Constitution of India Test 4 — Questions & Solutions
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When the constitutionality of a law is challenged as infringing a fundamental right, the test the Court applies, as laid down in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, is the law's:
aDirect and inevitable effect on the fundamental right
bObject and purpose alone
cPith and substance
dForm rather than substance
Answer: A
Maneka Gandhi established that what matters is the 'direct and inevitable effect' of the impugned law on the fundamental right, not merely its object, form or incidental operation.
Q2Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, the Supreme Court laid down a general rule regarding oral interviews in selections by a 'State' body. The rule is that allocation of more than what proportion of total marks to the interview is ordinarily unreasonable and violative of Article 14?
a10%
b15%
c25%
d33%
Answer: B
Ajay Hasia held that allotting more than 15% of total marks to the oral interview in a competitive selection by a 'State' body is ordinarily unreasonable and hit by Art. 14, subject to special circumstances (Lila Dhar).
Q3Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
The doctrine of severability, as applied under Article 13, means that:
aThe entire statute is struck down if any one provision violates a fundamental right
bThe Court rewrites the offending provision to make it constitutional
cOnly the offending provision is declared void if it is severable from the rest of the statute, which survives
dThe statute is suspended until Parliament amends it
Answer: C
Per the words 'to the extent of the inconsistency' in Art. 13 and cases like Mahendra Lal Jaini, only the repugnant, severable provision is void; the remainder of the statute stands if it can operate independently.
Q4Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Article 27 prohibits compelling any person to pay taxes the proceeds of which are appropriated for promotion or maintenance of a particular religion. Following Prafull Goradia v. Union of India, which utilisation would breach Article 27?
aUsing a relatively small part of a tax to provide some facility or concession to a religious denomination
bLevying a fee to regulate the secular administration of religious institutions
cAny expenditure of public funds touching a religious institution, however small
dUsing a substantial part of a tax (e.g. about 25% of income tax) for promotion of a particular religion
Answer: D
Prafull Goradia (2011) held Art. 27 is violated only when a substantial part of a tax is used for a particular religion; a relatively small expenditure for a facility or concession does not offend Art. 27.
Q5Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Article 27 forbids compulsory payment of a 'tax' for promotion of a particular religion, but in Commissioner, H.R.E. v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar the Court held that Article 27 is NOT attracted to:
aA fee levied to defray the State's expenses in regulating the secular administration of religious institutions
bA cess earmarked for building a temple
cA surcharge appropriated to maintain a particular denomination
dAny levy whatsoever connected with religion
Answer: A
In Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar the Court distinguished a 'fee' (for secular regulation of religious institutions) from a 'tax'; Art. 27 forbids only taxes appropriated to favour a particular religion, not regulatory fees.
Q6Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Under Article 30(1), the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions is held by:
aReligious minorities only
bAll minorities, whether based on religion or language
cLinguistic minorities only
dAny section of citizens having a distinct culture, whether or not a minority
Answer: B
Art. 30(1) expressly confers the right on 'all minorities, whether based on religion or language'. The distinct-culture/'any section of citizens' formulation belongs to Art. 29(1), not Art. 30(1).
Q7Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Article 29(1) protects the right of a section of citizens to conserve its distinct language, script or culture. As clarified in D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, this clause:
aIs confined to religious minorities
bIs confined to linguistic minorities determined statewide
cExtends to any section of citizens, whether of the majority or minority, having a distinct language, script or culture
dApplies only to institutions receiving State aid
Answer: C
Per D.A.V. College, the common thread of Art. 29(1) is distinct language, script or culture—not religion; it protects any section of citizens, majority or minority, unlike Art. 30(1) which requires a religious or linguistic minority.
Q8Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Regarding admissions in minority educational institutions, which proposition reflects the law after T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, modifying St. Stephen's College?
aMinority institutions may reserve exactly 50% of seats for their own community in all cases
bMinority institutions may admit only members of their own community
cPreference to own-community candidates is never permissible in any degree
dThe rigid 50% ceiling for own-community admissions is not proper; the State should fix the percentage by balancing the interests of all
Answer: D
In T.M.A. Pai Foundation the eleven-judge Bench held the fixed 50% ceiling of St. Stephen's was not proper; the State must arrive at the percentage for minority students by properly balancing the interests of all.
Q9Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Under Article 28(1), no religious instruction shall be provided in educational institutions wholly maintained out of State funds. As explained in Aruna Roy v. Union of India, this clause:
aDoes not prohibit the study of religions, but bars denominational religious instruction in wholly State-funded institutions
bProhibits even the academic study of religions in State institutions
cProhibits moral education dissociated from denominational doctrine
dPermits denominational religious instruction if parents consent
Answer: A
Aruna Roy held Art. 28(1) bars denominational religious instruction in wholly State-funded institutions but does not prohibit the academic study of religions; what is forbidden is religious, not moral, instruction.
Q10Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A weekly journalist moved the Supreme Court under Article 32 contending that a judicial order of a High Court Judge prohibiting publication of a witness's evidence violated his right under Article 19(1)(a). On the question whether such a judicial order can be challenged as State action under Article 12, what did the Supreme Court hold?
aEvery order of a court, judicial or administrative, is 'State' under Article 12 and can be challenged under Article 32
bA judicial decision deciding a controversy between parties does not contravene the fundamental rights of the parties and superior courts are not 'State' insofar as their judicial orders are concerned
cHigh Courts are 'State' but the Supreme Court is excluded from Article 12 altogether
dOnly the administrative orders of courts fall outside Article 12, while judicial orders are always within it
Answer: B
In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1967 SC 1) and Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002), the Court held a judicial order does not violate fundamental rights and superior courts of justice do not fall within 'State or other authorities' under Article 12 for their judicial orders; they are 'State' only when acting administratively.
Q11Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
In Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002), the Supreme Court clarified the tests laid down in Ajay Hasia for determining whether a body is an 'instrumentality or agency' of the State under Article 12. Which statement correctly reflects that clarification?
aIf a body satisfies any one of the Ajay Hasia factors it must necessarily be held to be 'State'
bMere regulatory control by the State is sufficient to make a body 'State' under Article 12
cThe Ajay Hasia factors are not a rigid set; the body must be financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the pervasive control of the Government
dOnly bodies created by statute can ever qualify as instrumentalities of the State
Answer: C
Pradeep Kumar Biswas held the Ajay Hasia principles are not rigid; the real test is whether the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the pervasive control of the Government—mere regulatory control does not suffice.
Q12Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A pre-Constitution law was inconsistent with a fundamental right and thus became inoperative against citizens on 26 January 1950. Years later, a constitutional amendment removed the inconsistency. Which doctrine governs the revival of such a law, and what is its effect?
aDoctrine of severability—only the inconsistent portion is severed and the rest survives
bDoctrine of waiver—the citizen is deemed to have surrendered the right
cDoctrine of repugnancy—the law stands repealed and cannot be revived
dDoctrine of eclipse—the law was only overshadowed and becomes fully operative once the inconsistency is removed
Answer: D
Under the doctrine of eclipse (Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P., 1955), a pre-Constitution law inconsistent with Part III is not dead but eclipsed; once the shadow of inconsistency is removed it becomes free from all infirmity and fully operative.
Q13Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Khanna J's decisive opinion in Kesavananda Bharati grounded the basic structure limitation primarily on what reasoning?
aThat to 'amend' means the old Constitution survives without loss of its identity, so its basic structure or framework cannot be destroyed
bThat fundamental rights in Part III are per se immutable and beyond all amendment
cThat 'law' in Article 13 includes amendments
dThat sovereignty rests with Parliament as a Constituent Assembly
Answer: A
Khanna J reasoned that 'amendment' postulates the old Constitution surviving without loss of identity; while any provision (even a fundamental right) may be altered, the basic structure or framework cannot be destroyed.
Q14Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
The first case to actually apply (rather than merely formulate) the basic structure doctrine to strike down a constitutional amendment was:
aMinerva Mills v Union of India
bIndira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain
cWaman Rao v Union of India
dIR Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu
Answer: B
Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, concerning the Thirty-ninth Amendment (Article 329A), was the first case to apply the basic structure doctrine, and it was a democracy-based challenge.
Q15Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, what was the principal objection to Article 329A, expressed by Mathew J in terms of it being like a 'bill of attainder'?
aIt abolished the office of the Prime Minister
bIt transferred election disputes from the High Courts to administrative tribunals
cIt validated a specific disputed election by a legislative judgment lacking the generality essential to law, subverting free and fair elections
dIt removed the right to property from Part III
Answer: C
The Court held that legislatively validating an invalid election without changing the law or applying law to facts was a 'legislative judgment' like a bill of attainder, subversive of free and fair elections and the democratic structure.
Q16Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In P Sambamurthy v State of Andhra Pradesh, Article 371-D(5) — empowering the State government to modify or annul an administrative tribunal's verdict — was struck down as violating which basic feature?
aSecularism
bFederalism
cFree and fair elections
dThe rule of law
Answer: D
The Court held that allowing the State (a losing party) to set at naught a tribunal's decision would 'sound the death knell of the rule of law', a basic feature linked to judicial review.
Q17Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
On the role of tribunals vis-a-vis the High Courts, how did L Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) depart from SP Sampath Kumar?
aIt held tribunals could only play a supplemental, not a substitutional, role, so the power of judicial review under Articles 32 and 226 could not be excluded
bIt held tribunals could wholly oust the High Courts' power under Article 226 if an effective alternative existed
cIt held that tribunal members enjoyed the same constitutional safeguards of independence as superior court judges
dIt abolished administrative tribunals entirely
Answer: A
Chandra Kumar departed from Sampath Kumar's 'substitutional' view, holding that tribunals can only be supplemental and that the power of the Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 32 and 226 to test legislation cannot be limited.
Q18Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In Kihoto Hollohan v Zachillu, while broadly upholding the anti-defection (Tenth Schedule) amendment, on what ground did the Court strike down paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule?
aIt violated the rule of law
bIt had not been ratified by half of the State legislatures, the principle of severability being applied to the amendment
cIt destroyed the secular character of the Constitution
dIt infringed the freedom of speech of legislators
Answer: B
The Court held paragraph 7 (ousting judicial review) unconstitutional for want of ratification by half the State legislatures, and applied the principle of severability to constitutional amendments while upholding the rest.
Q19Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In Minerva Mills v Union of India (1980), what was the core constitutional principle on which the amended Article 31C (immunising all Directive-Principle laws from Articles 14 and 19) was struck down?
aThat Part IV is wholly subordinate to Part III in every respect
bThat Directive Principles cannot ever be given effect to by legislation
cThat the balance between Parts III and IV is the bedrock of the Constitution and to privilege one over the other alters its identity
dThat only the right to property forms part of the basic structure
Answer: C
Minerva Mills held that the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III and IV; the amended Article 31C destroyed this balance and so violated the basic structure.
Which of the following best distinguishes the writs of prohibition and certiorari?
aProhibition lies against executive authorities while certiorari lies only against courts
bCertiorari can be issued only by the Supreme Court, prohibition only by the High Courts
cProhibition is available for errors of fact, certiorari only for errors of law
dThey differ chiefly in the stage: prohibition issues while proceedings are pending to forbid the tribunal from continuing, whereas certiorari issues after a decision is made to quash it
Answer: D
Per Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, both writs restrain inferior courts/tribunals from exceeding jurisdiction, but at different stages: prohibition forbids continuing pending proceedings, while certiorari quashes a decision already made.
A person is arrested in State A and then detained in State B. He wishes to file a habeas corpus petition under Art. 226. Which High Court has jurisdiction to issue the writ?
aThe High Courts of both State A and State B
bOnly the High Court of State A, where the arrest took place
cOnly the High Court of State B, where he is detained
dNeither; only the Supreme Court under Art. 32 can be approached
Answer: A
Read with Art. 226(2), where a person is arrested in one State and detained in (or removed to) another, the High Courts of both States have jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus, since part of the cause of action arises in each.
Regarding the power of superintendence of a High Court under Art. 227 over subordinate courts and tribunals, which statement is correct?
aIt is purely administrative and does not include judicial revision
bIt includes judicial superintendence and can be exercised suo motu, even where no appeal or revision lies, but cannot be used to direct a subordinate court to decide a case in a particular manner
cIt empowers the High Court to correct every wrong decision of a subordinate court within its jurisdiction
dIt extends to courts and tribunals constituted under laws relating to the Armed Forces
Answer: B
Art. 227 superintendence is both administrative and judicial, exercisable suo motu and even absent a statutory appeal/revision, but it is confined to keeping inferior courts within their authority — it cannot dictate how they decide cases, and excludes Armed Forces tribunals (Art. 227(4)).
A State Legislature, in order to overcome an adverse decree passed by the Supreme Court under Art. 131 in favour of another State, enacts a law nullifying that decree. The law is:
aValid, as a State Legislature can legislate to settle a federal dispute
bValid, provided the Governor gives assent
cUnconstitutional, as it usurps judicial power and violates the separation of powers and the adjudicatory scheme of Art. 131
dValid only if ratified by Parliament
Answer: C
Legislation by a State or Parliament seeking to decide or nullify a federal dispute adjudicated under Art. 131 (or 262) usurps judicial power and offends the separation of powers, and is unconstitutional (State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala; Re Punjab Termination of Agreement Act).
Under Art. 233(2), a person not already in the judicial service is eligible to be directly appointed a District Judge if he has been an advocate or pleader for not less than seven years. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, this requirement means:
aSeven years of practice at any time in the past, even if discontinued long ago
bSeven years of judicial service in a subordinate court
cTen years of practice, plus recommendation by the State Public Service Commission
dSeven years of practice as an advocate immediately preceding the application, and the appointee must also be recommended by the High Court
Answer: D
For direct recruitment under Art. 233(2), the seven years' practice means seven years as an advocate immediately preceding the application (not at any time in the past), and the candidate must additionally be recommended by the High Court.
The control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto, including posting, promotion and grant of leave to judicial officers below the rank of District Judge, is vested by Art. 235 in the High Court. Following this scheme, for the dismissal or removal of such a judicial officer:
aThe High Court holds the disciplinary inquiry and recommends the punishment, but the formal order of dismissal/removal must be passed by the Governor
bThe High Court itself passes the order of dismissal, the Governor having no role
cThe Governor dismisses the officer on the advice of the Council of Ministers, without reference to the High Court
dThe State Public Service Commission imposes the punishment after inquiry by the High Court
Answer: A
Though 'control' under Art. 235 is complete and includes disciplinary inquiry, when it comes to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank the High Court is the recommending authority; the formal order must be passed by the Governor (appointing authority) read with Art. 311(2) (Rajendra Singh Verma v. Lt. Governor of NCT of Delhi).
Which of the following is the correct position regarding what is binding as a precedent under Art. 141?
aBoth the ratio decidendi and the obiter dicta are equally binding on all courts
bOnly the ratio decidendi binds; obiter dicta, casual expressions and decisions sub silentio or per incuriam do not lay down binding law
cThe final order or relief granted in the judgment is what binds all courts
dEvery observation of the Supreme Court is binding because it is the highest court
Answer: B
Under Art. 141 only the ratio decidendi — the reason underlying the decision — is binding. Obiter dicta, passing expressions, and decisions rendered sub silentio or per incuriam do not constitute binding law.
Q27Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A Governor, while a murder appeal arising out of an offence under the IPC is still sub judice before the Supreme Court, grants a full pardon. The accused argues the appeal is now infructuous. Which is the correct legal position drawn from the case law on Art. 161?
aThe pardoning power cannot be exercised at all while an appeal is pending
bThe Governor has no power over IPC offences, only the President does
cA full pardon may be granted even during pendency of an appeal so the court may be debarred from hearing it, but the power to merely suspend a sentence is subject to the Supreme Court's rules on pending appeals
dThe pardon is void because pardon can be granted only after the appeal is finally decided
Answer: C
Per Nanavati v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 (commentary on Art. 161), a full pardon may be granted during the pendency of an appeal, debarring the court from hearing it, but the power to suspend a sentence is subject to the Supreme Court's rules on cases pending in appeal.
Q28Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A Governor purports to remit a sentence imposed for an offence under Sections 489A-489D IPC (counterfeiting currency notes). The remission is challenged. The correct position is:
aValid, because Art. 161 extends to all offences committed within the State
bValid, because the convict is lodged in a jail within the State
cInvalid, because only the President may remit any sentence of imprisonment
dInvalid, because currency and bank notes fall within exclusive Union jurisdiction (Entries 36 and 93, List I), so the executive power of the State does not extend to that subject
Answer: D
Per Ramanaiah v. Supdt. Central Jail, AIR 1974 (commentary on Art. 161), the Governor can exercise the power only where the offence relates to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends; currency notes being a Union subject, the Governor cannot remit such a sentence.
Q29Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
Parliament amends the Representation of the People Act to delete the requirement that a person chosen to represent a State in the Council of States must be an elector in that very State, allowing any Indian elector to be elected. This was challenged as violating federalism. The Supreme Court held:
aThe amendment is valid; residence is not the essence of the Rajya Sabha's structure and a residential qualification is not constitutionally required
bThe amendment is unconstitutional, as residence in the State is the very essence of representation in the Upper House
cThe amendment is valid only if the State Legislature concerned ratifies it
dThe amendment violates the basic structure because Rajya Sabha members must vote at the dictate of their State
Answer: A
In Kuldip Nayar v. UOI, (2006), the Supreme Court upheld the deletion, holding that residence is not the essence of the Upper House's structure and 'representative of the State' in Art. 80(4) is not a qualification; Art. 84(c) leaves such qualifications to Parliament.
Q30Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
Which of the following is the correct distinction between the electoral colleges for the President and the Vice-President?
aBoth include elected members of State Legislative Assemblies
bOnly the Presidential electoral college includes elected members of State Legislative Assemblies; the Vice-Presidential college consists of members of both Houses of Parliament
cThe Vice-Presidential college includes nominated members of Parliament but the Presidential college excludes them
dThe President is elected by both Houses of Parliament only, while the Vice-President is elected by Parliament plus the Assemblies
Answer: B
Under Art. 54, the Presidential college includes elected members of both Houses of Parliament and of State Legislative Assemblies; under Art. 66(1) (as amended by the 11th Amendment), the Vice-President is elected only by members of both Houses of Parliament.
Q31Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
During a session from which several members were absent owing to detention under a preventive-detention law, a Constitution Amendment Act is passed. Its validity is challenged on the ground that those members could not participate. Following Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, the challenge fails primarily because:
aPreventive detention automatically suspends a member's right to vote in the House
bA detained member is deemed to have resigned his seat under Art. 101
cArt. 85 deals with composition of Parliament, which is not affected by absent members, and Art. 122 bars courts from questioning proceedings on the ground of non-attendance
dThe Speaker's certificate can be challenged in court to reopen the question
Answer: C
Per Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 (commentary on Art. 85), the composition of Parliament is governed by Art. 81 and is unaffected by absent members; courts are barred by Art. 122 from questioning proceedings on the ground of non-attendance, and the Speaker's certificate is conclusive.
Q32Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A member of a Legislative Assembly tenders his resignation to the Speaker. Before it is accepted, he writes again seeking to withdraw it. Which statement reflects the law after the Constitution (33rd Amendment) Act, 1974?
aResignation takes effect the moment the letter is addressed to the Speaker, so it cannot be withdrawn
bThe Speaker must accept every resignation and has no power to inquire into it
cOnly the House by resolution, not the Speaker, can accept a member's resignation
dTermination of membership depends on acceptance by the Speaker, who may inquire into its voluntariness/genuineness, and until accepted the member may withdraw it
Answer: D
Per the 33rd Amendment to Arts. 101(3)(b)/190(3)(b) and UOI v. Gopal Chandra Misra, AIR 1978, resignation now depends on acceptance by the Speaker/Chairman, who may inquire into its genuineness; until accepted it may be withdrawn.
Q33Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
A Union Minister writes a letter to the Chief Minister of a State advising him to recommend dissolution of the State Legislative Assembly to the Governor. The State approaches the Court contending this is an unconstitutional 'direction' under Article 256. Which of the following is correct?
aIt is not a 'direction' within Article 256; even if it is a 'threat' it gives no justiciable cause of action to the State
bIt is a valid direction under Article 256 binding on the State
cIt is a direction under Article 257(2) regarding means of communication
dIt amounts to a Proclamation under Article 356 and is justiciable
Answer: A
In State of Rajasthan v. UOI (AIR 1977), the Court held such a letter is not a 'direction' under Art. 256; even if a 'threat', it gives no justiciable cause of action, as dissolution is in the exclusive State sphere where Art. 256 cannot operate.
Q34Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Regarding entrustment of functions between the Union and States under Articles 258 and 258A, which statement is INCORRECT?
aUnder Art. 258(1) the President entrusts Union functions to a State only with that State's consent
bUnder Art. 258(1) the President may also entrust to a State his personal constitutional powers such as those under Arts. 352 and 356
cUnder Art. 258(2) Parliament may confer powers/duties on a State without the State's consent
dUnder Art. 258A the Governor may entrust State functions to the Union with the consent of the Government of India
Answer: B
Per Tinsukia Development Corpn. v. State of Assam (AIR 1961), Art. 258(1) lets the President entrust Union functions exercisable by him on behalf of the Union, but NOT powers expressly vested in him as President (e.g. Arts. 123, 124, 352, 356, 360).
Q35Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
A decree is passed by a civil court in Bombay on 1 March 1950. Execution is sought in a court at Goa in 1962 (Goa having become part of India on 20-12-1961, with the CPC extended). Under Article 261(3), the decree is:
aNot executable, as Goa was foreign territory when the decree was passed
bExecutable only after a fresh suit under s. 13 CPC
cExecutable in Goa, since Art. 261(3) makes a post-1950 Indian decree executable anywhere that is part of the territory of India when execution is sought
dExecutable only if it is a criminal court order
Answer: C
Per Narhari Shioram Shet Narvekar v. Pannalal Umediram (AIR 1977), a post-26-1-1950 Indian civil decree is executable in any territory that has become part of India by the time execution is sought, once the CPC has been extended there.
Q36Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Parliament has constituted a Water Disputes Tribunal under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 and referred an inter-State river dispute to it; the Tribunal then passes its award. Which is correct regarding the bar on courts under Article 262(2) read with s. 11 of the Act?
aThe Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Art. 136 to entertain a challenge to the award is also barred
bThe bar applies from the moment any State makes a request to the Central Government
cEven the question of the Tribunal's own jurisdiction is barred from the Supreme Court
dThe bar comes into play only once a Tribunal is constituted and the dispute referred, but a challenge to the award itself under Art. 136 is not barred
Answer: D
Per State of Orissa v. Govt. of India (2009) and State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu (2017), the bar attaches only on constitution and reference to the Tribunal; the Supreme Court's Art. 136 power to examine a challenge to the award is not barred under Art. 262.
Q37Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Under Article 352 as amended by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, a resolution of Parliament approving a Proclamation of Emergency must be passed:
aBy a majority of the total membership of each House and by not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting
bBy a simple majority of members present and voting in each House
cBy the Council of States alone
dBy two-thirds of the total membership of each House
Answer: A
Article 352(6) requires the approving resolution to be passed by a majority of the total membership of the House AND by not less than two-thirds of members present and voting — the 'double/special majority' introduced by the 44th Amendment.
Under Article 324(5), the manner and grounds of removal of the Chief Election Commissioner differ from those of other Election Commissioners. Which statement correctly reflects this distinction?
aBoth the CEC and other Election Commissioners can be removed only by the impeachment process applicable to a Supreme Court Judge
bThe CEC can be removed only in like manner and on like grounds as a Supreme Court Judge, while another Election Commissioner can be removed only on the recommendation of the CEC
cThe CEC can be removed by the President at pleasure, whereas other Election Commissioners enjoy the protection of the impeachment procedure
dOther Election Commissioners can be removed only after a Supreme Court inquiry, while the CEC is removable on the President's satisfaction
Answer: B
The first proviso to Art. 324(5) protects the CEC by requiring removal in the like manner and on like grounds as a Supreme Court Judge, while the second proviso allows removal of other Election Commissioners only on the CEC's recommendation (T.N. Seshan v. UOI).
In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India, the Constitution Bench, while upholding the validity of the law making the Election Commission a multi-member body, laid down how business of the Commission must be transacted. Which proposition did it adopt, thereby overruling the earlier Dhanoa view?
aThe CEC has a casting vote and can veto the other Commissioners
bThe CEC alone can issue any order without consulting the other Commissioners
cAll business shall ordinarily be transacted unanimously, and on difference of opinion, by the opinion of the majority, the CEC being only primus inter pares
dDecisions require the concurrence of all three Commissioners failing which the matter goes to the President
Answer: C
In T.N. Seshan v. UOI the Court held business shall as far as possible be unanimous and otherwise by majority, making the CEC primus inter pares, thus overruling Dhanoa's view that the CEC was superior.
An Election Commission direction issued under Art. 324 required the Returning Officer's compliance, but the RO ignored it. The direction was non-statutory (not traceable to the RP Act or Rules). On these facts, what is the legal position regarding validity of the election?
aThe election is automatically void for breach of a binding Commission direction
bThe Commission can itself set aside the election for the RO's disobedience
cThe High Court must set aside the election under Art. 226 for violation of the direction
dNo election can be invalidated on the ground that the RO failed to comply with non-statutory directions of the Commission, even though they are administratively binding on him
Answer: D
Per Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman, no election can be invalidated because the electoral officer failed to comply with non-statutory directions of the Commission, though such directions are administratively binding.
Art. 329(b) bars challenge to an election except by an election petition. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, the word 'election' in this context was held to mean:
aThe entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected, not merely the final result
bOnly the final declaration of the result by the Returning Officer
cOnly the act of polling on the day fixed for voting
dOnly the stage of acceptance or rejection of nomination papers
Answer: A
Following Ponnuswami and Mohinder Singh Gill, 'election' in Art. 329(b) means the whole process from notification to declaration of result, so intermediate steps cannot be challenged under Art. 226; the only remedy is an election petition.
A Member of a State Public Service Commission was later appointed Chairman of the same Commission. For computing his six-year tenure under Art. 316(2), from which date does the term run?
aFrom the date he first entered office as a Member, so prior service as Member is counted
bHe gets a fresh tenure of six years from the date of his appointment as Chairman
cHis tenure as Chairman cannot exceed the unexpired portion of his Member's term
dHe is ineligible to become Chairman of the same Commission of which he was a Member
Answer: B
Per State of Mysore v. R.V. Bidap (relying on Art. 319(d)), where a Member is subsequently appointed Chairman he can claim a fresh tenure of six years from the date of appointment as Chairman, subject to the age-limit under Art. 316(2).
Q43Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
On the date of commencement of the Constitution, S has his domicile in India and has been ordinarily resident in India for five years preceding commencement, but neither S nor either of his parents was born in the territory of India. Is S a citizen under Article 5, and on what reasoning?
aNo, because Article 5 requires that S or a parent be born in the territory of India
bYes, but only if his parents were Indian nationals
cYes, under Article 5(c), since the three clauses (a), (b) and (c) are alternative and clause (c) is satisfied by domicile plus five years' ordinary residence
dNo, because mere domicile can never confer citizenship under Article 5
Answer: C
Per Abdul Sattar v. State of Gujarat, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 5 are alternative, not cumulative; S qualifies under clause (c) through domicile plus not less than five years' ordinary residence, the nationality of his parents being immaterial.
Q44Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
Parliament enacts the Citizenship Act, 1955 and, purporting to act under Article 11, makes a provision that affects citizenship already acquired under Articles 5 to 8. Is this competent (Izhar Ahmed Khan v. UOI)?
aNo, Articles 5–10 are entrenched and Parliament cannot touch citizenship already acquired under them
bYes, but only with the prior consent of the affected State Legislatures
cNo, because acquisition and termination of citizenship are State subjects
dYes, Article 11 is not fettered by Articles 5–10 and Parliament may even take away or affect citizenship already acquired under the earlier Articles
Answer: D
Article 11 preserves Parliament's plenary power over acquisition, termination and all matters of citizenship; Izhar Ahmed Khan v. UOI holds this power is not fettered by Articles 5–10 and Parliament may take away or affect citizenship already acquired thereunder.
Q45Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
A non-citizen submits an application to the Collector for registration as a citizen of India, and the Collector refuses to forward it to the Central Government. Per National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, such refusal:
aAmounts to denial of a statutory as well as a constitutional right, the Collector being obliged to forward the application to the Central Government
bIs valid, as the Collector has discretion to reject applications at the threshold
cIs permissible because only the State Government can entertain such applications
dIs justified since a non-citizen has no right to apply for registration at all
Answer: A
National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh held the Collector who receives a registration application is obliged to forward it to the Central Government, and refusal to do so amounts to denial of a statutory and constitutional right.
Q46Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
A Bill seeking to alter the boundaries of State X is to be introduced in Parliament. As to the views of State X's Legislature, which statement is correct under the proviso to Article 3?
aThe Bill cannot be introduced until State X's Legislature gives its consent to the proposal.
bThe President must refer the Bill to State X's Legislature for its views, but Parliament is not bound by those views; if the specified period expires without a response, the Bill may still be introduced.
cOnce the Bill is referred, every subsequent amendment to it must be referred afresh to State X's Legislature before being accepted.
dNo reference to State X's Legislature is required at all; only the recommendation of the President is needed.
Answer: B
Under the proviso to Art. 3 the President must refer such a Bill to the State Legislature for its views, but Parliament is not bound by them and the Bill may be introduced if the specified period expires without a response (Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay; Pradeep Chaudhary v. UOI). Consent (not mere views) is required only for J&K.
Q47DPSP & Fundamental Duties
The Fundamental Duties in Part IVA were added by which amendment, and on whose recommendation, as stated in the commentary?
aThe Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, on the recommendation of the Sarkaria Commission.
bThe Constitution (86th Amendment) Act, 2002, on the recommendation of the Swaran Singh Committee.
cThe Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, on the recommendation of the Swaran Singh Committee.
dThe Constitution (24th Amendment) Act, 1971, on the recommendation of the Swaran Singh Committee.
Answer: C
Part IVA (Art. 51A) was inserted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, in accordance with the recommendations of the Swaran Singh Committee.
Q48DPSP & Fundamental Duties
A citizen files a writ of mandamus seeking to compel another citizen to perform a duty listed in Art. 51A, and separately argues that the State must equip him to perform his own duties. Which statement reflects the commentary's position?
aFundamental Duties are enforceable by mandamus, and the State must equip the citizen to perform them.
bMandamus lies, but the State has no obligation to equip the citizen.
cThe duties are addressed to the State, so the citizen may compel the State to equip him.
dFundamental Duties are not enforceable by mandamus or any other legal remedy, and a citizen cannot claim that the State must equip him to perform his Art. 51A duties.
Answer: D
Surya Narain v. UOI holds Fundamental Duties are not enforceable by mandamus; HeadMasters Association, W.B. v. UOI holds a citizen cannot claim the State must equip him to perform his Art. 51A duties (the duties are addressed to citizens).
Q49DPSP & Fundamental Duties
Article 44 directs the State to endeavour to secure a uniform civil code. According to the commentary (Sarla Mudgal v. UOI), Art. 44 is based on which concept?
aThat there is no necessary connection between religion and personal law in a civilised society.
bThat personal law is an essential and inseparable part of every religion.
cThat a uniform civil code can be enforced directly by the courts through mandamus.
dThat personal laws are protected as fundamental rights immune from legislative change.
Answer: A
Sarla Mudgal v. UOI (1995) states Art. 44 rests on the concept that in a civilised society there is no necessary connection between religion and personal law; the Court urged early legislation to implement it.
Q50DPSP & Fundamental Duties
In State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat (2005), the Supreme Court upheld a total ban on slaughter of certain cattle as a reasonable restriction. On what reasoning regarding the relationship between Directive Principles and Article 19(6) did the Court principally rely?
aA Directive Principle automatically overrides a Fundamental Right whenever the two conflict
bImplementation of a Directive Principle falls within the expression 'restriction in the interests of the general public' in Article 19(6), so a restriction aimed at securing a Directive is reasonable, provided it does not clearly conflict with the right and is within legislative competence
cArticle 19(6) is wholly subordinate to Part IV, so no test of legislative competence applies to such restrictions
dA restriction securing a Directive Principle is conclusively valid and cannot be tested against Article 19 at all
Answer: B
In Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat (2005) the Court held that implementation of a Directive Principle is within 'restriction in the interests of the general public' under Art. 19(6), subject to two limitations: it must not clearly conflict with the Fundamental Right and must be within the enacting legislature's competence under Part XI.
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