Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 983; Balasaheb v. Venkat, (2006) 5 SCC 530). In Section 138 NI Act prosecutions — the largest single category of summons cases in India — this discretion is routinely exercised in favour of substitution by the complainant’s heirs (T.N. Jayarajan, (1992) 3 Crimes 666 (Ker); A.S. Merchant v. Brij Mehra, (2005) 11 SCC 412).

The BNSS innovation in Section 279 is the new requirement that the Magistrate must give the complainant thirty days’ time to be present before acquitting under the section. The thirty-day window is the BNSS’s structural response to the criticism that complainants — particularly Section 138 NI Act complainants — were being acquitted-out for one missed hearing. The provision is mandatory; non-compliance is liable to be struck down in revision or under the High Court’s Section 528 BNSS inherent jurisdiction. The customary ‘pleader’ to ‘advocate’ substitution in the proviso also appears.

An acquittal under Section 279 attracts the bar of Section 337 BNSS (previously Section 300 CrPC) — double jeopardy — and bars a second complaint on the same facts unless the order of acquittal is set aside. The remedy against a Section 279 acquittal is the State or complainant appeal under Section 419(4) BNSS (previously Section 378(4) CrPC); a revision is not maintainable (Krishna v. Mohammed, 2003 CrLJ 149 (Del)).

Section 280 BNSS — withdrawal of complaint

Section 280 BNSS (previously Section 257 CrPC) permits the complainant, at any time before a final order is passed, to satisfy the Magistrate that there are sufficient grounds for permitting him to withdraw his complaint. If satisfied, the Magistrate permits the withdrawal and acquits the accused against whom the complaint is withdrawn.

The provision is exclusive to summons trials; there is no parallel in warrant trials. In a warrant case, even if the complainant withdraws, the Magistrate must proceed with the case, unless he finds the charge groundless (Cricket Association v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 1925). The withdrawal-acquittal under Section 280 attracts the Section 337 BNSS double-jeopardy bar; a fresh prosecution on the same facts is not maintainable except where the original court had no jurisdiction or the complaint was a nullity for want of sanction. The structural exclusivity of withdrawal as a summons-procedure exit is one of the cleanest distinctions between the two Magistrate-trial tracks.

Section 280 has been used by the Supreme Court as a creative compounding mechanism. In Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 SC 2111, the Court permitted withdrawal under Section 257 CrPC even though the offence was not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC. The mechanism is exceptional and case-by-case; it is not a routine substitute for the compounding regime.

Section 281 BNSS — power to stop proceedings

Section 281 BNSS (previously Section 258 CrPC) lets a Magistrate of the first class — or, with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, any other Judicial Magistrate — stop the proceedings in any summons case instituted otherwise than upon complaint. The stoppage must be for reasons recorded in writing.

The consequence depends on the stage. If the stoppage is after the evidence of the principal witnesses has been recorded, the Magistrate pronounces a judgment of acquittal. If it is at any earlier stage, the accused is released, and the release has the effect of discharge.

The section is not available in complaint cases (John Thomas v. K. Jagadeesan, (2001) 6 SCC 30). The structural rationale is that complaint cases have their own absent-complainant exit route under Section 279; the Section 281 stoppage power is reserved for police-instituted summons cases where there is no complainant whose absence triggers acquittal.

A Section 281 discharge does not finally bar a fresh trial — Section 337(5) BNSS (previously Section 300(5) CrPC) makes consent of the discharging court (or a court to which it is subordinate) a condition precedent to a fresh trial for the same offence. Reopening of stopped proceedings on a police requisition is permissible where the discharge formality was never completed; the Supreme Court in Renuka v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 14 SCC 345 held that revival was justified, but required the Magistrate to pass a reasoned order on the requisition.

Section 282 BNSS — convert summons-case to warrant-case

Section 282 BNSS (previously Section 259 CrPC) is the upward-conversion gate. Where in the course of a summons trial relating to an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding six months, the Magistrate considers that in the interests of justice the offence should be tried as a warrant case, he may proceed to re-hear the case under the warrant-trial procedure and may recall any witness already examined.

Two conditions are cumulative: the offence must be punishable with imprisonment exceeding six months, and the Magistrate must form the view that the interests of justice require warrant procedure. The conversion is ‘in the course of’ the trial, not at its inception — the word is ‘re-hear’. A Magistrate cannot, on day one, treat a summons case as a warrant case under colour of Section 282; he must begin under summons procedure and decide, somewhere along the way, that conversion is warranted (Cf. Ganesh v. Eknath, 1978 CrLJ 1009).

The reverse — trying a warrant case as a summons case — is void; the upward conversion under Section 282 is the procedural correction the Code provides. Where joint trial of summons and warrant offences is unavoidable, the warrant procedure governs the joint proceeding (State v. E. Bhaskaran, AIR 1971 Ker 188).

No discharge gate (with one BNSS exception)

The pre-2024 settled position was that Chapter XX of the CrPC did not contemplate discharge of the accused in a summons trial. Once the plea was taken under Section 251 CrPC and recorded under Section 252 CrPC, the trial had to be taken to its logical end — conviction or acquittal — and there was no procedural exit by way of discharge (S. Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 4711; Kumar v. Perumal, 1997 CrLJ 907 (Mad)). The same logic applied to summary trials.

The BNSS keeps that general position but introduces one targeted exception: the new proviso to Section 274 BNSS allows the Magistrate, on finding the accusation groundless, to release the accused — with the release operating as a discharge. This is a narrow exit, not a general discharge gate; the accusation must appear groundless on the face of the materials, and the Magistrate must record reasons in writing. The proviso aligns the summons trial with the discharge architecture of the heavier Magistrate-trial track while keeping the summons trial’s broader speed-of-disposal logic intact.

Compounding, probation, and sentencing in summons trials

Three procedural overlays are common in summons-trial practice. Compounding under Section 359 BNSS (previously Section 320 CrPC) is available for the offences listed there; for compoundable offences without court permission, the parties simply file the composition and the Magistrate records the consequent acquittal. For offences compoundable with court permission, the Magistrate must satisfy himself that the composition is voluntary and is not being used to defeat the public interest in prosecution.

Probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and Section 401 BNSS (previously Section 360 CrPC) is the most common alternative to substantive sentence in summons cases involving first offenders, juveniles in conflict with law (where the Juvenile Justice Act overrides the Code anyway), and minor offences against property. The probation order is recorded in lieu of sentence; the Magistrate is bound to consider probation where its statutory conditions are attracted, and a failure to record reasons for declining probation is reversible. The interplay with the bail and bond regime is structural — the probation bond replaces the bail bond on conviction.

Sentencing in summons trials is constrained by the lighter punishment-quantum architecture. Maximum imprisonment in a summons case is two years; in a summary trial, three months. The form of the judgment is governed by Sections 392 to 407 BNSS (previously Sections 353 to 365 CrPC), treated in detail in the judgment form and contents chapter.

BNSS comparison — what changed

The substantive procedural architecture is unchanged. The BNSS additions are calibrated:

1. Section 274 BNSS — new proviso enabling discharge on finding the accusation groundless.
2. Section 276 BNSS — ‘pleader’ replaced by ‘advocate’.
3. Section 279 BNSS — thirty-day notice to absent complainant before acquittal; ‘pleader’ to ‘advocate’.
4. Sections 275, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282 — no substantive change.

The case law on Sections 251 to 259 CrPC carries forward without amendment to Sections 274 to 282 BNSS — Bharat K. Gupta, Mahant Kaushalya, Sivaraman v. Agarwall, S. Sethuraman, John Thomas v. Jagadeesan, Mahesh Chand, Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas, Balasaheb v. Venkat, S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, Renuka v. State of Karnataka — all good law, with the doctrinal language re-stated in BNSS terms.

Common reversible errors in summons trials

Four patterns recur and merit attention.

Particulars stated mechanically. A reading of the section number of the penal statute, without describing the facts that constitute the offence, is no compliance with Section 274 BNSS. Where prejudice is shown — as where the accused was unrepresented and never understood the case against him — the conviction is liable to be reversed.

Plea recorded in third person, summary form. The plea must be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused (Mahant Kaushalya). A formulaic ‘the accused pleaded guilty’ entry is liable to be set aside, particularly where the conviction carries imprisonment.

Quick acquittal under Section 279 without thirty-day notice. The BNSS thirty-day requirement is mandatory. An acquittal recorded the same day the complainant first failed to appear is reversible; complainants are entitled to the statutory window, and Magistrates who shortcut it under workload pressure invite revision.

Section 281 stoppage in complaint cases. Section 281 applies only to summons cases instituted otherwise than on complaint (John Thomas v. Jagadeesan). A Magistrate who stops a complaint case under Section 281 instead of relying on Section 279, Section 280, or the substantive merits has acted without jurisdiction; the order is liable to be set aside in criminal revision under Section 442 BNSS.

Exam-angle takeaways

Five points exam-setters use without fail.

1. No formal charge in a summons case. Only ‘particulars of the offence’ are stated under Section 274 BNSS. The audit-trail consequence is that the Section 510 BNSS irregularity-curable framework, not the void-trial consequence, governs.
2. BNSS innovation — groundless-accusation discharge under Section 274 proviso. The first-ever discharge gate in summons trials. Until 2024, no discharge was contemplated; S. Sethuraman said so squarely.
3. BNSS innovation — thirty-day notice under Section 279. Mandatory before acquittal for non-appearance of complainant. The most likely MCQ-banker for the BNSS-versus-CrPC contrast in this chapter.
4. Section 281 BNSS applies only to police-instituted cases. John Thomas v. Jagadeesan is the constant authority.
5. Section 282 BNSS converts summons to warrant; the reverse is void. Conversion can be ordered ‘in the course of’ the trial, not at its inception.

The summons-trial chapter is the procedural backbone of the Indian Magistrate’s court — most lower-court criminal work passes through it. A long-form mains answer should walk through the nine-section sequence, highlight the BNSS additions, contrast the chapter with the heavier warrant trial on one side and the lighter summary trial on the other, and finish with the no-discharge architecture (now subject to the Section 274 proviso). A prelims MCQ will pivot on the new BNSS thirty-day notice, the Section 281 police-case-only restriction, the Section 282 conversion conditions, or the absence of formal charge. The companion procedural piece — the appellate review of summons-trial verdicts — is treated in the appeals in criminal cases chapter; the complaint procedure chapter explains how summons-case complaints are filtered before they reach the trial stage. The full procedural toolkit is mapped in the broader Code of Criminal Procedure notes.

Frequently asked questions

Is a formal charge framed in a summons trial?

No. Section 274 BNSS (previously Section 251 CrPC) requires the Magistrate only to state the ‘particulars of the offence’ to the accused; no formal written charge is framed. The Supreme Court in Bharat K. Gupta v. Arun Kumar, (2000) 10 SCC 658 explained that the Magistrate must incorporate the substance of the accusation but not the details. Failure to comply does not by itself vitiate the trial — the Section 510 BNSS irregularity-curable test (previously Section 465 CrPC) applies. The question is whether the omission has occasioned a failure of justice; where the accused was represented and cross-examined witnesses fully, no prejudice arises.

What is the BNSS innovation in Section 274 on discharge in summons trials?

Section 274 BNSS adds a new proviso allowing the Magistrate, on finding the accusation groundless, to release the accused after recording reasons in writing — with such release operating as a discharge. This is the first-ever discharge gate in summons trials. The pre-2024 position was settled by S. Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 4711: Chapter XX CrPC contemplated no discharge; once the plea was taken, the trial had to be taken to its logical end. The BNSS proviso narrows that gap. The threshold is high — the accusation must appear groundless on the face of the materials — but a procedural exit now exists.

When may the Magistrate acquit the accused for non-appearance of the complainant under Section 279 BNSS?

Section 279 BNSS (previously Section 256 CrPC) lets the Magistrate acquit the accused if the complainant fails to appear on the date fixed for the appearance of the accused or on any subsequent adjourned date, unless the Magistrate thinks it proper to adjourn or the complainant is represented by an advocate or by the officer conducting the prosecution. The Supreme Court in Sivaraman v. Agarwall, 1978 CrLJ 1376 read the section as opening three courses: acquit, adjourn, or dispense with attendance. The BNSS adds a mandatory thirty-day notice to the absent complainant before acquittal — a new safeguard particularly important in Section 138 NI Act prosecutions where complainants were earlier acquitted-out for one missed hearing.

Can a complainant withdraw a summons-case complaint? Is the same available in a warrant case?

Yes for summons cases, no for warrant cases. Section 280 BNSS (previously Section 257 CrPC) lets the Magistrate, if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds, permit the complainant to withdraw the complaint at any time before a final order; the consequence is acquittal of the accused. The Supreme Court in Cricket Association v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 1925 held that there is no parallel provision in warrant trials — even if the complainant withdraws, the Magistrate must proceed unless the charge is groundless. Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 SC 2111 used Section 257 creatively to permit withdrawal in a non-compoundable offence; the use is exceptional and case-by-case.

When can a summons case be tried as a warrant case under Section 282 BNSS?

Two conditions are cumulative under Section 282 BNSS (previously Section 259 CrPC): the offence must be punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding six months, and the Magistrate must form the opinion that, in the interests of justice, the offence should be tried as a warrant case. The conversion is ‘in the course of’ the trial — the word is ‘re-hear’ — not at its inception (Cf. Ganesh v. Eknath, 1978 CrLJ 1009). The Magistrate must wipe off the proceedings so far and start de novo under warrant procedure; witnesses already examined may be recalled. The reverse — trying a warrant case as a summons case — is void, not curable.