On 10 April 2005 a young wife in a Maharashtra village was found burning in her marital home. She lived five more days and spoke to a doctor, a policeman and a magistrate. The trial court acquitted all four in-laws because her accounts disagreed. The Bombay High Court kept one account, convicted only her mother-in-law of murder, and sent her to prison for life. On 5 November 2026 the Supreme Court set that conviction aside.
Five days, three statements, three versions
- 10 Apr 2005, about 10 a.m. Sunitabai suffers burns; Vishwas Desle (also called Vishwas Patil, a Police Patil) puts out the fire and takes her to the Civil Hospital.
- The same morning The doctor's case papers (Ex.-56) record her naming the mother-in-law, Kamalbai, as the one who poured kerosene.
- Afternoon A police officer records a statement (Ex.-44) and a Special Executive Magistrate another (Ex.-48); the doctor endorses her fitness each time.
- 15 Apr 2005 She dies of septicaemia from burns.
- 28 Sep 2017 The High Court convicts Kamalbai alone.
- 5 Nov 2026 The Supreme Court acquits her.
Ex.-44 and Ex.-48 told a collective story: her husband (A1) and brother-in-law (A4) tied her hands and legs, Kamalbai poured the kerosene and her father-in-law (A2) lit it. Ex.-56 named Kamalbai alone. Her father and a relative said she had given them the collective version in the hospital. All four in-laws were charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, with Sections 498A, 342 and 406 added.
The High Court's route to a lone conviction
The High Court threw out Ex.-44 and Ex.-48 and the oral accounts because they did not match Ex.-56, and then called Ex.-56 truthful. It also relied on the accused's own statement that only Kamalbai was at home, and held that her failure to explain how the victim burned counted against her. The acquittal of the other three stood.
The Supreme Court noted that the High Court never explained why the prosecution's own case, framed in the charge, was not accepted.
What a doctor's note cannot do on its own
Start with the rule the case turns on. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act (now Section 26(1) BSA) makes a dead person's statement about the cause of her death relevant, whether or not she expected to die. Our commentary books list the working rules. A reliable declaration can be the sole basis of a conviction without corroboration. A court must still ask whether she could observe, whether her memory was impaired, whether the statement was early and free of tutoring, and whether it agrees with her other statements. Where there are several declarations at variance, the books say the test of common prudence is to see which one is corroborated by other prosecution evidence, citing Sudhakar v. State of M.P., AIR 2012 SC 3265.
The Court quoted the principles from Abhishek Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 INSC 924, for multiple declarations:
| Principle (Abhishek Sharma) | How it bit in this case |
|---|---|
| Declarations must be voluntary, reliable, and made in a fit state of mind | Burns were about 94 percent per the doctor (PW-7), which the Court treated as a reason to look for corroboration |
| Only material inconsistencies shake credibility | Who lit the fire and whether the limbs were tied differ between the statements; the High Court itself accepted the difference as real |
| Where they conflict, look to other evidence for corroboration | The man who rescued her, Vishwas Desle, was never examined |
| Prefer a statement recorded by a Magistrate or similar officer, if truthful and free of suspicion | The Magistrate's statement (Ex.-48) was the one the High Court discarded |
| Medical fitness and the chance of tutoring by relatives matter most when statements differ | Her father and a relative said she gave them the collective version, which matches the discarded statements |
It is tempting to summarise this case as “a sole uncorroborated declaration cannot convict”. That is too tidy. This was not a case of one declaration standing alone: there were three, and the second and third contradicted the first. The Court said that once the High Court found Ex.-44 and Ex.-48 inconsistent with Ex.-56, it ought to have looked for corroboration of Ex.-56, "especially" with burns of 94 percent, and that without it Ex.-56 could not be the sole basis to reverse an acquittal and convict her alone. The Court did not say that a sole declaration always needs corroboration.
The witness who was not called
Vishwas Desle was the first person at the house, put out the fire, took the victim to hospital and was present when the history was written in Ex.-56. The investigating officer admitted he had recorded his statement under Section 161 CrPC (now Section 180 BNSS). The prosecution gave no reason for not calling him, and the High Court said his absence did not matter. The Supreme Court called him a material witness: he could have confirmed what the victim said first, and he could have proved the partly burnt rope seized from the spot, which would have supported the "hands and legs tied" account in the discarded statements. The Court found the Sessions Judge was right to be troubled by this.
The Court also weighed the ages: the victim was about thirty and the appellant about sixty. A sixty-year-old acting alone against a woman half her age is not impossible, but the Court treated the gap as a relevant factor when an acquittal was being overturned.
Section 34 and the charge nobody framed
The charge was murder by all four "in furtherance of common intention". No independent charge under Section 302 alone was framed against anyone. The High Court got around this by pointing to the defence statement that Kamalbai alone was at home with the victim. The Supreme Court rejected that: the defence was an answer to a joint accusation, and treating it as proof of a solo act would create "a new accusation" she never faced.
It leaned on Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, a four-Judge Bench decision, which our crimes commentary also cites (AIR 1963 SC 1413). Common intention needs a prior concert with one or more others. If three of four accused are acquitted, whether on rejected evidence or reasonable doubt, the fourth cannot be said to have acted jointly with them, unless the evidence shows other persons, named or unnamed, took part. Our chapter on common intention and common object sets out the same rule. Section 34 IPC is now Section 3(5) BNS.
The Court went on to test the evidence independently, saying "notwithstanding" this legal bar. That tells you the order of its reasoning: the charge problem was enough, and the evidence problem independently confirmed it.
Why her silence could not fill the gap
The High Court treated Kamalbai's failure to explain how the victim burned, when she was alone at home, as a major factor against her. The Supreme Court held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act (now Section 109 BSA) operates only after the prosecution has discharged its initial burden. It cited Anees v. State Govt. of NCT, 2024 INSC 368, a three-Judge Bench decision that the section cannot make up the prosecution's inability to produce circumstances pointing to guilt. Our chapter on burden of proof frames special knowledge as operating only on facts truly within the accused's own knowledge.
Here the prosecution had not shown which of its three accounts was true, so there was nothing yet for the accused to explain. A good answer in the mains would add that the section is about facts only the accused can know, such as what happened inside a closed house, but it still starts after the prosecution proves its own case.
A hearing the High Court did not give
The Court also noted that after reversing the acquittal the High Court did not hear her on sentence, as the appellate-powers section of the old Code required (Section 386(a) as the Court cited it, now Section 427 BNSS). It cited Ramkrushna Prahllad Dongardive v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 INSC 1099, for the detail, and added that "nothing much would turn" on it because the conviction was being quashed. Treat it as an observation, not a holding. Our chapter on appeals in criminal cases covers the appellate powers.
What the judgment leaves open
- It does not decide whether a doctor's case-paper entry such as Ex.-56 counts as a dying declaration of equal rank with a Magistrate's, though it quotes the principle preferring a Magistrate's statement when there are inconsistencies.
- It does not say which of the three accounts was true. The acquittal rests on reasonable doubt and the absence of corroboration, not on a finding of innocence.
- Its summary of the exhibits is not fully consistent. One passage refers to the Magistrate's statement as Ex.-48 and to the police statement as Ex.-44, but another repeats Ex.-48 where Ex.-44 is meant. Rely on the Court's reasoning rather than its exhibit numbers when quoting.
- A defence suggestion that a 1.15 p.m. statement, naming no accused, was kept out of the chargesheet was denied by the investigating officer; the Court did not rule on it.
Then and now: the provisions in this case
- Offences: IPC s.302 → BNS s.103(1); s.34 → s.3(5); s.498A → s.85.
- Evidence: IEA s.32(1) → BSA s.26(1); IEA s.106 → BSA s.109.
- Procedure: CrPC s.161 → BNSS s.180; CrPC s.386 → BNSS s.427.
For a one-page summary of the section shifts see our chapter on dying declarations. For judiciary practice, the Maharashtra Judiciary paper tests the old section numbers, so learn both.
Three questions on the three strands
1. A victim of burns makes three dying declarations. The trial court disbelieves all three; the High Court discards two as inconsistent with the third and convicts on the third, which has no other support. The Supreme Court's approach in Kamalbai Waman Patil is that:
- a dying declaration recorded by a doctor can never support a conviction
- a conviction on any dying declaration requires corroboration in every case
- where declarations conflict, the court should look for independent corroboration of the one it relies on, particularly when overturning an acquittal
- the first declaration made always prevails over later ones
Answer
(c) The Court did not lay down a rule for sole declarations. It held that, with inconsistent declarations and heavy burns, the High Court should have sought corroboration, which the unexamined rescuer would have supplied or tested.2. The accused was alone at home with the victim and gave no explanation for her burns. Under Section 109 BSA (earlier Section 106 IEA), as applied in this case:
- the prosecution must first prove facts which, if believed, point to the accused; only then does her silence count against her
- the burden of disproving murder shifts to the accused as soon as she is shown to have been at home
- the section applies only to civil cases
- silence alone is sufficient for conviction if the accused was the only adult present
Answer
(a) Citing Anees, the Court held that the section cannot fill gaps in the prosecution case and applies with care in criminal trials.3. Four accused are charged with murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and no separate charge under Section 302 is framed. Three are acquitted and the High Court convicts the fourth under Section 302 on the defence statement that she alone was at home. Which statement is correct?
- The conviction is valid because Section 302 is wider than Section 34
- The conviction is valid because a defence statement can be used as the only proof of a solo act
- Section 34 IPC corresponds to Section 3(5) BNS, but the conviction is valid as no prejudice is caused
- Section 34 IPC corresponds to Section 3(5) BNS, and the conviction is bad because it creates a new accusation and joint action with acquitted co-accused cannot be inferred