Constitution of India Test 5 — Questions & Solutions
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A post-Constitution statute was enacted in clear violation of a fundamental right. Subsequently the Constitution was amended (prospectively) so as to remove the inconsistency. Can the statute be revived by the amendment?
aNo, a post-Constitution law violating a fundamental right is void ab initio (still-born) and cannot be revived by a subsequent prospective amendment
bYes, the doctrine of eclipse applies equally to post-Constitution laws
cYes, but only if the affected citizens consent
dNo, because Article 13(2) does not apply to post-Constitution laws at all
Answer: A
Per Deep Chand v. State of U.P. (AIR 1959 SC 648), a post-Constitution law contravening a fundamental right is void ab initio (still-born) under Article 13(2); the doctrine of eclipse does not apply and it cannot be revived unless the amendment is retrospective.
Q2Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
An applicant to a public office, after applying, challenged the constitutionality of the very Act creating that office on the ground that it violated his fundamental right under Article 16. The State argued he had waived the right by applying. What is the correct legal position on waiver of fundamental rights?
aFundamental rights conferred for individual benefit, such as Article 19, may be waived by the individual
bThere can be no waiver of fundamental rights and no estoppel against the Constitution; a person cannot waive any Part III right by his own act
cA fundamental right can be waived only by a registered instrument
dWaiver is permissible only against fundamental rights that are also available to aliens
Answer: B
In Basheshar Nath v. CIT and conclusively in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. (AIR 1986 SC 180), the Court held there can be no estoppel against the Constitution and no fundamental right under Part III can be waived by an individual's act.
Q3Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Where a law authorises imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and outside constitutionally permissible limits, and the offending portion cannot be separated without altering the language, what is the consequence?
aThe law is read down and applied only within constitutional limits
bOnly the unconstitutional applications are struck down, leaving the text intact
cThe whole law must be held wholly unconstitutional and void as it is not severable
dThe law is valid until the State actually applies it unconstitutionally
Answer: C
Per Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 124), where a single provision covers both permissible and impermissible restrictions and cannot be severed without altering the language, it must be held wholly unconstitutional and void—the doctrine of severability cannot save it.
Q4Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Under Article 14, a classification is valid only if it satisfies two conditions. Which of the following correctly states the twin test of permissible classification?
aThe classification must apply uniformly to all persons and must be approved by Parliament
bThe classification must benefit the disadvantaged and must be based on a prior judicial direction
cThe classification must treat all persons identically and must not create any inequality
dThe classification must be founded on intelligible differentia, and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation
Answer: D
The settled twin test (State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar) requires (i) classification founded on intelligible differentia distinguishing those grouped from those left out, and (ii) a rational nexus between that differentia and the object of the legislation.
Q5Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
In an examination for admission to an educational institution, the selection authority allocated a high percentage of total marks to the oral interview. Applying the test of arbitrariness under Article 14, which allocation has the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional?
aAllocation of more than 15% of total marks to the oral interview
bAllocation of exactly 15% of total marks to the oral interview
cAny allocation of marks to an oral interview, however small
dAllocation of less than 10% of total marks to the oral interview
Answer: A
In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (AIR 1981 SC 487), the Court struck down as violative of Article 14 the allocation of more than 15% of the total marks for the oral interview in an admission examination.
Q6Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A new criminal statute, enacted after an act was committed, sought to (i) make that act an offence for the first time and (ii) impose a penalty heavier than existed when the act was done. Which protection under Article 20(1) is engaged, and what exactly does it prohibit?
aIt prohibits the very passing of such a retroactive law by the legislature
bIt prohibits conviction under an ex post facto law and infliction of a penalty greater than that which could have been inflicted when the offence was committed
cIt prohibits any change in the procedure of trial even if no new offence is created
dIt prohibits retrospective civil liabilities as well as criminal penalties
Answer: B
Article 20(1) does not bar the passing of a retroactive law but bars conviction under an ex post facto law and the infliction of a penalty greater than that inflictable when the act was committed (Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal; Shiv Bahadur Singh Rao v. State of U.P.). Procedural changes are not barred.
Q7Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Customs authorities confiscated goods and imposed a penalty on a person under the Sea Customs Act; thereafter he was prosecuted in a criminal court for the same facts. He pleaded the bar of Article 20(2) (double jeopardy). Which condition essential to invoke Article 20(2) was NOT satisfied here?
aThe two offences must arise from the same set of facts
bThe accused must have raised the plea at the earliest stage
cThe earlier proceeding must have been before a court of law or judicial tribunal in which the person was 'prosecuted'
dThe later proceeding must impose a heavier penalty
Answer: C
In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay (AIR 1953 SC 325), customs confiscation proceedings were not a 'prosecution' before a court or judicial tribunal, so a condition essential to Article 20(2)—a prior prosecution and punishment before a judicial body—was absent, and the subsequent criminal trial was not barred.
Q8Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Which of the following is a correct distinction between the bar under Article 20(2) and the rule of 'issue estoppel' in criminal law?
aArticle 20(2) operates only on acquittal, whereas issue estoppel operates only on conviction
bBoth require an identical issue and identical offence
cIssue estoppel is a constitutional guarantee while Article 20(2) is a mere rule of evidence
dArticle 20(2) requires the offence to be identical and operates where the accused was prosecuted and punished, whereas issue estoppel applies where the accused was acquitted and the issue is identical
Answer: D
Per Asst. Collector of Customs v. L.R. Malwani (AIR 1970 SC 962), Article 20(2) requires the offence to be identical and bars a second prosecution after the accused was prosecuted and punished; issue estoppel, a facet of autrefois acquit, applies where there was a prior acquittal and the issue is identical.
Q9Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
The 44th Amendment Act, 1978, sought to reform the preventive-detention safeguards in Article 22, including reducing the detention period without Advisory Board confirmation from three months to two months and reconstituting the Advisory Board. What is the present status of these particular amendments?
aThey have never been brought into force, so the pre-amendment text of Article 22 still applies
bThey came into force immediately on the President's assent in 1978
cThey were struck down by the Supreme Court as violative of the basic structure
dThey came into force in 1982 following A.K. Roy v. Union of India
Answer: A
The 44th Amendment's changes to Article 22(4) and (7) were never notified into force; despite the Court's adverse comments in A.K. Roy v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 710), the amendment remains a dead letter and the pre-amendment text of Article 22 continues to apply.
Q10Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Which of the following arrests/detentions has been held to fall WITHIN the protection of Article 22(1)–(2) (right to be informed of grounds and produced before a magistrate)?
aRecovery and physical restraint of an abducted person under the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act, 1949
bArrest under the orders of the Speaker of a Legislature for contempt of the House
cArrest for detention in the civil prison for recovery of arrears of income-tax
dDeportation of an alien
Answer: B
Clauses (1)-(2) of Article 22 apply to arrests of a criminal/quasi-criminal nature. Civil-recovery arrests, recovery of abducted persons and deportation of aliens fall outside; but arrest under the Speaker's order for contempt was held within its protection (Gunapati Keshavram Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan).
Q11Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Workmen engaged on construction work for the Asiad Games were paid wages below the statutory minimum wage. They claimed a violation of Article 23. How did the Supreme Court treat the concept of 'forced labour' under Article 23?
aForced labour requires physical compulsion; payment of low wages cannot amount to it
bForced labour arises only where no remuneration at all is paid (begar)
cWhere a person is made to provide labour for remuneration less than the minimum wage, it amounts to 'forced labour' under Article 23
dArticle 23 is enforceable only against the State, so private contractors are immune
Answer: C
In People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 1473), the Court held 'forced labour' is a wide expression and is attracted whenever a person is obliged to work at wages below the statutory minimum wage, even if some remuneration is paid; Article 23 is enforceable even against private persons.
Q12Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A pre-Constitution executive deprivation of property continued to operate from day to day after the Constitution came into force. The deprived person challenged it as violative of his fundamental right. Which statement is correct?
aPart III being prospective, no pre-Constitution order can ever be challenged after 1950
bThe order is automatically void merely because the deprivation continues, regardless of its original validity
cOnly a fresh statute, not a continuing executive order, can be tested against Part III
dWhere the deprivation continues day-to-day, the order becomes void on contravention of a fundamental right as soon as the Constitution comes into force—provided the pre-Constitution order was void ab initio under the then-existing law
Answer: D
Though Part III is prospective, where a pre-Constitution order results in a continuing day-to-day deprivation it becomes void on the Constitution's commencement (Shantisarup R.S. Seth v. UOI)—but only if it was void ab initio under the pre-existing law; if it was valid then, the completed deprivation cannot be reopened (Zila Parishad Moradabad v. K.S. Mills).
Q13Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In Waman Rao v Union of India, the Supreme Court fixed which date as the watershed for testing laws added to the Ninth Schedule (Article 31B) against the basic structure doctrine?
a24 April 1973, the date of Kesavananda Bharati
b26 January 1950, the date of commencement
c27 February 1967, the date of Golak Nath
d1 February 1977, the date of the Forty-second Amendment
Answer: A
Waman Rao held that Ninth Schedule entries prior to 24 April 1973 (the date of Kesavananda Bharati) get full Article 31B protection, but later additions are valid only if they do not damage or destroy the basic structure.
Q14Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Which proposition best reflects the holding in IR Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu (2007) on Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule?
aArticle 31B itself is unconstitutional and was struck down
bArticle 31B is valid, but laws added to the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 can still be tested against the basic structure, since such insertion is an amendment under Article 368 and cannot confer unlimited immunity
cAll laws ever placed in the Ninth Schedule are absolutely immune from judicial review
dThe basic structure doctrine applies equally to ordinary statutes and executive action
Answer: B
IR Coelho treated Article 31B as valid but held that insertions after 24 April 1973 are amendments under Article 368 and thus subject to basic structure review; Article 31B cannot go beyond the limited amending power.
Q15Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Parliament passes a Constitution Amendment Bill that seeks to curtail the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 by setting up a tribunal. It is passed by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting in each House (exceeding 50% of total membership) and assented to by the President, but is NOT ratified by any State Legislature. Which of the following is correct?
aThe amendment is valid, since Article 226 falls within Part III and special ratification is never required for amendments touching the judiciary.
bThe amendment is valid, because ratification is required only when Article 368 itself is amended.
cThe amendment is invalid, because amendment of Article 226 (in Part VI, Chapter V) requires ratification by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States under the proviso to Article 368(2).
dThe amendment is invalid, because every Constitution Amendment Act requires State ratification.
Answer: C
Under the proviso to Article 368(2), an amendment affecting Chapter V of Part VI (High Courts in the States, which includes Art. 226) must be ratified by Legislatures of at least one-half of the States; absent ratification it is void.
Q16Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In Kihota Hollohan v. Zachilhu (1992), Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule (inserted by the 52nd Amendment) ousting all court jurisdiction over disqualification of members was struck down by the Supreme Court. On what specific ground was Paragraph 7 invalidated?
aIt violated the basic structure by destroying free and fair elections.
bIt was a colourable exercise of legislative power under Article 245.
cIt abolished the office of the Speaker as adjudicating authority.
dIt, in effect, changed Articles 136, 226 and 227 and therefore required ratification by half the State Legislatures under the proviso to Article 368(2), which was not obtained.
Answer: D
Though Para 7 did not alter the language of Arts. 136/226/227, its effect was to wholly oust their jurisdiction; the Court held it attracted proviso (b) to Art. 368(2), and for want of State ratification (Para 7 being severable) it was struck down.
Q17Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Consider the following propositions about clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 (inserted by the 42nd Amendment, 1976):
1. Clause (5) declared there shall be no limitation whatever on Parliament's constituent power to amend the Constitution.
2. Clauses (4)-(5) were struck down by the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills v. Union of India.
3. The ground of invalidation was that they destroyed the limited nature of the amending power and judicial review, both basic features.
Which are correct?
a1, 2 and 3
b1 and 2 only
c2 and 3 only
d1 and 3 only
Answer: A
In Minerva Mills (1980) the Constitution Bench invalidated Cls. (4)-(5) of Art. 368 because the limited amending power and judicial review are basic features; a donee of limited power cannot convert it into unlimited power.
Q18Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
The doctrine of basic structure was first propounded in Kesavananda Bharati (decided 24 April 1973). In Waman Rao v. Union of India, the Supreme Court fixed this date as the cut-off for applying the doctrine. What is the consequence for laws placed in the Ninth Schedule?
aAll laws in the Ninth Schedule, whenever inserted, enjoy absolute immunity from Part III challenge.
bLaws inserted before 24 April 1973 enjoy full Article 31-B protection, but laws inserted on or after that date are valid only if they do not damage the basic structure.
cOnly laws inserted after 24 April 1973 are immune; earlier ones can be reopened.
dThe Ninth Schedule was deleted from the Constitution after Kesavananda Bharati.
Answer: B
Per Waman Rao and reaffirmed in I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N. (2007), Ninth Schedule laws added before 24-4-1973 retain full Art. 31-B protection, while those added on or after that date must survive basic-structure scrutiny.
Q19Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Which of the following modes of altering the Constitution does NOT amount to an 'amendment of the Constitution' under Article 368?
aCession of a part of Indian territory to a foreign State.
bAmending the manner of election of the President under Article 54.
cCreation of a new State or reconstitution of existing States by Parliament under Articles 2-4 by simple majority.
dAmending the distribution of legislative powers in the Seventh Schedule.
Answer: C
Changes under Arts. 2-4 (reorganisation of States), 169 and 240, effected by simple majority, are expressly not treated as 'amendment of the Constitution' under Art. 368; cession of territory, by contrast, requires an Art. 368 amendment (Berubari).
A party who has exhausted appeal and review before the Supreme Court alleges that a final judgment has resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice due to violation of natural justice. Apart from review under Art. 137, what further remedy did the Supreme Court evolve, and where?
aA second review petition, recognised in P.N. Eswara Iyer
bA fresh writ petition under Art. 32 before a larger Bench
cA reference to the President under Art. 143
dA curative petition, conceived in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, to prevent abuse of process and cure gross miscarriage of justice
Answer: D
Although the Constitution prescribes no remedy after dismissal of a review petition, the Supreme Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra devised the 'curative petition' to be entertained in the rarest of rare cases (e.g. breach of natural justice or apprehension of bias) to cure gross miscarriage of justice.
A writ of mandamus is sought to compel the State to provide free legal aid by enforcing Art. 39A. The petition is liable to fail primarily because:
aA Directive Principle in Part IV is not legally enforceable until implemented by legislation, so no mandamus lies to compel the State to carry out a Directive
bMandamus never lies against the Government
cMandamus lies only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, never for any other purpose
dLegal aid is a private duty, not a public duty
Answer: A
Mandamus enforces a legal duty of a public nature, but a Directive Principle (such as Art. 39A) is not judicially enforceable until implemented by suitable legislation; hence no mandamus lies to compel the State to carry out a Directive.
A litigant whose only grievance is the violation of a statutory (non-fundamental) legal right wishes to seek a prerogative writ. Which of the following correctly states the position regarding Articles 32 and 226?
aHe may approach the Supreme Court under Article 32, as its writ jurisdiction extends to enforcing any legal right
bHe may approach the High Court under Article 226, but not the Supreme Court under Article 32, since Article 32 is confined to enforcement of fundamental rights
cHe may approach either court, as Articles 32 and 226 are co-extensive in scope
dHe may approach neither, as prerogative writs lie only for fundamental-rights violations
Answer: B
Article 32 can be invoked only for enforcement of Part III fundamental rights, whereas Article 226 is wider and may be exercised for enforcement of any legal right and 'for any other purpose' (Tirupati Balaji Developers v State of Bihar; Dwarka Nath v ITO).
A petitioner seeks a writ of quo warranto challenging an appointment to a public office, arguing that the appointee, though eligible, is unsuitable on grounds of character and competence. The High Court should:
aIssue the writ, since quo warranto tests both eligibility and suitability of the holder
bDismiss the petition for want of locus standi, as the petitioner has no personal interest
cDecline to issue the writ, since quo warranto lies for lack of eligibility but not for questions of suitability or fitness
dIssue the writ only if the petitioner first exhausts an alternative remedy
Answer: C
Quo warranto lies where the holder is ineligible or the appointment is contrary to statutory rules; 'suitability' or 'fitness' (character, integrity, competence) is a matter of opinion not amenable to the writ (Mahesh Chandra Gupta v Union of India). Locus standi is not required for quo warranto.
An inferior tribunal, protected by a statutory finality (ouster) clause, commits a mere error of law within its jurisdiction, without breaching natural justice. A party seeks certiorari from the High Court. Which is correct?
aCertiorari will lie, because an ouster clause cannot bar judicial review of any error
bCertiorari will lie only if the error caused financial loss to the party
cCertiorari will lie because finality clauses are unconstitutional
dCertiorari will not lie, because the error is within jurisdiction and the ouster clause precludes challenge to such an intra-jurisdictional error of law
Answer: D
Per Kihoto Hollohan v Zachillhu, an ouster clause limits certiorari to action outside jurisdiction; it precludes challenge to a mere intra-jurisdictional error of law that is not a nullity for breach of natural justice.
After the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act 1963, a fresh ground for invoking a High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 was introduced. Which of the following is that ground?
aThat the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the High Court's territory, even if the authority's seat lies outside it
bThat the Supreme Court has transferred the matter to the High Court
cThat the petitioner resides within the High Court's territory irrespective of where the cause of action arose
dThat the matter involves interpretation of the Constitution
Answer: A
The Fifteenth Amendment inserted Clause (1-A) (renumbered Clause (2) by the Forty-second Amendment) making cause of action arising wholly or in part within the territory an additional ground for Article 226 jurisdiction, notwithstanding the authority's seat being elsewhere.
Which of the following statements about the writ jurisdiction inter se between constitutional courts is INCORRECT?
aA High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court
bThe Supreme Court may issue a writ under Article 32 to a High Court to correct its judicial orders
cOne Bench of a High Court cannot issue a writ to another Bench of the same High Court
dThe writ jurisdiction of a High Court cannot be invoked to issue certiorari to the Supreme Court
Answer: B
Per Rupa Ashok Hurra v Ashok Hurra, even the Supreme Court would not issue a writ under Article 32 to a High Court; High Courts are not inferior courts though their orders are correctable in the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Q27Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A candidate's nomination to a Legislative Assembly is rejected at scrutiny because he then stood convicted of an offence entailing disqualification. During the pendency of the election petition, his conviction is set aside on appeal. The legal consequence is:
aThe setting aside is irrelevant, since disqualification is determined as on the date of scrutiny and cannot change
bHe can only contest a fresh election, not revive the existing petition
cThe rejection of his nomination would be set aside, because setting aside a conviction on appeal wipes it out retrospectively as if never passed
dThe election must be countermanded and held afresh for all candidates
Answer: C
Per Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal, AIR 1971 (commentary on Art. 102/173), an acquittal on appeal wipes out the conviction retrospectively, so a nomination rejected on that ground will be set aside in the election petition.
Q28Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
Which of the following persons would be DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for President under Art. 58(2), but would NOT be disqualified for membership of the Lok Sabha under Art. 102(1)(a)?
aA person of unsound mind so declared by a competent court
bAn undischarged insolvent
cA person who has voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship
dA person holding an office of profit under a local or other authority subject to the control of the Government (but not under the Government itself)
Answer: D
Per Abdul Shakoor v. Election Tribunal, AIR 1958 (commentary on Art. 102), the words 'under any local or other authority' appear in Arts. 58(2) and 66(4) but are absent in Art. 102(1)(a); so such an office disqualifies for President but not for Parliament.
Q29Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A person who is not a member of either House of a State Legislature is appointed a Minister and continues for eight months without getting elected. Which statement is correct?
aHe ceases to be a Minister at the end of six months from the date of his non-membership, and meanwhile he cannot vote in the House or its committees
bHe may continue indefinitely so long as he does not vote in the House
cHe is barred from even attending or speaking in the House, since he is not a member
dHis appointment was void from the outset, as only a sitting member can be a Minister
Answer: A
Per Art. 164(4) and Har Sharan Verma v. Tribhuvan Narain Singh, AIR 1971, a non-member may be a Minister for a maximum of six months and, under Art. 177, may speak but not vote in the House or its committees.
Q30Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
Following B.P. Singhal v. UOI, (2010), which statement about a Governor's tenure under Art. 156 is correct?
aArt. 156(3) guarantees a fixed five-year term that overrides the President's pleasure
bA Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President and may be removed without notice or cause, though such removal is open to limited judicial review for arbitrariness or mala fides
cA Governor can be removed only by impeachment by Parliament
dThe President must record reasons in every order of removal, failing which it is automatically void
Answer: B
In B.P. Singhal v. UOI, (2010), the Court held the Governor holds office during the President's pleasure and may be removed without cause; the five-year term in Art. 156(3) is not a limitation, but removal is subject to limited judicial review for arbitrariness/mala fides.
Q31Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A Legislative Assembly is prematurely dissolved. A petition contends that under Art. 174(1) fresh elections must be held within six months because not more than six months may intervene between two sittings. The correct view is:
aCorrect; Art. 174(1) prescribes a six-month outer limit for holding fresh elections after dissolution
bCorrect; Art. 174(1) read with Art. 356 compels elections within six months
cIncorrect; Art. 174(1) applies only to a live, existing Assembly, prescribes no limitation period for elections after dissolution, and conduct of elections lies in the exclusive domain of the Election Commission under Art. 324
dIncorrect; the six-month rule applies but is directory, not mandatory
Answer: C
Per the commentary on Art. 174, it deals only with a live legislature and contains no six-month limit for post-dissolution elections; conduct of elections is the exclusive domain of the Election Commission under Art. 324.
Q32Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
Regarding the composition of a State Legislative Council under Art. 171, which of the following is correct?
aThe total number of members of a Council may equal the strength of the Legislative Assembly
bAbout one-third of the members are elected by members of the Legislative Assembly from among persons who are themselves members of the Assembly
cAll members of the Council are directly elected by the people of the State
dThe total membership of a Council shall not exceed one-third of the Assembly's strength and in no case be less than forty, with about one-twelfth elected by a graduates' electorate
Answer: D
Under Art. 171(1), the Council's total must not exceed one-third of the Assembly and not be less than forty; Art. 171(3)(b) provides that about one-twelfth are elected by an electorate of graduates of at least three years' standing.
Q33Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Which of the following grounds for a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 352(1) was REMOVED by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978?
aInternal disturbance
bExternal aggression
cWar
dImminent danger of armed rebellion
Answer: A
The 44th Amendment substituted 'armed rebellion' for 'internal disturbance' as a ground under Art. 352(1), so internal disturbance is no longer a ground for a Proclamation of Emergency.
Q34Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
A continuous, unmanageable influx of millions of people fleeing across the border into an Indian State, impairing its economic and political well-being, was held capable of constituting 'external aggression' triggering the Union's duty under Article 355. This was held in:
aS.R. Bommai v. UOI (1994)
bSarbananda Sonowal v. UOI (2005)
cMinerva Mills v. UOI (1980)
dState of Rajasthan v. UOI (1977)
Answer: B
In Sarbananda Sonowal v. UOI (2005), the Court held 'aggression' in Art. 355 is wider than 'war' and a bloodless inundation by millions of fleeing migrants threatening a State's existence can amount to external aggression.
Q35Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Under Article 356, a Proclamation of President's Rule has been in force for one year and the Union wishes to extend it further by resolution. Which conditions must be satisfied for any extension beyond one year?
aOnly that the Election Commission certifies that elections cannot be held
bOnly that a Proclamation of Emergency under Art. 352 is in operation
cBoth: a Proclamation of Emergency under Art. 352 must be in operation, AND the Election Commission certifies that continuance is necessary due to difficulties in holding elections in that State
dA special majority resolution of both Houses, with no further conditions
Answer: C
Article 356(5) (44th Amendment) bars extending President's Rule beyond one year unless BOTH a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation in India or the State, AND the Election Commission certifies elections cannot be held in the State.
Q36Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Which of the following correctly distinguishes Article 358 from Article 359?
aArticle 358 operates only on a Presidential Order, while Article 359 is automatic on the Proclamation
bArticle 358 can suspend enforcement of Articles 20 and 21, while Article 359 cannot
cArticle 359 suspends Article 19 automatically, while Article 358 needs a Presidential Order
dArticle 358 automatically suspends Article 19 (only on war/external aggression), while Article 359 requires a separate Presidential Order to suspend enforcement of specified rights
Answer: D
Per Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1964): Art. 358 automatically suspends Art. 19 (now only on war/external aggression) once the Proclamation issues; Art. 359 needs a further Presidential Order to suspend the enforcement of specified rights (and after the 44th Amendment cannot include Arts. 20 and 21).
Q37Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
During a Proclamation of Financial Emergency under Article 360, which of the following directions is the President NOT competent to issue?
aDirecting the President himself to dissolve the State Legislative Assembly
bDirecting reduction of salaries and allowances of persons serving the affairs of a State
cDirecting reduction of salaries of Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts
dDirecting that all Money Bills passed by a State Legislature be reserved for the President's consideration
Answer: A
Article 360(3)-(4) empowers the President to direct States to observe canons of financial propriety, reduce salaries (including of SC/HC Judges), and reserve State Money Bills; it contains no power to dissolve a State Assembly (that arises under Art. 356, not Art. 360).
Under Art. 317, the Chairman or a Member of a Public Service Commission is sought to be removed on the ground of 'misbehaviour'. What is the prescribed procedure?
aThe President may remove him directly after recording reasons, without any reference
bRemoval only by the President's order after the Supreme Court, on a Presidential reference, inquires and reports that he ought to be removed
cParliament must pass an address by special majority as in the case of a Supreme Court Judge
dThe Governor may suspend and remove him on the advice of the Council of Ministers
Answer: B
Art. 317(1) provides that removal for misbehaviour can be ordered by the President only after the Supreme Court, on a reference, holds an inquiry under Art. 145 and reports that he ought to be removed; this vests the determination in the Supreme Court to immunise the PSC from political pressure.
Art. 320(3)(c) requires consultation with the Public Service Commission in disciplinary matters. A government servant was dismissed without such consultation. Relying on State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, what is the effect?
aThe dismissal is null and void for want of mandatory consultation
bThe dismissal is void only if the servant proves prejudice
cThe provision is not mandatory; omission of consultation does not confer a right on the servant nor render the action void
dThe Commission's prior approval is a condition precedent and its absence vitiates the order
Answer: C
In State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava the Supreme Court held the words 'shall be consulted' in Art. 320(3) are directory; non-consultation does not make the action null and void and confers no enforceable right, since Art. 311 (not Art. 320) protects the servant.
Article 319 bars a former Chairman/Member of a PSC from further 'employment under the Government'. In Hargovind Pant v. Raghukul Tilak, the Court held that appointment of an ex-PSC Member as Governor was not barred because:
aA Governor is appointed by the President and therefore falls outside Art. 319
bThe bar applies only to ex-Chairmen, not to ex-Members
cThe bar lapses two years after the Member ceases to hold office
dA constitutional office like Governor is not 'employment under the Government', there being no master-servant relationship or governmental control
Answer: D
In Hargovind Pant v. Raghukul Tilak the Court applied the twofold test of master-servant relationship and governmental control and held a constitutional office (Governor) held under the Constitution and not subordinate to Government is not 'employment under the Government' under Art. 319.
Article 361 grants personal immunity to the Governor for acts done in his official capacity. Where a Governor exercises functions ex officio as Chancellor of a University (a statutory body), what is the position regarding immunity?
aThe Chancellor cannot claim the immunity conferred upon the Governor by Art. 361(1), as those powers are not exercised by virtue of his office as Governor under the Constitution
bThe Chancellor's acts attract the full immunity of Art. 361(1) as he is the same person as the Governor
cThe immunity extends vicariously to all officers appointed by the Governor as Chancellor
dThe Chancellor must act on the advice of the Council of Ministers and the State is liable for his acts
Answer: A
Per Hardwari Lal v. G.D. Tapase, statutory ex-officio functions such as Chancellor of a University are not exercised by virtue of the office of Governor under the Constitution, so the Chancellor cannot claim Art. 361(1) immunity and need not act on ministerial advice.
Article 361A protects newspaper publication of a substantially true report of legislative proceedings. Which of the following reports would NOT enjoy this protection?
aA substantially true report of a debate on a motion before the House, published without malice
bA report of the proceedings of a secret sitting of either House of Parliament
cA report of proceedings broadcast by wireless telegraphy as part of a broadcasting service, published without malice
dA substantially true report of an open sitting of a State Legislative Assembly, published without malice
Answer: B
The proviso to Art. 361A(1) excludes reports of the proceedings of a secret sitting from the protection; the immunity otherwise applies to substantially true reports (including by wireless broadcast under cl. (2)) of Union or State legislative proceedings made without malice.
Q43Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
An agreement between India and a neighbouring foreign State involves ceding a part of Indian territory to that foreign State. By what means can this cession be lawfully implemented?
aBy an ordinary law of Parliament passed under Article 3.
bBy executive action of the Union Government implementing the treaty, without any legislation.
cOnly by an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368.
dBy a law passed under Article 4 amending the First Schedule.
Answer: C
Per Re Berubari Union, Art. 3 is confined to inter-State adjustments and cannot effect cession of Indian territory to a foreign State; such cession requires a constitutional amendment under Art. 368. A mere settlement of a boundary dispute, however, is not a cession (Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. UOI).
Q44Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
A law passed by Parliament under Article 3 reorganising States amends the First Schedule and provides for the apportionment of assets and the representation of the affected States in Parliament. Which statement is correct?
aBecause it amends the First Schedule, the law must be passed by the special majority procedure prescribed in Article 368.
bThe validity of such a law can be challenged on the ground that it trenches upon a subject in the State List of the Seventh Schedule.
cSuch supplemental provisions may extend to abolishing the legislature of an affected State altogether.
dSuch a law is not deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 368, even though it amends the First and Fourth Schedules.
Answer: D
Art. 4(2) expressly provides that a law under Art. 2 or 3 amending the First and Fourth Schedules is not deemed an amendment under Art. 368. The power is plenary and not fettered by Art. 246 or the Lists (Mullaperiyar; Kuldip Nayar), but it cannot abolish a State's organs altogether (Mangal Singh v. UOI).
Q45Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
After 1-3-1947 but before 26-1-1950, M moved from India to a place now in Pakistan to take up employment for an indefinite period, his family and considerable property remaining in India. He did not return under any permit for permanent resettlement. What is his citizenship status at the commencement of the Constitution?
aHe is not deemed to be a citizen of India, because such departure constitutes 'migration' under Article 7 notwithstanding his retained Indian domicile and property.
bHe remains a citizen of India because he retained his Indian domicile and immovable property here.
cHe remains a citizen of India because intention of permanent residence in Pakistan is essential to 'migration' and he had none.
dHis status must be determined by the Central Government under section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955.
Answer: A
Under Art. 7 a person who migrated to Pakistan after 1-3-1947 is not deemed a citizen of India. 'Migration' does not require change of domicile or intention of permanent residence; departure for employment for an indefinite period suffices, and retention of property/family in India is irrelevant (Kulathil Mammu v. State of Kerala).
Q46Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
P was admittedly a citizen of India under Article 5. The State Government, alleging that P later voluntarily acquired a foreign citizenship by obtaining a foreign passport, prosecutes him as a foreigner without any prior determination on the citizenship question. Which authority is competent to decide whether P lost his Indian citizenship?
aThe High Court in a writ petition under Article 226.
bThe Central Government, under section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, and such determination is a condition precedent to action against him.
cThe State Government, since it is prosecuting him.
dA civil court by way of a suit for declaration.
Answer: B
The Central Government has exclusive jurisdiction under s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 to decide whether a citizen lost citizenship by voluntarily acquiring foreign citizenship; courts cannot decide it under Art. 226/32 or by suit, and that determination is a condition precedent to action against the person (State of A.P. v. Khader Abdul; State of Gujarat v. Ibrahim Yakub).
Q47DPSP & Fundamental Duties
An indigent accused, relying on Article 39A read with Article 21, files a writ petition seeking that the State be compelled to supply him a lawyer at State cost, there being no legislation specifically implementing Article 39A. As per the commentary's view (Ranjan Dwivedi v. UOI), what is the correct legal position?
aHe can compel the State by writ to supply a lawyer because Article 39A is directly enforceable
bHe has no remedy of any kind since Directive Principles create no rights
cIn the absence of implementing legislation he cannot compel the State by writ; his remedy lies in an application to the Sessions Court under Section 304(1) Cr.P.C.
dHe may only approach the High Court under Article 226, never a Sessions Court
Answer: C
Per Ranjan Dwivedi v. UOI (AIR 1983), absent legislation implementing Art. 39A an accused cannot compel the State by writ to furnish a lawyer at State cost; the remedy of an indigent accused lies in an application to the Sessions Court under s. 304(1), Cr.P.C., 1973.
Q48DPSP & Fundamental Duties
Regarding the legal enforceability and utility of Fundamental Duties under Article 51A, which of the following statements is INCORRECT?
aFundamental Duties are not enforceable by mandamus or any other legal remedy
bIf the State makes a law to prohibit conduct violating a Fundamental Duty, the courts may uphold it as a reasonable restriction on the relevant Fundamental Right
cCourts may look at the Duties while interpreting equivocal statutes admitting of two constructions
dA citizen may compel the State by writ to equip him so that he may perform his duties under Article 51A
Answer: D
Per HeadMasters Association, W.B. v. UOI (AIR 1983), since the Duties are addressed to the citizen and not the State, a citizen cannot claim the State must equip him to perform his Art. 51A duties; the other statements correctly reflect the commentary (Surya Narain; Mumbai Kamgar Sabha).
Q49DPSP & Fundamental Duties
In Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja (2014), banning Jallikattu and bullock-cart races, the Supreme Court described which provisions as the 'magna carta of animal rights' read into the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960?
aArticle 51A(g) and Article 51A(h)
bArticle 48 and Article 48A alone
cArticle 21 and Article 51A(a)
dArticle 47 and Article 39(e)
Answer: A
In Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja (2014) the Court held that Articles 51A(g) (compassion for living creatures) and 51A(h) (scientific temper, humanism) are the 'magna carta of animal rights' and must be read into ss. 3 and 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.
Q50DPSP & Fundamental Duties
On the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' under Article 39(d), which statement best reflects the position taken in the commentary?
aIt is an independently enforceable Fundamental Right expressly conferred by Article 39(d) itself
bIt is not a Fundamental Right per se but is a constitutional goal that colours Articles 14 and 16, so its denial through irrational classification can be struck down, yet unequals cannot be made equals
cCourts must mechanically grant parity wherever any similarity of duties exists, regardless of qualifications or mode of recruitment
dIt applies only as between the two sexes and never within the same sex
Answer: B
Per Randhir Singh v. UOI (AIR 1982) and later cases, 'equal pay for equal work' is not itself a Fundamental Right but a constitutional goal colouring Arts. 14 and 16; denial through irrational classification is invalid, but unequals (e.g. differing qualifications, mode of recruitment, responsibilities) cannot be treated as equals.
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