Constitution of India Test 3 — Questions & Solutions
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An accused is acquitted by a Customs authority in adjudication proceedings under the Sea Customs Act and is later prosecuted before a criminal court on the same facts. He pleads the bar of Article 20(2). Which condition, essential to invoke Article 20(2), is NOT satisfied here?
aThere was no prior 'prosecution and punishment' before a court of law or judicial tribunal, since proceedings before a customs/statutory authority are not a 'prosecution'
bThe two offences are distinct
cThe accused had not yet been arrested
dThe grounds of detention were not communicated
Answer: A
Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay held that proceedings before a customs authority are not a 'prosecution' before a court or judicial tribunal, so Article 20(2) (which requires prior prosecution AND punishment) is not attracted.
Q2Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
An accused, against whom an FIR is registered, is directed by the investigating agency to provide a specimen of his voice and his thumb impressions. He claims protection under Article 20(3). Which is correct?
aBoth the voice sample and thumb impressions are protected, as they are testimony against himself
bNeither voice samples nor thumb impressions are protected, as they are merely 'identification data' and do not convey personal knowledge relating to the charge
cOnly the voice sample is protected; thumb impressions are not
dProtection applies only if physical force is used to obtain them
Answer: B
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (thumb/finger impressions, specimen writing) and Ritesh Sinha v. State of U.P. (voice sample) hold these are mere identification data, not 'being a witness', hence outside Article 20(3).
Q3Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Investigating officers, without the subject's consent, administer a narco-analysis test to obtain verbal answers and seek to use the results in the trial. On the application of Article 20(3), which statement is correct?
aNarco-analysis results are always admissible as they are scientific evidence
bArticle 20(3) has no application to narco-analysis as it is not 'testimony'
cCompulsory administration of narco-analysis to elicit verbal responses amounts to testimonial compulsion barred by Article 20(3), though the bar does not apply where the subject gives informed consent
dArticle 20(3) applies even to voluntary, consented tests, making them inadmissible
Answer: C
Selvi v. State of Karnataka held compulsory narco-analysis imparting personal knowledge is testimonial compulsion barred by Article 20(3), but the bar does not apply where the person gives informed consent.
Q4Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A statute provides that no person tried for an offence before a Panchayat Court (which can try criminal charges but cannot impose imprisonment) shall be defended by a lawyer. The provision is challenged under Article 22(1). What is the correct position?
aThe provision is valid because the tribunal cannot impose imprisonment
bArticle 22(1) applies only to persons under preventive detention
cArticle 22(1) guarantees an absolute right to be supplied with a lawyer at State expense
dThe provision is void for contravening Article 22(1), as it denies the accused his right to be defended by a lawyer of his choice in a trial of the offence, regardless of the tribunal's power to imprison
Answer: D
State of M.P. v. Shobharam struck down a statutory bar on lawyers before a Panchayat Court as violating Article 22(1); the right to be defended by counsel does not depend on the tribunal's power to imprison.
Q5Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A person already in jail in connection with a criminal case is sought to be placed under preventive detention. The detention is challenged as unnecessary because he is already in custody. What is the correct legal principle?
aThere is no legal bar to passing a detention order against a person in custody, but it should ordinarily not be exercised unless there is cogent material that the detenu is likely to be released and the detaining authority is subjectively satisfied detention is needed
bA detention order can never be passed against a person already in custody
cA pending criminal prosecution is an absolute bar to any preventive detention
dPreventive detention requires proof of an offence beyond reasonable doubt
Answer: A
T. P. Moideen Koya v. Govt. of Kerala held there is no bar to detaining a person in custody if the authority is subjectively satisfied; ordinarily it should not be done absent cogent material that he is likely to be released on bail.
Q6Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
It is contended that a pending criminal prosecution bars an order of preventive detention on the same facts, and vice versa. What did the Supreme Court hold in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal?
aPreventive detention and criminal prosecution are parallel, mutually exclusive proceedings; one bars the other
bA preventive detention order may be made in anticipation of, simultaneously with, or even after discharge or acquittal in, a criminal proceeding, and may rely on the same facts; pendency of prosecution is no bar
cPreventive detention can be ordered only after conviction in the criminal case
dPreventive detention is barred once a criminal proceeding is withdrawn for want of evidence
Answer: B
Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B. held criminal prosecution and preventive detention are not parallel bars; detention may be ordered before, with, or after a prosecution, even on the same facts, and pendency of prosecution is no bar.
Q7Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
In Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, the Supreme Court clarified the test for determining whether a body is 'State' under Article 12. Which of the following best reflects the holding regarding the Ajay Hasia indicators?
aSatisfaction of any one of the Ajay Hasia indicators automatically makes a body 'State'
bOnly bodies created by statute can ever be 'State' under Article 12
cThe Ajay Hasia indicators are not a rigid formula; the real test is whether the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by, or under the pervasive control of, the Government
dMere regulatory control by the Government is sufficient to make a body 'State'
Answer: C
Pradeep Kumar Biswas (2002) held the Ajay Hasia tests are not rigid; the body must be financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under pervasive (not merely regulatory) governmental control to be 'State' under Art. 12.
Q8Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A body administratively located outside the territory of India is controlled by the Government of India. Regarding its status under Article 12:
aIt can never be 'State' because it is outside Indian territory
bIt is 'State' only if a special statute is enacted
cThe question of Article 12 does not arise for bodies outside India
dIt may still be 'State' because the phrase 'under the control of the Government of India' qualifies 'other authorities', not 'territory'
Answer: D
The expression 'under the control of the Government of India' qualifies 'other authorities', not 'territory'; hence an authority located outside India may still be 'State' under Art. 12 if it is under the pervasive control of the Government of India.
Q9Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
In Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, the Supreme Court held that a final judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be assailed under Article 32 as violative of fundamental rights. The principal reason was:
aSuperior courts of justice do not fall within 'State' or 'other authorities' under Article 12 when exercising judicial functions
bArticle 32 is not itself a fundamental right
cOnly High Courts, not the Supreme Court, are amenable to Article 32
dA judgment can be challenged only by a party to the case
Answer: A
Rupa Ashok Hurra (2002) held superior courts exercising judicial functions are not 'State' or 'other authorities' under Art. 12, so a final judicial order cannot violate Part III; relief lies only via a curative petition.
Q10Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
The doctrine of eclipse, as explained in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P., applies to:
aBoth pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws inconsistent with fundamental rights
bA pre-Constitution law which was valid when enacted but became inconsistent on the commencement of the Constitution, and which revives once the inconsistency is removed
cPost-Constitution laws only, which become void ab initio
dLaws placed in the Ninth Schedule
Answer: B
Per Bhikaji Narain Dhakras, the doctrine of eclipse applies to pre-Constitution laws valid at enactment but overshadowed by Art. 13(1); removal of the inconsistency (e.g. by amendment) revives the law in full vigour.
Q11Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Under Article 13(1), a pre-Constitution law inconsistent with fundamental rights is 'void to the extent of the inconsistency'. Following Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, what is the effect of such voidness as regards aliens?
aThe law is wiped off the statute book entirely and cannot operate against anyone
bAliens may also invoke the inconsistency to escape the law
cThe law remains good and enforceable as against persons not entitled to the relevant fundamental right, such as aliens
dThe law becomes void only prospectively against all persons
Answer: C
Behram and Bhikaji held Art. 13(1) does not obliterate the law for all persons; it remains good against those not given the fundamental right (e.g. aliens regarding Art. 19 rights), being unenforceable only against rights-holders.
Q12Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
On the question whether a fundamental right may be waived by the individual entitled to it, the position settled in Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax is that:
aRights conferred solely for individual benefit, including Article 19(1) rights, can be waived
bOnly the right under Article 14 can be waived
cWaiver is permissible if reduced to a written agreement
dNo fundamental right can be waived, as such rights are prohibitions addressed to the State founded on public policy
Answer: D
In Basheshar Nath, Bhagwati and Subba Rao, JJ. held a fundamental right is a prohibition addressed to the State and cannot be waived by an individual, agreeing with the majority in Behram's case that the rights rest on public policy.
Q13Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Which of the following amendments was held by the courts NOT to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution?
aThe abolition of privy purses and privileges of ex-Rulers by the 26th Amendment
bThe insertion of Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule by the 52nd Amendment
cThe amended Article 31C inserted by the 42nd Amendment
dClauses (4)-(5) of Article 368 inserted by the 42nd Amendment
Answer: A
In Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC 1267), the 26th Amendment abolishing privy purses was upheld, the privileges being incompatible with the republican and egalitarian basic features; the other three were struck down.
Q14Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v Union of India (1951), on what basis did the Supreme Court reject the argument that a constitutional amendment could be struck down for violating Part III?
aIt held that fundamental rights were a part of the basic structure and hence immune from amendment
bIt held that the word 'law' in Article 13 did not include constitutional amendments, which are an exercise of constituent power distinct from ordinary legislation
cIt held that Parliament's amending power flowed from Entry 97 of List I and not from Article 368
dIt held that amendments to Part III required ratification by at least half of the State legislatures
Answer: B
In Shankari Prasad the Court drew a distinction between constituent power and ordinary legislation and held that 'law' in Article 13 does not include constitutional amendments, so amendments could not be challenged for contravening Part III.
Q15Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
The earliest seeds of the basic structure doctrine in India are traced to which judicial opinions?
aThe unanimous opinion in Shankari Prasad
bThe majority opinion of Subba Rao CJ in Golak Nath
cThe minority opinions of Hidayatullah and Mudholkar JJ in Sajjan Singh
dThe opinion of Khanna J in Kesavananda Bharati
Answer: C
The minority opinions of Hidayatullah and Mudholkar JJ in Sajjan Singh (1965) first questioned whether the 'basic features' of the Constitution could be amended, giving the doctrine its early origins.
Q16Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Mudholkar J in his Sajjan Singh opinion drew support for limits on the amending power from a decision of which foreign court?
aThe Supreme Court of the United States
bThe House of Lords (United Kingdom)
cThe Constitutional Court of Germany
dThe Supreme Court of Pakistan
Answer: D
Mudholkar J took note of a Supreme Court of Pakistan decision (Fazlul Quader Chowdhry) that held universal franchise and the form of government to be beyond the amendment power.
Q17Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In Golak Nath v State of Punjab (1967), where did the majority locate the substantive power to amend the Constitution, treating Article 368 as merely procedural?
aIn Articles 245, 246 and 248 read with Entry 97 of List I
bIn Article 13 of the Constitution
cIn the Preamble
dIn Article 368 itself read with the proviso
Answer: A
Golak Nath held that the amending power was derived from Articles 245, 246 and 248 (and Entry 97 of List I), with Article 368 merely prescribing procedure, so amendments were ordinary 'law' subject to Article 13.
Q18Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Which constitutional amendment was enacted to nullify Golak Nath by clarifying Articles 13 and 368 to confirm that Parliament could amend any part of the Constitution?
aThe Twenty-fifth Amendment
bThe Twenty-fourth Amendment
cThe Thirty-ninth Amendment
dThe Forty-second Amendment
Answer: B
The Twenty-fourth Amendment clarified Articles 13 and 368 to make clear there were no restrictions on Parliament's amending power; it was challenged in Kesavananda Bharati.
Q19Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
How did Kesavananda Bharati (1973) differ from Golak Nath in the textual basis it used to restrict the amending power?
aIt relied on Article 13 to subject amendments to Part III, exactly as Golak Nath had
bIt located the limits in the Preamble alone
cIt placed restrictions on the amending power by virtue of Article 368 itself, rejecting the reliance on Article 13 and the residuary-power theory
dIt held that all amendments required ratification by the States
Answer: C
Kesavananda overruled Golak Nath in key respects: it accepted the constituent-power/ordinary-law distinction, rejected the residuary-power and Article 13 routes, and found implied limits within Article 368 itself.
When does the Supreme Court have power under Art. 139A(1) to withdraw cases pending before High Courts to itself?
aWhenever any case is pending before two or more High Courts, regardless of the questions involved
bOnly on an application made by the Attorney-General of India, and never suo motu
cOnly to transfer a case from a Debts Recovery Tribunal to a High Court
dWhere cases involving the same or substantially the same questions of law are pending before the Supreme Court and one or more High Courts, and those are substantial questions of general importance
Answer: D
Art. 139A(1) permits withdrawal where cases with the same or substantially the same questions of law are pending before the Supreme Court and one or more High Courts and those are substantial questions of general importance. After the 44th Amendment the Court may act suo motu or on application by the Attorney-General or a party.
A litigant wants to challenge an appointment to a public office, arguing that the appointee lacks the statutory qualification to hold it. Which of the following is the most appropriate writ, and on what basis as to standing?
aQuo warranto, which may be sought by any member of the public acting bona fide, even without any personal interest in the office
bMandamus, which requires the applicant to show infringement of his own legal right
cCertiorari, available only to a person who was a party to the appointment proceedings
dProhibition, available only before the appointee assumes charge of the office
Answer: A
Quo warranto tests the validity of a title to a public office; the concept of locus standi is inapplicable and any bona fide member of the public may apply, since the applicant enforces no right of his own. It is thus an exception to the rule that only an aggrieved person may move under Art. 226.
A District Judge whose appointment is later declared invalid (for want of proper consultation with the High Court under Art. 233) had already decided several cases before the declaration. What is the effect on those judgments?
aAll such judgments automatically become void and must be retried
bThe judgments remain valid under the 'de facto' doctrine, as he held office under colour of lawful authority
cThe judgments are valid only if confirmed by the Governor
dThe judgments are void but the parties cannot challenge them in any proceeding
Answer: B
Under the de facto doctrine (Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P.), judgments pronounced and acts done by a judge holding office under colour of lawful authority, before his appointment is declared invalid, retain the same efficacy as those of a de jure judge.
In which of the following situations would the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 131 NOT be attracted?
aA dispute between two States as to the existence of a legal right
bA dispute between the Government of India and a State on the constitutional validity of a Central law
cA dispute in which a private statutory corporation is impleaded as a party alongside a State
dA dispute between the Union and a State as to their competence to legislate under Schedule VII
Answer: C
Art. 131 jurisdiction is confined to disputes between the constituent units of the federation; the enlarged definition of 'State' in Art. 12 does not extend to Art. 131, so a statutory corporation is not a 'State' and a suit involving a private party must go to the ordinary courts (State of Bihar v. UOI).
A High Court refuses to grant a certificate under Art. 132(1) to appeal against its judgment involving a substantial question of constitutional interpretation. After the deletion of Art. 132(2) by the 44th Amendment, what is the aggrieved party's remedy?
aApply to the Supreme Court for a certificate under Art. 132(2)
bFile a review petition in the High Court under Art. 137
cSeek a reference by the President under Art. 143
dApproach the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal under Art. 136
Answer: D
After omission of Art. 132(2) by the 44th Amendment, the Supreme Court can no longer itself grant a certificate where the High Court has refused; the remedy of a person denied a certificate under Art. 132(1) is to seek special leave under Art. 136.
When the Supreme Court dismisses a special leave petition under Art. 136 by a non-speaking order (without giving any reasons), which of the following correctly states the legal consequence?
aThere is no merger; the High Court judgment continues to exist and may be reviewed by the High Court
bThe High Court judgment merges into the Supreme Court's order and cannot be reviewed
cThe dismissal lays down the law under Art. 141 and binds all courts
dIt bars all other parties from filing a special leave petition against the same judgment
Answer: A
A summary dismissal of an SLP by a non-speaking order does not attract the doctrine of merger nor lay down law under Art. 141; the High Court judgment subsists and can be reviewed, and other parties are not barred from filing their own SLPs (Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala).
An inferior tribunal, having jurisdiction over the subject-matter, decides a question of fact wrongly on the evidence before it. A party seeks certiorari under Art. 226. The High Court should:
aIssue certiorari, since any erroneous finding of fact is reviewable
bRefuse certiorari, because the function in certiorari is supervisory, not appellate, and a mere error of fact within jurisdiction is not a ground
cConvert the petition into an appeal and reappraise the entire evidence
dIssue prohibition instead, to stop the tribunal from acting
Answer: B
Certiorari is supervisory, not appellate; it does not lie for an erroneous decision of fact (or law) within jurisdiction. It issues only for jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice, or an error of law apparent on the face of the record.
Q27Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A sitting MLA holds a position carrying an 'honorarium' from the State Government and is alleged to be disqualified under Article 191(1)(a)/102(1)(a) for holding an office of profit. Which test did the Supreme Court lay down?
aAny payment, however labelled, automatically makes the office one of profit
bThe label 'honorarium' conclusively saves the office from being one of profit
cThe substance, not the label, matters; there must be some pecuniary gain beyond mere compensation for out-of-pocket expenses
dOnly payments exceeding a statutorily fixed amount can constitute an office of profit
Answer: C
Per Shibu Soren v. Dayanand Sahay, (2001), it is the substance not the form that matters; an honorarium does not constitute an office of profit unless it yields some pecuniary gain beyond compensation defraying out-of-pocket expenses, capable of bringing the holder under executive influence.
Q28Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
Which of the following holders is NOT regarded as holding an 'office of profit under the Government' so as to be disqualified from membership of the Legislature under Article 102(1)(a)?
aThe Comptroller and Auditor-General of India
bA person holding a permanent salaried post directly under a State department
cA person paid a salary by the Central Government for a permanent post
dA salaried employee of a municipality (a statutory body)
Answer: D
Per Abdul Shakoor v. Election Tribunal, AIR 1958 and Ashok Kumar Bhattacharyya v. Ajoy Biswas, AIR 1985, office under a statutory body (e.g., a municipality) is not office 'under the Government'; whereas the CAG, though independent, is held to be an 'officer' of the Union Government.
Q29Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
On a resolution for the removal of the Speaker of the House of the People, the Speaker, though present, does not preside. Regarding his right to vote on that resolution, which is correct under Article 96?
aHe may speak and take part, and is entitled to vote only in the first instance, but not in the case of an equality of votes
bHe cannot vote at all on the resolution or on any other matter during those proceedings
cHe has only a casting vote in case of equality
dHe may vote both in the first instance and exercise a casting vote
Answer: A
Art. 96(2) allows the Speaker, while a resolution for his removal is under consideration, to speak and take part, and to vote only in the first instance, but not in the case of equality of votes (i.e., no casting vote). This contrasts with Art. 92(2) where the Chairman cannot vote at all.
Q30Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
The Legislative Assembly of a State stands dissolved a few weeks before the term of the sitting President expires, so its elected members cannot vote in the Presidential election. Which of the following correctly states the legal position?
aThe Presidential election must be postponed until the new Assembly is constituted, because the electoral college under Art. 54 would otherwise be incomplete
bThe election must still be completed before the expiry of the President's term under Art. 62(1), and the absence of those members does not invalidate it
cThe outgoing President's term automatically stands extended until that State elects a fresh Assembly
dThe Vice-President must act as President until the dissolved Assembly is reconstituted and votes
Answer: B
Under Re Presidential Election, AIR 1974, the time limit in Art. 62(1) read with Art. 56(1) is mandatory and the election cannot be postponed; Art. 71(4) protects the election notwithstanding any vacancy in the electoral college 'for whatever reason'.
Q31Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A retired High Court judge holding no other post is elected President. Within days of taking the oath under Art. 60, it emerges that on the date of his nomination he had not taken the oath prescribed by the Third Schedule. His election is challenged on this ground. The challenge will:
aSucceed, because every person filling a constitutional office must take the Third Schedule oath before nomination
bSucceed, because Art. 84(a) applies to all elected constitutional functionaries
cFail, because the qualifications for a Presidential candidate are exhaustively governed by Art. 58, not Art. 84, and the only oath he must take is under Art. 60 after election
dFail only if Parliament has by law exempted Presidential candidates from the oath
Answer: C
Per the commentary on Arts. 58 and 84 (Baburao Patel v. Zakir Hussain; Charan Lal Sahu v. Zail Singh), a Presidential candidate need not take the Third Schedule oath; Art. 58 governs his qualifications and the Art. 60 oath is taken only after election, before entering office.
Q32Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
Both the office of President and that of Vice-President fall vacant simultaneously due to death. Under the President (Discharge of Functions) Act, 1969 (enacted under Art. 70), the Chief Justice of India discharges the President's functions. Does the disqualification in Art. 58(2) (office of profit) bar him?
aYes, because the CJI holds a constitutional office of profit
bYes, unless Parliament specifically exempts the CJI
cNo, because judges of the Supreme Court are deemed not to hold any office of profit
dNo, because he is only discharging the functions of the President and is not seeking election as President
Answer: D
Per Arun Kumar v. UOI, AIR 1982 (commentary on Art. 70), the disqualification under Art. 58(2) is not attracted because the CJI merely discharges the functions of the President and is not seeking election as President.
Q33Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Under Article 360, a Proclamation of Financial Emergency permits the Union to issue directions including a requirement that:
aAll Money Bills passed by a State Legislature be reserved for the President's consideration
bThe State Legislative Assembly be dissolved within thirty days
cAll State High Court judges be transferred
dThe Election Commission postpone all State elections
Answer: A
Article 360(4)(a)(ii) allows directions requiring all Money Bills (and other Bills to which Art. 207 applies) to be reserved for the President's consideration after passage by the State Legislature; salaries (including of SC/HC judges) may also be reduced.
Q34Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Under Article 257(2)-(4), where the Union directs a State as to construction/maintenance of communications of national or military importance, and extra costs are incurred, any dispute over the sum payable, in default of agreement, is determined by:
aThe Finance Commission
bAn arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of India
cThe Inter-State Council under Article 263
dThe President in his discretion
Answer: B
Article 257(4) provides that the extra costs are paid by the Government of India as agreed, or in default of agreement, as determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of India (a similar mechanism appears in Arts. 258(3)).
Q35Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
A direction can validly be issued by the Union to a State under Article 256 only when:
aThe Prime Minister considers it politically necessary
bThe matter falls within the exclusive State sphere
cThere is a law made by Parliament or an existing law applying in that State, compliance with which is sought to be ensured
dThe Governor recommends such a direction
Answer: C
Article 256 operates only where a Parliamentary law or existing law applies in the State; it does not empower the Union to interfere in matters of exclusive State concern. A letter advising dissolution of the Assembly is not a 'direction' (State of Rajasthan v. UOI).
Q36Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Regarding adjudication of inter-State river water disputes under Article 262 read with the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, which statement is correct?
aThe Supreme Court's jurisdiction is barred from the moment any State raises a complaint, even before a Tribunal is constituted
bA State Legislature may enact a law deciding such a dispute in its own favour
cThe Tribunal's award cannot be challenged before the Supreme Court under Article 136 in any circumstance
dParliament may by law oust the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and all other courts over such disputes, and this bar operates once the Tribunal is constituted and the dispute referred to it
Answer: D
Art. 262(2) lets Parliament bar court jurisdiction; per State of Orissa v. Government of India the bar under s.11 operates only once the Tribunal is constituted and the dispute referred. A State law deciding such a federal dispute is void (State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala), and an award is challengeable under Art. 136.
Q37Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Under Article 249, Parliament acquires power to legislate on a matter in the State List in the national interest only when:
aThe Council of States, by a special majority, declares it expedient in the national interest
bThe Lok Sabha, by a simple majority, so resolves
cA Proclamation of Emergency under Article 352 is in operation
dTwo or more States request Parliament to do so
Answer: A
Under Art. 249, the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) must, by a resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of members present and voting, declare it expedient in the national interest before Parliament can make temporary laws on a State List matter. (This is distinct from Art. 250, which operates during an Emergency.)
A candidate's nomination paper is wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer during the election process. As per Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, his remedy is:
aan immediate writ petition under Article 226 to set aside the rejection
bto await the election and then challenge it by an election petition; no intermediate remedy lies
ca civil suit for a declaration
dan appeal to the Election Commission, whose order is final and unchallengeable
Answer: B
Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer (AIR 1952 SC 64) held 'election' in Article 329(b) covers the whole process from notification onward; even wrongful rejection of nomination can be challenged only by a post-election election petition, with no intermediate court remedy.
The Comptroller and Auditor-General of India is removed from office:
aby the President at pleasure
bby a resolution of the Public Accounts Committee
cin the like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court
dby the President on the advice of the Council of Ministers
Answer: C
Article 148(1) provides that the CAG, though appointed by the President by warrant, can be removed only in the same manner and on the same grounds as a Supreme Court Judge (i.e., by the address procedure of Article 124(4)).
In Association of Unified Tele Services Providers v. UOI, the Supreme Court held regarding the CAG's powers under Article 149 that:
athe CAG can never audit any private entity under any circumstances
bParliament can abolish the CAG's audit functions by ordinary law
cthe CAG's audit reports are binding and not open to comment by the Government
dthe duties and powers of the CAG under Article 149 are part of the basic structure and cannot be taken away by Parliament
Answer: D
In Association of Unified Tele Services Providers v. UOI ((2014) 6 SCC 110), the Court held the CAG's duties and powers under Article 149 are part of the basic structure and upheld audit of telecom licensees' revenue-sharing accounts to protect public revenue.
Two States, after passing resolutions in their respective Legislatures, wish to have a single Public Service Commission serving both. Under Article 315(2), such a Joint State Public Service Commission can be created by:
aan order of the President alone
ba law made by Parliament
can agreement between the two Governors
da notification by the Union Public Service Commission
Answer: B
Under Article 315(2), where the Legislature of each concerned State passes a resolution, Parliament may by law provide for a Joint State Public Service Commission to serve those States.
Q43Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
A Muslim wife moved to Pakistan after 1-3-1947 for an indefinite period, leaving her husband (who retained Indian domicile) in India, and did not return under a permit for permanent return. Applying Abdus Samad v. State of W.B., her citizenship status is:
aShe retains Indian citizenship because, as a wife, her domicile follows her husband who stayed in India
bShe retains citizenship because a married woman is legally incapable of migrating on her own
cShe loses Indian citizenship under Article 7, since the wife-follows-husband domicile rule does not apply to 'migration', and she failed to show the move was for a temporary purpose
dHer status can only be decided by a civil suit, not under Article 7
Answer: C
Abdus Samad v. State of W.B. held the private-international-law rule that a wife's domicile follows the husband's does not apply to 'migration' under Article 7; she loses Indian citizenship if she cannot show the migration was for a temporary purpose.
Q44Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
A man left India for Pakistan after 1-3-1947 to take up employment for an indefinite period, acquired no property in Pakistan, and left considerable property and his parents behind in India. On the question of 'migration' under Article 7 (Kulathil Mammu v. State of Kerala), these facts mean:
aHe did not migrate, because retention of property and family in India negatives migration
bMigration under Article 7 requires proof of acquired domicile of choice in Pakistan
cThe question is irrelevant because Article 7 applies only to women and minors
dHe migrated, since departure for employment for an indefinite period is migration, and non-acquisition of property abroad and leaving family behind are not relevant considerations
Answer: D
Kulathil Mammu held 'migration' means voluntary movement not for a specific or short purpose and is not equated with change of domicile; departure for employment for an indefinite period is migration, and facts like leaving property or family behind are not relevant considerations.
Q45Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
Q continued to reside in India until 26-1-1950 and thereby acquired Indian citizenship under Article 5, but went to Pakistan in 1953. The State seeks to treat him as a foreigner. Which is correct?
aHaving acquired citizenship under Article 5, he does not lose it merely by later moving to Pakistan unless it is shown he voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship, a question for the Central Government under s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act
bHe automatically loses Indian citizenship under Article 7 by going to Pakistan after 26-1-1950
cArticle 9 applies and he automatically ceases to be a citizen
dAny High Court may decide the loss of citizenship under Article 226 by examining disputed facts
Answer: A
State of U.P. v. Shah Md. holds Article 7 covers migration only between 1-3-1947 and 26-1-1950; one who acquired citizenship under Article 5 does not lose it by later movement to Pakistan unless he voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship, determinable exclusively by the Central Government under s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955.
Q46Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
In a deportation proceeding it is admitted that R acquired Indian citizenship, but the Government alleges he later lost it by obtaining a Pakistani passport. The High Court is moved under Article 226. Per Khader Abdul and State of Gujarat v. Ibrahim Yakub, the court should:
aItself decide whether R voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship and pass final orders
bStay/relegate the matter for determination by the Central Government under s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, since such determination is a condition precedent to action against R as a foreigner
cDirect the State Government to decide the question of foreign citizenship
dDismiss the petition as the question is non-justiciable in every forum
Answer: B
Where a person admittedly held Indian citizenship, only the Central Government under s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act can decide whether he lost it by voluntarily acquiring foreign citizenship; such determination is a condition precedent (State of Gujarat v. Ibrahim Yakub) and courts cannot decide it themselves.
Q47DPSP & Fundamental Duties
In Ratlam Municipal Council v. Vardhichand, the Supreme Court relied on Art. 38 (read with s. 133 Cr.P.C.) to hold which of the following?
aA municipality may decline to abate a public nuisance in slums on the plea of inadequate financial resources.
bCourts cannot interfere with municipal sanitation matters as they fall outside justiciable Directives.
cCourts should make a positive mandatory order directing the municipality to remove the public nuisance within a given time, irrespective of its financial resources.
dOnly the State Government, and not the courts, can compel a municipality to remove insanitary conditions.
Answer: C
Ratlam Municipal Council v. Vardhichand (1980) held that, having regard to Art. 38, courts may issue a positive mandatory order to abate the nuisance within a fixed time regardless of the municipality's finances.
Q48DPSP & Fundamental Duties
A group demonstrating against the Government burns a copy of the Constitution at a meeting and then claims the meeting is protected by the freedoms in Art. 19. On the reasoning in the commentary on Fundamental Duties, what is the correct position?
aThe act is fully protected, since Art. 51A duties carry no legal consequence whatsoever.
bThe demonstrators may be punished directly under Art. 51A(a) even in the absence of any law.
cArt. 51A applies only to the State and so is irrelevant to the demonstrators' claim.
dBurning the Constitution violates the duty in Art. 51A(a); such conduct cannot claim the protection of the freedom of expression or assembly under Art. 19.
Answer: D
The commentary explains that one who burns the Constitution in breach of the duty in Art. 51A(a) cannot assert Art. 19 protection for the assembly; though the duty itself is not directly enforceable, it negates the rights claim.
Q49DPSP & Fundamental Duties
Which of the following Fundamental Duties under Art. 51A is matched with the CORRECT clause?
aTo protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to have compassion for living creatures — Cl. (g).
bTo develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform — Cl. (g).
cTo safeguard public property and to abjure violence — Cl. (j).
dTo strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity — Cl. (h).
Answer: A
Under Art. 51A, Cl. (g) is protection of the natural environment and compassion for living creatures; (h) is scientific temper, (i) is safeguarding public property and abjuring violence, and (j) is striving towards excellence.
Q50DPSP & Fundamental Duties
In Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja (2014), which clauses of Art. 51A were described as the 'magna carta of animal rights' and read into Sections 3 and 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960?
aArt. 51A(a) and (b).
bArt. 51A(g) and (h).
cArt. 51A(c) and (d).
dArt. 51A(i) and (j).
Answer: B
In A. Nagaraja (2014) the Court held Arts. 51A(g) (compassion for living creatures) and (h) (humanism) are the magna carta of animal rights and must be read into ss. 3 and 11 of the PCA Act, 1960.
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