A civil suit is pending, and one side is tired of waiting. It goes to the police station instead. The Station House Officer calls the other side in, keeps them there for hours, and hints that a settlement or a payment would end the trouble. Eight sets of petitioners told the Andhra Pradesh High Court that this was happening to them. On 4 November 2026 Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam disposed of all eight writ petitions by one order, and its central sentence is short: the police have no jurisdiction to adjudicate or determine the civil rights of parties.
Eight petitions, one complaint: a summons with no crime behind it
The disputes were familiar ones: money advanced, a settlement deed, a fish-tank holding, a strip of farmland. What they shared was the allegation that the police had stepped in on one side.
| W.P. No. (2026) | Underlying dispute | What the petitioners complained of |
|---|---|---|
| 24281 | Settlement deed of 7 March 2026; O.S. No. 569 of 2026 pending | Two petitioners called to the I Town station in Nellore and made to stay, pressed to compromise or pay |
| 16790 | Alleged money transaction, no crime registered | A police notice of 16 June 2026 calling the petitioner to the station |
| 29172 | Civil dispute in Kurnool, no crime registered | Repeated summoning to the III Town station |
| 23291 | Dispute with a couple in Visakhapatnam | Called to the Commissionerate's pre-litigation cell and threatened to pay |
| 23031 | Two FIRs (170 of 2024, 21 of 2026) already registered | Detained for hours and pressed to pay or register land, despite complying with notices |
| 22898 | 32 acres of fish-tank land; O.S. No. 58 of 2025 on part | Police and revenue officials said to be helping private parties take possession |
| 23670 | Land of 31 cents in Tirupati district | Attempted dispossession with machinery, and a prayer for a departmental inquiry |
The State's reply was brief. The Assistant Government Pleader denied that anyone had been called and said the police would not interfere in civil disputes unless a crime for a cognizable offence was registered. He then read out the Director General of Police's instructions on land disputes, No. 76/DGP's Peshi/2025 of 24 October 2025. The private respondents said crimes lay behind the quarrels but did not dispute that civil suits were pending. The Court framed one question: do the police have any power to interfere with or determine civil rights, especially while the dispute is before a civil court or statutory forum?
Notice what the order does not do. It records the State's denial and makes no finding that anyone was in fact summoned. It answers the legal question and directs conduct for the future. That is why the directions are phrased in general terms.
The DGP's own circular had already drawn the line
The circular the order reproduces tells every unit to handle land disputes on two tracks. The first is preventive: work with the Executive Magistrate so that prohibitory orders issue quickly, bind over the parties where needed, and have the CI or SDPO supervise the ground. The second is criminal: where intent or violence is evident, such as trespass, cheating, forgery, assault or conspiracy, register the case and investigate promptly. Between the two sits the key instruction: in title disputes the police should not take sides, ownership and possession belong to the civil courts and revenue authorities, and police action becomes mandatory only where public peace, life or property is threatened or a crime arises.
The circular says preventive proceedings are to be taken "under BNS". The peace-bond and preventive-action provisions are in the BNSS, so read that phrase as loose drafting (see the preventive action chapter and the chapter on security for keeping the peace).
Direction (ii) of the order tells the police to follow this circular "stricto sensu". Our reading is that an administrative instruction now has a court's direction behind it, though the order does not discuss that consequence.
Two doors, and the police may open only one
A purely civil dispute gives the police nothing to do. A dispute that discloses a crime gives them a duty, not a discretion. The order draws on the Andhra Pradesh High Court's own earlier rulings, J. Lakshmi v. Commissioner of Police (2004) and G.B.C. Raj Gopal v. Government of A.P. (2014), to say that the police role in a criminal case ends with registering and investigating. J. Lakshmi adds that even where a land quarrel is pending in a civil court and could grow into a law-and-order problem, the police may take it up only after registering a crime.
| What reaches the police | What they may do | Code anchor |
|---|---|---|
| Information of a cognizable offence | Register it, investigate, report to the court | s.154 CrPC, now s.173 BNSS; police report s.173 CrPC, now s.193 BNSS |
| A money or title quarrel, no offence disclosed | Nothing adjudicatory; tell the parties to go to court | Order, paras 10, 20 and 22 |
| A possession dispute likely to cause breach of peace | Alert the Executive Magistrate; keep order | s.145 CrPC, now s.164 BNSS |
| A person whose evidence is needed in a registered case | Require attendance by notice under the Code | s.160 CrPC, now s.179 BNSS; s.41A CrPC, now s.35(3) BNSS |
The last row matters for the petitioners' grievance. Both attendance provisions sit in the part of the Code on investigating offences. A station house officer who calls someone in to talk about a loan, with no registered case, is not using either of them. One mapping trap: s.179 BNSS lowers the protected age in its proviso from sixty-five to sixty.
Where a quarrel is criminal, and where it is only a debt
The order is no shield for a defaulter, because direction (iv) lets the police proceed if they make out a cognizable offence. The circular names the offences that matter in land and money fights. Cheating is s.318 BNS, criminal breach of trust is s.316 BNS, and criminal trespass is s.329 BNS (the old ss.415 to 420, 405 to 409 and 441 IPC, as the mapping chapters in the cheating notes show).
The test that separates them from a debt is intention. The IPC commentary in our library records the Supreme Court declining to infer cheating where a seller of property failed to mention a pending partition suit but nothing showed a dishonest intention at the start of the negotiation. A promise broken later is a breach of contract; one made with no intention of keeping it is cheating. Pending civil litigation does not stop the police from registering an offence. What it removes is the officer's claim to decide who owns the land.
Why the magistrate's possession power does not help the station house officer
Section 164 BNSS (s.145 CrPC, with no change in substance) is the one place the Code lets an executive authority look at who holds disputed land. The Executive Magistrate, not the police, decides who was in actual possession on the date of the preliminary order, and does not decide title.
The Court then cites Mohd. Abid v. Ravi Naresh (2022) for the proposition that once a civil court is seized of the same property, the s.145/146 proceedings cannot continue in parallel, and Mohd Shakir v. State of U.P. (2022) for the rule that even when dropping the proceeding the Magistrate must not comment on the parties' rights. On that footing the order says that executive magisterial powers become "very minimal" once a civil court has the dispute. That is softer than Mohd. Abid; our chapter on ss.164 to 167 BNSS notes that a pending suit alone is no bar if a breach of peace is genuinely feared, provided any civil injunction is respected. In an answer, state the settled core: possession only, never title.
If a High Court may not ask for payment, a police officer certainly may not
The sharpest authority in the order is Shailesh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. (2025). A High Court had asked an accused to go to mediation and pay Rs. 25,00,000 to the complainant as a condition for dealing with his quashing petition. The Supreme Court asked why a court should help a complainant recover a sum due. It said the court should either hold that no offence is disclosed or hold that no case for quashing exists, and that recovery belongs to the civil or commercial court, to arbitration or to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. The part the Andhra Pradesh High Court leans on is the plain statement that money cannot be recovered in a civil dispute by lodging an FIR and seeking police help, which the Supreme Court called an abuse of process of law.
If a constitutional court cannot make a money payment a price of relief, a police station cannot make it a price of peace.
A writ against high-handedness, and the work Article 21 did
The petitions invoked Articles 14, 19(1), 21 and, in the land cases, 300A. The order rests first on the principle that judicial power comes only from the Constitution or a statute and cannot be assumed by another authority. The Article 21 link is made through Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand (2026), cited for the point that executive discretion affecting liberty must be fair, rational and non-arbitrary and cannot stay uncanalised. The order does not give a separate ruling on Article 300A or Article 19(1). Our Article 21 chapter and the chapter on writs explain why mandamus under Article 226 is the natural remedy when an officer acts without legal authority.
Behind the Article 226 remedy sits Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which civil courts try every suit of a civil nature unless a statute bars it expressly or by necessary implication. The civil court can do what the police cannot: grant a temporary injunction against dispossession and enforce it, including through Order XXXIX Rule 2A, which deals with disobedience of an injunction. The chapters on civil court jurisdiction and temporary injunctions cover the two powers. The order adds that with about 166 police per lakh of population against the 222 the United Nations recommends, diverting officers to non-police work harms policing itself.
What the order leaves unanswered
- It does not find that any petitioner was called or detained. The State denied it, and the directions are general, framed as "without legal cause".
- The Tirupati petitioners asked for a departmental inquiry against the SHO, and no such direction was made. The order closes with no costs and no compensation.
- The Nandyal petitioner already faced two FIRs and had answered notices. Direction (iv) leaves the police free to proceed on any cognizable offence, and the order does not separately address pressure to pay inside a registered case.
- It does not say whether the DGP's circular binds as a statutory instrument or what follows if the police ignore the directions.
- It is a single-judge order. It binds the parties and the police in these petitions and will persuade, rather than bind, other benches of the High Court.
- The police may settle the matter if both parties give their consent in writing
- The police may decide possession of the property as an interim measure
- The police have no power to determine civil rights, but must register and investigate if a cognizable offence is disclosed
- The police may act only after the civil court gives permission
Answer
(c). The police role is limited to preventing breaches of peace and to registering and investigating cognizable offences. Adjudicating a civil right belongs to the civil courts.
- the title of the parties to the property
- who was in actual possession on the date of the preliminary order, subject to what a competent civil court later decides
- whether the police officer's version of the dispute is correct
- the compensation payable for wrongful dispossession
Answer
(b). The Magistrate looks to actual possession, never to title, and the order yields to the civil court.
- s.154 CrPC and s.173 BNSS; s.145 CrPC and s.164 BNSS; s.160 CrPC and s.179 BNSS
- s.154 CrPC and s.164 BNSS; s.145 CrPC and s.173 BNSS; s.160 CrPC and s.179 BNSS
- s.154 CrPC and s.173 BNSS; s.145 CrPC and s.179 BNSS; s.160 CrPC and s.164 BNSS
- s.154 CrPC and s.179 BNSS; s.145 CrPC and s.164 BNSS; s.160 CrPC and s.173 BNSS
Answer
(a). Information in cognizable cases moved to s.173 BNSS, land disputes likely to breach the peace to s.164, and the power to require attendance of witnesses to s.179.