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Earning money from books does not make the National Book Trust private: the Supreme Court reads Article 12 on cumulative control

Registered as a society, partly self-funded, publishing books for a living. None of it displaced a Government that creates the Trust, picks its Chairman and audits its books.

Supreme Court 2026 INSC 1202Decided 6 November 2026Prashant Kumar Mishra and Augustine George Masih, JJ.Constitutional Law · Administrative Law
Editorial geometric scene of a large open book whose pages are held by a hand reaching in from a government building outline, with a row of coins on one side and a thin chain running from the book to the building
Coins from book sales on one side, a chain of control to the Government on the other: the Court weighed the chain. Illustration: Law Mock

The National Book Trust sells books, earns a good part of its income from them, and is registered as a society. It argued that this made it a private body outside Article 12. On 6 November 2026 the Supreme Court said the argument asks the wrong question. A body is not tested by how it earns but by who creates it, who runs it and who checks its accounts. On those facts the Trust is "State" for Part III, and the 2012 Delhi High Court Full Bench stands.

One question, and the Court said what it was not deciding

The judgment opens by saying that, shorn of the factual matrix, the only question is whether the Trust is "State" within Article 12. The appeal had been pending since 2015 against a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court that answered a reference on the point. The judgment does not narrate the employment dispute behind the reference, and a candidate should not invent one. What the Court gives us is the constitutional question and a narrow answer: the Trust is an "other authority", the appeal is dismissed, and no interference is called for.

The bench also marked limits. Publishing books is not, by itself, a sovereign or exclusively governmental function, and not every activity of educational or public utility turns its doer into "State". This is a ruling about structure and control.

The ladder the Court climbed: from Mohan Lal to Pradeep Kumar Biswas

Article 12 lists the Government and Parliament, the State governments and legislatures, and "all local or other authorities". Everything turns on those last words. Our Article 12 chapter records the sequence. First came the idea that "other authorities" must be read like the named bodies. Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal (1967), cited in the judgment, rejected that narrowing. Then Sukhdev Singh (1975) brought in statutory corporations under pervasive control. Then Ramana Dayaram Shetty, a three-judge decision of 1979, asked whether a body is really an instrumentality or agency of the Government. Ajay Hasia (1981, five judges) turned that into indicia, and the Court took care to say they are "merely indicative", to be used with care and caution so that the net does not catch every autonomous body that has some link to Government.

The indicia quoted in the judgment run from State shareholding and funding, through State-conferred monopoly and deep and pervasive control, to functions of public importance. What matters most here is that the form of incorporation is irrelevant. A statutory corporation, a Government company or a registered society can each qualify, because the inquiry is "why it has been brought into existence", not how it was born.

Pradeep Kumar Biswas (2002, seven judges) then tightened the method. The tests are not a rigid checklist; the question is whether, on the cumulative facts, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government, and that control must be particular to the body and pervasive. Merely regulatory control does not make a body "State". That sentence is the engine of the present judgment.

CaseBench (as the judgment records)What it added
Ramana Dayaram Shetty (1979) 3 SCC 4893 judgesInstrumentality or agency of Government can be "State"
Ajay Hasia (1981) 1 SCC 7225 judgesIndicia; form of incorporation not decisive; society can qualify
Pradeep Kumar Biswas (2002) 5 SCC 1117 judgesCumulative test; control must be particular and pervasive; regulation alone is not enough
Zee Telefilms (2005) 4 SCC 649Cited for para 22 to 24A public function in isolation is not enough
Asked before: Odisha Judiciary Mains 2017 (Q1) asked: "The definition of the expression 'The State' in Article 12 has been extended so much that even a private organisation comes in this expression. Discuss." Odisha Judiciary Prelims 2013 (Q2) asked which of Berhampur University Student Union, C.S.I.R., Municipal Corporation of Bhubaneswar and UPSC is not a "State". The student union is the odd one out. CSIR is the body held to be "State" in Pradeep Kumar Biswas itself.

Reading the Trust's own rulebook

The Court's work is largely a close reading of the Memorandum of Association and Rules, in this order.

  • Birth. The Trust was set up under a Government of India resolution of 15 June 1957 and reorganised by another of 28 September 1962. The Court treats its creation as attributable to the Government, for a national purpose, and not as a private initiative later regulated.
  • Chairman. Rule 3 has the Government appoint the Chairman, who holds office at its pleasure (Rules 7 and 13). The Chairman is the chief executive officer and exercises the powers for day-to-day functioning (Rules 48 and 50).
  • Governing body. The Ministries of Education, Finance, and Information and Broadcasting are represented. The Government nominates other members. The Executive Committee under Rule 26 includes ministry representatives, the Finance representative doubling as Financial Adviser, and its non-official members are also Government nominees.
  • Rule-making. The Executive Committee's regulatory power needs previous Government approval (Rule 42), and changes to rules and purposes need approval under Rule 60.
  • Money. Financial matters go to the Financial Adviser (Rule 57), and some disagreements go up to the Ministers of Education and Finance (Rule 51). Accounts follow a form prescribed in consultation with the CAG, who audits with powers like those over Government accounts (Rule 58). Annual reports and audited accounts go to the Government (Rule 59).

The Court did not count a single factor. It counted the whole: creation, composition, the Chairman, finance, audit and approval over the rulebook.

Paragraph 15 therefore says these provisions are not isolated instances of ordinary regulatory supervision. That is the contrast Pradeep Kumar Biswas demands: regulation from outside versus control built into the body.

Why the sale proceeds did not rescue the Trust

The Trust's best argument was financial. Government grants, it said, were only one source of income, and in some years its own receipts were a substantial part of the total. The Full Bench was therefore wrong, it said, to treat grants as conclusive.

The Court accepted that financial assistance is an important but not exclusive factor, and then declined the inference. Income from selling publications "does not, by itself, displace" pervasive Government control found elsewhere in the framework. Financial autonomy in one respect cannot be isolated from the way the body is composed, managed and supervised. The audit and accounting rules showed Government involvement "structurally embedded", not a condition attached to an occasional grant.

In an answer, treat the funding indicium as one input. "The Trust earns revenue, so it is private" uses a factor as if it were the test.

Public function: relevant, but only alongside control

The Trust's objects include good literature at moderate prices, publication of classical Indian literature, translation of Indian and foreign works, book exhibitions and seminars. The Court did not say these make it "State". It cited Zee Telefilms for the point that a public function in isolation is insufficient. The functions matter because they show why the Government created the Trust and shaped it, "not merely incidental activities of a private commercial publisher".

The bench noted later material from the amicus, including the PM-YUVA scheme for young authors, but expressly refused to rest its conclusion on post-2012 developments. It used them only as corroboration that the governmental purpose is not merely historical.

Compare the negative cases our Article 12 chapter lists. In Zee Telefilms the BCCI was held outside Article 12, being a private body not created by statute and not financially or administratively dominated by Government. A private educational institution does not become State merely because it has recognition or affiliation (Unnikrishnan, as noted in the Part III commentary). The Trust is on the other side of the line because Government does not merely recognise or regulate it; Government made it.

What Article 12 status does not give the employees

This is the part likely to be asked. The Trust argued before the Full Bench that "State" status would drag in all the consequences of Government employment. The Court answered in paragraphs 22 and 23. Declaring the Trust "State" does not make it a department of the Government of India, does not make every employee a civil servant, and does not give employees the protections Part XIV gives Government servants. Article 12 has a distinct function for Part III and "no automatic consequence" under Articles 309, 310 or 311. The judgment cites Ajay Hasia (para 12) and Pradeep Kumar Biswas (para 20) for this.

Our notes on services say the same in another setting. A statutory corporation's employees, even if the body is "State" under Article 12, do not hold a civil post under Article 311 merely for that reason (S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 1150), and Article 12's definition does not necessarily apply outside Part III (Dasaratha Rama Rao Gazula v. State of A.P., AIR 1961 SC 564). What does follow is Part III discipline: the Trust's actions can be tested against fundamental rights.

Writ maintainability: separate the two questions

  • Article 12 asks: is the respondent bound by Part III, so that Articles 14, 19 and 21 can be enforced against it?
  • Article 226 asks: is the respondent amenable to a writ at all? That is wider, because the writ can issue "for any other purpose".
  • A body outside Article 12 can still face a writ where it discharges a public duty (Andi Mukta Sadguru Trust v. V.R. Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607), but mandamus will not enforce a purely private contractual obligation (Praga Tools, AIR 1969 SC 1306).
  • For the Trust: once it is "State", a petition under Article 226 against it for breach of Part III is straightforward. The judgment does not decide what service relief an employee may get; it does not say that service rules under Articles 309 to 311 apply.

What the judgment leaves open

It does not decide what relief any employee gets, and it does not revisit Zee Telefilms. It also records that decisions have gone both ways on societies: a society is not automatically "State" merely because it is associated with Government. So apply the case rule by rule, asking whether control is built into the body.

Mains frame: "Is a registered society that earns its own income 'State' under Article 12?"

  • Form is irrelevant: society, company or corporation can each qualify (Ajay Hasia).
  • Method: cumulative, not a checklist; control must be particular and pervasive, not merely regulatory (Pradeep Kumar Biswas).
  • Apply: creation by resolution, Government Chairman and nominees, approval over rules, financial adviser, CAG audit.
  • Answer to income: sale receipts do not displace structural control.
  • Limit: no civil-servant status or Article 311 protection follows.

MCQs on Article 12 and the National Book Trust

1. In Chairman, National Book Trust v. A.R. Abdul Gaffar (2026), the Trust argued that it earns substantial income from book sales and is registered as a society. The Supreme Court held that:
  1. these facts do not displace the pervasive Government control shown by its constitution, composition, finance and audit, so the Trust is "State"
  2. a body that earns most of its income independently cannot be "State"
  3. a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is outside Article 12
  4. publishing is a sovereign function, which alone makes the Trust "State"
Answer

(a). The Court applied the cumulative test. Sale income and society form do not answer the question, and the Court expressly said publishing is not by itself a sovereign function.

2. The Supreme Court held that declaring the National Book Trust "State" under Article 12:
  1. makes its employees holders of civil posts under Article 311
  2. makes the Trust a department of the Government of India
  3. has no automatic consequence under Articles 309, 310 or 311 and does not make its employees civil servants
  4. exempts the Trust from Articles 14 and 21
Answer

(c). Article 12 serves Part III. The Court said it does not make the Trust a Government department or confer on employees the protections available to Government servants under Part XIV.

3. After Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002), which statement about the Ajay Hasia tests is correct?
  1. A body that satisfies any one test is automatically "State"
  2. The tests are not rigid; the question is whether the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by Government, with control that is particular to it and pervasive
  3. Mere regulatory control under a statute is enough to make a body "State"
  4. The tests apply only to statutory corporations, not to societies
Answer

(b). The seven-judge Bench rejected the one-factor shortcut and said regulatory control alone does not make a body "State". Ajay Hasia itself held that a society can qualify.

Source: Supreme Court of India, The Chairman, National Book Trust, India and Another v. A.R. Abdul Gaffar and Others, Civil Appeal No. 14369 of 2015, 2026 INSC 1202, judgment of 6 November 2026 affirming the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court dated 1 June 2012. This explainer is for exam preparation and is not legal advice.

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