On 1 May 2025 a Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court refused to suspend a sentence and, in the same order, wrote several paragraphs about the trial judge: that she had used "cut, copy and paste", left the writing to a stenographer, and perhaps did not deserve to remain in service. He sent the order to the judicial academy and told the Registrar General to place it in her confidential report. On 2 November 2026 the Supreme Court set those paragraphs aside. The reason was not that the officer had been right about every line of her judgment, but that nobody had asked her.
An order about a sentence that became an order about a judge
The officer, a district judge sitting as a Special Judge for POCSO cases, had tried two accused from one FIR in separate trials, since Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice Act bars a joint proceeding of a child in conflict with law and an adult. She delivered two judgments on the same day, each imposing twenty years. Some evidence details from one trial slipped into the other judgment. The child's appeal came before the High Court with an application to suspend the sentence. The Single Judge rejected it on merits, then went further. Our notes cover the separate-trial rule; for this article the identity of the accused and the offence do not matter, and the judgment itself keeps the officer's name masked.
- 20 Jan 2024 Two separate judgments delivered on one day, one per trial.
- 1 May 2025 High Court refuses suspension of sentence; paragraphs 9 to 11 criticise the officer; paragraphs 17 and 18 direct training and a note in her ACR "after obtaining her comments".
- 2 Nov 2026 Supreme Court expunges paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 17 and 18.
The High Court's paragraph 8 only recorded that the two judgments were passed together and that the other trial had 17 prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court did not touch that factual note. What fell were the inferences drawn from it.
What the officer said when she finally spoke
The appeal to the Supreme Court was her first chance to explain, and the Court read her explanation as credible. The witnesses and the evidence in the two trials were almost the same, so the facts were "intricately intermingled". The single stenographer of the Special Court was on leave, so she dictated part of the judgment straight to a clerk on the computer and the rest to the stenographer on his return. The wrong serial numbers of prosecution witnesses were typographical slips that changed neither the outcome nor the substance. Special POCSO courts also work with thin staff under a statutory push for quick disposal.
A reader may ask why this matters if the High Court was only speaking in a bail-stage order. The answer is that the High Court's own premise, that she handed the writing to a clerk, was a finding of fact about conduct. It was reached without the person who knew the facts. The Court said it could not "subscribe" to the High Court's view that she acted in dereliction of duty.
Two separate wrongs in the same order
The judgment can be read as two distinct faults, and mains answers should keep them apart.
The procedural fault. The strictures were recorded on the judicial side, with no show-cause and no chance to explain, which the Court called a breach of audi alteram partem. This is the ordinary rule that an adverse order affecting a person's standing needs notice first. Our chapter on natural justice traces how Kraipak and Maneka Gandhi took the rule to every decision with civil consequences; here the consequence is on a career, not a property right, and the Court said so in terms: such remarks can destroy a judicial officer's career and chill the whole district judiciary.
The substantive fault. The Court held that even if some error had occurred, the High Court should have been magnanimous. Calling an officer a shirker for typographical slips that did not touch the result was "avoidable". So the remarks failed on merits too, which is why the Court did not simply send the matter back for a hearing. It expunged them.
Remarks that criticise a judgment are one thing; remarks that condemn the judge are another. The first belongs to an appeal order, the second needs a hearing and an administrative file.
The line between correcting a judgment and condemning the judge
The Court's authorities all sit on one side of that line. It relied on Kaushal Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1473), which in turn drew on In Re: 'K', A Judicial Officer ((2001) 3 SCC 54) and Sonu Agnihotri v. Chandra Shekhar (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3382). As the judgment summarises them, High Courts should ordinarily avoid strictures on judicial officers while deciding matters on the judicial side. A court may criticise an erroneous order. It should not comment on an officer's personal conduct or calibre without giving her a chance to explain. Concerns about conduct go to the Chief Justice on the administrative side. We report these only as the judgment describes them; the judgment is our source for their holdings.
The newest link is Shuvendu Saha v. State of West Bengal (2026 INSC 367). The Court noted its direction that where the situation warrants, comments on the merits or quality of a judge's judgment should go into a remark slip, placed before the administrative judge or the Chief Justice for follow-up. That is the working answer to every "what should the High Court have done?" question: not silence, but a different channel.
| If the High Court is unhappy with a trial judgment | Judicial side | Administrative side |
|---|---|---|
| Wrong law or finding | Correct it in the appeal or revision order, in measured language | Nothing needed |
| Doubt about the officer's diligence or quality | No strictures; no direction about her record | Remark slip to the administrative judge or Chief Justice; officer gets a chance to explain |
| Grave misconduct | Not the forum | Disciplinary control under Article 235, with the service rules and Article 311 where punishment is in view |
Why "control" under Article 235 points to the administrative side
Article 235 vests "control" over district courts and the courts below them in the High Court. The commentary in our law books reads "control" widely: general superintendence of the working of the subordinate courts, disciplinary control over presiding officers, transfer, confirmation and promotion (Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu, AIR 1979 SC 193, as quoted there). It also records that control means exclusive, not dual, control, and that it includes the duty to guide, advise and encourage subordinate judges to work "independently, fearlessly and objectively" (Anil Kumar Vithal Shete v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 12 SCC 148). The Supreme Court used almost the same vocabulary for Article 227, saying superintendence should "guide, strengthen and nurture" the district judiciary.
The text of Article 235 also carries a limit. Nothing in it authorises the High Court to deal with a judicial officer "otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service". An ACR entry ordered inside a bail order sidesteps the ordinary service process, where the officer sees the entry and can represent against it. The High Court's own paragraph 18 asked for her comments, but only after the stricture had already been written. That order of events is the heart of the matter: a hearing that follows the adverse finding does not cure it.
Our chapter on the State judiciary and subordinate courts places Articles 227, 233 and 235 side by side. One point from the books helps with exam framing: the commentary says exercise of power under Article 235 is not justiciable unless some other provision is violated. Here that "other provision" was the natural-justice limb of Articles 14 and 21 and the officer's service conditions, which is why a High Court's Article 235 power is wide but not unreviewable.
The judgment-writing lesson the High Court was reaching for
It would be wrong to read this ruling as saying that how a judge writes does not matter. The High Court was right that a judgment should be the judge's own work, and the Supreme Court did not hold otherwise. In the criminal context the content of a judgment is governed by Section 393 BNSS (earlier Section 354 CrPC), which requires the points for determination, the decision and the reasons. Once signed, a judgment can be altered only for clerical or arithmetical errors under Section 403 BNSS (earlier Section 362 CrPC). Our chapter on judgment form and contents lists both. This is why a mixed-up serial number in a signed judgment cannot simply be corrected by the trial judge later, and why the appellate court has to deal with it.
The true ruling is narrower and more useful. A misplaced paragraph is a defect in a judgment that the appellate court can cure while hearing the appeal. It does not, without more, show want of diligence, and it never shows that without hearing the author. The Court accepted the officer's account that the slips were bona fide and did not alter the outcome.
What the judgment leaves open
Three points are not decided. First, the Court did not hold that a High Court can never mention an officer's work in a judicial order; it said such comments should "ordinarily" be avoided and that the right course is the remark slip. Second, it did not decide whether the conviction was sound; the criminal appeal against the child's conviction was a separate matter. Third, it sent a copy of its judgment to the Registrar General so that it reaches the Chief Justice, which is itself an administrative-side step.
1. A High Court, while refusing a suspension of sentence, records strictures on the trial judge and directs a note in her ACR without calling for her explanation. According to the Supreme Court in the Rajasthan judicial-officer case, the strictures:
- stand, because Article 227 allows any remark in a judicial order
- cannot be sustained, because they breach audi alteram partem and should have gone on the administrative side
- stand, because the officer could later make a representation to the Registrar General
- fall only because the conviction was set aside
Answer
(b) The remarks were recorded without any opportunity to explain. The appropriate course was a remark slip before the administrative judge or the Chief Justice. A later chance to comment does not cure an adverse finding already recorded.2. Where a High Court has concerns about the quality of a subordinate judge's judgment but no misconduct is alleged, the course approved in Shuvendu Saha, as relied on in this judgment, is to:
- record the concern in the appellate order so the officer learns from it
- direct the judicial academy to hold training for that officer
- ask the Registrar General to place the order in her ACR
- record the observations in a remark slip placed before the administrative judge or the Chief Justice
Answer
(d) The remark slip routes the concern to the administrative side, where the officer can be heard before any consequence follows. Options (a) to (c) are exactly the steps the Court set aside here.3. Which statement about the High Court's powers over the district judiciary is correct?
- Control over a person already appointed as District Judge lies with the High Court under Article 235, even though appointment is by the Governor under Article 233
- Control under Article 235 is shared equally between the High Court and the State Government
- Article 227 lets a High Court punish a judicial officer by dismissal on its own order
- Article 235 control extends only to posting and leave