Constitution of India Test 1 — Questions & Solutions
Every question from this subject test with the correct answer and a detailed, source-backed solution. Free to read. Want the real exam feel — a timer, instant scoring, and a topic-wise weakness report? Take it as a test.
50
Questions
8
Topics
+ solutions
Every question
Take this as a timed mock test — instant score + subject-wise analytics. First mock free, then ₹999/year for unlimited.
In interpreting the expression “other authorities” in Article 12, the Supreme Court held that the rule of ejusdem generis cannot be applied. What was the principal reason given?
aBecause there is no common genus or feature running through the named bodies (Government, Parliament, Legislatures, local authorities)
bBecause the named bodies are all created by the Constitution itself
cBecause “other authorities” must be read narrowly to mean only statutory bodies
dBecause the word “or” in the Article is conjunctive
Answer: A
In Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, the Court held ejusdem generis cannot apply to “other authorities” because there is no common feature/genus running through the enumerated bodies. The word “or” is disjunctive, not conjunctive.
Q2Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A registered society discharging certain functions claims it is not “State” under Article 12. On the commentary, when would such a society nonetheless fall within Article 12?
aWhenever it is registered under the Societies Registration Act
bIf it is an instrumentality or agency of the State, or exercises statutory power to make rules/bye-laws having statutory force
cOnly if it receives any government grant, however small
dOnly if a majority of its members are government servants
Answer: B
A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is ordinarily not “State,” but becomes so if it is an instrumentality/agency of the State (Som Prakash Rekhi) or exercises statutory rule-making power (Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. IAAI).
Q3Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay established a principle about laws contravening fundamental rights under Article 13. Which statement reflects it?
aA law violating a fundamental right is voidable only at the instance of the affected person
bSuch a law remains valid until expressly repealed by the legislature
cWhere a legislature makes a law contravening a fundamental right, the position is the same as if it had no power to legislate on the subject at all
dSuch a law is invalid only against citizens but valid against non-citizens
Answer: C
Per Behram Khurshed Pesikaka, since Art. 245(1) makes legislative power subject to the Constitution, a law contravening a fundamental right stands as though the legislature had no power to legislate on the subject, and the invalidity goes to the root of legislative power.
Q4Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Under the reservation jurisprudence in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India as relied on in the commentary, the phrase “any provision” in Article 16(4)/15 is wide enough to include which of the following?
aOnly the actual reservation of posts, nothing else
bReservation in promotion only, not in direct recruitment
cProvisions exceeding 50% in all circumstances
dReservation plus other supplemental and ancillary provisions such as exemptions and concessions necessary for upliftment, consistent with Art. 335
Answer: D
The commentary, citing Indra Sawhney, states “any provision” is wide enough to include not only reservation but supplemental/ancillary provisions like exemptions and concessions necessary for upliftment of backward classes, consistent with Art. 335.
Q5Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Relaxation in qualifying marks for SC/ST/backward-class candidates, per the cases relied on in the commentary, is available—
aBoth when competing with general candidates and when only reserved candidates appear in the examination
bOnly when such candidates compete with general candidates
cNever, as it always affects administrative efficiency
dOnly in promotions, not in recruitment examinations
Answer: A
Per Haridas Parsedia v. Urmila Shakya, relaxation in qualifying marks is available to reserved candidates not only when competing with general candidates but also when only reserved candidates appear in the examination.
Q6Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Article 20(2) embodies protection against double punishment. According to the cases relied on in the commentary, the bar against a second prosecution applies only when—
aThe accused was previously prosecuted for the offence, whether or not punished
bThe accused was both prosecuted and punished for the same offence previously
cThe accused was previously acquitted, even on a technicality
dAny earlier departmental inquiry was conducted on the same facts
Answer: B
Per Venkataraman v. UOI, the word “and” in Art. 20(2) is conjunctive, so the clause bars a second prosecution only where the accused was both prosecuted and punished for the same offence previously.
Q7Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Which of the following is NOT barred by Article 20(2), as explained in the commentary?
aA fresh proceeding to prosecute and punish a second time for the same offence
bA second punishment in a fresh proceeding for the identical offence
cA provision for two penalties for the same offence imposed in the same proceeding without double prosecution
dA second show-cause proposing removal after a penalty had already been imposed for the same misconduct
Answer: C
Per State of M.P. v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotri, Art. 20(2) does not prohibit two penalties for the same offence imposed in the same proceeding (no double prosecution/conviction); the clause applies only where a fresh proceeding seeks to prosecute and punish again.
Q8Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
On the protection against ex post facto laws under Article 20(1), which proposition is correct per the commentary?
aIt bars all retrospective civil liabilities and forfeitures
bIt applies equally to preventive detention and externment
cIt bars reduction of sentence by subsequent legislation
dIt prohibits only judicial punishment with retrospective effect; it does not bar substitution of a penalty that is not higher than the previous one
Answer: D
Art. 20(1) prohibits only retrospective judicial punishment (Brij Bhukan Kalwar) and does not bar substituting a penalty not greater than the previous one (Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab); it does not apply to preventive detention or externment.
Q9Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A preventively detained person who is also a citizen seeks to assert freedoms under Article 19. Per Khudiram Das v. State of W.B. and related cases in the commentary, which is correct?
aA valid preventive-detention law complying with Art. 22(5) cannot be held to offend Art. 19, since procedural reasonableness and natural justice are embodied in Art. 22(5)
bPreventive detention always violates Art. 19(1)(d) and is void
cA detenu automatically loses every other fundamental right during detention
dArt. 19 has no application whatsoever to any detenu
Answer: A
Per Khudiram Das, a preventive-detention law complying with Art. 22(5) cannot offend Art. 19 because procedural reasonableness and natural justice are embodied in Art. 22(5); and a detenu does not lose other rights such as Art. 19(1)(a) (State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar).
Q10Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Article 17 abolishes “untouchability.” On the scope explained in the commentary (Devarajiah; State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale), which statement is correct?
a“Untouchability” includes any instigation of social boycott based on a person’s conduct
b“Untouchability” refers to social disabilities historically imposed on certain classes by reason of birth in certain castes, and is not based on mens rea
cThe offence of practising untouchability requires proof of mens rea
dThe term is exhaustively defined in the Constitution itself
Answer: B
Per Devarajiah v. Padmanna and Appa Balu Ingale, “untouchability” refers to social disabilities historically imposed by reason of birth in certain castes (not social boycott for conduct), is an integral part of the caste system, and is not based on mens rea.
Q11Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Article 23 prohibits traffic in human beings and forced labour but contains an exception. That exception permits—
aBonded labour where the debtor consents in writing
bEmployment of children below 14 in non-hazardous work
cCompulsory service imposed by the State for public purposes
dAny labour exacted as punishment by a private employer
Answer: C
Art. 23 prohibits traffic in human beings and all forms of forced labour but authorises the State to impose compulsory service for public purposes; read with Arts. 39, 41, 42, the State must also identify and rehabilitate bonded labourers (Bandhua Mukti Morcha).
Q12Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Under Article 28(1), as construed in Aruna Roy v. Union of India, which of the following is permissible in State-funded institutions?
aImparting religious instruction in the name of religious education
bPerforming religious worship as part of the curriculum
cCompulsory teaching of rituals, observances and modes of worship
dStudy of the philosophies of religions, with emphasis on essential moral and spiritual thought, as distinct from religious instruction
Answer: D
Per Aruna Roy v. UOI, Art. 28 forbids imparting religious instruction (rituals, observances, modes of worship) but permits study of religions and their philosophies, emphasising essential moral/spiritual thought; the line between the two must be carefully observed.
Q13Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
A Bill is introduced in the Lok Sabha to amend Chapter IV of Part V (the Union Judiciary) of the Constitution. After being passed by both Houses by the requisite special majority, what further step is mandatory under Article 368 before the Bill is presented to the President?
aRatification by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States
bA fresh resolution of the Council of States alone
cApproval of the Bill by a national referendum
dPrior recommendation of the President under Article 117
Answer: A
Under the proviso to Article 368(2), amendments affecting Chapter IV of Part V (Union Judiciary), among other federal provisions, additionally require ratification by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States before presentation to the President.
Q14Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In which decision did the Supreme Court FIRST hold that a Fundamental Right could not, by its very nature, be amended under Article 368, requiring instead a new Constituent Assembly to alter such rights?
aSankari Prasad v. Union of India
bGolak Nath v. State of Punjab
cSajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan
dKesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala
Answer: B
In Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1643), a 6:5 majority overruled Sankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh and held that Fundamental Rights in Part III could not be abridged by the Article 368 amending process.
Q15Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
The Constitution (24th Amendment) Act, 1971 was enacted primarily to counteract which judicial outcome?
aThe invalidation of clauses (4)-(5) of Article 368 in Minerva Mills
bThe basic structure doctrine propounded in Kesavananda Bharati
cThe Golak Nath ruling that Fundamental Rights cannot be abridged by amendment
dThe striking down of Article 31C in Kesavananda Bharati
Answer: C
The 24th Amendment inserted Article 13(4) and Article 368(1)/(3) to overcome Golak Nath, making clear that a constitutional amendment is not 'law' under Article 13 and that Fundamental Rights may be amended under Article 368.
Q16Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In Kesavananda Bharati, the majority held that the limitation on the amending power flows from the very meaning of the word 'amend'. Which judge's opinion is regarded as having broken the tie and thereby constituting the majority view?
aSikri, C.J.
bHegde, J.
cRay, J.
dKhanna, J.
Answer: D
In the 13-judge bench's 7:6 verdict, it was the opinion of Khanna, J. that broke the tie; one must refer to his judgment to ascertain the majority ratio that the basic structure cannot be destroyed.
Q17Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368, inserted by the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, were struck down in Minerva Mills v. Union of India. What was the principal ground for invalidating these clauses?
aThey sought to convert a limited amending power into an unlimited one and exclude judicial review, both basic features
bThey were not ratified by one-half of the State Legislatures
cThey violated the federal principle in the proviso to Article 368
dThey were enacted without the prior assent of the President
Answer: A
In Minerva Mills (AIR 1980 SC 1789), the Court held that the limited nature of the amending power and judicial review are basic features; clauses (4)-(5), which excluded review and made the power unlimited, therefore damaged the basic structure.
Q18Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule (inserted by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985), which ousted the jurisdiction of all courts over disqualification of members, was declared unconstitutional in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu on what ground?
aIt destroyed the basic feature of free and fair elections
bIt was, in effect, a change to Articles 136, 226 and 227 requiring ratification by one-half of the States, which was absent
cIt abolished the office of the Speaker as adjudicating authority
dIt conferred unconstitutional judicial power on Parliament
Answer: B
In Kihoto Hollohan (AIR 1993 SC 412), the Court held that Para 7, by 'in effect' altering Articles 136, 226 and 227, attracted proviso (b) to Article 368(2); lacking State ratification, the severable Para 7 was invalid.
Q19Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
According to Waman Rao v. Union of India, from which date are constitutional amendments open to challenge on the ground that they damage the basic structure of the Constitution?
a26 January 1950 (commencement of the Constitution)
b25 June 1975 (proclamation of Emergency)
c24 April 1973 (date of the Kesavananda judgment)
d31 July 1980 (date of the Minerva Mills judgment)
Answer: C
Waman Rao (AIR 1981 SC 271) held that the basic structure doctrine, propounded in Kesavananda on 24 April 1973, has prospective operation; amendments made before that date are valid, while those on or after are open to basic-structure challenge.
In the Second Judges Case (S.C. Advocates-on-Record Association v. UOI, 1993) and the Third Judges Case (Special Reference No. 1 of 1998), the Supreme Court evolved the 'collegium' system. Which of the following correctly states the position after these decisions on appointment of Supreme Court Judges?
aThe word 'consultation' in Art. 124(2) means mere consultation, and the President is free to disregard the Chief Justice's advice
bThe opinion of the Chief Justice of India alone, without consulting any other Judge, is binding on the President
cThe collegium consists of the CJI and the two senior-most Judges of the Supreme Court
dThe opinion of the Chief Justice of India has primacy and is to be formed in consultation with a collegium of the CJI and the four senior-most Judges of the Supreme Court
Answer: D
Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 held that the CJI's opinion under Art. 124(2) has primacy and must be formed in consultation with a collegium of the CJI plus the four senior-most Supreme Court Judges; 'consultation' was read to almost mean concurrence.
The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under Art. 131 is exclusive. Which of the following disputes would be entertainable by the Supreme Court under Art. 131?
aA dispute between two States as to the constitutional validity of a Central law affecting their governmental powers, involving a legal right
bA claim by a State against the Union Railway for loss of goods consigned to it, the State acting as a consignee
cA suit by a private society challenging the validity of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956
dA dispute referable to a Tribunal under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956
Answer: A
Art. 131 covers disputes between the Union and States or between States involving a legal (not merely contractual or political) right (State of Karnataka v. UOI). Contractual claims, water disputes ousted by Art. 262 r/w the 1956 Act, and suits by private parties fall outside it.
A High Court grants a certificate stating only that the case 'involves a substantial question of law', omitting any reference to interpretation of the Constitution. What is the consequence of this defect?
aThe certificate is treated as one under Art. 132(1) and the appeal must be heard by a Constitution Bench of five Judges
bThe certificate is treated as one under Art. 133(1)(a), and an appeal under Art. 132 will not lie
cThe certificate is invalid and no appeal can lie at all
dThe certificate automatically entitles the party to appeal under Art. 136
Answer: B
Under Art. 132 the substantial question must relate to interpretation of the Constitution; a bare certificate of a substantial question of 'law' is one under Art. 133(1)(a), not Art. 132 (Transport Commr., A.P. v. Sardar Ali). Only an Art. 132 appeal must go before a five-Judge Constitution Bench under Art. 145(3).
Regarding the Supreme Court's discretionary power to grant special leave to appeal under Art. 136, which statement is INCORRECT?
aSpecial leave can be granted even where the High Court has refused a certificate under Art. 133 or 134
bThe constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 136 cannot be taken away or curtailed by ordinary legislation
cArt. 136 confers a right of appeal on the aggrieved party in every case where injustice is alleged
dSpecial leave will ordinarily be refused where the appellant has not exhausted available statutory remedies of appeal or revision
Answer: C
Art. 136 confers no right of appeal on any party; it is a discretionary, extraordinary residuary power of the Supreme Court (Ashok Nagar Welfare Assn. v. R.K. Sharma). The other statements correctly describe its scope.
Under Art. 141 the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India. Which of the following is binding as a 'precedent' under Art. 141?
aObiter dicta of the Supreme Court, equally with its ratio decidendi
bAn order disposing of an SLP on the special facts of the case, without laying down any principle of law
cA decision rendered per incuriam, in ignorance of a binding statutory provision
dThe ratio decidendi, i.e., the principle and reasons underlying the decision on a question of law
Answer: D
Only the ratio decidendi — the reasons underlying the decision on a question of law — binds under Art. 141. Obiter dicta have persuasive but not binding force, fact-specific orders are not precedents, and a per incuriam decision lays down no good law.
The remedy of quo warranto is distinctive among the writs in respect of who may apply. Which of the following is the correct position regarding a writ of quo warranto?
aAny member of the public acting bona fide may apply to challenge an appointment to a public office, even without any personal interest
bOnly a person who is himself a candidate for the public office, or whose own legal right has been infringed, may apply
cQuo warranto lies in respect of the managing committee of a private school
dQuo warranto lies against a Judge of a High Court on the ground that he has crossed the retiring age
Answer: A
Quo warranto is an exception to ordinary locus standi: any member of the public acting bona fide may seek it to challenge an appointment to a public office. It lies only in respect of public, substantive, statutory/constitutional offices, and (since Arts. 124(2A)/217(3)) not against a Judge on the age ground.
Consider the following propositions about the writ of mandamus. Which is correct?
aMandamus is used where an inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction, to quash its order
bMandamus may issue against a private body discharging a public function in connection with a public duty imposed on it
cMandamus can be issued to enforce a Directive Principle, such as free legal aid under Art. 39A
dMandamus is available against the President for the performance of the duties of his office under Art. 361
Answer: B
Mandamus is a public-law remedy that may lie even against a private body if it discharges a public function and the matter concerns that public duty. It commands action (unlike certiorari/prohibition which deal with excess of jurisdiction), cannot enforce non-justiciable Directive Principles, and does not lie against the President (Art. 361).
Q27Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
An elected member of a State Legislative Assembly, who is part of the electoral college for the Presidential election, dies a week before polling, and the Assembly's strength stands depleted. On these facts, which statement is correct regarding the conduct of the Presidential election?
aThe election must be postponed until the vacancy in the Assembly is filled, so that uniformity of representation is maintained
bThe Vice-President must act as President until the Assembly's full strength is restored
cThe election may proceed and cannot be postponed beyond the mandatory time limit; the depleted electoral college is competent to elect
dThe election is void because Article 54 requires the full strength of every Assembly
Answer: C
Per Re Presidential Election, AIR 1974, the time limit in Art. 62 read with Art. 56 is mandatory; the electoral college always stands ready to act and the election cannot be postponed merely because some seats are vacant. Art. 71(4) further insulates the election from challenge on the ground of any vacancy.
Q28Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A member of the Legislature of a Union Territory constituted under Article 239A claims the right to vote in the election of the President. Is the claim sustainable?
aYes, because all State legislators vote in the Presidential election
bYes, because Article 367 extends the General Clauses Act to such bodies
cNo, because Union Territory legislators are nominated, not elected
dNo, because Article 54(b) speaks of 'Legislative Assemblies of States' and Art. 239A refers to a 'Legislature', not a Legislative Assembly
Answer: D
Per Shiv Kirpal Singh v. V.V. Giri, AIR 1970, members of a UT 'Legislature' under Art. 239A are not within Art. 54(b), which speaks of 'Legislative Assemblies of States'; only the express Explanation (Delhi, Puducherry) brings certain UTs in.
Q29Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
Under the scheme for the President's pardoning power in Article 72, in which of the following situations does the President NOT have exclusive competence vis-a-vis the Governor?
aA sentence of death, where the Governor of the State also has a concurrent power to suspend, remit or commute under the law in force
bA sentence passed by a Court Martial
cAn offence against a law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends
dA remission for an offence under a Union law administered only by the Centre
Answer: A
Art. 72(3) preserves the Governor's power under Art. 161 to suspend, remit or commute a death sentence; thus the President's power over death sentences in Art. 72(1)(c) is not exclusive but concurrent with the Governor's.
Q30Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
Both the office of President and that of Vice-President fall simultaneously vacant by resignation. Who discharges the functions of the President until a new President is elected?
aThe Speaker of the House of the People
bThe Chief Justice of India, or in his absence the senior-most available Judge of the Supreme Court
cThe senior-most Minister of the Union Council of Ministers
dThe Deputy Chairman of the Council of States
Answer: B
Under Art. 70 and the President (Discharge of Functions) Act, 1969, on a simultaneous vacancy in both offices the CJI (or senior-most available SC Judge) discharges the President's functions; per Arun Kumar v. UOI, AIR 1982, the Art. 58(2) office-of-profit bar does not attach as he only discharges functions, not seeks election.
Q31Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
The Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 substituted Article 71. What was its principal effect concerning disputes about the election of the President?
aIt transferred jurisdiction over such disputes from the Supreme Court to a body to be set up by Parliament
bIt gave Parliament an unchallengeable power to validate any Presidential election by law
cIt restored the original position, vesting the inquiry into and decision of such disputes in the Supreme Court whose decision is final
dIt made the High Court of the President's home State the forum for such disputes
Answer: C
The 39th Amendment (1975) had ousted the Supreme Court's jurisdiction; the 44th Amendment undid this and restored original Art. 71(1), vesting in the Supreme Court the inquiry into and final decision of doubts and disputes relating to the election of the President or Vice-President.
Q32Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A returned candidate to the Rajya Sabha is challenged on the ground that he is not, and never was, a voter registered within the State whose seat he occupies. Which statement reflects the correct constitutional position?
aResidence in the State is an implied qualification under Article 80 and the election is void
bThe challenge succeeds because Article 84 expressly requires domicile in the State concerned
cOnly the Election Commission, not a court, can entertain such a challenge
dThe challenge fails; residence in the State is not a constitutional qualification and Parliament validly dispensed with the statutory residence requirement
Answer: D
Per Kuldip Nayar v. UOI, (2006), residence within the State is not a constitutional qualification; 'representative of the State' in Art. 80(4) is not a qualification, and Parliament could validly delete the statutory residence requirement without offending federalism.
Q33Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
A resolution of either House of Parliament approving a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 352 must be passed by:
aA majority of the total membership of the House and a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting
bA simple majority of members present and voting
cA majority of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the House
dA majority of the total membership and three-fourths of the members present and voting
Answer: A
Article 352(6) requires a special majority for approval of an Emergency Proclamation: a majority of the total membership of the House plus two-thirds of members present and voting, analogous to Art. 368(2).
Q34Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Under Article 352 as amended by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, the President may issue a Proclamation of Emergency only when:
aThe Prime Minister advises him orally
bThe decision of the Union Cabinet to issue such a Proclamation has been communicated to him in writing
cBoth Houses of Parliament have first passed enabling resolutions
dThe Governor of the affected State sends a report
Answer: B
Article 352(3), inserted by the 44th Amendment as a reaction to the 1975 Emergency declared on the PM's sole advice, requires the written decision of the Union Cabinet before the President issues the Proclamation.
Q35Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Following the 44th Amendment, the President is OBLIGED to revoke a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 352 if:
aThe Rajya Sabha passes a resolution of disapproval
bThe Supreme Court directs revocation on the ground of changed circumstances
cThe House of the People passes a resolution disapproving its continuance
dOne-tenth of the members of the Rajya Sabha give written notice
Answer: C
Article 352(7) makes it mandatory for the President to revoke the Proclamation if the House of the People (Lok Sabha) passes a resolution disapproving it or its continuance; a special sitting can be convened on notice by 1/10 of its members under Cl.(8).
Q36Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Which of the following is NOT a ground on which a Proclamation under Article 352 may be issued after the 44th Amendment?
aWar
bExternal aggression
cArmed rebellion
dInternal disturbance
Answer: D
The 44th Amendment substituted 'armed rebellion' for 'internal disturbance' in Art. 352(1); 'internal disturbance' is no longer a ground for a national Emergency, though it remains relevant under Art. 355.
Q37Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
In S.R. Bommai v. UOI (1994), the Supreme Court held that a Proclamation under Article 356 is judicially reviewable. Which ground was NOT recognised as a valid basis for striking it down?
aThat the factual material in the Governor's report was insufficient or incorrect
bThat it was issued on the basis of no material at all
cThat it was based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant considerations
dThat it was vitiated by legal mala fides
Answer: A
Per Bommai and Rameshwar Prasad, courts will not examine the sufficiency or correctness of the material in the Governor's report; review is confined to no material, irrelevant/extraneous considerations, or legal mala fides.
The Chairman of a State Public Service Commission can be removed from office on the ground of misbehaviour only by:
athe Governor, after an inquiry by the State Vigilance Commission
ban order of the President, after the Supreme Court on a reference by the President reports that he ought to be removed
cthe Governor, on an address passed by the State Legislature
dthe President, on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India
Answer: B
Under Article 317(1), the Chairman or member of a PSC (Union or State) can be removed on the ground of misbehaviour only by order of the President after the Supreme Court, on a Presidential reference, inquires and reports that he ought to be removed.
X, a member of a State Public Service Commission, is adjudged an insolvent during his term. Which course is constitutionally correct for his removal?
aHe can be removed only after a Supreme Court inquiry under Article 317(1)
bHe can be removed by the Governor by a simple order
cHe can be removed by the President by order under Article 317(3) without any reference to the Supreme Court
dHe cannot be removed; insolvency is not a ground for removal
Answer: C
Article 317(3)(a) lets the President remove a PSC Chairman/member by order, without the Article 317(1) Supreme Court procedure, if he is adjudged insolvent, engages in paid employment outside his office, or is unfit by infirmity of mind or body.
Under Article 319, the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission, on ceasing to hold office, is:
aeligible for appointment as Chairman of any State Public Service Commission
beligible for appointment as a Governor only
celigible for re-appointment as UPSC Chairman for a second term
dineligible for further employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State
Answer: D
Article 319(a) bars the UPSC Chairman, after office, from any further employment under the Government of India or of a State. Unlike a State PSC Chairman or members, he gets no exception for heading another commission.
In Hargovind Pant v. Raghukul Tilak, the Supreme Court held that an ex-member of a Public Service Commission being appointed as Governor:
adoes not violate Article 319 because the office of Governor is a constitutional office, not 'employment under the Government'
bviolates Article 319 as it is employment under the Government
cviolates Article 319 only if the appointment is to his home State
dis permitted only with the prior approval of the President under Article 319
Answer: A
In Hargovind Pant v. Raghukul Tilak (AIR 1979 SC 1109), the Court applied the master-servant/control test and held the Governor's office is a constitutional office held under the Constitution, not 'employment under the Government', so the Article 319 bar does not apply.
Regarding the advisory role of a Public Service Commission in disciplinary matters under Article 320(3)(c), which statement is correct as settled in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava?
aNon-consultation with the Commission renders the Government's disciplinary action null and void
bThe provision is directory; failure to consult does not by itself void the action and gives the officer no remedy in court
cArticle 320(3)(c) confers an enforceable right on the government servant like Article 311
dThe Commission's advice on the penalty is binding on the Government
Answer: B
In State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (AIR 1957 SC 912), 'shall be consulted' in Article 320(3) was held directory; non-consultation does not nullify the action and confers no right on the servant, unlike Article 311.
Q43Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
Parliament passes a law ceding a small portion of Indian territory to a neighbouring foreign State to settle a long-standing dispute, treating it as an ordinary law under Article 3. Which statement best reflects the constitutional position laid down in Re Berubari Union?
aA cession of Indian territory to a foreign State is valid if enacted by ordinary law under Article 3, since Article 3 deals with alteration of boundaries
bNo territory of India can ever be ceded to a foreign State under any circumstances
cCession of territory to a foreign State falls outside Article 3 and can be effected only by a constitutional amendment, though a mere settlement of a boundary dispute is not a cession
dCession requires only the recommendation of the President and reference to the affected State Legislature
Answer: C
Re Berubari Union (AIR 1960 SC 845) held Article 3 is confined to inter-State adjustments and cession of territory to a foreign State requires a constitutional amendment; Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel clarified that a mere boundary-dispute settlement is not a cession.
Q44Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
A Bill seeks to diminish the area of State X and merge part of it into Union Territory Y, and also to alter the boundary of Union Territory Y itself. Under the Proviso to Article 3 read with Explanation I, whose views must the President obtain before introduction?
aThe Legislatures of both State X and Union Territory Y
bOnly the Legislature of Union Territory Y
cNeither, since both are merely territorial adjustments
dOnly the Legislature of State X
Answer: D
Under Explanation I to Article 3, 'State' in clauses (a)–(e) includes a Union territory, but in the Proviso 'State' does not include a Union territory; hence the Bill must be referred only to the Legislature of State X, not Union Territory Y.
Q45Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
After the President refers a State-reorganisation Bill to a State Legislature, which obtains its views in time, Parliament substantially amends the Bill during passage. Which proposition is correct per Babulal Parate and Pradeep Chaudhary?
aParliament is not bound by the State Legislature's views, and a fresh reference is not required even where a substantive amendment is carried out
bParliament is bound to accept the views expressed by the State Legislature
cThe substantially amended Bill must be referred afresh to the State Legislature for its fresh views
dAny amendment makes the Bill void for want of a fresh Presidential recommendation
Answer: A
Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay and Pradeep Chaudhary v. UOI hold that once the original Bill is referred the Proviso is satisfied; Parliament is not bound by the State's views and no fresh reference is needed even for a substantive amendment.
Q46Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
A law made under Articles 3 and 4 reorganising a State is challenged on the ground that some of its provisions trespass on subjects in List II of the Seventh Schedule. Per Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. UOI, the challenge:
aMust succeed, since Parliament cannot legislate on List II matters
bFails, because the law-making power under Articles 3 and 4 is plenary and not fettered by Article 246 or the Lists of the Seventh Schedule
cSucceeds only if the State Legislature objects
dMust be referred to the Supreme Court under Article 143 before it can be decided
Answer: B
In Mullaperiyar the Court held the power under Articles 3 and 4 is paramount, plenary and not subject to Article 246 or Lists II and III; validity of such a law cannot be questioned for lack of legislative competence under the Lists.
Q47DPSP & Fundamental Duties
A State enacts an agrarian-reform law to implement the Directive in Art. 39(b), but the law abridges a fundamental right in Part III. Which of the following correctly states the constitutional position as settled in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala?
aThe Directive Principle in Art. 39(b) automatically overrides the conflicting fundamental right, since Part IV is fundamental in the governance of the country.
bA Directive Principle can never justify any abridgment of a fundamental right under any circumstances.
cParliament is competent to amend the Constitution to override or abrogate a fundamental right so as to enable the State to implement the Directives, so long as the basic features of the Constitution are not affected.
dThe court may itself compel the State to make the law implementing Art. 39(b) by issuing a writ of mandamus.
Answer: C
Kesavananda Bharati (1973) held that Parliament may amend the Constitution to override fundamental rights in order to implement the Directives, subject to the basic-structure limitation; Directives do not per se override fundamental rights (Art. 37).
Q48DPSP & Fundamental Duties
Which of the following propositions about the legal character of the Directive Principles is INCORRECT, having regard to Art. 37 and the cases the commentary cites?
aDirectives are not enforceable by any court and create no justiciable rights in favour of individuals (Kesavananda Bharati).
bCourts cannot declare a law void merely because it contravenes a Directive Principle (Deep Chand v. State of U.P.).
cCourts cannot compel the Government to make a law to carry out a Directive, e.g. to provide free compulsory education (U.P.S.E. Bd. v. Harishankar Jain).
dThe Directives by themselves confer legislative power on the appropriate Legislature, independent of the Seventh Schedule (Deep Chand v. State of U.P.).
Answer: D
Deep Chand v. State of U.P. (1959) held the Directives per se neither confer nor take away legislative power; competence must be traced to the Legislative Lists in the Seventh Schedule, so (c) is incorrect.
Q49DPSP & Fundamental Duties
In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, the Supreme Court laid down which principle regarding the relationship between Part III and Part IV as the law then stood?
aThe State may implement the Directives only subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, and the Directives cannot override the prohibition in Art. 13(2) against abridging fundamental rights.
bDirective Principles prevail over fundamental rights whenever the two are in conflict.
cFundamental rights are subordinate to the Directives because the latter are 'fundamental in the governance of the country'.
dThere is a permanent and irreconcilable conflict between Part III and Part IV that only Parliament can resolve.
Answer: A
Champakam Dorairajan (1951) held the State can implement Directives only within constitutional limits, and they cannot override the Art. 13(2) bar on abridging Part III rights (later modified by Art. 31C).
Q50DPSP & Fundamental Duties
In Minerva Mills v. Union of India and Kesavananda Bharati, the relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles was described as one of:
aStrict hierarchy with the Directives at the apex.
bHarmony and complementarity, the two together forming the conscience and core of the Constitution.
cInherent disharmony requiring the Directives to always yield to the Rights.
dMutual exclusion, each operating in a watertight compartment.
Answer: B
The commentary (Kesavananda, Minerva Mills, Markandeya v. State of A.P.) holds there is no disharmony; Rights and Directives supplement each other and together constitute the 'conscience of the Constitution'.
Practiced enough reading? Attempt Constitution of India mocks under real exam conditions and track your weak subjects.
Law Mock is an independent preparation resource and is not affiliated with any High Court, Public Service Commission, or government body. All exam information is sourced from official notifications and is updated periodically.
