Offences Relating to Religion

Sections 298 to 302 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — re-enacting Sections 295 to 298 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 with one significant addition — protect the religious sensibilities of every class of citizens. The chapter is short (five sections), but it sits at the busiest junction in the entire Code: every prosecution under it raises a constitutional question, every conviction is appealed, and every acquittal is debated outside the courtroom. The drafting principle the original Law Commissioners articulated remains the operative one — every person should be at liberty to profess his own religion, and no person should be permitted to insult the religion of another.

The chapter must be read alongside the constitutional protections in Articles 19(1)(a), 25 and 26, the procedural sanction requirement in Section 218 BNSS (previously Section 196(1) CrPC), and the parallel offence of promoting enmity between classes under Section 196 BNS (previously Section 153A IPC). For the exam aspirant, the most heavily examined provision is Section 299 BNS (the relabelled Section 295A IPC) — its constitutional validity, its mens rea threshold, and the BNS innovation of "or through electronic means".

Statutory anchor and scheme

The chapter has a clear five-fold structure. Section 298 BNS (previously Section 295 IPC) penalises injuring or defiling a place of worship or any sacred object. Section 299 BNS (previously Section 295A IPC) penalises deliberate and malicious insults to the religion or religious beliefs of any class of citizens. Section 300 BNS (previously Section 296 IPC) penalises voluntary disturbance to a religious assembly. Section 301 BNS (previously Section 297 IPC) penalises trespass on burial places and indignities offered to a corpse. Section 302 BNS (previously Section 298 IPC) penalises uttering words or making gestures with the deliberate intention of wounding religious feelings.

Three observations frame the chapter. First, the mens rea threshold rises across the sequence — knowledge or intention in Section 298, deliberate and malicious intention in Section 299, voluntariness in Section 300, intention or knowledge in Section 301, and deliberate intention in Section 302. Second, the BNS has carried over the case-law inheritance verbatim, with one drafting addition — "or through electronic means" — inserted in Section 299 BNS. Third, the general exceptions of Sections 14 to 44 BNS apply, but the courts have read them narrowly in this chapter: bona fide religious discussion is preserved through the substantive ingredients of "deliberate" and "malicious", not through external defences.

Defiling a place of worship — Section 298 BNS

Section 298 BNS (previously Section 295 IPC) penalises any person who destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by a class of persons, with the intention of insulting their religion or with the knowledge that the act is likely to be regarded as such an insult. Punishment is imprisonment up to two years, or fine, or both.

Three ingredients matter. First, the act must be destruction, damage or defilement. "Defilement" is not confined to making an object materially unclean — Sivakoti Swami (1885) holds that the term extends to acts that render the object ritually impure. Second, the object must be a place of worship or a sacred object. The Supreme Court in Veerabadran v. Ramaswami (AIR 1958 SC 1032) held that an object, however trivial in itself, qualifies if it is regarded as sacred by any class of persons; actual worship of the object is not required. Third, there must be a class of persons — and "class" requires a principle of classification, not a random group (Benarashi Lal, 1956).

The case law on "object" is restrictive in one direction. Imam Ali (1887, FB) — and the line of authority following it — holds that "object" refers only to inanimate objects. The killing of a cow within sight of a public road frequented by Hindus is therefore not punishable under Section 298 BNS, even though the act may be capable of wounding religious feelings under Section 302 BNS. Romesh Chunder Sannyal v. Hiru Mondal applied the same logic to the killing of a bull dedicated and set at large on a Hindu ceremonial occasion.

The mens rea is alternative — intention or knowledge. The lighter "knowledge" prong matters in cases where the accused acts in mixed motive (e.g., commercial gain coupled with foreseeable insult). DP Titus v. LW Lyall (1981) — where a Christian pastor used part of a church for a charitable nursery — held that purely secular use by a co-religionist does not amount to insult.

Deliberate and malicious insult — Section 299 BNS

Section 299 BNS (previously Section 295A IPC) is the most litigated provision in the chapter. It penalises any person who, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words spoken or written, or by signs or visible representations or otherwise — including through electronic means, insults or attempts to insult the religion or religious beliefs of that class. The BNS addition of "or through electronic means" closes a long-running gap that the IPC formulation had left open in the era of online speech and social media.

The provision was inserted into the IPC by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1927 in response to the Lahore High Court's 1927 ruling that no offence then lay under Section 153A IPC for indecent comments on a deceased religious leader. The Allahabad High Court had taken a contrary view in Kali Charan Sharma v. Emperor (AIR 1927 All 649). The Legislature stepped in, and Section 295A IPC — now Section 299 BNS — was the result.

The constitutional validity of the provision was settled by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in 1957 (the Ramji Lal ruling, AIR 1957 SC 620), holding that the section falls within the public-order ground of restriction in Article 19(2). The rule has held since: the section is not a general bar on religious discussion; it penalises only the aggravated form of insult perpetrated with deliberate and malicious intention. Insults offered unwittingly, carelessly, or in the heat of controversy fall outside the section.

The five-element test

The Calcutta High Court in Sujato Bhadra v. State of West Bengal (2006) crystallised the ingredients into five elements: (i) by written words (or, after the BNS addition, by spoken or written words, signs, visible representations or electronic means); (ii) with deliberate and malicious intention; (iii) of outraging religious feelings; (iv) of any class of citizens of India; (v) insulting or attempting to insult the religion or religious beliefs of that class. The Bombay High Court in R. V. Bhasin v. State of Maharashtra (2012, FB) — the book-ban case on a polemical text — applied the same five-element formulation.

The Supreme Court reiterated the position in Mahendra Singh Dhoni v. Yerraguntla Shyamsundar (AIR 2017 SC 2392), quashing a complaint against a celebrity cricketer over a magazine cover photograph. The judgment underlines that the section does not penalise every act capable of insult; it penalises only insults perpetrated with the deliberate-and-malicious dual intent.

Malice, manner and the publication-as-a-whole rule

Malice is rarely capable of direct proof. The courts have long held that, where the offending conduct is voluntary and without lawful excuse, malice may be presumed (Khalil Ahamad, AIR 1960 All 715, SB). The Calcutta line in Chandanmal Chopra (1986) and Nand Kishore Singh (1985, Patna SB) requires the offending publication to be read as a whole — isolated passages picked out of context cannot, without more, sustain a conviction. The truth of the offending allegation is not a defence (Henry Rodrigues, 1962). Section 218 BNSS (previously Section 196(1) CrPC) requires prior sanction of the appropriate Government before a court takes cognizance — a procedural safeguard reflecting the political sensitivity of the offence and connecting the chapter to the wider procedural-law treatment of offences against public justice.

Disturbing religious assembly — Section 300 BNS

Section 300 BNS (previously Section 296 IPC) penalises any person who voluntarily causes disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies. Punishment is imprisonment up to one year, or fine, or both.

Three ingredients are operative — a voluntary disturbance, an assembly engaged in religious worship or ceremony, and the assembly being lawfully engaged in such worship. The Madras Full Bench in Vijiaraghava Chariar (1903, FB) explained the protective core: the section secures freedom from molestation when persons meet for religious acts in a quiet spot exclusively reserved for the assembly, but does not extend to worship in an unquiet, public thoroughfare.

The cases on inter-sect disturbance are illuminating. Ata-Ullah v. Azim-Ullah (1889, FB) held that a Muslim of one sect pronouncing the word amin loudly in a mosque is not committing an offence under Section 300 BNS, even if other sects are disturbed — bona fide worship does not become disturbance because of inter-sect difference. Jangu v. Ahmadullah (1889, FB) restated the rule. Mohamud Khan (1948, Nag) held that a religious procession does not lose its character merely because the music is temporarily stopped in front of a mosque — the section penalises wilful disturbance, not the lawful exercise of competing religious rights. The definitions clause in Section 2 BNS supplies the meaning of "voluntarily" — a person causes a result voluntarily when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it or knew at the time to be likely to cause it.

Trespass on burial places — Section 301 BNS

Section 301 BNS (previously Section 297 IPC) extends the chapter's protection to places of sepulchre, places set apart for the performance of funeral rites, depositories for the remains of the dead, and human corpses. The conduct is wide — committing trespass, offering indignity to a corpse, or causing disturbance to persons assembled for funeral ceremonies. The mens rea is intention or knowledge of likelihood, on either of two limbs (wounding feelings or insulting religion).

"Trespass" in this section is not confined to criminal trespass as defined in Section 329 BNS (previously Section 441 IPC) — it includes any unlawful entry made with the intention or knowledge specified in the section (Sanoo v. State, 1941). The section therefore catches conduct that would not otherwise meet the threshold of criminal trespass. Maqsud Husain (1923, All) — sexual conduct inside a mosque — illustrates the section's reach. Subramania v. Venkata (1883) extended the section to obstruction of obsequies; Ghosita v. Kalka (1885) excluded a Muharram procession from the meaning of "funeral ceremony".

"Indignity" to a corpse is not statutorily defined. Surdarshan Kumar v. Gangacharan Dubey (1999) treats indignity as conduct that is spiteful, humiliating or disgraceful — and emphasises that the assessment is contextual: the same act may not amount to indignity in one setting yet may in another, depending on the surrounding circumstances and the actor's intention. The chapter's connection with the wider offences affecting the human body arises here when the alleged indignity is coupled with concealment of evidence of an underlying death.

Wounding religious feelings by words or gestures — Section 302 BNS

Section 302 BNS (previously Section 298 IPC) penalises any person who, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person, utters words or makes sounds in that person's hearing, makes gestures in his sight, or places objects in his sight. The provision is the chapter's residual mens-rea-heavy offence — every element keys off the actor's deliberate intention to wound the religious feelings of an identifiable person.

The original Law Commissioners explained the drafting balance the section seeks to maintain: "a warm expression dropped in the heat of controversy, or an argument urged by a person, not for the purpose of insulting and annoying the professors of a different creed, but in good faith for the purpose of vindicating his own, will not fall under the definition contained in this clause". The provision therefore preserves bona fide religious discussion while penalising deliberate provocation.

Two doctrinal points are worth noting. First, Shalibhadra Shah (1981, Guj) held that Section 298 IPC — now Section 302 BNS — does not apply to a written article; it is confined to oral utterances, sounds, gestures or objects placed in the person's sight. Written matter falls within the wider Section 299 BNS. Second, malicious intention must either be shown to exist or be apparent from the nature of the act (Mudassir Ullah Khan v. State of UP, 2013).

The cases illustrate the boundary. Narasimha v. Shree Krishna (1892) — interpolation of a forbidden chant in an authorised ritual — was held to be within the section. Rahman v. State (1893) — exhibiting cow's flesh in an uncovered state, carried round a village, with intention to wound the feelings of Hindus — was within the section. Sheikh Amjad v. State (1942) — a private slaughter at dawn, witnessed only because two Hindus happened to walk by — was held not within the section, the deliberate-intention element being absent.

The BNS innovation — electronic means

The single doctrinal change in the BNS chapter is the addition of "or through electronic means" to Section 299 BNS. The phrase resolves a long-running tension between Section 295A IPC and the offences in the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Supreme Court had, before the BNS, indicated that online insults to religion were covered by the IPC formulation read with Section 79 of the IT Act and the intermediary rules; the BNS now puts the matter beyond doubt by drafting the electronic-means rider into the substantive offence.

The change matters in three ways. First, it eliminates the argument that purely-online insult falls outside the section's "words spoken or written" formulation. Second, it brings the substantive offence into alignment with Section 196 BNS (promotion of enmity) and Section 197 BNS (imputations prejudicial to national integration), both of which already carried electronic-means language. Third, it strengthens the procedural side — the BNSS investigation regime for electronic evidence applies fully to Section 299 BNS prosecutions, including the Section 27 BSA / Section 65B IEA equivalents for certification of electronic records.

Procedural side and constitutional balance

Three procedural features of the chapter deserve attention. First, prior sanction under Section 218 BNSS (previously Section 196(1) CrPC) is required for cognizance of offences under Section 299 BNS. The Himachal Pradesh High Court in Acharya Rajneesh v. Naval Thakur (1990) quashed proceedings instituted without sanction. Second, the State Government has the power to forfeit a publication under Section 96 BNSS (previously Section 95 CrPC) where it appears to contain matter the publication of which is punishable under Section 299 BNS — a power upheld in Baragur Ramchandrappa v. State of Karnataka (1998, FB). Third, in Andhra Pradesh, Sections 299 and 302 BNS have been made cognizable by state notification under Section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 — a state-specific deviation candidates should remember.

The constitutional balance is the chapter's animating tension. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the chapter falls within the Article 19(2) ground of public order, and that the deliberate-and-malicious mens rea is the mechanism that keeps bona fide religious discussion outside the section. A useful comparative exercise — popular in mains questions — is to read Section 299 BNS alongside Section 196 BNS (promotion of enmity, previously Section 153A IPC) and the offence on imputations prejudicial to national integration. The sections form an overlapping scheme that connects to the wider chapter on offences against public tranquillity.

Sentencing pattern

The chapter's sentencing scheme is graduated. Section 298 BNS — two years; Section 299 BNS — three years; Sections 300, 301 and 302 BNS — one year each. Fines are alternatives or in addition. The Supreme Court has not laid down a deterrent rule for these offences in the way it has for motor-accident cases under hurt and grievous hurt, but High Courts have, where the offending conduct produces public-order disruption, declined the benefit of probation. Where the offence overlaps with abetment — for example, an editor who publishes the offending article on the instigation of a third party — the abettor is liable for the same punishment as the principal under Section 49 BNS.

Selected leading authorities

The constitutional-validity line: the 1957 Ramji Lal ruling is the source authority; Henry Rodrigues (1962) extended the validity reasoning to the Article 25(1) challenge. The mens-rea-threshold line: Mahendra Singh Dhoni (2017) and R. V. Bhasin (2012, FB) are the modern restatements. The publication-as-a-whole rule: Chandanmal Chopra (1986) and Nand Kishore Singh (1985). The defilement-of-place line: Veerabadran (1958) on triviality of the sacred object; Imam Ali (1887, FB) on the inanimate-object restriction. The disturbance line: Vijiaraghava Chariar (1903, FB) on the protective core. The trespass-on-burial line: Maqsud Husain (1923) and Surdarshan Kumar (1999). The deliberate-intention line: Shalibhadra Shah (1981) on the oral-only confinement of Section 302 BNS.

Exam angle

Three lines of question recur. First, the constitutional-validity arc — candidates must be able to trace it from the 1927 amendment, through the 1957 Constitution Bench, to the 2017 Dhoni quashing. Second, the mens rea distinction across the five sections — knowledge or intention in Section 298, deliberate and malicious intention in Section 299, voluntariness in Section 300, intention or knowledge in Section 301, and deliberate intention in Section 302. Third, the BNS addition of "or through electronic means" in Section 299 BNS — examiners are increasingly asking candidates to identify the BNS innovations and their practical effect. Procedural questions (sanction under Section 218 BNSS, state notifications making the offence cognizable, forfeiture of publications) are also frequent. Candidates writing answers on Section 299 BNS should always read the publication "as a whole" and should never confuse the section with the parallel criminal conspiracy or hate-speech offences under Section 196 BNS — the doctrinal lines, while related, are distinct, and the connection back to the broader offences against the State is best read alongside the public-order chapter.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between Section 298 BNS and Section 302 BNS?

Section 298 BNS (previously Section 295 IPC) penalises destruction, damage or defilement of a place of worship or sacred object, with intention or knowledge that the act will be regarded as an insult to a class of persons. Section 302 BNS (previously Section 298 IPC) penalises words spoken, sounds made, gestures or objects placed in the sight or hearing of a particular person, with the deliberate intention of wounding that person's religious feelings. The first protects places and objects; the second protects individual sensibilities. The first allows the lighter knowledge prong; the second requires deliberate intention.

Is Section 299 BNS constitutionally valid given Article 19(1)(a)?

Yes. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 295A IPC — now Section 299 BNS — in 1957, holding that it falls within the public-order ground of restriction in Article 19(2). The rule has held since. The provision does not impose a general bar on religious discussion; it penalises only the aggravated form of insult perpetrated with deliberate and malicious intention. Insults offered unwittingly, carelessly, or in the heat of bona fide controversy fall outside the section.

Does Section 299 BNS now cover online insults to religion?

Yes. The BNS adds "or through electronic means" to the actus reus of Section 299 BNS — closing the long-running gap that the Section 295A IPC formulation had left in the era of social media. The phrase resolves the earlier tension with Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 by drafting the electronic-means rider directly into the substantive offence. Standard BNSS rules on certification of electronic evidence apply to such prosecutions.

Is sanction required to prosecute under Section 299 BNS?

Yes. Section 218 BNSS (previously Section 196(1) CrPC) requires prior sanction of the appropriate Government before a court can take cognizance of an offence under Section 299 BNS. Acharya Rajneesh v. Naval Thakur (1990) quashed proceedings for want of sanction. The procedural safeguard reflects the political sensitivity of the offence — without sanction, the offence cannot be prosecuted, and any cognizance taken without sanction is vitiated.

Does the killing of a sacred animal attract Section 298 BNS?

No, not directly. The Allahabad Full Bench in Imam Ali (1887) — and the line of authority that follows it — holds that the word "object" in Section 298 BNS refers only to inanimate objects. The killing of a cow within sight of a public road frequented by Hindus is therefore not punishable under Section 298 BNS. It may, however, attract Section 302 BNS if the killing is done with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of a particular person; the doctrinal line was traced in Rahman v. State (1893).