Constitution of India Test 2 — Questions & Solutions
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A minority educational institution under Article 30(1) admits some non-minority students. Per P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, the effect is—
aAdmission of a “sprinkling of outsiders” does not make it shed its minority character and may better serve conservation of the minority’s language, script and culture
bThe institution immediately loses its minority character
cIt must convert to a wholly aided general institution
dIt can no longer claim any administrative autonomy
Answer: A
Per P.A. Inamdar, Arts. 29(2) and 30(1) read together contemplate a minority institution with a “sprinkling of outsiders”; admitting non-minority members does not cause it to shed its minority character and may better conserve the minority’s language, script and culture.
Q2Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Regarding who may invoke the writ of habeas corpus under Article 32, the commentary recognises an exception to the rule that one may enforce only one’s own fundamental rights. That exception permits—
aAn absolute stranger to file for any writ on another’s behalf
bAny person, provided he is not an absolute stranger, to seek habeas corpus to liberate someone illegally imprisoned
cAn association to file under Art. 32 to enforce members’ rights
dA petitioner to complain of discrimination suffered by others under any Article
Answer: B
Per Harbans Singh v. State of U.P., habeas corpus is an exception: not only the detained person but any person who is not an absolute stranger may move to liberate someone illegally imprisoned; ordinarily a petitioner can enforce only his own rights (State of A.P. v. McDowell).
Q3Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
On the maintainability of habeas corpus under Article 32, which situation is correct per the cases in the commentary?
aA petition becomes automatically infructuous the moment the detenu is released, barring any later challenge
bA natural mother may obtain habeas corpus for her minor child even where custody is lawful under a Family Court order
cWhere custody of a minor is lawful under a competent Family Court order, a habeas corpus petition is not maintainable as the custody is not illegal
dCertiorari may be issued against a High Court’s judicial order
Answer: C
Per Saiba Ali v. State of Maharashtra, where a child’s custody is lawful under a competent Family Court order, habeas corpus is not maintainable since the custody is not illegal; the Court will not issue certiorari against a High Court (Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar).
Q4Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A journalist files a writ under Article 32 contending that a High Court judge's order prohibiting publication of a witness's evidence violated his freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a). On the question whether the judicial order can be attacked as 'State' action under Article 12, which proposition is correct?
aEvery act of a court, judicial or administrative, is 'State' under Article 12 and can be challenged for violating fundamental rights
bCourts are wholly excluded from Article 12 for both judicial and administrative functions
cOnly the Supreme Court, and not the High Courts, falls within 'State' under Article 12
dA purely judicial order of a superior court cannot be said to violate fundamental rights, as such courts are outside 'State' qua their judicial functions, though they are 'State' when acting administratively
Answer: D
In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra and Riju Prasad Sarma v. State of Assam, courts are excluded from 'State' only as regards their judicial orders, but are 'State' when acting in their administrative capacity.
Q5Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Applying the test laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, when is a body held to be an 'instrumentality or agency' of the State under Article 12?
aWhen it is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by, or under the deep and pervasive control of, the Government, such control being particular to that body and not mere regulatory control
bWhenever it satisfies any one of the indicia listed in Ajay Hasia, since those indicia are a rigid set
cOnly if it has been created by a statute
dWhenever it receives any recognition or affiliation from the State
Answer: A
Pradeep Kumar Biswas held that the Ajay Hasia factors are not rigid; the real test is whether the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the pervasive (not merely regulatory) control of the Government.
Q6Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A pre-Constitution law that was inconsistent with a fundamental right is later amended so as to remove the inconsistency. The State seeks to act under the amended provision, but it is argued that the law was 'dead' at the commencement of the Constitution and cannot be revived. Which doctrine answers this argument?
aDoctrine of severability — only the offending clause is void
bDoctrine of eclipse — the inconsistent pre-Constitution law was only overshadowed, not dead, and revives in full once the inconsistency is removed
cDoctrine of waiver — the right could be waived once amended
dDoctrine of pith and substance
Answer: B
Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P. and Deep Chand v. State of U.P. establish that under Article 13(1) a pre-Constitution inconsistent law is only eclipsed; removing the inconsistency revives it for all purposes.
Q7Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Regarding the difference between Article 13(1) and Article 13(2) as to the effect of unconstitutionality, which statement is correct?
aBoth clauses render the offending law void ab initio, so even pre-Constitution transactions are reopened
bA pre-Constitution inconsistent law is void ab initio, while a post-Constitution contravening law is merely eclipsed
cA post-Constitution law contravening Part III is void ab initio and even convictions under it must be set aside, whereas a pre-Constitution inconsistent law is rendered void only from the commencement of the Constitution and does not affect past, closed transactions
dNeither clause makes any law void without a Constitutional amendment
Answer: C
Keshavan Madhava Menon held Art. 13(1) is prospective (void only from commencement, past transactions saved), while Deep Chand held an Art. 13(2) post-Constitution contravening law is stillborn/void ab initio, vitiating even convictions under it.
Q8Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A litigant who had applied for and obtained appointment to an office created by a statute later challenges that very statute as violating his fundamental right under Article 16, arguing nonetheless that he had waived the right by applying. What is the correct position on waiver of fundamental rights?
aFundamental rights created for the benefit of individuals, such as Article 19, can be waived
bA fundamental right can be waived only with the consent of the President
cA fundamental right is lost merely by non-exercise over a period of time
dThere can be no waiver of any fundamental right and no estoppel against the Constitution; a person cannot waive a fundamental right by any act of his
Answer: D
Basheshar Nath v. CIT and the Constitution Bench in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation held there can be no waiver of fundamental rights and no estoppel against the Constitution.
Q9Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A State law confers a special, more favourable procedure on a defined class of persons. To survive a challenge under Article 14 on the ground of reasonable classification, the classification must satisfy two cumulative conditions. Which pair correctly states them?
aThe differentia must be founded on an intelligible basis distinguishing the group from those left out, AND that differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute
bThe classification must be scientifically perfect, and it must benefit a backward class
cThe classification must treat all citizens identically, and it must be approved by Parliament
dThe classification must be geographical, and it must be free of any over-inclusiveness whatsoever
Answer: A
Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar and State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar lay down the twin test: intelligible differentia plus rational nexus with the object of the legislation.
Q10Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
The Legal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act was made applicable only to the State of Assam. The Supreme Court struck it down under Article 14. On which precise ground?
aA State law can never single out one State for special treatment
bThe classification confining the Act to Assam had no rational nexus with the policy and object of the Act, and was therefore violative of Article 14
cParliament lacked legislative competence to legislate for Assam
dThe Act violated Article 20(1) by being retrospective
Answer: B
In Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India the classification limiting the Act to Assam had no rational nexus with its policy and object and was struck down under Article 14.
Q11Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
Several civilian National Awards (such as Bharat Ratna and Padma awards) are challenged as 'titles' prohibited by Article 18(1). Which statement reflects the Supreme Court's view?
aAll National Awards are titles and are void under Article 18(1)
bNational Awards are valid only because they are military distinctions
cNational Awards are not 'titles' within Article 18(1) and are not violative of equality, but they cannot be used as suffixes or prefixes to the recipient's name
dNational Awards may freely be used as prefixes and suffixes once conferred
Answer: C
Balaji Raghavan v. Union of India held National Awards are not 'titles' under Article 18(1), are not violative of equality (also supported by Art. 51A duties), but must not be used as prefixes or suffixes to names.
Q12Fundamental Rights (Art 12–35)
A State legislature, to control unauthorised use of canal water, enacts a law levying a special enhanced rate for such unauthorised use, with retrospective effect. The levy is challenged as a higher 'penalty' imposed retrospectively in breach of Article 20(1). What is the correct view?
aArticle 20(1) is violated because any retrospective monetary burden is a penalty
bArticle 20(1) is violated because the rate is enhanced
cArticle 20(1) applies because the levy is imposed by a revenue authority
dArticle 20(1) is not attracted, because there was no law prohibiting the use of water, hence no 'offence' and no 'punishment'; the levy is a civil liability, not a penalty
Answer: D
In Jawala Ram v. State of Pepsu, since no law forbade the use of water, there was no 'offence' or 'punishment'; the enhanced rate was a civil liability, so Article 20(1) was not attracted.
Q13Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court held that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973—
aMust be tested on the touchstone of the basic structure doctrine and may be struck down if they damage the essence of a fundamental right
bEnjoy absolute immunity from any challenge whatsoever
cAre open to challenge only for procedural defects under Article 368
dCan be challenged only by the State Legislatures that originally enacted them
Answer: A
I.R. Coelho ((2007) 2 SCC 1) held that post-24 April 1973 insertions into the Ninth Schedule lose absolute immunity and must be tested against the basic structure, particularly the essence of fundamental rights.
Q14Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
A constitutional amendment seeks to cede a part of Indian territory to a foreign State. Which is the correct constitutional route?
aIt can be done by ordinary law under Article 3 by simple majority
bIt requires an amendment of Article 1 under Article 368, as the cession involves territory of India
cIt can be done by an executive treaty alone under Article 253
dIt is wholly outside the amending power and impermissible
Answer: B
As held in Re Berubari Union and Sasanka Sekhar Maity, cession of Indian territory to a foreign power cannot be done by ordinary law; it requires amendment of Article 1 under Article 368 since Article 368 includes power to amend Article 1.
Q15Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the 39th Amendment (Article 329A) on the ground that it violated which basic feature?
aSecularism
bIndependence of the judiciary
cFree and fair elections / the democratic structure
dFederalism
Answer: C
In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (AIR 1975 SC 2299), the validation of the Prime Minister's election immune from judicial scrutiny was held subversive of the principle of free and fair elections, a basic feature of the Constitution.
Q16Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Which of the following alterations is NOT treated as an 'amendment of the Constitution' within the meaning of Article 368?
aAmendment of any List in the Seventh Schedule
bAmendment of the manner of election of the President under Article 54-55
cAmendment of the provisions of Article 368 itself
dCreation of a new State or reconstitution of existing States under Articles 2-4
Answer: D
Matters under Articles 2-4 (creation/reconstitution of States), Article 169 and Article 240 are alterable by simple majority and are expressly NOT treated as 'amendment of the Constitution'; the others fall within Article 368, with (b), (c) and (d) requiring State ratification.
Q17Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
In Minerva Mills, while striking down the amended Article 31C, the Court identified which feature as part of the bedrock basic structure of the Constitution?
aThe balance between Part III (Fundamental Rights) and Part IV (Directive Principles)
bThe supremacy of Directive Principles over Fundamental Rights
cThe unlimited primacy of Article 19 over all other provisions
dThe exclusion of judicial review for economic legislation
Answer: A
Minerva Mills held that the harmony and balance between Parts III and IV is an essential basic feature; the amended Article 31C, by giving Part IV absolute primacy and withdrawing Articles 14 and 19, destroyed that balance.
Q18Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
Following the Minerva Mills reasoning, why can Parliament NOT amend Article 368 so as to convert itself into a new Constituent Assembly with unlimited power?
aBecause Article 368 cannot be amended at all
bBecause the limited nature of the amending power is itself a basic feature that Parliament cannot enlarge
cBecause such amendment requires a national referendum
dBecause the President can veto any such amendment
Answer: B
Minerva Mills held that the limited nature of the amending power under Article 368 is itself a basic feature; the donee of a limited power cannot use that power to convert it into an unlimited one or make itself a new Constituent Assembly.
Q19Amendment, basic structure & landmark cases
An amendment removes certain classes of cases from the jurisdiction of a High Court only incidentally—by curtailing a fundamental right—rather than by directly altering Article 226. Per the commentary on the proviso to Article 368(2), is State ratification required?
aYes, because any narrowing of Article 226's field attracts the proviso
bYes, because Article 226 is in Part VI, Chapter V
cNo, because the proviso is not attracted where the impact on Article 226 is merely incidental
dNo, because High Court jurisdiction is never covered by the proviso
Answer: C
Per Sajjan Singh and Sankari Prasad, the proviso is not attracted merely because the field of Article 226 is incidentally narrowed (e.g., by deleting a fundamental right); ratification is needed only where the object is directly to restrict Article 226.
On the distinction between the writs of certiorari and prohibition, which statement is correct?
aBoth writs lie against administrative and local bodies as well as private persons performing any duty
bCertiorari, but not prohibition, can be issued to compel a tribunal to exercise a jurisdiction it has declined
cProhibition issues to quash a completed order, whereas certiorari prevents a tribunal from proceeding
dProhibition issues before the inferior tribunal makes the order, to prevent usurpation of jurisdiction, while certiorari issues after the order to quash it
Answer: D
Prohibition and certiorari have the same object (preventing usurpation of jurisdiction) but differ in the stage: prohibition is preventive, issuing while proceedings are pending, while certiorari is curative, issuing after the order to quash it. Both lie only against judicial/quasi-judicial authorities, not to compel action (that is mandamus).
The High Court's power of superintendence under Art. 227 differs from its writ jurisdiction under Art. 226. Which statement is correct?
aUnder Art. 227 the High Court may not only quash the impugned order but also give directions guiding the inferior court, and may substitute its own decision in an appropriate case
bUnder Art. 227 the High Court issues a writ of certiorari to quash, and can then do no more
cThe power under Art. 227 can be exercised only on the application of an aggrieved party and never suo motu
dThe jurisdiction under Art. 227 can be taken away by ordinary legislation declaring the tribunal's decision final
Answer: A
Art. 227 confers wider supervisory power than certiorari: the High Court may quash and additionally issue guiding directions, and even substitute its own decision in appropriate cases. No writ is issued under Art. 227; it may be exercised suo motu and cannot be ousted by ordinary legislation.
Applying the rule in Daryao v. State of U.P. on res judicata between Art. 226 and Art. 32, in which situation will a fresh petition under Art. 32 be BARRED?
aWhere the High Court dismissed the Art. 226 petition in limine on a preliminary ground without a speaking order
bWhere the Art. 226 petition was dismissed on the merits by a speaking order which has not been set aside in appeal
cWhere the earlier petition was for habeas corpus and was dismissed by the High Court
dWhere the High Court left the question open without deciding it
Answer: B
Per Daryao, a writ petition under Art. 226 dismissed on the merits by a speaking order operates as res judicata barring a later Art. 32 petition on the same facts unless set aside on appeal. Dismissal in limine, a question left open, and habeas corpus petitions are exceptions.
Which of the following statements about the scope of Art. 32 is correct?
aArt. 32 may be invoked to enforce an ordinary statutory right even where no fundamental right is infringed
bThe Supreme Court may, under Art. 145, validly require security to be furnished for filing a petition under Art. 32
cThe right to move the Supreme Court under Art. 32 is itself a fundamental right and forms part of the basic structure
dArt. 32 may be used to compel the State to implement a Directive Principle of State Policy
Answer: C
The right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights is itself a fundamental right and an inviolable part of the basic structure. Art. 32 lies only for fundamental-rights violations; a rule requiring security was struck down in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr.
On the territorial reach of the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Art. 226, which proposition is correct after the insertion of clause (2)?
aA writ may issue irrespective of where the cause of action arises, against any authority anywhere in India
bA writ can issue only if the person or authority is physically resident or located within the High Court's territory, the situs of the cause of action being immaterial
cThe territorial limits applicable to Art. 226 are identical to those of the Supreme Court under Art. 32
dA writ may issue where the cause of action wholly or in part arises within the High Court's jurisdiction, even though the seat of the Government/authority lies outside it
Answer: D
Art. 226(2) enables a High Court to issue writs where the cause of action wholly or in part arises within its jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the authority or residence of the person is outside its territory.
Both the Supreme Court (Art. 129) and the High Courts (Art. 215) are courts of record with power to punish for contempt. Which statement correctly reflects the law on this contempt power?
aThe inherent power to punish for contempt under Art. 129/215 cannot be denuded, restricted or abrogated by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
bArts. 129 and 215 confer a wholly new jurisdiction on these courts which did not exist before the Constitution
cThe contempt power under Art. 129 is entirely a creation of, and can be limited by, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
dThe Supreme Court's power under Art. 129 extends only to contempt of itself and not of subordinate courts or tribunals
Answer: A
Arts. 129 and 215 merely recognise a pre-existing situation; the inherent contempt power cannot be abrogated or restricted by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Rajeshwar Singh v. Subrata Roy Sahara). The Supreme Court can also act for contempt of High Courts, lower courts and tribunals.
The Supreme Court has power under Art. 137 to review its judgments, and has evolved a further remedy of the 'curative petition'. Which statement is correct?
aIn a criminal case, review lies on any ground available in a civil case, including re-appreciation of evidence
bThe curative petition remedy was conceived in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra to cure gross miscarriage of justice after dismissal of a review
cA curative petition is the first remedy and may be filed even without first seeking a review
dA curative petition need not aver that the grounds were taken in the review petition and need not be certified by a Senior Advocate
Answer: B
The curative petition was conceived in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra as a remedy in rarest cases to prevent gross miscarriage of justice after a review is dismissed. It must aver the grounds were raised in the review and be certified by a Senior Advocate; criminal review is ordinarily confined to error apparent on the record.
Q27Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
Which of the following correctly distinguishes a nominated member of the Rajya Sabha from an elected member, as recognised by the Supreme Court?
aA nominated member cannot vote on ordinary Bills
bA nominated member cannot become a Minister
cA nominated member cannot participate in the election of the President of India, whereas an elected member can
dA nominated member holds office for two years only, an elected member for six
Answer: C
Per Kuldip Nayar v. UOI, (2006), there is no difference in status between elected and nominated Rajya Sabha members except that nominated members cannot participate in the Presidential election, since Art. 54 limits the electoral college to 'elected members'.
Q28Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
During a Proclamation of Emergency, the term of the House of the People is sought to be extended. What is the maximum period and limit for such extension under Article 83(2)?
aBy Parliament by law, for any period it thinks fit while the Emergency lasts
bBy the President by order, for one year, renewable indefinitely
cBy Parliament by law, for a single fixed period of two years
dBy Parliament by law, for not more than one year at a time, and not beyond six months after the Proclamation ceases to operate
Answer: D
The proviso to Art. 83(2) permits Parliament by law to extend the Lok Sabha's term during a Proclamation of Emergency for not more than one year at a time, and in no case beyond six months after the Proclamation ceases to operate.
Q29Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A member of the House of the People resigns by a letter addressed to the Speaker. The Speaker, on inquiry, is satisfied that the resignation was extracted under coercion. Which is correct?
aThe Speaker shall not accept the resignation if satisfied it is not voluntary or genuine, and until accepted it may be withdrawn
bThe resignation takes effect from the date of the letter regardless of the Speaker's view
cThe Speaker must accept it but may later refer the matter to the President
dOnly a court can decide whether the resignation was voluntary
Answer: A
After the 33rd Amendment, the proviso to Art. 101(3)(b) empowers the Speaker/Chairman to refuse a resignation found not voluntary or genuine; per UOI v. Gopal Chandra Misra, AIR 1978, resignation is effective only on acceptance and may be withdrawn before then.
Q30Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A person aged 33 years, a citizen of India and otherwise qualified, files nomination for election as President. The nomination is rejected. On what ground is the rejection valid?
aHe has not taken the oath prescribed by the Third Schedule
bHe has not completed thirty-five years of age, as required by Article 58(1)(b)
cHe is not a registered elector in any State
dHe has not completed thirty years of age as required for the Council of States
Answer: B
Art. 58(1)(b) requires a Presidential candidate to have completed thirty-five years of age. Per Baburao Patel v. Zakir Hussain, AIR 1968, qualifications such as age and citizenship are governed by Art. 58 itself, and a Presidential candidate need not take the Third Schedule oath.
Q31Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
Which is the correct distinction between 'prorogation' and 'adjournment' of a House of Parliament as explained by the Supreme Court?
aBoth terminate the session, but prorogation also dissolves the House
bProrogation is ordered by the Speaker, adjournment by the President
cAdjournment is an interruption within the same session, while prorogation terminates the session and ends, with exceptions, all then-current proceedings
dAdjournment ends the life of the House; prorogation merely suspends a sitting
Answer: C
Per Ramdas Athawale v. UOI, (2010), an adjournment is an interruption within one and the same session, whereas prorogation (under Art. 85(2)(a)) terminates the session and puts an end, with certain exceptions, to all then-current proceedings.
Q32Union & State executive, Parliament & legislatures
A law and a Constitution Amendment Act are passed during a Lok Sabha session from which several members are absent because they are in preventive detention. The validity of the legislation is challenged on that ground. Which is correct?
aThe legislation is void because Article 85 requires the full composition of the House
bThe legislation is valid only if the Speaker had granted leave of absence to the detained members
cThe court must summon the detained members to verify the quorum before ruling
dThe legislation is valid; non-attendance of some members does not affect the composition of Parliament or render the session invalid
Answer: D
Per Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Rajnarain, AIR 1975, Art. 85 does not deal with composition (which is in Art. 81); non-attendance of some members does not invalidate a session of a duly constituted House, and Art. 122 bars courts from questioning proceedings on that ground.
Q33Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
A Proclamation issued under Article 356 must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within what period, failing which it ceases to operate?
aTwo months
bOne month
cThree months
dSix months
Answer: A
Under Art. 356(3), a Proclamation of President's Rule ceases to operate at the expiration of two months unless approved by resolutions of both Houses; whatever is done during these two months is not illegal merely because approval was not obtained (State of Rajasthan v. UOI).
Q34Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
A Proclamation under Article 356, once approved, may be continued by successive parliamentary resolutions, but its continuance beyond ONE year requires (in addition to Parliament's resolution) that:
aThe Governor submits a fresh report confirming the breakdown
bA Proclamation of Emergency under Art. 352 is in operation AND the Election Commission certifies that continuance is necessary owing to difficulties in holding Assembly elections
cThe Supreme Court certifies that the constitutional machinery has not been restored
dThe State Legislative Council passes an approving resolution
Answer: B
Article 356(5) bars continuance beyond one year unless (i) an Art. 352 Emergency is in operation in the whole of India or the relevant State, and (ii) the Election Commission certifies that continuance is necessary due to difficulties in holding Assembly elections.
Q35Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
The proviso to Article 356(1) expressly bars the President, while assuming the functions of a State, from:
aDissolving the Legislative Assembly
bAuthorising expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of the State
cAssuming powers vested in a High Court or suspending provisions relating to High Courts
dConferring the State Legislature's powers on Parliament
Answer: C
The proviso to Art. 356(1) forbids the President from assuming any powers of a High Court or suspending, in whole or part, any constitutional provision relating to High Courts.
Q36Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
Which statement correctly distinguishes Article 358 from Article 359?
aArticle 358 requires a separate Presidential order, while Article 359 operates automatically
bArticle 358 can suspend enforcement of Articles 20 and 21, but Article 359 cannot
cBoth suspend the same fundamental rights but for different durations
dArticle 358 suspends Article 19 automatically on a war/external-aggression Emergency, while Article 359 only suspends the right to move courts for enforcement of rights specified in a Presidential order
Answer: D
Per Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab: Art. 358 automatically suspends Art. 19 (only on war/external aggression) without any order, while Art. 359 needs a Presidential order and merely suspends the remedy to enforce the rights specified therein (never Arts. 20-21).
Q37Centre-State relations & emergency provisions
After the 44th Amendment, a Presidential order under Article 359 suspending the enforcement of fundamental rights CANNOT extend to:
aArticles 20 and 21
bArticle 14 and Article 19
cArticle 19 and Article 22
dArticle 32 alone
Answer: A
The 44th Amendment inserted 'except Articles 20 and 21' in Art. 359(1), so even during Emergency the right to move courts for enforcement of Arts. 20 and 21 survives, superseding ADM Jabalpur v. Shukla.
A member of a State Public Service Commission attains the age of 62 years after serving for four years. Under Article 316(2), he:
acontinues until he completes six years from entering office
bmust vacate office on attaining 62, as that is reached earlier than the six-year term
cmay continue up to 65 years like a Union Commission member
dmay be given a one-time extension of two years by the Governor
Answer: B
Under Article 316(2), a State Commission member holds office for six years OR until 62 years, whichever is earlier. Attaining 62 at four years' service comes first, so he must demit office then.
In Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court held that a selection made by a Public Service Commission is NOT vitiated merely because a member was related to a candidate, provided that:
athe related candidate ultimately failed to get selected
bthe relationship was disclosed in writing to the Governor beforehand
cthe related member did not sit while that candidate was interviewed or take part in any discussion on the candidate's merits
dat least two other members of the Commission were also present
Answer: C
In Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana ((1985) 4 SCC 417), the selection is invalid only if the related member sits while that candidate is interviewed or participates in discussion of his merits; mere relationship does not vitiate it.
Under Article 324(5), the constitutional protection regarding removal differs between the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and other Election Commissioners. Which is correct?
aBoth the CEC and other Election Commissioners can be removed only like a Supreme Court Judge
bOther Election Commissioners enjoy the same removal protection as the CEC, but the CEC may be removed by the President at pleasure
cBoth are removable by the President at pleasure
dThe CEC can be removed like a Supreme Court Judge, while other Election Commissioners can be removed only on the recommendation of the CEC
Answer: D
Under the provisos to Article 324(5), the CEC is removable only in the same manner and on the same grounds as a Supreme Court Judge, whereas other Election Commissioners/Regional Commissioners cannot be removed except on the CEC's recommendation.
In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, the Supreme Court held that Article 324(1) confers on the Election Commission the power to order a repoll or cancel a poll. This power is best described as:
aa reservoir of residual power to act in areas unoccupied by legislation, to ensure free and fair elections
ba power exercisable only with the prior sanction of Parliament
ca purely judicial power not subject to any judicial review
da power that overrides even valid laws made under Article 327
Answer: A
In Mohinder Singh Gill (AIR 1978 SC 851), Article 324(1)'s words 'superintendence, direction and control' were held a reservoir of residual power to fill gaps where law is silent, enabling orders like repoll/cancellation; but the Commission cannot act in derogation of a valid Article 327 law.
Under Article 329(b), an election to either House of Parliament or a State Legislature can be called in question:
aby a writ petition under Article 226 at any stage of the election process
bonly by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as the appropriate Legislature provides
cby a suit in a civil court after the result is declared
dby a reference made by the Governor to the High Court
Answer: B
Article 329(b) bars all courts and permits questioning an election only by an election petition under the law made by the appropriate Legislature (Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, AIR 1952 SC 64).
Q43Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
Under Article 4(2), a law passed under Article 2 or 3 amending the First and Fourth Schedules and providing for representation in Parliament:
aIs deemed an amendment of the Constitution requiring ratification by the States
bMust be passed by the special majority prescribed in Article 368
cShall not be deemed an amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 368 and may be passed by ordinary majority
dRequires the prior assent of the Rajya Sabha by a two-thirds majority
Answer: C
Article 4(2) expressly provides that such a law is not to be deemed a constitutional amendment under Article 368; Kuldip Nayar v. UOI confirms 'representation in Parliament' under Article 4 is excluded from the Article 368 procedure.
Q44Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
State A files an original suit under Article 131 against State B seeking a declaration that a disputed strip of land lies within A's administrative jurisdiction. If decreed, what is the effect under State of Orissa v. State of Andhra Pradesh?
aThe decree itself alters the boundaries fixed under Article 1(2) read with the First Schedule
bThe Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit at all
cThe decree automatically amends the First Schedule once it attains finality
dThe decree may declare administrative jurisdiction but cannot itself alter the boundaries fixed under Article 1(2) and the First Schedule, which only Parliament can change under Article 3
Answer: D
State of Orissa v. State of Andhra Pradesh held that only Parliament can alter State boundaries under Article 3; an Article 131 decree may settle administrative jurisdiction but cannot alter the boundaries fixed under Article 1(2) and the First Schedule.
Q45Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
Goa, Daman and Diu were acquired from Portugal by annexation and administered from 20-12-1961 before being incorporated into the First Schedule. Until such incorporation, under which limb of Article 1(3) did such acquired territory fall?
aArticle 1(3)(c) — such other territories as may be acquired
bArticle 1(3)(a) — territories of the States
cArticle 1(3)(b) — Union territories specified in the First Schedule
dOutside Article 1(3) altogether until a constitutional amendment was passed
Answer: A
Per the commentary on Article 1, Goa, Daman and Diu were administered as 'acquired Territory' under Article 1(3)(c) from 20-12-1961 until incorporated as a Union Territory by the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1962.
Q46Preamble, Union & territory, citizenship
P was born in Lahore (now in Pakistan), migrated to Delhi on 1 September 1948, and has ordinarily resided in India since. His father was born in British India. Which provision governs his citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution, and what additional requirement applies?
aArticle 5(a); no further requirement since he was born in undivided India
bArticle 6; since he migrated on or after 19-7-1948 he had to be registered as a citizen by an appointed officer before commencement, after at least six months' residence
cArticle 7; he is deemed not to be a citizen of India
dArticle 8; he must register with the Indian consular representative abroad
Answer: B
Article 6 governs migrants from Pakistan; as P migrated on/after 19-7-1948, clause (b)(ii) required registration by an appointed officer before commencement, the Proviso requiring at least six months' residence before the application.
Q47DPSP & Fundamental Duties
In Randhir Singh v. Union of India, the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' was held to be enforceable on what basis?
aAs an independent, expressly enumerated fundamental right in Part III.
bAs a directly enforceable right under Art. 39(d) read with Art. 37.
cBy reading Art. 39(d) and the word 'Socialist' in the Preamble into Arts. 14 and 16, so that its denial amounts to an irrational classification.
dOnly through a suit for damages and never by writ petition.
Answer: C
Randhir Singh (1982) held that, though not itself a fundamental right, 'equal pay for equal work' read with Art. 39(d) and 'Socialist' in the Preamble colours Arts. 14/16, so its denial is an irrational classification.
Q48DPSP & Fundamental Duties
An indigent person is produced before a Magistrate on a criminal charge but does not apply for a lawyer. On the strength of Art. 39A read with Art. 21, which statement is correct?
aThe right to free legal aid arises only after the accused files a written application requesting it.
bFree legal aid is available only at the appellate stage, not at trial.
cAn accused can, even without any implementing legislation, compel the State by writ to supply a lawyer at State cost.
dThe right of an indigent accused to free legal aid arises from the moment he is first produced before a Magistrate and does not require any application from him.
Answer: D
Khatri v. State of Bihar and Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh hold the indigent accused's right to free legal aid arises on first production before a Magistrate and needs no application.
Q49DPSP & Fundamental Duties
In State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat (2005), a restriction on the fundamental right to trade was upheld with reference to Directive Principles. The Court held such a restriction is reasonable subject to two limitations. Which is one of those two limitations?
aThe restriction must not run in clear conflict with the fundamental right and must be within the legislative competence of the enacting legislature.
bThe restriction must have been approved by a referendum of the affected trade.
cThe restriction must be temporary and lapse within ten years.
dThe restriction must be supported by compensation paid to the affected persons.
Answer: A
Mirzapur Moti Kureshi (2005) held a restriction securing a Directive is reasonable provided it does not clearly conflict with the fundamental right and is within the enacting legislature's competence (Part XI, Ch. I).
Q50DPSP & Fundamental Duties
Regarding the expression 'material resources of the community' in Art. 39(b), which of the following has the commentary held NOT to be covered, or has it instead held all of these to be covered?
aElectrical energy generated by a private undertaking (Tinsukia Electric Supply Co. v. State of Assam).
bAll of the above are held to be 'material resources of the community'.
cMines, minerals and quarries (Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat).
dBoth natural/physical resources and movable or immovable property (State of T.N. v. Abu Kavur).
Answer: B
The commentary construes 'material resources' widely to include natural and physical resources, movable and immovable property, privately generated electrical energy, and mines/minerals/quarries.
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