Maintenance of Public Order and Tranquillity — Sections 129–148 CrPC / Equivalent BNSS

Sections 148 to 167 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — re-enacting Sections 129 to 148 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with only marginal verbal change — collect the Executive Magistrate's preventive arsenal. The chapter is preventive, not penal: it does not punish a riot, it stops one. It does not punish a public nuisance, it removes one. It does not adjudicate a private wrong, it fences off the breach of public peace that the wrong threatens. The whole architecture is police jurisdiction in the Privy Council sense — quick, summary, executive, and answerable to the writ courts when it strays.

The chapter sits inside Part XI of the BNSS and divides cleanly into four limbs. Sections 148 to 151 BNSS (previously Sections 129 to 132 CrPC) deal with the dispersal of unlawful assemblies. Sections 152 to 162 BNSS (previously Sections 133 to 143 CrPC) deal with the removal of public nuisance. Section 163 BNSS (previously Section 144 CrPC) confers the famous power to make urgent prohibitory orders. Section 144A CrPC, dealing with the carrying of arms in procession and mass drill with arms, was inserted by Act 25 of 2005 but never brought into force; the BNSS does not retain a direct counterpart. The four limbs are read together because their condition precedent is the same — apprehended danger to public peace, public health, public safety, or public tranquillity.

Constitutional foundation

Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution guarantees to every citizen the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. The right is, however, subject to the reasonable restrictions that the State may impose under Article 19(3) in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order. Chapter XI BNSS is enacted under that constitutional power. In Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1973 SC 87, the Supreme Court read down a rule that conferred uncanalised power on the police to refuse permission for a public meeting; the same logic now applies to every order under Sections 148 to 163 BNSS — the power must be exercised on stated material, for the stated purpose, and is open to judicial scrutiny. State of Bihar v. K.K. Misra, (1970) 3 SCC 337, and Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746, between them put the constitutional ceiling on this jurisdiction: the order must be reasonable, the purpose must fall inside Article 19(3), and the duration must be temporary.

Dispersal of unlawful assemblies — Sections 148 to 150 BNSS

The three sections form a graded scheme of force. The least invasive tier is Section 148 BNSS (previously Section 129 CrPC). Any Executive Magistrate, the officer in charge of a police station, or, in the absence of the latter, any police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector, may command an unlawful assembly — or any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace — to disperse. Members are duty-bound to comply. If the assembly does not disperse on command, or conducts itself in a manner showing a determination not to disperse, civil force may be used; the dispersing authority may also requisition the assistance of any male person not belonging to the armed forces.

Two ingredients must be satisfied. First, the assembly must be either an unlawful assembly within the meaning of Section 189 BNS (previously Section 141 IPC) — five or more persons united by one of the five common objects spelt out in that section — or an assembly of five or more persons in fact likely to disturb the public peace. The chapter on definitions and key concepts sets out who an Executive Magistrate is and how his jurisdiction is locally bounded. Hanuman v. State, AIR 1969 All 130, treats both alternatives as independent; the assembly need not be unlawful in the technical sense if its actual conduct threatens the peace. Second, the determination not to disperse must be objective: the apprehension is judged on the conduct shown, not on the Magistrate's anticipation alone.

Section 149 BNSS (previously Section 130 CrPC) escalates. If the assembly cannot be otherwise dispersed and dispersal is necessary for public security, the District Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by him — note that the BNSS replaces the CrPC's reference to the "Executive Magistrate of the highest rank present" with this clearer formulation — may cause the assembly to be dispersed by the armed forces. The officer requisitioned must obey, and must use as little force and do as little injury to person and property as is consistent with dispersal.

Section 150 BNSS (previously Section 131 CrPC) is the emergency tier. When public security is manifestly endangered and no Executive Magistrate can be communicated with, any commissioned or gazetted officer of the armed forces may himself disperse the assembly with the forces under his command. The instant it becomes practicable to communicate with an Executive Magistrate, he must do so and obey thenceforward. The provision is constitutionally vital because it codifies the chain of command — the Magistrate, not the officer, retains political accountability for the decision to use armed force against civilians.

The relationship between this scheme and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, was clinched by the Constitution Bench in Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 431. The Court held that Sections 130 and 131 CrPC (now Sections 149 and 150 BNSS) are not adequate to deal with the continuous deployment of armed forces in aid of civil power across a disturbed area for an extended period; AFSPA fills that gap and is neither discriminatory nor violative of Article 14. The two regimes therefore coexist — the BNSS sections operate in normal districts, AFSPA operates only where a notification under Section 3 of that Act has been issued.

Sanction shield — Section 151 BNSS

Section 151 BNSS (previously Section 132 CrPC) bars prosecution of any Executive Magistrate, police officer, requisitioned civilian, or armed-forces officer for any act purporting to be done under Sections 148 to 150 BNSS, except with sanction — Central Government sanction where the accused is an officer or member of the armed forces, State Government sanction in any other case. The leading case remains Nagraj v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 269. The Court drew a sharp distinction. Where the complaint itself alleges that the act was done while purporting to disperse an unlawful assembly, the Magistrate cannot entertain the complaint without sanction. Where the complaint merely alleges the offence with no such allegation, the Court must proceed as it would on any other complaint; the question of sanction may arise later if the accused brings the protective umbrella down.

The protection is not unlimited. H.H.B. Gill v. The King, AIR 1948 PC 128, settled the meaning of "acts purporting to be done under" — the act must be reasonably connected with the official duty, not merely contemporaneous with it. Picking the pocket of a member of an unlawful assembly, or stealing from a house in the course of dispersal, falls outside the protection. Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 735, adds a layer: where the accused is also a public servant, sanction under Section 218 BNSS (previously Section 197 CrPC) may be required in addition to sanction under Section 151. A police officer prosecuted for theft committed during dispersal therefore needs a double sanction.

Public nuisance — Section 152 BNSS

Section 152 BNSS (previously Section 133 CrPC) is the central operative provision in the public-nuisance regime. A District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government may, on the report of a police officer or other information, make a conditional order for the removal of any of six categories of nuisance: (a) unlawful obstruction or nuisance to a public place, way, river, or channel; (b) injurious trade, occupation, or storage of goods; (c) construction or substance likely to occasion conflagration or explosion; (d) building, tent, structure, or tree likely to fall and cause injury; (e) unfenced tanks, wells, or excavations adjacent to a public way; and (f) dangerous animals.

The order is conditional in form: it asks the person to do the act within a stated time, or to appear and show cause why the order should not be made absolute. Sub-section (2) bars civil suits against an order duly made. The procedural shift from the old Code is explained in our overview chapter on the history, object and scheme of the BNSS. Vasant Manga Nikumba v. Baburao Bhikanna Naidu, 1996 SCC (Cri) 27, locates the section in its context — Sections 268 to 294 IPC (now Sections 270 to 297 BNS) punish the offence of public nuisance; Section 152 BNSS provides the procedural remedy for its removal. The two regimes are independent and cumulative.

Public nuisance, not private — and emergency, not stale

Two limits run through every reported decision under this section. First, the nuisance must be public. State of M.P. v. Kedia Leather and Liquor Ltd., (2003) 7 SCC 389, confirmed that effluent and air discharge causing hardship to the general public is a public nuisance and that Section 133 CrPC was not impliedly repealed by the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, or the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 — the regimes operate in different planes. K.B. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SC 4818, applied the same logic to dust and smell from a dry-chilli godown. Where, by contrast, the inconvenience is to a single neighbour — an air conditioner mounted on a bank window in Branch Manager, Vijaya Bank v. State of Gujarat, 1999 CrLJ 946 (Guj), or a tenant's bakery furnace in Ramlal v. State of Rajasthan, 2007 CrLJ 1949 — the remedy is a civil suit, not a Section 152 order.

Second, the section is for emergencies. Stale grievances that could equally well be litigated civilly fall outside its reach. Ashrafi v. State, (1965) 1 CrLJ 535 (All), held that a public-way obstruction existing for ten years or more should not be brought under this jurisdiction. The Magistrate must record a prima facie satisfaction that the imminent danger or continuing public injury justifies summary action. Shyam Sunder v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 CrLJ 3959 (Raj), set aside a demolition order made under clause (d) without recording such satisfaction.

Procedure after the conditional order — Sections 153 to 161 BNSS

The procedural cascade is sequential and must be followed step by step. Sections 153 and 154 BNSS (previously Sections 134 and 135 CrPC) deal with service of the order and the option of either obeying it or appearing to show cause; the BNSS adds, in clause (b) of Section 154, that the appearance and hearing may be permitted through audio-video conferencing — a procedural modernisation that did not exist in the old Code and that travels through the chapter on the processes to compel appearance as well. Section 155 BNSS (previously Section 136 CrPC) makes failure to comply punishable; the BNSS replaces the IPC reference with the corresponding section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

If the person appears and denies the existence of the public right alleged, Section 156 BNSS (previously Section 137 CrPC) requires the Magistrate to inquire into that denial. If the evidence in support of the denial is reliable, the proceedings must be stayed pending decision by a competent civil court; if not, the Magistrate proceeds to Section 157 BNSS (previously Section 138 CrPC) and decides whether the conditional order should be made absolute. The BNSS adds a new proviso to Section 157 stipulating a timeline for completion of these proceedings — a long-overdue codification, given the criticism that Section 138 CrPC inquiries were dragging on for years.

The two inquiries are sequential, not simultaneous. Chowlia v. Ashutosh, (1975) CrLJ 959 (Cal), and a long line of decisions hold that the question of public right must be settled first; only on a finding adverse to the objector does the Magistrate proceed to the question of obstruction. Skipping the first inquiry and going straight to the second vitiates the order. Branch Manager, Vijaya Bank v. State of Gujarat, 1999 CrLJ 946, set aside a Section 138 order where no conditional order under Section 133(1) had been issued at all — there is no jurisdiction to make a final order without the foundational conditional one.

Section 158 BNSS (previously Section 139 CrPC) authorises local investigation and examination of an expert; the conduct of investigation more generally is the subject of our chapter on police investigation powers. Section 159 BNSS (previously Section 140 CrPC) is incidental, on written instructions to the local-investigation officer. Section 160 BNSS (previously Section 141 CrPC) is the enforcement provision. Once the order is made absolute, a fresh notice is served fixing time for compliance; non-compliance attracts prosecution under the corresponding penal provision (the BNSS replaces Section 188 IPC with the equivalent BNS section), and the Magistrate may himself have the act performed and recover the costs by attachment and sale of the offender's property.

Section 161 BNSS (previously Section 142 CrPC) authorises an ex parte injunction pending inquiry where the Magistrate considers that immediate action is necessary to prevent imminent danger or serious injury. Section 162 BNSS (previously Section 143 CrPC) — modernised by the BNSS to add the words "or Deputy Commissioner of Police" — empowers the Magistrate to order any person not to repeat or continue a public nuisance defined by the IPC, BNS, or any special or local law. The order under Section 162 is permanent in effect, unlike the temporary orders under Section 163.

Section 163 BNSS — urgent orders in cases of nuisance or apprehended danger

Section 163 BNSS reproduces Section 144 CrPC verbatim and is the most-litigated, most-misunderstood provision in the chapter. The District Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, where such direction is likely to prevent obstruction, annoyance, or injury to any person lawfully employed, danger to human life, health, or safety, or a disturbance of public tranquillity, riot, or affray. The gist of the section is urgency. Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884, locates this in the very text — the Magistrate must be satisfied that immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, and his decision on that point is the foundation of his jurisdiction.

The constitutional architecture of the section was settled in Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746. The Constitution Bench upheld Section 144 against challenge under Article 19(1)(a) to (d), reading down only the second part of the old Section 146(6) — which the new sub-sections of Section 163 BNSS have anyway recast. The Court emphasised the temporary character of the order and the duty to give reasons. Successive blanket orders are forbidden; Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, AIR 1984 SC 51, condemned the practice of issuing successive Section 144 orders on the same subject matter and directed that recurring problems be dealt with under Sections 107 or 145 CrPC (now Sections 126 and 164 BNSS) — read together with our chapter on security for keeping the peace and the disputes regarding immovable property.

The most exhaustive modern restatement is In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 1, where the Supreme Court reviewed the Yog Guru Ramdev midnight eviction. The Court reaffirmed that Section 144 is a public-purpose power that exists to protect public order; the satisfaction of the authority must precede the order and be visible on its face; the directions issued must be necessary to protect the interests of others or to prevent danger to human life, health, safety, or public tranquillity; and these features must coexist at a given point of time. The judgment is a compulsory read for any candidate writing on this section.

What can and cannot be ordered

Section 163(1) reads as a power to make a prohibitory order — "abstain from a certain act". The plain reading would exclude mandatory orders. Kusumbkumari v. Hemnalini, (1933) 38 CWN 115, took that view. Madhu Limaye, however, observed that a mandatory direction is permissible where necessary to prevent the undesirable happenings listed in the sub-section, and the Allahabad Full Bench in Abdul v. Haridullah, AIR 1951 All 238, supplied the reasoning: the power to direct removal is implicit where removal is the only effective way to enforce a prohibition. The position therefore is that mandatory orders are exceptional and confined to genuine emergencies.

What the Magistrate cannot do under this section is also clear. He cannot adjudicate title or settle private rights — Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 2198, treats public-peace prevention and private-rights adjudication as different jurisdictions. He cannot attach property or appoint a receiver under this section; those powers belong to Section 165 BNSS (previously Section 146 CrPC). He cannot ban the lawful sale of State-organised lottery tickets in disguise of a public-order order — State of Haryana v. Suman Enterprises, (1994) 4 SCC 217. He cannot regulate a field already occupied by special legislation — Jiwan Kumar v. State of Punjab, 2008 CrLJ 3576 (P&H DB), set aside a Section 144 order seeking to regulate the sale of medicines, holding the Drugs and Cosmetics Act prevailed.

Duration, service, and appeal

The order is short-lived. It cannot remain in force for more than two months from the date it is made. The State Government may, by notification, extend it by a further period not exceeding six months when necessary for the prevention of danger to human life, health, or safety, or to prevent a riot or affray. M.E. Supply Company, In re, 1997 CrLJ 143, reads the temporary character as the constitutional anchor of the section: the moment an order acquires perpetual injunction effect or runs beyond the statutory ceiling, it is invalid.

Once the order is served, the rules on serving and executing orders, summonses, and warrants set out in the chapter on search warrants and seizure apply by extension to the publication and personal-service requirements that follow Sections 153 and 134 BNSS. An order under Section 163 can be challenged by revision before the Sessions Judge, by an application under Article 226 to the High Court for an appropriate writ, and where a fundamental right is affected, by a petition under Article 32 to the Supreme Court. Dange v. State of U.P., (1970) 3 SCC 218, confirmed the writ remedy where the purposes cited fall outside Section 144(1). Violation of an order, once duly promulgated and within jurisdiction, attracts prosecution under the corresponding BNS section (previously Section 188 IPC); Garg v. Superintendent, (1970) 3 SCC 227, holds that for prosecution it must be shown that the order was lawfully made, that its violation tends to cause obstruction, annoyance, or danger, and that the accused had knowledge.

Section 144A CrPC — the unbrought-into-force arms-procession provision

Section 144A was inserted in the CrPC by Act 25 of 2005 to empower the District Magistrate to prohibit, by public notice or order, the carrying of arms in any procession or the organising of mass drill or mass training with arms in any public place, where necessary for the preservation of public peace or maintenance of public order. The notice may be directed to a particular person or to a community, party, or organisation, and remains in force for three months extendable by the State Government to six. The Supreme Court in In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident, supra, noted the provision and its policy basis. The provision was, however, never brought into force, and the BNSS does not retain a direct counterpart — exam candidates should be careful to flag both points when answering on the limits of the District Magistrate's power.

Reading the chapter together with adjacent regimes

The Magistrate's preventive arsenal does not begin and end with this chapter. It interlocks at three points. With preventive action of the police under Sections 168 to 172 BNSS (previously Sections 149 to 153 CrPC), where the police's power to prevent cognizable offences and to arrest in their immediate apprehension — itself the subject of our chapter on arrest of persons — complements the Magistrate's standing power. With the security-for-peace regime under Sections 125 to 143 BNSS (previously Sections 106 to 124 CrPC), where bonds replace temporary prohibitions for habitual offenders, treated in detail in the chapter on peace bonds and good-behaviour bonds under Sections 125 to 143 BNSS — and with the maintenance jurisdiction under Section 144 BNSS for wives, children, and parents, which sometimes intersects when a public-order order also addresses domestic disturbance. And with the disputes-concerning-immovable-property regime under Sections 164 to 167 BNSS (previously Sections 145 to 148 CrPC), where the Magistrate's question is no longer whether to prevent a riot but whether to declare possession until eviction in due course of law.

Two distinctions recur in the question papers and deserve to be memorised. Section 152 BNSS (Section 133 CrPC) and Section 163 BNSS (Section 144 CrPC). A Section 152 order is conditional, becomes absolute on inquiry, and is permanent in effect; a Section 163 order is unconditional in form, immediate in operation, and temporary in duration. K.B. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra formulated the relationship: Section 152 is more specific and Section 163 more general, so a public-nuisance situation falling squarely under Section 152 is taken out of the general reach of Section 163. Section 163 BNSS and Section 164 BNSS (Section 144 vis-a-vis Section 145 CrPC). Kauleshari v. Binda, (1976) CrLJ 649, fixed the rule: where the apprehended breach concerns land or water, Section 164 is mandatory and Section 163 is excluded; "may" in Section 163 yields to "shall" in Section 164. The exam-going candidate should keep Raja v. Ram, (1975) CrLJ 1268, ready as a corollary — where the ingredients of both sections are present, it is proper to proceed under Section 164.

Touchpoints with the Constitution and other statutes

Three touchpoints close the picture. First, Article 25 — the freedom of religion. Debnarayan v. Inspector of Police, (1986) 1 Cal LJ 320, upheld a Section 144 order requiring religious processions to refrain from playing musical instruments past mosque areas at certain times; the order was held proportionate, time-limited, and did not offend Article 25. Second, Article 19(1)(g) — freedom of trade. Bal Bharti Nursery School v. District Magistrate, 1996 CrLJ 442 (All), upheld a Section 144 restriction on trade as not violative of the fundamental right where the restriction was necessary to protect public peace. Third, the inherent power of the High Court under Section 528 BNSS (previously Section 482 CrPC) is in principle available, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against using it to disturb a Section 144 order made on proper material — Ravi Rama Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 169.

Comparative table — CrPC and BNSS

The renumbering for this chapter is mechanical, with one structural exception. The table below maps the principal provisions discussed in this article. Note that BNSS Section 149 changes the dispersing officer from "the Executive Magistrate of the highest rank present" to "the District Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate authorised by him", and that Section 154 BNSS expressly permits hearing through audio-video conferencing.

• S. 129 CrPC = S. 148 BNSS — dispersal of assembly by civil force.
• S. 130 CrPC = S. 149 BNSS — use of armed forces to disperse assembly.
• S. 131 CrPC = S. 150 BNSS — armed-forces officer's emergency power.
• S. 132 CrPC = S. 151 BNSS — protection from prosecution.
• S. 133 CrPC = S. 152 BNSS — conditional order for removal of nuisance.
• S. 138 CrPC = S. 157 BNSS — show cause; new proviso on timeline.
• S. 142 CrPC = S. 161 BNSS — injunction pending inquiry.
• S. 143 CrPC = S. 162 BNSS — repetition of public nuisance.
• S. 144 CrPC = S. 163 BNSS — urgent orders in cases of nuisance or apprehended danger.
• S. 144A CrPC — never notified; no BNSS counterpart.

Candidates appearing for the CrPC and BNSS mains paper should carry the dual citation discipline into every answer — "under Section 163 BNSS (Section 144 CrPC), an Executive Magistrate may, in cases of urgency…" — because every paper from 2024 onward expects both citations on every limb of the chapter. The chapter on powers of police officers sets up the institutional actor; the chapter on the constitution of criminal courts sets up the Magistrate's position in the hierarchy; the chapter on sentencing jurisdiction sets up the limits of the Magistrate's punitive arm. Read with those three, the architecture of public-order maintenance is complete.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between Section 152 BNSS (S.133 CrPC) and Section 163 BNSS (S.144 CrPC)?

A Section 152 BNSS order is conditional and is made for the removal of a specific public nuisance falling within the six clauses of sub-section (1); after inquiry under Sections 156 and 157 it is made absolute and is permanent in effect. A Section 163 BNSS order is unconditional, made in cases of urgent apprehended danger to public peace, and is temporary — it cannot remain in force for more than two months, extendable by the State Government to six. The Supreme Court in K.B. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra (2005) held that Section 152 is the more specific provision; a public nuisance falling within it is taken out of the general reach of Section 163.

Can the District Magistrate issue successive orders under Section 163 BNSS on the same subject matter?

No. The Supreme Court in Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, AIR 1984 SC 51, expressly forbade the issuance of successive Section 144 orders to give a Section 144 order perpetual character. The constitutional validity of the section rests on its temporary nature and the two-month plus six-month statutory ceiling. Where the apprehended danger is recurrent or chronic, the proper recourse is to Sections 126 BNSS (security for keeping the peace) or Section 164 BNSS (disputes regarding immovable property), not back-to-back Section 163 orders. M.E. Supply Company, In re, 1997 CrLJ 143, applied the same reasoning.

Is sanction required to prosecute a police officer for excess force during dispersal of an unlawful assembly?

Yes, often double sanction. Section 151 BNSS (previously Section 132 CrPC) requires sanction of the State Government — or Central Government, if the accused is an officer of the armed forces — for any act purporting to be done under Sections 148 to 150 BNSS. Where the police officer is also a public servant, Section 218 BNSS (previously Section 197 CrPC) requires an additional sanction. Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 735, held that both sanctions are necessary. Nagraj v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 269, however, distinguishes between complaints that allege the act was done in dispersing an unlawful assembly (sanction needed before cognizance) and complaints that simply allege the offence (sanction question arises only at a later stage).

Can a Section 163 BNSS order direct a person to do something positively, or only to refrain from acting?

The plain words 'abstain from a certain act' suggest only a prohibitory power, and Kusumbkumari v. Hemnalini (1933) took that strict view. The Constitution Bench in Madhu Limaye v. SDM, Monghyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746, however, observed that mandatory directions are permissible where they are necessary to prevent the undesirable happenings the section is designed to prevent. The Allahabad Full Bench in Abdul v. Haridullah, AIR 1951 All 238, supplied the reasoning: the power to direct removal is implicit where removal is the only effective method of enforcing a prohibition. Mandatory orders are therefore exceptional and confined to genuine emergencies; the default is prohibitory.

Does the Section 152 BNSS public-nuisance regime survive the special pollution-control statutes?

Yes. State of M.P. v. Kedia Leather and Liquor Ltd., (2003) 7 SCC 389, settled the controversy. The Supreme Court held that Section 133 CrPC (now Section 152 BNSS) and the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, operate in different areas and there is no impediment to their coexistence. The two pollution Acts did not impliedly repeal Section 133 CrPC. The Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 152 BNSS therefore continues even where the underlying nuisance is also actionable under the special pollution legislation. The Karnataka High Court in Harihar Poly Fibres v. SDM, 1997 CrLJ 2731, reached the same conclusion.

What is the consequence of disobedience of an order made absolute under Section 152 BNSS?

Two consequences flow. First, prosecution under the corresponding BNS section (the BNSS replaces the reference to Section 188 IPC with the equivalent BNS provision) for disobeying a lawful order of a public servant. Second, under Section 160 BNSS (previously Section 141 CrPC), the Magistrate may himself cause the act required by the order to be performed and recover the costs of such performance from the offender by attachment and sale of his movable property — this is a coercive enforcement remedy in addition to the penal remedy. The two remedies are cumulative; the offender does not escape costs by paying the fine, and does not escape the fine by submitting to the costs.