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A film that rides on a cricketer's fame can be held to account without being pulled from cinemas: Delhi HC on Sourav Ganguly and Doosra

A fictional girl, a real captain and a shirt waved from a balcony. Justice Tejas Karia had to decide whether a story built around archival footage and a famous name is storytelling or trade, and what an interim order can sensibly do once the film is already in cinemas.

Delhi HC CS(COMM) 1156/2026Decided 6 November 2026Tejas Karia, J.CPC · Specific Relief · Constitution · IPR
Two-colour linocut in deep red and cream of a shirt tied to a raised cricket bat over a balcony rail, with a clapperboard, a film strip and stumps around a red sun, no faces
The shirt on the bat, the clapperboard beside it: a real celebration borrowed by a film. Illustration: Law Mock

The film is called Doosra. Its heroine, Tara, grows up in a small town, wrestles with family expectations and her own identity, and finds courage in a cricket victory. The victory is real, so is the captain, and on 6 November 2026 the Delhi High Court held that this is not an innocent borrowing. Justice Tejas Karia found, prima facie, that Sourav Ganguly's persona was being used to draw audiences. He did not pull the film from cinemas. He chose a middle order: disclaimers within two days, a ₹2 crore bank guarantee within two weeks, and a full restraint if either is missed.

One reel, two stories running side by side

  • 2017 to 2019 The producer and her husband approach Ganguly for an interview. On 6 June 2018 his manager replies that a documentary and a biopic on the same man will not sit easily together. A teaser follows in June 2019.
  • 5 Aug 2021 Ganguly signs a life-rights agreement with the second plaintiff for an authorised biopic. The plaintiffs plead a fixed consideration of ₹25 crore plus box-office shares.
  • 8 Jul 2026 First-look poster of the biopic, with a proposed release on 14 May 2027.
  • 12 and 15 Oct 2026 Trailer of Doosra released; the film is certified.
  • 17 to 23 Oct 2026 Legal notice, suit (21 Oct), and a theatrical release on 23 Oct. The same day the Court issues notice and orders the film to be screened for it.
  • 6 Nov 2026 Order on the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC.

The judge watched the film, the teaser and the trailer, and read the sealed biopic manuscript. His reading was that Doosra is really two narratives: Tara's fictional journey, and a second thread following Ganguly's career from his early international years to the NatWest final at Lord's in 2002. The thread that matters is the join. Tara's family talk about him, and the film keeps returning to his setbacks, his attitude and the shirt-waving celebration as the lever that moves her story. Ganguly, in other words, is less background than engine.

A licence for footage is not a licence for a face

The defence leaned on a stack of licences from the BCCI, the ICC and broadcasters for the archival clips. The Court separated two questions that lawyers often blur. A copyright owner can permit a clip to be used; only the person in the frame can permit his name, image and standing to be turned into commercial pull. The licences, the judge noted, were confined to the footage and carved out personal rights, so they could not be read as Ganguly's consent.

The 2017 to 2019 emails fared no better. They showed knowledge of a project, not authority for its eventual form, and the manager's 2018 note on the biopic overlap pointed away from consent.

Four minutes against a whole film: why the stopwatch lost

The producers stressed that the licensed footage of Ganguly runs for about four minutes. The plaintiffs counted 25 to 27 seconds of a 2 minute 12 second trailer. The Court declined to make screen time the test. What counts is the job the persona does: whether it is merely part of an account of cricket history or whether its recognition and goodwill are used to build interest in the fiction and in its marketing. Nothing in Tara's arc needed this victory, since Indian cricket has many.

Identifiable, valid, and used to attract the audience: the Court asked how the persona was used, not how long it was on screen.

The framework came from decisions of the Delhi, Bombay and Madras High Courts. It adopted the two elements in Titan Industries: an enforceable right in the persona, and identifiability from the defendant's use. The producers conceded that the right exists, so the contest was about infringement. They argued, citing D.M. Entertainment, that some form of endorsement or association is needed. The Court did not require a false endorsement; it asked whether the commercial value of fame was being drawn on without authority. Shivaji Rao Gaikwad, where a film trading on a star's name was restrained although it was not a biopic, supplied the nearest analogy.

Where does Article 21 sit in a suit between two private parties?

Be precise about what the judgment says. It does not decide the case on Article 21. It quotes Chitra Jagjit Singh for the idea that the right of publicity grew out of the right of privacy but is a separate, proprietary interest, and it describes personality rights as protected under common law. When the defence invoked R. Rajagopal, the Court agreed that privacy no longer shields what is already public record, and then answered that Ganguly's complaint was not about secrecy at all. It was about who gets to turn his public record into revenue.

That is the exam-safe way to hold the topic: privacy explains where the right came from, publicity explains what is protected, and a civil court can enforce it against a private film company through a suit and an application for interim relief. Passing off is the familiar cousin (goodwill, misrepresentation, damage). The Madras case the Court quoted pleaded it alongside personality rights, but this order rests on personality and publicity rights and decides nothing on passing off.

Asked before: Delhi Judiciary Mains 2022 (Q11) set a passing-off suit in which the defendant pleaded delay, acquiescence and estoppel on four years of use, and asked whether an injunction should issue. Delhi Judiciary Mains 2019 (Q6) asked candidates to enumerate the principles for grant of a temporary injunction and quote the relevant provision. This case sits where both questions meet.

The artistic-work defence, and why it did not carry the day

Justice Karia did not wave away free expression. He accepted that fiction may draw on history and public figures, that placing a story beside real events is not by itself infringement, and that the commercial nature of a film does not defeat the defence. The line he drew runs between using a person as part of a historical account and using his recognition and appeal to attract an audience. Where the second purpose is evident, the Court held, invoking expression does not justify taking the economic value.

The judgment names no Article of Part III. The balancing is done inside a civil suit, through the nature, manner and purpose of the use. Whether the same facts count as legitimate artistic freedom at trial is what paragraph 72 leaves open, since the Court expresses no view on the merits.

Delay: the teaser did not start the clock

The producers called the suit nine years late and relied on John Hart Jr. v. Mukul Deora to say damages are the answer. The Court looked at what each piece of promotion revealed. The teaser, which carried an interview clip of Ganguly and presented a story of Indian cricket through a girl's eyes, gave no hint of a film centred on him. The trailer and the film did. Ganguly gave notice five days after the trailer and sued four days after that. The Court also found the seven-year gap before release, ending right after the biopic's date was announced, a fact that tells against the producers on intent.

A film already in cinemas: an order that is neither refusal nor ban

The application asked for a restraint on exhibition in every medium. Here is how the Order XXXIX analysis ran. The prima facie case was found for Ganguly. On balance of convenience, the Court held that since the film had already been released, public viewing should not be stopped at this stage. The judgment does not use the label irreparable injury as a separate heading; it records that the exploitation damaged his personality and impaired his ability to decide whether and how his persona is commercially used, which is the loss money does not easily measure.

Three further choices shaped the order. First, scene-by-scene excision was refused as unworkable, because the persona is woven into how the two narratives are combined, and editing the film would mean a court restructuring the artwork. Second, the Court prescribed a disclaimer in English and Hindi, shown for five seconds after the existing disclaimer at the start and two seconds at the end, saying the film is not meant to infringe Ganguly's personality rights and that use of his name is not his consent and remains sub judice. Third, one or more of the first six defendants must furnish an unconditional ₹2 crore bank guarantee in favour of the Registrar General within two weeks.

What is actually restrained. Paragraph 71 states the restraint as the consequence of default. If the disclaimer or the guarantee is not in place in time, the defendants are restrained from exhibiting, streaming and licensing the film anywhere, and from circulating trailers, teasers, posters, clips and other promotional material, including the 12 October trailer, that commercially appropriates Ganguly's name, image, likeness, persona or distinctive celebration. Read the order closely before repeating the common summary that promotional material has simply been stopped.

The text of the CPC explains why a court may fashion such terms. Rule 2 of Order XXXIX covers a suit to restrain breach of contract "or other injury of any kind", and Rule 2(2) lets the court grant the injunction on terms about duration, keeping an account, giving security or otherwise. The judgment does not cite that sub-rule for the guarantee, so treat the link as our reading of the provision and not as the Court's reasoning. Section 37(1) of the Specific Relief Act sends temporary injunctions to the CPC in any case, so a student who knows the trinity and Rule 2 can reconstruct the order from first principles.

What remains open

  • The suit is untried. Whether Ganguly will get a permanent injunction or damages, and how a trial court weighs artistic freedom against the persona, is undecided.
  • The second plaintiff's life-rights agreement was not the basis of the order; the producers say the plaintiffs conceded it was irrelevant to this application.
  • The bank guarantee is security, not a measure of damages, and the judgment does not say how it would be applied at the end of the suit.

1. A producer licenses archival cricket footage from the copyright owners and then uses it in a film. On the approach of the Delhi High Court in Sourav Ganguly v. Masha Sajdeh, which statement is correct?

  1. The licences amount to the player's consent to commercial use of his persona
  2. Earlier correspondence about a documentary interview amounts to authority for any later film
  3. Permission to use the footage and authority to commercially exploit the player's identity are separate questions, so the licences alone do not answer the personality-rights claim
  4. A player has no publicity right in footage of a public sporting event
Answer(c) The licences came from copyright owners and left out personal rights. Option (b) is wrong because knowledge of a project is not authorisation for its final use, and option (d) is wrong because the Court held that the right exists and was not disputed.

2. Which best describes the interim order passed on the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC?

  1. The film may continue in cinemas subject to disclaimers within two days and a ₹2 crore bank guarantee within two weeks, with a restraint taking effect on default
  2. The film's exhibition in all media was restrained at once
  3. The Court directed deletion of the scenes listed in the plaintiffs' table
  4. The application was refused and the plaintiffs were left to claim damages
Answer(a) The Court found a prima facie case but, because the film was already released, did not stop public viewing. Option (c) is wrong because it held excision unworkable and not permissible by judicial direction.

3. Which statement on temporary injunctions is correct?

  1. A temporary injunction can be granted only by the decree at the final hearing
  2. For a celebrity plaintiff the tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury are dispensed with
  3. Order XXXIX Rule 2 CPC applies only to breach of contract and not to other injuries
  4. Section 37(1) of the Specific Relief Act sends temporary injunctions to the CPC, and Order XXXIX Rule 2(2) lets the court attach terms such as giving security
Answer(d) A perpetual injunction needs a decree under Section 37(2), and a temporary one can be granted at any stage. Rule 2 covers "breach of contract or other injury of any kind", and the tests are not waived for any plaintiff.

Source: High Court of Delhi, Sourav Ganguly & Anr. v. Masha Sajdeh & Ors., CS(COMM) 1156/2026, I.A. 29441/2026 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, reserved 2 November 2026, decided 6 November 2026, Tejas Karia J.. This explainer is for exam preparation and is not legal advice.

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