On 1 August 2026 a Special Judge framed UAPA charges against Sachin Waze, the police officer accused in the Antilia explosives and Mansukh Hiran murder case. On 29 September the same judge granted him bail. On 5 November a Bombay High Court Division Bench quashed that order, held that the statutory bar in Section 43D(5) of the UAPA “operates with full force”, and told the trial court to prioritise the trial instead.
Fifty-nine days between a charge and a bail order
- 13 Mar 2021 NIA, which took over three linked FIRs, arrests Waze; UAPA sections are added to the IPC counts.
- 16 Sep 2023 First regular bail refused on merits during investigation.
- 6 Mar 2026 His habeas corpus petition is dismissed; discharge is refused on 15 July.
- 1 Aug 2026 Charges framed, including UAPA ss.16, 18 and 20.
- 7 Aug 2026 A Division Bench closes his time-barred appeal against the 2023 refusal (778 days late) and lets him apply afresh.
- 29 Sep 2026 Special Judge grants bail.
- 5 Nov 2026 High Court allows the NIA's appeal and sets the order aside.
The prosecution case is that Waze, then an Assistant Police Inspector in the Mumbai Crime Intelligence Unit, took a friend's Scorpio, had its plates swapped, parked it near the Ambani residence with twenty gelatin sticks and a threat note, staged a claim by a terror group, and then had the vehicle's owner killed when he refused to take the blame. Three FIRs (theft, explosives, murder) now form one NIA case, and the trial court has found them “intricately and intrinsically interlinked”.
What the proviso to s.43D(5) asks, and what it does not
Section 43D(5) does two things. It requires the Public Prosecutor to be heard on any bail plea for an offence under Chapters IV or VI of the UAPA, and its proviso then forbids release if the court, on the case diary or the final report under Section 173 CrPC (now Section 193 BNSS), finds reasonable grounds to believe the accusation is prima facie true. The word is “shall not”, in contrast to the “may be released” of Section 437 CrPC (Section 480 BNSS).
The Bench set out the authorities that give the proviso its content. NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali reads “prima facie true” as meaning that the investigating agency's material must prevail unless contradicted, taken as a whole and not piece by piece, without questioning admissibility at this stage. Gurwinder Singh, as reproduced in the judgment, breaks that into eight propositions, one of which matters most here: once charges are framed, a very strong suspicion is presumed to exist, and the accused has an “arduous task” showing that the material still fails the bail test. Vernon pulls the other way, asking for a “surface-analysis” of probative value, and the Bench quoted it too.
| Stage | Question the court asks | Where the accused stands |
|---|---|---|
| Framing of charge (s.227/228 CrPC, now ss.250/251 BNSS) | Is there ground for presuming the offence, a strong suspicion? | Higher threshold for the prosecution |
| UAPA bail (s.43D(5) proviso) | Are there reasonable grounds to believe the accusation is prima facie true? | Lighter satisfaction than for a charge, per Watali para 23 |
| Ordinary bail (s.439 CrPC, now s.483 BNSS) | Gravity, evidence, flight, tampering, repetition, standing of the accused | Discretion; the Watali list of eight factors |
The table shows why the Special Judge's central reasoning collapsed. He held that charge-framing needs a lower degree of satisfaction than refusing bail, and that material enough for a charge was “not sufficient” to deny bail. The Bench called this “absolute legal perversity”: it reverses the ladder in Watali, and on a UAPA case where charges had just been framed on the same material, the threshold was in effect already crossed.
The proviso is satisfied by the material in the report, not by the absence of a victim's statement or a witness the judge finds unimpressive.
Terror, a family and gelatin sticks without a detonator
The nine reasons the trial court gave were mostly about Section 15, the definition of a terrorist act. It said no statement from the Ambani family showed they were terrorised, that the sticks without a detonator or fuse were “useless”, that “economic security” in Section 15 reaches only counterfeit currency, and that a single family is not a “section of the people”. The NIA's answers, set out in the judgment, are the useful part for students.
- Section 15 is disjunctive: an act done with intent to threaten, or likely to threaten, unity, integrity, security, economic security or sovereignty, or with intent to strike terror, or likely to strike terror, in the people or any section of them. “Likely” makes the test partly objective, so a recorded fear of the target is not an ingredient.
- Section 15(1)(a) lists “bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances” and the forensic report called the sticks explosives; the counterfeit-currency clause is one limb among several, not a definition of economic security.
- Section 18 punishes conspiracy and preparatory acts. Quoting Union of India v. Barakathullah (2024 INSC 452), the Bench noted that Section 18 does not require a terrorist act under Section 15 to be made out. A deficit on Section 15 therefore does not clear the bar.
On the facts, the Bench found “various ingredients of a terrorist act” evident, including prima facie material of an act likely to threaten economic security and to strike terror. It relied on the explosives with a threat note naming the family, and on a Telegram post in the name of Jaish-ul-Hind that the group publicly disowned. Notice what it did not do: it did not give a final ruling on whether one family can be a “section of the people”. It stayed at the level the proviso allows, material that looks true at first sight.
The links between accused and act came from statements the Bench read in full, some from sealed-cover or truncated copies. KW-1, under Section 164 CrPC (Section 183 BNSS), described driving behind the Scorpio on Carmichael Road and the plate swap; others described the SIM cards, a hotel room booked on a false identity, and DVRs dumped in the Mithi River. One reading is that this answers the Watali-versus-Vernon tension: a bail court under Section 43D(5) does read the statements, and an eyewitness account recorded before a Magistrate has plain probative weight even on a surface look. This is our inference, not the Bench's own.
The August order was not a licence to start again
The Special Judge treated the Division Bench's 7 August order as the reason for his own, remarking that he would have refused bail at the threshold. The High Court rejected that reading. The August order only closed an appeal that could not proceed, noted that investigation was over and charges framed, and directed a decision “on merit” and “in accordance with law”. It did not decide that Waze deserved bail, and it did not tell the judge to ignore the material that had supported refusal in 2023.
The Bench leaned on Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra: an accused may apply repeatedly, but a court hearing a later application must consider why the earlier one was refused. Our notes on bail record the same rule from the Orissa High Court, that a later bail plea allowed on the same facts without any intervening circumstance is liable to be cancelled under Section 439(2) CrPC. Here the only real change was that charges had been framed, a change that strengthens the prosecution.
Setting aside a bail order is not cancelling bail
This is the doctrinal point examiners are most likely to take. The NIA came by appeal under Section 21 of the NIA Act, not by an application to cancel under Section 439(2) CrPC (now Section 483 BNSS). The two routes ask different questions.
| Cancelling bail already granted | Appeal against the grant itself | |
|---|---|---|
| Question | Has the accused's conduct since release made liberty unsafe? | Was the order legally sustainable when made? |
| Typical grounds | Tampering, intimidation, abuse of liberty, flight, supervening circumstances (State v. Sanjay Gandhi) | Irrelevant material, non-application of mind, ignoring a statutory bar (Subodh Kumar Yadav v. State of Bihar) |
| Effect | Review of a decision already made | The order is quashed; release never stood on good law |
The Bench never asked whether Waze had misused his freedom. It held that the bail order failed the first test and that the trial court had “a complete go-bye” with the settled parameters. It also took the unusual step of describing the order's tone in detail, quoting its remarks about “cutting the crap” and unwrung withers, and saying such language does not meet the standard of judicial reasoning. For a judiciary candidate the lesson is practical: a short, colourful bail order that skips the statutory test is exposed on appeal.
For the “police protector turned predator” point, the Bench cited Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta, itself a cancellation case, to underline why an officer's access to witnesses and his clout weigh on the bail question. Our chapter on bail and bonds sets out the cancellation grounds, including Aslam Babalal Desai and Dolat Ram.
Five years in jail: why Najeeb did not carry the day
Waze's strongest card was time, about five years and eight months since arrest. Constitutional law is in this part of the case. Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb holds that a statutory bail restriction cannot oust the power of a constitutional court to grant bail when continued detention offends Article 21; Vernon repeated that, with the caution that it applies to bail restrictions invoked on material of low probative value. Our chapter on Article 21 traces the same right from Hussainara Khatoon, where undertrials held longer than the maximum sentence were freed.
The Bench noted the Supreme Court's divergent approach, with Gurwinder Singh and Gulfisha Fatima (2026 INSC 2) treating delay as no trump card and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi expressing reservations about that line. It also recorded that Tasleem Ahmed (order of 22 May 2026) has sent the whole question to a larger Bench. It then drew three conclusions:
- Where the prosecution material crosses the Section 43D(5) threshold and the offence can draw life imprisonment, five years in custody is not “long incarceration” (citing Kalyan Chandra Sarkar).
- Delay and Article 21 cannot be a sole ground when antecedents, influence over police witnesses, an alleged murder of a witness and public interest all point the other way.
- The remedy for a slow trial is expedition: the trial was about to begin, and the NIA said it would lead its main witnesses first.
Compare Andrabi as printed in the case-law library we use: bail was ordered after five years and eleven months, with over 350 witnesses still to be examined and the trial effectively out of sight. That is the fact pattern the Bench distinguished, since here there was a charge, a trial date in view and an accused alleged to have killed a witness. How far Najeeb gives a time-based right will be decided in Tasleem Ahmed, and this ruling may be revisited when it is.
What the judgment leaves open
- The Bench does not decide whether a single family is a “section of the people” under Section 15; it holds only that the material is prima facie sufficient.
- The ASG argued that parity with the co-accused who got bail (A-10, A-5) was misplaced, since roles differ; the final analysis does not take up parity separately.
- The 778-day delay question under the NIA Act appeal provisions stays open, as the August order said.
- The larger-Bench reference in Tasleem Ahmed may reset how prolonged custody interacts with the proviso.
Then and now: provisions in this case
- Bail: CrPC s.437 → BNSS s.480; s.439 → s.483; s.436A → s.479 (extended to life-imprisonment offences, with a first-offender proviso).
- Process: CrPC s.161 → BNSS s.180; s.164 → s.183; s.173 → s.193; ss.227/228 → ss.250/251; s.294 → s.330. This 2021 case runs under the CrPC, and the BNSS numbers are for exam use.
- Offences: IPC s.120B → BNS s.61(2); s.302 → s.103; s.364 → s.140(1); s.201 → s.238. The UAPA stays in force as a special law; BNS s.113 is the corresponding “terrorist act” offence in the general code.
Read together with appeals in criminal cases, framing of charge and offences against the State, the case is a single bail problem tested at four angles: statutory bar, Article 21, repeat applications and appellate review. Practise it at the CrPC/BNSS mock test.
Three questions to test the three propositions
1. After a charge-sheet is filed under the UAPA, the proviso to Section 43D(5) bars release on bail if the court, on a perusal of the case diary or the Section 173 report, is of the opinion that:
- the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
- there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusation against him is prima facie true
- there are no reasonable grounds for believing he is not guilty
- the offence carries a minimum sentence of seven years
Answer
(b) This is the text of the proviso. Option (c) describes the stricter “not guilty” test in statutes such as the NDPS Act, which Watali distinguishes, and options (a) and (d) are not the test.2. In the Sachin Waze appeal, the Bombay High Court set aside the Special Judge's bail order mainly because:
- the accused had violated the conditions of an earlier bail order
- the Public Prosecutor had not been heard before the order was passed
- five years in custody had not been counted in the accused's favour, which the court called an error of arithmetic
- the Special Judge ignored the Section 43D(5) test and held that framing a charge needs a lesser satisfaction than refusing bail, which the Bench called legal perversity
Answer
(d) The NIA was heard below, and the Bench did not find any misuse of liberty. It faulted the legal approach, treating the charge stage as the lighter test, the reverse of Watali.3. Which statement best separates an appeal against a bail order from an application to cancel bail?
- An appeal can succeed where bail was granted on irrelevant material, without application of mind or in disregard of a statutory bar; cancellation usually needs supervening circumstances such as tampering
- Both require proof that the accused has misused his liberty after release
- Only a Magistrate can cancel bail, while only the High Court can hear an appeal against a grant
- An appeal against a bail order can be filed only if the accused has been convicted