The prosecution's case under Section 306 IPC rested on four postcards said to have been written by a husband to the wife who had left him. A Jaipur court gave him ten years' rigorous imprisonment and the Rajasthan High Court agreed. On 3 November 2026 the Supreme Court acquitted him, for two separate reasons: the prosecution had not properly proved he wrote the letters, and even if he had, the letters did not instigate anything.
Four postcards, a delayed complaint and a silent inquest
- 1996 The couple marry; they have a son.
- February 2009 The wife leaves the matrimonial home and lives with her parents. She files an FIR under Sections 498A, 406 and 323 IPC and takes proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act.
- 18 January 2011 She dies at her parents' home, more than two years after leaving.
- 2 February 2011 Her mother files a complaint; a Magistrate sends it for investigation and an FIR under Section 306 follows.
- 9 December 2016 Conviction and ten years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 50,000.
- 11 May 2017 / 3 November 2026 High Court dismisses the appeal; Supreme Court acquits.
We keep the wife anonymous here; the law reports name her, and nothing in the exam point needs it. The Court noted what the early record did not say. The hospital case history, given by a relative, spoke of a sudden fire when she was alone. The inquest statements of her father and brother recorded death by burning without a word suggesting suicide, and the complaint came fifteen days later. The defence produced police-control entries pointing to a short circuit or a gas cylinder.
The Court did not decide whether the death was an accident, and neither will we. It rested on the one piece of evidence the prosecution called "palpable": the four postcards, Exhibits P-16 to P-19.
Who wrote them? An expert nobody cross-examined
The investigating officer took no specimen of the husband's handwriting. The expert compared the postcards with an application said to have been handed over at his arrest and with a pocket diary produced by his brother. The Court's point was simple: an expert's opinion is only as good as the standard writing it compares against, and nobody had proved the husband wrote those standards.
Then came the bigger gap. The prosecution never examined the expert. The Court said handwriting comparison "is not a perfect science", so its report must be tested in cross-examination, and a handwriting expert's report is not one of the reports Section 293 CrPC (now Section 329 BNSS) lets a court read without calling the author. It relied on Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210, and on Patel Babubhai Manohardas v. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 503, which in turn collects Shashi Kumar Banerjee, Murari Lal and Keshav Dutt. Our chapter on expert and opinion evidence covers the statutory side: Section 45 IEA is Section 39 BSA, and the non-expert who knows the writing is Section 41 BSA.
Silence in the Section 313 statement is not proof
The lower courts had also reasoned that the husband never specifically denied writing the letters when examined under Section 313 CrPC (now Section 351 BNSS). The Court would not have it: the prosecution "must stand on its own legs", and a failure to deny cannot stand in for proof of an incriminating circumstance. The statement has to be read as a whole. The husband's own account was that he had neither met nor spoken to his wife for three years, which is hard to square with a trail of letters but does not prove they were his.
Even if he wrote them: what abuse mixed with pleading adds up to
Having removed the foundation, the Court still tested the letters on the footing that they were his. It had read them. They contained abuse, derogatory remarks and threats, but also repeated appeals to the wife to withdraw the pending cases and live with him. They also showed anxiety about the effect of the litigation on the family and the couple's son, and an urging to keep away from lawyers, doctors and police. Read whole, the Court said, they showed an attempt to pressure her into abandoning the cases and returning.
The letters "by themselves cannot be construed to be the instigating material which was the immediate cause" for the act.
That sentence is the exam answer. A wife who had left more than two years earlier and was pursuing her own cases was not someone whose life the letters had made unlivable overnight. Her father and brother did not say she was disturbed by the letters; her mother's claim that she was shocked was called "a sheer exaggeration", and the family never mentioned the letters at the inquest.
What Section 107 and Section 108 BNS ask for
The judgment applies Sections 306 and 107 IPC without setting out a list of cases on instigation. The tests below come from the books and notes, not from this ruling, and the Court did not cite them. Our chapter on abetment gives the frame: abetment is instigating, conspiring with an act, or intentionally aiding, under Section 45 BNS (IPC 107), and abetment of suicide is Section 108 BNS (IPC 306), punishable with up to ten years and fine.
| Element | What the books say | Where Goverdhan fell short |
|---|---|---|
| A suicide, not an accident | The death must be shown to be suicidal before abetment is reached (Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana, AIR 1989 SC 378, in Ratan Lal) | Contemporaneous police entries and the inquest pointed elsewhere; the Court did not rule on this |
| Instigation with intent | Mens rea is the necessary companion of instigation (Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh; Chitresh Kumar Chopra) | The letters mixed threats with appeals to reconcile; no intent to push her to die was shown |
| A live link to the act | "Live or proximate link" between the accused's act and the suicide (M. Mohan v. State, AIR 2011 SC 1238) | Separation of more than two years; no reliable link between the letters' timing and the death |
| Sustained incitement | Contiguity, continuity, culpability and complicity (Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2017 SC 74) | Only four postcards, with no reliable evidence tying their delivery or contents to the death |
The one proximity passage the Court itself quoted comes from inside Patel Babubhai: even on the footing that the note was genuine, no act of incitement proximate to the suicide was attributed to the accused. The Court did not cite Sanju v. State of M.P., AIR 2002 SC 1998 (a "go and die" remark does not by itself instigate), but our note on abetment treats it as controlling on the limits of the word.
Why the seven-year presumption never came into play
Many answers on this topic jump straight to Section 113A IEA (Section 117 BSA), the presumption of abetment where a married woman kills herself within seven years of marriage after cruelty by her husband or his relatives. The judgment does not mention it, and on its dates it could not apply: the marriage was in November 1996 and the death in January 2011, about fourteen years later. Our chapter on statutory presumptions sets out the conditions. The consequence is the one the prosecution met: with no presumption, instigation had to be proved the ordinary way.
Ratan Lal adds that even where the presumption is open, the prosecution must still prove cruelty in the Section 498A sense. That is why the next point mattered.
The charge nobody framed
The Court noted that no charge under Section 498A IPC (now Section 85 BNS) had been framed. If the letters were so cruel that they drove her to end her life, it said, a cruelty charge was "essential". The point is practical: the cruelty offence is where harassment of a wife is measured, and a Section 306 conviction that leans on harassment alone sits oddly beside the absence of that charge. Our chapter on offences against women explains that the two can be charged together and carry separate punishments.
Delay, inquest and the missing live link
The Court's reading of the witnesses is a model of how to attack causation. The father never said his daughter was disturbed by letters. The brother offered a general suggestion of depression without naming any letter. The mother spoke of shock, and the Court called that an exaggeration. Fifteen days passed before the complaint, with no explanation. If the family had believed the letters had broken her, the inquest was the place to say so. For a mains answer, list these as the ordinary tools for testing an "instigation" case: who said what, when, and at the first opportunity.
What the judgment leaves open
- It never decides whether the death was suicide, even though the early record spoke of an accident. An answer should not say the Court "held it was suicide".
- It applies Sections 306 and 107 IPC without restating the instigation cases or Section 113A IEA. Treat Sanju, Ramesh Kumar and Gurcharan Singh as the books' authorities, not as this ruling's.
- Threatening language was found in the letters, yet the Court did not consider whether it might support a different offence; it was dealing with abetment only.
Then and now: the provisions in this case
- Offences: IPC s.107 → BNS s.45; s.306 → s.108; s.498A → s.85.
- Procedure: CrPC s.293 → BNSS s.329; s.313 → s.351.
- Evidence: IEA s.45 → BSA s.39; s.113A → BSA s.117.
Three questions on proof, mapping and the presumption
1. In Goverdhan v. State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court held that a prosecution which relies on a handwriting expert's report to prove who wrote disputed letters:
- should examine the expert in court so that the opinion can be tested in cross-examination, since such a report is not within Section 293 CrPC (Section 329 BNSS)
- need not examine the expert if the accused does not specifically deny authorship under Section 313 CrPC
- may rely on the report alone, because the accused did not take a formal objection
- may rely on the report if the investigating officer has obtained a specimen at the time of arrest, without more
Answer
(a) The Court said comparison is not a perfect science and the report must be proved by examining the expert. Options (b) and (c) are rejected because silence under Section 313 does not discharge the prosecution's burden, and option (d) ignores the requirement of testing the opinion.2. Which of the following correctly maps the provisions at issue from the old criminal laws to the new?
- IPC s.107 → BNS s.108; IPC s.306 → BNS s.45; CrPC s.313 → BNSS s.329
- IPC s.107 → BNS s.45; IPC s.306 → BNS s.85; CrPC s.293 → BNSS s.351
- IPC s.107 → BNS s.46; IPC s.306 → BNS s.108; CrPC s.313 → BNSS s.329
- IPC s.107 → BNS s.45; IPC s.306 → BNS s.108; CrPC s.293 → BNSS s.329
Answer
(d) Section 45 BNS defines abetment, Section 108 BNS punishes abetment of suicide, and Section 329 BNSS is the old Section 293 CrPC. Section 313 CrPC is now Section 351 BNSS, and Section 46 BNS defines "abettor", as our abetment chapter records.3. A married woman, living apart from her husband, dies fourteen years after her marriage. The prosecution alleges that he abetted her suicide by letters. Which statement is correct?
- The court must presume abetment under Section 113A IEA (Section 117 BSA) once the husband is shown to have written the letters
- The presumption is not available because the death was more than seven years after the marriage, so instigation must be proved
- The presumption is available if cruelty is proved, whatever the length of the marriage
- A conviction under Section 306 IPC cannot be sustained unless a charge under Section 498A has also been framed