Most cheque-bounce cases are fought over the debt: was the money owed, was the cheque only a security. In Kuldeep Chand the Himachal Pradesh High Court never got that far. The cheque had been written to "Kuldeep Chand and Company". The complaint was filed by Kuldeep Chand. Almost fifteen years after the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, dismissed the complaint, the High Court held on 5 November 2026 that the gap between those two names was enough to end the case.
A road-cutting contract and a Rs 3 lakh cheque
The complainant said the accused had taken a contract from the HPPWD for a road from Chaura Maidan, Shimla to Jalog-Chanawag, and had engaged him by an agreement of 1 December 2005 to do the cutting from RD 8/245 to 12/0 at Rs 28 per cubic metre. For the work the accused gave a Rs 3,00,000 cheque on Punjab National Bank, Ghanahati. It came back with "insufficient funds", a notice went out, nothing was paid, and a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 followed.
The accused, examined under Section 313 CrPC (now Section 351 BNSS), admitted the agreement. His line was that the cheque had been given as a security, and given in favour of "Kuldeep Chand and Company". That sentence from the accused is where the case turned, because the cheque itself said the same thing.
The Magistrate dismissed the complaint on 22 December 2011 on several grounds: no document showed the complainant to be the proprietor of the company; he had admitted that the work was allotted to another person and not to the accused; the work was in Shimla and the cheque was dishonoured at Mandi, so Bilaspur had no jurisdiction; and the notice had gone to the wrong address. The complainant appealed as Cr. Appeal No. 122 of 2012, argued before Justice Rakesh Kainthla, with judgment reserved on 26 October 2026.
- 1 Dec 2005: agreement for road-cutting work at Rs 28 per cubic metre
- Cheque: Rs 3,00,000, PNB Ghanahati, payee "Kuldeep Chand and Company", returned for insufficient funds
- 22 Dec 2011: Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, dismisses the complaint
- 2012: Cr. Appeal No. 122 of 2012 filed in the High Court
- 5 Nov 2026: appeal dismissed; accused to furnish a bond of Rs 50,000 for six months
Who is "the payee" when the cheque names a business?
The headline of this ruling is easy to misread as one about the drawer. It is not. The drawer is the person who signed the cheque, here the accused, and nobody disputed that. The question was on the other side of the cheque: Section 142(1)(a) allows cognizance only on a written complaint "made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque". Three persons are in play here, and aspirants who blur them lose marks.
| Role | Who it was here | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Drawer | Piar Singh Kanwar, who issued the cheque | The person who commits the s. 138 offence |
| Payee | "Kuldeep Chand and Company", as written on the cheque | The person s. 142 allows to complain |
| Complainant | Kuldeep Chand, in his own name | Must be the payee, or show that he is |
The five ingredients of Section 138 were recited from Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485, quoting Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745. As quoted, they begin with a cheque drawn by a person on his own account for a debt, and they speak of the "payee or the holder in due course" giving the notice. The statute never invites a stranger to the cheque to prosecute. The notes on the holder in due course show how narrow the two categories are.
A proprietorship is only a man trading under a name
The complainant's best argument was that a proprietary concern and its owner are one. It relied on Shankar Finance & Investments v. State of A.P., (2008) 8 SCC 536, which says that a proprietary concern is not a legal entity distinct from its proprietor: it is "nothing but an individual trading under a trade name". Where the payee is a proprietary concern, that case allows a complaint in three ways: by the proprietor, describing himself as the sole proprietor of the payee; by the concern, described as a sole proprietorship represented by its proprietor; or by an attorney holder acting for either. What is not allowed is an attorney holder suing in his own name as if he were the payee. Milind Shripad Chandurkar v. Kalim M. Khan, (2011) 4 SCC 275, repeats the three routes.
So the complainant's premise was right, and his conclusion still failed. Shankar Finance gives the owner a route. It does not excuse him from taking it. The complaint here was in the name of Kuldeep Chand, and, as the High Court recorded from his own cross-examination, it nowhere mentioned "Kuldeep Chand and Company". He admitted the cheque was issued to the Company, admitted he had produced no constitution of it, and could say only that he was its owner.
A Delhi High Court decision pressed for the complainant, Shankar Lal Aggarwal v. Balram Luthra, did not help: the Bench noted that it had not referred to Shankar Finance and declined to follow it.
A bare statement that "I am the proprietor" was not enough
Counsel for the complainant said his proof affidavit had asserted proprietorship and had not been challenged in cross-examination. The High Court's answer rested on Milind Chandurkar again, on its facts almost a twin. There the complainant sued as proprietor of "Vijay Automobiles", the cheque had been issued to the firm, and he admitted he had produced no document to show he owned it. The Supreme Court held that a mere statement in an affidavit "is not sufficient", reasoning that a business large enough to sell Rs 7 lakh of diesel to one customer in a month would have bank records and tax records, and that nothing stopped him leading them, even at the appellate stage.
The Bench added two of its own decisions. In S.P. Saklani v. Ravinder Singh Thakur, 2012 SCC OnLine HP 771, the cheque and the dishonour memo were in the name of a firm; the complainant swore that he was its sole proprietor but conceded in cross-examination that he had no proof, and the complaint failed. In Ram Chand v. Rafee Mohammad, 2018 SCC OnLine HP 3334, a cheque issued by a partner of one concern could not be tied to the complainant's own company, and the acquittal stood. In each, the complainant could easily have connected himself to the payee and did not.
What a firm, a company and a proprietorship each do to the complaint
The same cheque, written to three kinds of business, sends the complainant down three different paths. The table keeps them apart.
| Payee named on the cheque | Legal personality | How the complaint must read |
|---|---|---|
| An individual | The person himself | In his name |
| A sole proprietorship ("X and Company") | None apart from the owner (Shankar Finance) | By X as sole proprietor of the payee, by the concern through X, or through an attorney holder; proof of the link if it is disputed |
| A company | Separate juristic person | In the company's name, through an authorised officer (M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 182) |
| A partnership firm | Not a legal entity; a collective name for the partners (Mahabir Cold Storage v. CIT, AIR 1991 SC 1357) | Not addressed in this judgment |
The fourth row is a reminder that the judgment decides the proprietorship case and nothing wider. Section 141, which defines "company" to include a firm or other association of individuals, concerns who may be prosecuted when the drawer is a business. It governs the accused's side, not the complainant's.
The jurisdiction finding that was overturned, and why it did not save the appeal
The Magistrate had said that, because the cheque was presented at Salapar in District Mandi, only the court at Sundernagar could hear the complaint. The High Court held that finding unsustainable. It relied on Nishant Aggarwal v. Kailash Kumar Sharma, (2013) 10 SCC 72, which allowed a complaint at the place where the payee resides, following K. Bhaskaran.
The Court then turned to Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129, which moved jurisdiction to the court where the cheque is dishonoured. Quoting the passage at paragraph 22 of that case, it observed that the ruling was made to bite only on complaints where, after summoning and the accused's appearance, recording of evidence under Section 145(2) had not begun. Complaints beyond that stage stayed where they were. The High Court held Dashrath inapplicable to this complaint and Nishant Aggarwal applicable, so the Sundernagar-only reasoning fell. The judgment does not discuss the 2015 amendment that inserted Section 142(2), which later tied jurisdiction to the payee's bank branch; our chapter on Sections 139 to 142 tells that part of the story.
A correct jurisdictional ruling cannot revive a complaint that fails on maintainability, and the Court noted that no other point was urged.
Reading an acquittal appeal under Section 138
This was an appeal by a complainant against acquittal, the route Section 378(4) CrPC gave and Section 419(4) BNSS now gives. The Court began with the state of the law as quoted from Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373: a court may interfere with an acquittal only if the view is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable or manifestly illegal. It draws on Kali Ram, Ghurey Lal, Chandrappa and Mrinal Das, and records the "double presumption of innocence": an accused is presumed innocent, and an acquittal strengthens that presumption.
The Court then added the cheque-bounce gloss from Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 18 SCC 106. The same rigour cannot be applied, because Sections 118 and 139 presume that the cheque was received in discharge of a debt, so the appellate court may look at the evidence to see whether the accused has shown a probable defence. Here the point did not hurt the accused. The Bench found that the Magistrate "took a reasonable view" of the maintainability issue and that, even if another view were possible, interference was not called for.
The presumption had no work to do. Section 139 presumes that the holder received the cheque for a debt, which presupposes a person who is a holder or payee. A complainant who has not shown he is the payee never reaches it. Our chapter on criminal appeals sets out Section 419 BNSS together with the leave requirement.
Under Section 437-A CrPC (Section 481 BNSS) the accused was directed to furnish a bond of Rs 50,000 with one surety, valid for six months, in case a special leave petition is filed.
Three questions on the payee, the forum and the acquittal
- maintainable, because a proprietorship has no existence apart from its owner
- maintainable, because Section 139 presumes the cheque was issued for a debt
- maintainable, if the accused admits the underlying agreement
- not maintainable, because the complainant has not shown that he is the payee of the cheque
Answer
(d). Option (a) states a true premise but ignores that the owner must still describe and prove himself as the payee. The presumption in (b) presupposes a holder, and admission of an agreement in (c) does not make X the payee.
- only the court where the drawer's bank branch is situated, in all cases
- Nishant Aggarwal, because Dashrath did not disturb complaints at or beyond the Section 145(2) stage
- only the court where the work or contract was performed
- the court at the district headquarters of the cheque's presentation, whatever the payee's residence
Answer
(b). The Court read Dashrath's own direction to mean that cases already at the evidence stage stayed in the court where they were pending, so Nishant Aggarwal's payee-residence rule applied.
- It may reverse the acquittal whenever another view of the evidence is possible
- It has no power to reappreciate the evidence, because the presumption under Section 139 is binding
- It has full power to reappreciate the evidence, but will not disturb a reasonable view; the presumption in Sections 118 and 139 means the strict acquittal rule applies with less rigour
- It must remand every acquittal to the trial court for fresh evidence
Answer
(c). The Court applied the "impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable or manifestly illegal" standard from Sanjay Kumar, and added Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel's point that the same rigour cannot be applied to Section 138 cases.