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The 2019 twenty-year POCSO floor could not reach a 2016 offence, but twenty years was still a lawful sentence

The headline says the Delhi High Court trimmed a POCSO sentence because the 2019 amendment did not apply. The judgment is more careful than that: the old range still allowed twenty years, and the cut rests on proportionality.

Delhi High Court CRL.A. 144/2021 (CNR DLHC010141122021)Decided 5 November 2026Madhu Jain, J.POCSO · Constitution · IPC/BNS · CrPC/BNSS
Linocut-style night scene of two wall-calendar leaves, a solid older one with a single circled day and a dashed ghost leaf beside it, above a balance whose low pan holds ten bars while three dashed bars hover over the raised pan
The older calendar leaf sets the weights; the bars the 2019 floor would have added stay off the pan. Illustration: Law Mock

A Special Court convicted a man of aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a girl of eight and sentenced him to twenty years' rigorous imprisonment. On 5 November 2026 Justice Madhu Jain upheld the conviction and brought the sentence down to fifteen years. The headline credits the date of the offence: the offence was in June 2016, so the 2019 amendment's twenty-year minimum was out of reach. That is true, but incomplete. A twenty-year term sat comfortably inside the range that applied in 2016. What the judgment really teaches is how to tell a legality point from a proportionality point.

Twenty years was never illegal in 2016, so what did the Court correct?

Paragraph 57 is short. It says the sentence is governed by Section 6 POCSO "as it stood" on the date of the offence, with a floor of ten years extendable to life, and that the enhancement to twenty years by the 2019 amendment "is inapplicable". Paragraphs 58 to 62 then move to proportionality, citing Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand ((2013) 7 SCC 545), and fix fifteen years as adequate.

Read the two steps together. The first fixes the window, ten years to life. The second picks a point inside that window. Because twenty years lies inside the old window as well as being the new floor, the Court never says the trial court exceeded its power. It does not say the trial court applied the 2019 floor either, and the sentence order quoted in the judgment gives only the convict's family circumstances and clean record as reasons. A tempting inference, that the judge borrowed the new minimum, is not on the record. Do not write it in an answer as if it were.

The date of the offence draws the outer boundaries. Within them, the sentence is a matter of judgment, and an appellate court can recalibrate it.

  • 5 Jun 2016 The offence, as found by the courts below.
  • 15 and 16 Jun 2016 The child tells her mother; the family reaches the police the next day.
  • 16 Aug 2016 Charge framed under Section 6 POCSO.
  • 2019 The POCSO (Amendment) Act raises the floors in Sections 4 and 6.
  • 6 Nov and 10 Dec 2020 Conviction; twenty years' rigorous imprisonment, a fine of Rs. 10,000 and six months' simple imprisonment in default.
  • 28 Oct and 5 Nov 2026 Appeal reserved; decided.

The amendment falls between the offence and the sentence. That gap is why a sentencing court must look backwards for its numbers.

Two floors for the same section number

ProvisionOffence on 5 June 2016Offence after the 2019 amendment
s.4(1) POCSO, penetrative sexual assaultImprisonment of either description, minimum seven years, up to life, and fineMinimum ten years, up to life, and fine
s.4(2) POCSO, child below sixteenDoes not existMinimum twenty years, up to life meaning the remainder of natural life, and fine
s.6 POCSO, aggravated penetrative sexual assaultRigorous imprisonment, minimum ten years, up to life, and fine (as the Court records at para 57)Rigorous imprisonment, minimum twenty years, up to natural life, or death; fine to be just and reasonable and paid to the victim

Three consequences for a 2016 offence follow from the table. The floor under Section 6 is ten, not twenty. Death is not available, because the 2019 amendment introduced it as an outer limit. And if the child's age had not been proved as below twelve, the case would have fallen under Section 4 with a seven-year floor, not Section 6 with a ten-year floor. The exam trap is always the same: the question gives a date, and the candidate answers from the current text.

What Article 20(1) adds, though this judgment never names it

Nowhere does the judgment cite Article 20(1), although the reasoning is its textbook application. The clause has two limbs. The first stops a person being convicted for an act that was not an offence when done. The second stops a penalty heavier than the one the law in force at the time of the offence allowed. The books treat Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1953 SC 404) as the leading case on the second limb. Our Article 20 notes add that the clause targets conviction and sentence, not trial procedure, relying on Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. (AIR 1953 SC 394).

The rule is asymmetric. In Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab (AIR 1965 SC 444) the Supreme Court held that Article 20(1) does not prevent a law that only softens the rigour of an existing criminal law from reaching an accused who is awaiting sentence. So if Parliament had lowered the floor in 2019, a 2016 offender could ask for the benefit. Raising it gives him a shield. This is the pair of rules the headline compresses into "the 2019 minimum does not reach a 2016 offence".

Asked before: Delhi Judiciary Prelims 2018 asked when clause (1) of Article 20 is not violated. Three options described greater punishment applied retrospectively (by a State legislature, by a two-thirds Parliament, or to pending proceedings); the fourth was a procedural law on criminal proceedings passed by simple majority, which is the one that does not offend the clause. Assam Judiciary Prelims 2023 asked what Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab says clause (1) prevents the retrospective operation of: only those criminal laws that operate against the accused's interest. Both turn on the same asymmetry as this case.

Why fifteen: what the Court weighed and what it left unsaid

The reasoning is brief. The Court says a substantial custodial term is warranted by the child's tender age and the nature of the offence, but that satisfactory conduct in custody and the absence of established antecedents merit weight. It balances these against the "unamended" Section 6 framework and lands on fifteen years. It gives no reason why fifteen rather than twelve or eighteen. Counsel's own submission was that the appellant had already served about eleven years including remission (para 18). On that figure, which is counsel's and not the Court's, a fifteen-year term would leave roughly four years, before further remission. The Court does not do this sum or order release, and a mains answer should not.

If you compare this with the Delhi High Court's ruling of 2 November, the contrast is useful. There the Court corrected a sentence of the wrong description and the wrong length. Here the description is not in issue, the length is trimmed, and the judgment's sentencing reasoning is what an examiner will ask you to reproduce. Our earlier piece on that case is about the legality of the kind of imprisonment; this one is about the quantum.

The child's age did double duty

The conviction is under Section 6 only because the victim was below twelve, which brings in the aggravating clause the trial court called Section 5(m). The prosecution proved age with the school's admission register, the admission form and an affidavit by the mother on which the date of birth was entered. The Court asks the questions the Supreme Court did in P. Yuvaprakash v. State (2023 SCC Online SC 846) and Birka Shiva v. State of Telangana (2025 SCC Online SC 1454): who supplied the entry, and can the source be identified? Here it could, and the mother herself testified, so the register was not read in isolation. The result was a finding that the child was about eight, below twelve by a wide margin.

So age is a sentencing fact before it is a trial fact: it decides whether the bracket is Section 4 or Section 6, and so whether the floor is seven years or ten.

Evidence points that the appeal turned on, briefly

Paragraphs 25 to 56 are appreciation of evidence. Four points repay a short note.

  • Variation in a child's account. Differences about events before the assault did not displace her specific account of penetration, and the claim of tutoring had no material behind it (Pradeep v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 777, calls for care, not rejection).
  • Eleven days to the police. The disclosure came when the child complained of pain while being bathed, and the family went to the police next day. The Court applied State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh ((1996) 2 SCC 384): delay in sexual offences is not judged mechanically.
  • No fresh tear, no male DNA profile. The examination was eleven days after the event. The Court cited Radha Krishna Nagesh ((2013) 11 SCC 688) and State of H.P. v. Manga Singh ((2019) 16 SCC 759): absence of injury is not conclusive. A report that no profile could be generated neither identifies nor excludes the appellant, and the Court refuses to treat it as independent proof.
  • The loan defence. It failed on the defence witness's own admission that no repayment was ever demanded.

Which code governs a 2016 offence in 2026

The judgment mentions only the Cr.P.C. and the POCSO Act. Its appeal was filed in 2021 under Section 374(2) CrPC, before the new codes came into force. Our CrPC/BNSS notes state the savings rule at Section 531 BNSS: appeals, trials and inquiries pending immediately before 1 July 2024 continue under the 1973 Code. On the substantive side, the notes record that State amendments to the Penal Code survive through the savings clause in Section 358 BNS. The punishments of 2016 therefore stay frozen even though the code names have changed.

PointOld provisionNew provision
Rape (Penal Code route, not charged here)s.376 IPCs.64 BNS
Rape on a woman under twelves.376AB IPC (inserted 2018)s.65(2) BNS
Appeal from convictions.374(2) CrPCs.415 BNSS
Powers of the appellate courts.386 CrPCs.427 BNSS
Set-off of detention (trial court extended it)s.428 CrPCs.468 BNSS
Cases pending on 1 July 2024CrPC continuess.531 BNSS saving

What the judgment leaves open

  • It never names Article 20(1), cites no authority for the date-of-offence rule, and does not say whether the trial court had applied the amended floor.
  • It does not explain why fifteen years rather than another figure inside the old window.
  • Its operative paragraphs deal only with the term, the fine and the default term. The trial court's compensation direction and set-off order are not discussed.
  • It does not address whether time already spent in custody, with remission, is to be counted in any particular way.

Mains frame: "An offence under Section 6 POCSO was committed in 2016. The trial court sentences in 2020 to twenty years. Can the High Court reduce it?"

  • Window: law at the time of the offence, ten years to life; the 2019 floor and the death penalty cannot be applied (Article 20(1), second limb).
  • Not illegal per se: twenty years lies inside that window, so the interference is on proportionality, not on a legal defect.
  • Factors: child's age and gravity against custody conduct and absence of antecedents (Gopal Singh).
  • Procedure: appeal under Section 374(2) CrPC survives under Section 531 BNSS; appellate power under Section 386 CrPC (Section 427 BNSS).

MCQs on the law of the day of the offence

1. A person is convicted under Section 6 POCSO for an offence committed on 5 June 2016. Which statement is correct?
  1. The minimum is twenty years because the law in force at the time of sentencing applies
  2. The minimum is seven years because the offender had no antecedents
  3. The death penalty is available because the child was below twelve
  4. The applicable range is ten years to life; the 2019 floor of twenty years and the death penalty cannot be applied, although a twenty-year term would still lie inside the range
Answer

(d). The law in force at the time of the offence sets the limits (Article 20(1)). Twenty years was lawful as a term, but not as a minimum.

2. In Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab the Supreme Court held that clause (1) of Article 20 does not prevent the retrospective operation of:
  1. a law that merely mollifies the rigour of an existing criminal law
  2. a law that enhances the minimum sentence for an offence already committed
  3. a law that creates a new offence for earlier conduct
  4. any criminal law passed by a two-thirds majority in Parliament
Answer

(a). The clause bars retrospective creation of offences and enhancement of penalty. A softer law may be applied to an accused awaiting sentence.

3. A criminal appeal under Section 374(2) CrPC was filed in 2021 and remained pending on 1 July 2024. The appeal is disposed of:
  1. under Section 415 BNSS only, because the appeal is heard after the BNSS came into force
  2. under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam
  3. under the Cr.P.C., 1973, by virtue of the savings clause in Section 531 BNSS
  4. afresh, after the appellant re-files under the BNSS
Answer

(c). Section 531 BNSS saves appeals pending immediately before 1 July 2024 under the 1973 Code.

Source: High Court of Delhi, Navratan v. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., CRL.A. 144/2021 with CRL.M.(BAIL) 348/2021, judgment of Madhu Jain J. dated 5 November 2026 (reserved 28 October 2026); appeal under s.374(2) CrPC against the conviction of 6 November 2020 and sentence order of 10 December 2020 of the Special Court (POCSO), Saket. This explainer is for exam preparation and is not legal advice.

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