On 6 September 1980, in a suit she herself had filed, Dashoda Devi made a statement that Diwan Singh had been in possession of the land and house at Kamnya, near Theog, for ten to twelve years. Twenty-one years later a trial court dismissed Diwan Singh's suit and decreed her counterclaim against him; a District Judge upheld that in 2007. On 5 November 2026 Justice Rakesh Kainthla set both decrees aside and decreed the suit, holding that neither court had weighed her 1980 words.
One field, two stories of how a man came to farm it
Diwan Singh and his co-plaintiffs said the land had fallen to Het Ram in a private partition. Het Ram had no children, the plaintiffs looked after him, and he gave them the land in 1965 for a share of the produce. They claimed to be tenants, and ownership in the alternative by adverse possession, and asked for a declaration that the revenue entries were wrong and an injunction.
Dashoda Devi told a different story. She said Het Ram had four daughters, that she came into possession after his death, and that Diwan Singh volunteered to help her. She gave him Khasra Nos. 460, 461 and 544 (5 bigha 2 biswa) for as long as he served her, and let him live in the house as a licensee. She then terminated the licence orally and counterclaimed for possession.
- 1965 Plaintiffs say Het Ram handed them the land.
- 1975 Het Ram dies (as found by the appellate court).
- 6 Sep 1980 Dashoda Devi's statement in Civil Suit No. 109/1 of 1978: Diwan Singh in possession for 10-12 years (Ext. PB).
- 22 Sep and 7 Dec 1994 Sher Singh (DW4), a defence witness, is cross-examined; the two disputed documents are put to him.
- 20 Nov 2001 / 16 May 2007 Suit dismissed by the Sub Judge, Theog; first appeal dismissed by the District Judge (Forest), Shimla.
- 21 May 2008 Second appeals admitted on two substantial questions of law.
- 5 Nov 2026 Judgment after being reserved on 12 October; both decrees set aside.
The courts below accepted the licence story. They found no proof of the partition, noted a discrepancy about the share of produce, and said the plaintiffs had never claimed anything in Dashoda Devi's earlier suit even though Diwan Singh appeared there as a witness. The appellate court reasoned from one plaintiff witness who had seen the possession for 16-17 years that it began in 1976-77, after Het Ram died.
Why a third hearing on the facts was possible at all
Section 100 CPC gives a second appeal only on a substantial question of law, and the High Court must formulate it. Both questions framed here were really complaints about evidence: that the courts discarded two proved documents merely because they came late, and that they ignored the 1980 statement. Pleaded that way, they fit the exception the judgment collects from a long line of Supreme Court cases, which allows interference where material evidence was not considered or where a finding is perverse.
The Court set out both sides of that line. It can interfere where relevant evidence was ignored, inadmissible evidence was relied on, or the burden of proof was wrongly cast. It cannot interfere because it would have weighed the evidence differently, because equity points the other way, or because the first appellate court did not repeat every reason of the trial court. Our chapter on second appeals states the same two-way rule through Hero Vinoth, which the judgment quotes: a question of law becomes substantial not only when the law is debatable but also when settled law has been ignored.
A finding reached by ignoring relevant material is "perverse", and a perverse finding of fact is open to correction even in second appeal.
That is the working definition for answers. The Court cited Arulvelu for the meaning of perverse and Krishnan v. Backiam for the point that the first appellate court is the last court of fact unless its findings rest on no evidence or are perverse, and then only after a question of law has been framed. Here the question had been framed in 2008, so the argument could not be shut out on that ground.
"Belated" does not describe a document put to the other side's witness
The first substantial question was about the two documents. Ext. DW4/A records that Dashoda Devi, the owner, and her husband Het Ram gave the land and house to Diwan Singh for cultivation, that he had been in possession about ten years and paid half the produce as rent, and that she had no objection to his name in the revenue record. Ext. DW4/B, by Vidya Devi and Begi Devi, who described themselves as co-owners, says much the same and adds that Diwan Singh paid the land revenue.
Both courts refused to read them because they were produced late and not put to Dashoda Devi. The High Court first dealt with lateness. Sher Singh, the scribe, was a defence witness and came to court with his register. The plaintiffs asked to put the documents to him, the request was allowed, and his further cross-examination was deferred to 7 December 1994. He then admitted writing Ext. DW4/A at Dashoda Devi's instance, reading it over to her, and seeing her sign; he said the same of Ext. DW4/B.
The rules that normally require documents with the plaint (Order VII Rule 14) or before issues are settled (Order XIII Rule 1) carve out documents produced for the cross-examination of the other side's witnesses. In Order VII Rule 14(4) the word "plaintiff's" is read as "defendant's" in the light of Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353, as the judgment notes. A document that is ready for the opponent's witness, and then proved through that witness, cannot be called belated. Our chapter on production of documents gives the rules for ordinary cases; the lesson here is for the plaintiff who holds a paper that the defence side will have to deal with.
Does an admission have to be put to the person who made it?
The second ground used by the courts below was that the documents were never put to Dashoda Devi in cross-examination. The Court held that this misunderstands what an admission is. It relied on Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, (1974) 1 SCC 78, which draws a line between a party's own earlier statement and the earlier statement of a witness. For a witness, the previous statement only discredits and must be put to her under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. For a party, an admission that satisfies the Act is substantive evidence, proprio vigore, with no requirement that it be put to the maker. Bharat Singh v. Bhagirath, AIR 1966 SC 405, and Union of India v. Moksh Builders, (1977) 1 SCC 60, were quoted for the same point, the latter adding that an admission need not have been against interest when made.
Two refinements keep this from becoming a shortcut. First, the admission must be proved: here, through the scribe in the case of the documents, and through Dashoda Devi's own acceptance in cross-examination that she made the statement marked in Ext. PB. Second, admissibility is not weight. Quoting Vathsala Manickavasagam v. N. Ganesan, (2013) 9 SCC 152, the Court noted that an admission should be clear, certain and definite, and that once found, the onus shifts to its maker to explain it, failing which it is presumed true. Dashoda Devi offered no such explanation that the judgment records.
| Provision | Evidence Act, 1872 | Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 | Role in this case |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission defined | s.17 | s.15 | The Ext. PB statement and the two documents |
| Proof of admissions against the maker | s.21 | s.19 | Why no confrontation was needed (Bharat Singh read ss.17 and 21) |
| Not conclusive, may estop | s.31 | s.25 | Weight is for the court, and the maker may explain |
| Facts admitted need not be proved | s.58 | s.53 | Formal admissions in pleadings, a different thing |
| Cross-examination on previous statements in writing | s.145 | (renumbered; check the bare Act) | Applies to witnesses, not to a party's admission |
The mapping for sections 17 to 21 and 31 follows our IEA to BSA table, and the chapter on admissions adds that the BSA changed only the wording in this block. Candidates mix up the informal admission (Sections 17 to 21 IEA, proved as evidence) with the formal one (Section 58, which dispenses with proof), and the second is the one behind judgment on admissions under Order XII Rule 6.
Reading a 1980 sentence against a 1975 death
The reason the facts matter is that the appellate court had fixed the start of possession after Het Ram's death in 1975, so that the "tenancy from Het Ram" plea fell. The 1980 statement does not fit that. Ten to twelve years of possession counted back from September 1980 begins around 1968 to 1970, which is before Het Ram died; Ext. DW4/A says the husband and wife had handed the land over together. The Court read the statement as showing possession "before the death of Het Ram" and held that the finding of the courts below was "contrary to the recital" in Ext. DW4/A.
There is an irony the judgment does not spell out. The trial court counted against the plaintiffs that Diwan Singh made no claim in Civil Suit No. 109/1 of 1978, a suit brought by Dashoda Devi in which he gave evidence. Yet it was in that same suit that she made the statement of possession that was then set aside. The court below used the suit for one purpose and passed over what her statement in it said. The High Court called that "excluding relevant evidence which materially affected" the judgments.
Advocates should notice what the Court did not do. It did not prefer the plaintiffs' oral witnesses or re-weigh anyone's credibility. It identified three pieces of documentary and recorded evidence (Ext. DW4/A, Ext. DW4/B, Ext. PB) that two courts had refused to read for reasons the law does not support, and treated the resulting finding on the start and character of possession as vitiated.
What the decree leaves for later readers
Points the judgment does not settle
- Adverse possession was never decided. The plaintiffs pleaded it in the alternative and the Court said nothing on it. The reason is practical: possession that begins under the owner's grant is permissive, which is why such a plea sits uneasily beside a claim to be a tenant. Our chapter on adverse possession under Section 27 covers the requirement that possession be open and hostile.
- The final order is brief. It says the suit "is ordered to be decreed", without specifying which of the declaration and injunction prayers are granted, and without a line on the counterclaim for possession. Read with the two appeals, RSA Nos. 364 and 365, the judgment does not say which attacks which decree.
- No remand and no reference to Section 103. The High Court may itself decide issues of fact in second appeal, as our chapter on second appeals explains; the judgment does not cite the section, but decreeing the suit instead of remanding suggests the Court regarded the record as complete.
- Status and weight. The judgment is marked "No" for reporting, and a single judge applied settled rules. Treat it as a good illustration, not a new authority.
If a question asks for the argument in one paragraph
- Second appeal lies only on a substantial question of law (s.100 CPC); concurrent findings stand unless relevant evidence was ignored, inadmissible evidence was used, or the burden was misplaced.
- Documents produced for cross-examining the opponent's witness are outside the timing rules of Order VII Rule 14 and Order XIII Rule 1.
- A party's admission is substantive evidence; Section 145 IEA governs witnesses, not parties.
- The weight of an admission is for the court, and the maker must explain it.
Three questions to test the point
1. In a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, as the Himachal Pradesh High Court summarised the law in Diwan Singh v. Dashodha, a High Court may disturb concurrent findings of fact when:
- it would have preferred the plaintiff's oral evidence on re-appreciation
- the courts below ignored material evidence, so that the finding is perverse, and a substantial question of law has been framed on it
- the first appellate court did not advert to every reason given by the trial court
- equity favours the appellant, who has farmed the land for years
Answer
(b) Ignoring material evidence or acting on no evidence is a recognised exception. Options (a), (c) and (d) are among the grounds on which the judgment records that interference is not permitted.2. A defendant made a statement in an earlier suit admitting that the plaintiff was in possession of the land. In the present suit the statement was proved but never put to her in cross-examination. Following Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, the statement:
- cannot be read, because Section 145 of the Evidence Act requires it to be put to her
- can be used only to discredit her as a witness, and is not substantive evidence
- can be read only if she herself had entered the witness box
- is substantive evidence against her without being put to her, though it is not conclusive and she may explain it
Answer
(d) A party's admission under the Act is evidence in its own right. Section 145 is for the previous statements of witnesses, used to contradict them. The weight is separate, and the maker must explain it.3. Which row correctly pairs the Evidence Act sections that Bharat Singh v. Bhagirath read together, and the one on admissions being not conclusive, with their Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam counterparts?
- ss.17 and 21 become ss.15 and 17; s.31 becomes s.23
- ss.17 and 21 become ss.16 and 19; s.31 becomes s.26
- ss.17 and 21 become ss.15 and 19; s.31 becomes s.25
- ss.17 and 21 remain unchanged; s.31 becomes s.25