Himachal Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 1 — Questions & Solutions
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Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the expression "mesne profits" of property, as defined in Section 2(12), means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property:
aActually received only, without any interest on such profits
bMight with ordinary diligence have received, excluding any interest on such profits
cActually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits, but not including profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession
dActually received together with profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession
Answer: C
Section 2(12) defines mesne profits as profits the wrongful possessor actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received, plus interest, but expressly excludes profits due to improvements made by him.
Under Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, "judgment" means:
aThe formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties
bThe decision of a court of justice on any legal question
cThe formal expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree
dThe statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order
Answer: D
Section 2(9) defines "judgment" as the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order; option (a) is the definition of decree under Section 2(2) and option (c) is that of order under Section 2(14).
The doctrine of constructive res judicata, under which any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the former suit is deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue, is contained in:
aExplanation VIII to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
bExplanation VI to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
cExplanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
dExplanation II to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: C
Explanation IV to Section 11 embodies constructive res judicata: any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the former suit is deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue therein.
Under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no suit shall be instituted against the Government or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by him in his official capacity until the expiration of:
aSix months next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority
bOne month next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority
cTwo months next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority
dThree months next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority
Answer: C
Section 80(1) requires that no such suit be instituted until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of the appropriate authority.
Under Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no appeal shall lie from a decree:
aPassed in a suit for recovery of money below the pecuniary limit
bPassed ex parte against the defendant
cPassed by a court of small causes in any case whatsoever
dPassed by the court with the consent of parties
Answer: D
Section 96(3) bars an appeal from a decree passed by the court with the consent of parties, since a consent decree is in the nature of a contract between the parties.
An appeal to the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 from a decree passed in appeal by a subordinate court (second appeal) lies only where:
aThere is a perverse appreciation of evidence by the first appellate court
bThe High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law
cThe amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds twenty thousand rupees
dBoth the trial court and the first appellate court have recorded concurrent findings
Answer: B
Section 100(1) confines a second appeal to cases where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, which must be precisely formulated under Section 100(4).
Where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order has been heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, the bar on any further appeal, notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent, is found in:
aSection 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
bSection 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
cSection 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
dSection 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: C
Section 100A, as substituted by the 2002 Amendment, provides that no further (Letters Patent) appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of a single Judge who has heard and decided an appeal.
The power of the High Court or the District Court to transfer, at any stage, any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it to any subordinate court competent to try or dispose of the same is the "general power of transfer and withdrawal" conferred by:
aSection 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
bSection 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
cSection 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
dSection 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: B
Section 24 confers on the High Court and the District Court the general power, on application or suo motu, to transfer or withdraw any suit, appeal or proceeding at any stage to a competent subordinate court.
Restitution, whereby a court which passed a decree may, on the application of any party entitled to a benefit, place the parties in the position they would have occupied but for a decree that has since been varied or reversed, is provided for in:
aSection 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
bSection 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
cSection 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
dSection 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: D
Section 144 embodies the doctrine of restitution; the court of first instance is to make such restitution as will place the parties in the position they would have occupied but for the decree that has been varied or reversed.
Under the proviso to Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where the defendant fails to file the written statement within thirty days from the date of service of summons, the court may allow him to present it on such other day as it may specify, but not later than:
aOne hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons
bForty-five days from the date of service of summons
cNinety days from the date of service of summons
dSixty days from the date of service of summons
Answer: C
The proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 permits the court, for recorded reasons, to extend time for the written statement to a day not later than ninety days from the date of service of summons (in non-commercial suits).
In Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India (II), the Supreme Court of India, while upholding the validity of the 1999 and 2002 amendments, held that the period prescribed for filing the written statement under Order VIII, Rule 1 is:
aMandatory, so that the court has no power to extend it beyond ninety days
bApplicable only to commercial suits and to no other category
cDirectory and not mandatory, the court retaining power to extend time in exceptional cases
dMandatory only in suits against the Government
Answer: C
In Salem Advocate Bar Association (II) (2005) the Supreme Court held the Order VIII Rule 1 time-limit to be directory, not mandatory, so a court may in exceptional cases accept a belated written statement.
Where one of several defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendants, and no application for substitution of the legal representative is made within the time limited by law, the consequence under Order XXII, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is that:
aThe suit continues against the surviving defendants only, without any abatement
bThe suit is automatically stayed until a fresh suit is instituted
cThe court must dismiss the entire suit against all defendants
dThe suit abates as against the deceased defendant on the expiry of the limitation period for substitution
Answer: D
Under Order XXII Rule 4 read with Article 120 of the Limitation Act, failure to apply for substitution within ninety days of death causes the suit to abate as against the deceased defendant.
Under Order XXIII, Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where the court is satisfied that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit, it may permit him to withdraw with liberty to file a fresh suit. A plaintiff who withdraws a suit WITHOUT such permission is:
aEntitled to institute a fresh suit on the same subject-matter as a matter of right
bPrecluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter
cPermitted to revive the very same suit within thirty days
dEntitled to file a fresh suit only after obtaining the leave of the High Court
Answer: B
Under Order XXIII Rule 1(4), a plaintiff who withdraws without the court's permission to file afresh is precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter and is liable for costs.
Under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order the name of any party to be added or struck out:
aEither upon or without the application of either party, on such terms as may appear just
bOnly with the written consent of all existing parties to the suit
cOnly before the settlement of issues and not thereafter
dOnly on the application of the plaintiff and never suo motu
Answer: A
Order I Rule 10(2) empowers the court, at any stage and either upon or without the application of either party, to add or strike out parties whose presence is necessary to effectually adjudicate the questions involved.
The inherent power of a civil court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court is expressly saved by:
aSection 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
bSection 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
cSection 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
dSection 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: D
Section 151 saves the inherent powers of the court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of its process; it confers no new power but recognises an existing one.
Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting those of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. With respect to this provision, which one of the following statements is most accurate?
aA suit relating purely to religious rites and ceremonies, with no civil consequence, is nevertheless cognizable under Section 9
bThere is a presumption against the jurisdiction of the Civil Court unless a statute expressly confers it
cThe Civil Court can entertain a suit only if the statute creating the right also provides the remedy
dThere is a strong presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, and exclusion must be either explicitly expressed or clearly implied
Answer: D
Section 9 embodies a strong presumption in favour of the Civil Court's jurisdiction; ouster must be expressly stated or clearly implied and is never readily inferred. A suit involving no civil right (purely religious rites) is not of a civil nature.
The doctrine of res sub judice, which bars a Court from proceeding with the trial of a suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, is contained in:
aSection 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
bSection 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
cSection 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
dSection 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: D
Section 10 (stay of suit / res sub judice) prevents simultaneous trial of two parallel suits on the same matter. Section 11 is res judicata, which bars re-trial of an already decided matter.
Constructive res judicata, under which a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence in the former suit is deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue, is embodied in:
aExplanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
bExplanation II to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
cExplanation VI to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
dExplanation VIII to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: A
Explanation IV to Section 11 codifies constructive res judicata. Explanation VI deals with representative suits and Explanation VIII (inserted by the 1976 Amendment) with decrees of courts of limited jurisdiction.
Assertion (A): A foreign judgment which has not been given on the merits of the case is not conclusive between the parties under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Reason (R): Section 13 declares a foreign judgment conclusive only as to matters thereby directly adjudicated upon, subject to specified exceptions.
Choose the correct alternative:
aBoth A and R are true, but R does not explain A correctly
bBoth A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
cA is true, but R is false
dBoth A and R are false
Answer: B
Section 13(b) expressly makes a foreign judgment not conclusive where it has not been given on the merits, this being one of the six exceptions in Section 13, so R correctly explains A.
Which one of the following Courts shall ordinarily try the offence of murder punishable under Section 103 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aCourt of the Chief Judicial Magistrate
bCourt of any Magistrate of the first class
cHigh Court
dCourt of Session
Answer: D
Punishment for murder under Section 103 BNS is death or imprisonment for life with fine; being so grave, the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session.
The offence of 'attempt to murder' under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is provided in:
aSection 109
bSection 110
cSection 107
dSection 108
Answer: A
Section 109 BNS deals with attempt to murder, corresponding to the erstwhile Section 307 IPC; where hurt is caused the offender may be sentenced up to imprisonment for life.
Where the death of a woman is caused otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty in connection with a demand for dowry, the offence of 'dowry death' under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is dealt with by:
aSection 85
bSection 80
cSection 86
dSection 79
Answer: B
Section 80 BNS defines and punishes dowry death (minimum seven years' imprisonment, extendable to life), corresponding to Section 304B IPC.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence of a husband or relative of a husband subjecting a woman to cruelty is punishable under Section 85, while the meaning of 'cruelty' for that purpose is contained in:
aSection 86
bSection 87
cSection 84
dthe Explanation to Section 85 itself
Answer: A
Section 85 BNS creates the offence of cruelty by husband or his relative, and Section 86 BNS supplies the definition of 'cruelty', mirroring the scheme of Section 498A IPC.
A novel offence not found in the Indian Penal Code, 1860, namely 'organised crime', and the offence of 'terrorist act' are introduced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 respectively in:
aSection 111 and Section 113
bSection 112 and Section 115
cSection 113 and Section 111
dSection 109 and Section 111
Answer: A
Section 111 BNS introduces 'organised crime' and Section 113 BNS introduces 'terrorist act'; neither had a counterpart in the IPC.
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 expressly recognises, for the first time as a distinct offence, sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means or by making a promise to marry without any intention of fulfilling it. This offence is contained in:
aSection 63
bSection 64
cSection 70
dSection 69
Answer: D
Section 69 BNS punishes sexual intercourse obtained by deceitful means or a false promise to marry with imprisonment up to ten years and fine; it has no direct equivalent in the IPC.
Match List I (offence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) with List II (Section) and select the correct answer using the codes below:
List I: (P) Theft (Q) Criminal breach of trust (R) Kidnapping (S) Voluntarily causing grievous hurt
List II: (i) Section 117 (ii) Section 303 (iii) Section 137 (iv) Section 316
aP-(ii), Q-(iii), R-(iv), S-(i)
bP-(i), Q-(iv), R-(iii), S-(ii)
cP-(iii), Q-(iv), R-(ii), S-(i)
dP-(ii), Q-(iv), R-(iii), S-(i)
Answer: D
Theft = S.303, criminal breach of trust = S.316, kidnapping = S.137, voluntarily causing grievous hurt = S.117 under the BNS, 2023.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, 'criminal conspiracy' is defined and punished in:
aSection 45
bSection 120A
cSection 59
dSection 61
Answer: D
Section 61 BNS defines and punishes criminal conspiracy and falls in Chapter IV (Abetment, Criminal Conspiracy and Attempt); it corresponds to Section 120A/120B IPC.
The principle of joint liability whereby, when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each is liable as if the act were done by him alone, is contained under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 in:
aSection 190
bSection 34
cSection 3(4)
dSection 3(5)
Answer: D
Section 3(5) BNS embodies the rule of common intention (joint liability), which was earlier Section 34 IPC.
The offence of 'defamation' is retained under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and notably now permits community service as one of the punishments. Defamation is dealt with in:
aSection 356
bSection 354
cSection 499
dSection 357
Answer: A
Section 356 BNS defines and punishes defamation and, as a new feature, lists community service among the punishments; it corresponds to Sections 499-500 IPC.
The provision penalising acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India (which replaced the offence of sedition) under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, with the maximum term of imprisonment raised to seven years, is:
aSection 124A
bSection 152
cSection 113
dSection 150
Answer: B
Section 152 BNS penalises acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, replacing the sedition offence (S.124A IPC); the maximum imprisonment was raised from three to seven years.
A, intending to cause death, beats Z and also deliberately withholds food from Z, and by the combined effect of the beating and starvation Z dies. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, A is guilty of:
aculpable homicide not amounting to murder only
bno offence, as death resulted partly from omission
cgrievous hurt
dmurder
Answer: D
Where death is caused partly by an act and partly by an omission done with the intention of causing death, the offence is murder under Sections 100-101 BNS, punishable under Section 103.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence of murder is defined and its punishment provided respectively in:
aSection 102 and Section 105
bSection 100 and Section 103
cSection 101 and Section 103
dSection 100 and Section 101
Answer: C
Murder is defined in Section 101 of the BNS, 2023, while the punishment for murder (death or imprisonment for life, and fine) is laid down in Section 103. Culpable homicide is defined in Section 100.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, where a police officer in charge of a station receives information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence committed outside the local limits of his station, he shall record the same and forward it to the police station having jurisdiction. This 'Zero FIR' provision finds place in:
aSection 173
bSection 175
cSection 176
dSection 154
Answer: A
Section 173 BNSS deals with information in cognizable cases (FIR) and statutorily recognises the 'Zero FIR' — a cognizable offence may be registered at any police station irrespective of territorial jurisdiction and then transferred.
Under Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the maximum total period of detention of an accused during investigation, on the expiry of which the accused becomes entitled to default bail where the offence is punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, is:
a60 days
b120 days
c90 days
d15 days
Answer: C
Section 187(3) BNSS prescribes 90 days for offences punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment of ten years or more, and 60 days for other offences; on expiry the accused gets an indefeasible right to default bail.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, an order directing a person having sufficient means to pay a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife, children or parents unable to maintain themselves may be passed by a Magistrate of the first class under:
aSection 144
bSection 125
cSection 148
dSection 146
Answer: A
Section 144 BNSS is the successor to Section 125 CrPC and empowers a Magistrate of the first class to order maintenance of wife, children and parents.
Match List I (Provision under BNSS, 2023) with List II (Section) and select the correct answer using the codes below:
List I — (P) Power of police to arrest without warrant (Q) Information in cognizable cases (R) Examination of witnesses by police (S) Report of police officer on completion of investigation
List II — (i) Section 180 (ii) Section 193 (iii) Section 35 (iv) Section 173
aP-(iii), Q-(iv), R-(ii), S-(i)
bP-(iii), Q-(iv), R-(i), S-(ii)
cP-(i), Q-(ii), R-(iii), S-(iv)
dP-(iv), Q-(iii), R-(ii), S-(i)
Answer: B
Under BNSS: arrest without warrant = Section 35; FIR/information in cognizable cases = Section 173; examination of witnesses by police = Section 180; police report on completion of investigation = Section 193.
Under Section 35 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in the case of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than three years, and where the person is infirm or above the age of sixty years, no arrest shall be made without the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of:
aDeputy Superintendent of Police
bSuperintendent of Police
cSub-Inspector of Police
dInspector of Police
Answer: A
The proviso to Section 35(7) BNSS requires prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police before arresting such a person where the offence is punishable with imprisonment of less than three years.
Assertion (A): Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a proclaimed offender who has absconded to evade trial may be tried in his absence and a judgment of conviction pronounced against him.
Reason (R): Section 356 BNSS introduces inquiry, trial or judgment in absentia of a proclaimed offender, subject to procedural safeguards.
Choose the correct alternative:
aA is true, but R is false
bBoth A and R are true, but R does not explain A correctly
cBoth A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
dBoth A and R are false
Answer: C
Section 356 BNSS is a new provision permitting trial in absentia of a proclaimed offender who has absconded, with safeguards such as two warrants 30 days apart and newspaper publication; R correctly explains A.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in relation to an offence under Section 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 or 71 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (rape and allied offences), the statement of the victim shall be recorded by a woman police officer at the residence of the victim or a place of her choice, and may also be recorded through audio-video electronic means. This is provided in:
aSection 180 BNSS
bSection 176 BNSS
cSection 173 BNSS
dSection 183 BNSS
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 176(1) BNSS mandates that the statement of a victim of rape and allied offences be recorded by a woman police officer at the victim's residence or chosen place, and permits audio-video electronic recording.
Under Section 230 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in a case instituted on a police report, the Magistrate shall furnish to the accused and the victim (if represented by an advocate) a copy of the police report, FIR and other documents free of cost, without delay and in no case beyond:
aThirty days from the date of production or appearance of the accused
bThree days from the date of production or appearance of the accused
cSeven days from the date of production or appearance of the accused
dFourteen days from the date of production or appearance of the accused
Answer: D
Section 230 BNSS introduces a fixed timeline of fourteen days from the date of production or appearance of the accused for supply of the police report and connected documents, including to the victim if represented by counsel.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, where an offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term of seven years or more, the provision making it mandatory for a forensic expert to visit the crime scene to collect forensic evidence and record the process through audio-video electronic means is contained in:
aSection 184
bSection 173
cSection 176
dSection 193
Answer: C
Section 176(3) BNSS mandates that for offences punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more, a forensic expert shall visit the crime scene to collect forensic evidence and videograph the process.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, an application for plea bargaining may be filed by the accused, and the period within which such application is required to be filed is:
aWithin sixty days from the date of framing of charge
bAt any time before pronouncement of judgment
cWithin fifteen days from the date of framing of charge
dWithin thirty days from the date of framing of charge
Answer: D
Section 290 BNSS makes plea bargaining time-bound: the application must be filed within thirty days from the date of framing of charge, a change from the open-ended position under the CrPC.
Under Section 472 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a convict under sentence of death (or his legal heir or relative) may submit a mercy petition to the Governor of the State within a period, from the date on which the Superintendent of the jail informs him of the dismissal of the appeal or the date of confirmation of the sentence, of:
aThirty days
bSixty days
cSeven days
dFifteen days
Answer: A
Section 472 BNSS, a new provision codifying the mercy-petition procedure, prescribes a thirty-day period for the convict (or his heir/relative) to file a mercy petition before the Governor.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the obligation on every State Government to prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme is statutorily imposed by:
aSection 412
bSection 398
cSection 401
dSection 396
Answer: B
Section 398 BNSS is a new provision requiring every State Government to prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme; Section 396 deals with the Victim Compensation Scheme.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which one of the following statements regarding the powers of a Court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class to pass sentence is NOT correct?
aIt may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years
bIt may impose a fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees
cIt may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years
dIt may pass a sentence of community service
Answer: C
Under Section 23(2) BNSS a Magistrate of the first class may pass imprisonment up to three years, fine up to fifty thousand rupees, both, or community service; a term up to seven years is beyond its competence, so statement (d) is incorrect.
Under Section 193 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, on completion of investigation the police officer is required to inform the informant or the victim about the progress of the investigation, including by electronic communication, within a period of:
aNinety days
bThirty days
cOne hundred and eighty days
dSixty days
Answer: A
Section 193 BNSS introduces a duty on the investigating officer to inform the informant or victim of the progress of investigation within ninety days, a citizen-centric addition not found in the CrPC.
Assertion (A): Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, issuance of a notice of appearance is the rule and arrest is the exception.
Reason (R): Section 35(3) BNSS requires the police officer, in such cases, to issue a notice directing the person to appear, instead of arresting him as a matter of course.
Choose the correct alternative:
aA is true, but R is false
bBoth A and R are true, but R does not explain A correctly
cBoth A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
dBoth A and R are false
Answer: C
Section 35(3) BNSS (successor to Section 41A CrPC) makes notice of appearance the rule for offences punishable up to seven years, with arrest as an exception, as reaffirmed by the Supreme Court; R correctly explains A.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a "warrant-case" means a case relating to an offence:
aPunishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years
bPunishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year only
cIn which a police officer may arrest without warrant
dPunishable with imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards
Answer: A
Section 2(1)(y) BNSS defines a warrant-case as one relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years; every other case is a summons-case.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. This rule is contained in:
aSection 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
bSection 22 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
cThe proviso to Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
dSection 23(1) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 23(2) BSA (successor to old Section 27 IEA) lifts the bar of Section 23, allowing so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact discovered to be proved, whether or not it amounts to a confession.
A confession made by a person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer cannot be proved against him unless it is made:
aIn the immediate presence of a Magistrate
bIn the immediate presence of the Public Prosecutor
cIn writing and signed by two independent witnesses
dIn the immediate presence of the Superintendent of Police
Answer: A
Under Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, no confession made by a person while in police custody shall be proved against him unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.
A statement made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in a case in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, is relevant under:
aSection 26(b) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
bSection 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
cSection 26(c) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
dSection 26(e) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
Answer: B
Clause (a) of Section 26 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 makes a dying declaration relevant, covering statements as to the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death.
Where the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman, and it is shown that soon before her death she had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment in connection with a demand for dowry, the court:
aMay presume that such person caused the dowry death
bCannot draw any presumption in the absence of an eyewitness
cShall presume that such person caused the dowry death
dShall conclusively presume that such person caused the dowry death
Answer: C
Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 uses the mandatory expression 'shall presume', unlike Section 117 (abetment of suicide by a married woman) which uses 'may presume'.
Where the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or his relative, and it is shown that she committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and was subjected to cruelty, the court:
aMay presume the abetment of suicide having regard to all the circumstances
bIs barred from raising any presumption
cShall presume the abetment of suicide
dShall conclusively presume the abetment of suicide
Answer: A
Section 117 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 employs 'may presume', making it a discretionary, rebuttable presumption that requires cogent evidence of cruelty before being invoked.
Consider the following propositions regarding accomplice evidence under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA): (I) An accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person, and a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice. (II) The court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars. Which is correct?
aOnly (I) is correct, being Section 138
bOnly (II) is correct, being illustration (b) to Section 119
cBoth are correct; (I) is Section 138 and (II) is illustration (b) to Section 119
dBoth are incorrect
Answer: C
As enacted, Section 138 BSA provides that an accomplice is a competent witness and a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice (a departure from the 'uncorroborated' phrasing of the repealed Section 133 IEA), while illustration (b) to Section 119 BSA embodies the rule of prudence that an accomplice is presumptively unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars.
Under Section 39(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), when in a proceeding the court has to form an opinion on any matter relating to information transmitted or stored in any electronic record, the opinion of which of the following is a relevant fact?
aThe Examiner of Electronic Evidence referred to in Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000
bAny officer of the Cyber Crime Cell of the State Police
cThe Director of the Forensic Science Laboratory only
dThe Investigating Officer of the case
Answer: A
Section 39(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 makes the opinion of the Examiner of Electronic Evidence, a Central Government notified authority under Section 79A of the IT Act, 2000, a relevant fact on questions concerning electronic records.
In Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, the Supreme Court of India held that, for the admissibility of secondary electronic evidence, the requirement of a certificate under which provision (now re-enacted in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) is a mandatory precondition?
aSection 57 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
bSection 62 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
cSection 63(4) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
dSection 15 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
Answer: C
In Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014), reaffirmed in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (2020), the Court held that the certificate (now under Section 63(4) BSA, successor to Section 65B(4) IEA) is a mandatory condition for proving electronic records by secondary evidence.
The maxim 'omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta' (all acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done) finds reflection in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) principally in:
aSection 121 (estoppel)
bSection 104 (burden of proof)
cSection 119 (court may presume the existence of certain facts)
dSection 55 (oral evidence must be direct)
Answer: C
Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 permits the court to presume the existence of facts likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events and human conduct; the maxim of regularity of official acts is one application of this provision.
When a person is accused of an offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, or within any special exception or proviso, is:
aDischarged automatically once a plea is raised
bUpon the prosecution throughout
cUpon that accused person, and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances
dUpon the court to inquire into suo motu
Answer: C
Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 casts the burden of proving an exception (such as private defence or insanity) on the accused, and the court presumes the absence of such circumstances.
A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts which are to be used to contradict him. This rule is found in:
aSection 160 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
bSection 148 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
cSection 157 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
dSection 142 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
Answer: B
Section 148 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 governs cross-examination as to previous statements in writing and requires that the witness's attention be drawn to the contradicting parts before the writing is proved.
The doctrine of estoppel as embodied in Section 121 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) is best described as:
aA rule of substantive law creating rights
bA rule of evidence preventing a person from denying what he has by his declaration, act or omission caused another to believe and act upon
cA rule of procedure for framing of issues
dA rule of pleading regulating the form of the plaint
Answer: B
Estoppel under Section 121 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 is a rule of evidence: where one person has by declaration, act or omission intentionally caused another to believe a thing and act on it, he is estopped from denying its truth.
Under Section 120 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), in a prosecution for rape under specified clauses of sub-section (2) of Section 64 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, where sexual intercourse is proved and the question is one of consent, if the woman states in her evidence that she did not consent, the court:
aMust require independent corroboration before any presumption
bMay presume that she did not consent
cShall presume that she consented
dShall presume that she did not consent
Answer: D
Section 120 of the BSA raises a mandatory presumption of absence of consent ('shall presume') once intercourse is proved and the prosecutrix deposes that she did not consent, in the enumerated categories of aggravated rape.
Oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct. With reference to Section 55 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), which of the following is correct?
aIf it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it
bIf it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it
cAll of the above
dIf it refers to an opinion, it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds
Answer: C
Section 55 of the BSA requires oral evidence to be direct: as to facts seen, heard or perceived, it must come from the person who so saw, heard or perceived, and as to an opinion, from the person holding it.
All persons are competent to testify under Section 124 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers, by reason of:
aTender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind
bTheir being an accomplice in the offence
cTheir being related to a party to the proceeding
dTheir interest in the outcome of the case alone
Answer: A
Section 124 of the BSA makes everyone competent to testify, the only disqualification being inability to understand questions or give rational answers due to tender years, old age, disease of body or mind, or any other cause of that kind.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which provision declares that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence?
aSection 24
bSection 23
cSection 22
dSection 25
Answer: B
Section 23(1) of the BSA, 2023 bars proof of a confession made to a police officer against the accused, corresponding to the old Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
A, by a registered instrument, promises to pay his younger brother B a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 on account of natural love and affection between them. B sues to recover the amount when A refuses to pay. Which of the following is correct?
aThe agreement is valid and enforceable, being a registered promise made on account of natural love and affection between parties standing in near relation to each other
bThe agreement is valid only if A's love and affection towards B is proved by independent evidence
cThe agreement is voidable at the option of A
dThe agreement is void as it is made without consideration
Answer: A
Section 25(1) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 makes an agreement without consideration valid where it is expressed in writing, registered, and made on account of natural love and affection between parties standing in a near relation to each other.
X owes Y a debt which has become time-barred under the Limitation Act. X thereafter signs a written promise to pay Y Rs. 50,000 in respect of that debt. The agreement is:
aVoid for want of fresh consideration
bValid only if the promise is also registered
cVoidable at the option of X
dValid under Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, being a written and signed promise to pay a time-barred debt
Answer: D
Section 25(3) validates a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged, to pay wholly or in part a debt which the creditor might have enforced but for the law of limitation; no consideration is needed.
A agrees with B that A will not marry any person other than B's daughter, and B promises to pay A a sum of money if A marries any other person. With respect to the agreement restraining A's marriage, it is:
aValid, as restraint of marriage is permitted between near relations
bValid, as it does not restrain marriage absolutely
cVoidable at the option of A
dVoid, being an agreement in restraint of the marriage of a person other than a minor
Answer: D
Section 26 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 declares void every agreement in restraint of the marriage of any person other than a minor, whether the restraint is partial or total.
Necessaries are supplied to a minor suited to his condition in life. Under Section 68 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the person who supplied them is entitled to be reimbursed:
aFrom the minor personally, who is bound by the contract
bFrom the property of the minor
cFrom the natural guardian of the minor in his personal capacity
dHe has no right of reimbursement, the minor's agreement being void
Answer: B
Under Section 68, a person who supplies necessaries to one incapable of contracting (such as a minor) is entitled to be reimbursed from the property of such incapable person; the minor incurs no personal liability.
The leading authority for the proposition that an agreement entered into by a minor is void ab initio is:
aHadley v. Baxendale
bMohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose
cBalfour v. Balfour
dCarlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.
Answer: B
In Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 I.A. 114, the Privy Council held that a minor's agreement is absolutely void ab initio, the minor being incapable of contracting under Section 11.
An agreement which restrains a person from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is, under the Indian Contract Act, 1872:
aVoidable at the option of the restrained party
bValid in all cases
cVoid to that extent, subject only to the saving relating to sale of goodwill
dValid if the restraint is reasonable in the opinion of the court
Answer: C
Section 27 declares every agreement in restraint of trade void to that extent; the only statutory exception is the sale of goodwill, where a reasonable restraint within specified local limits is permitted.
A contracts to deliver a cargo of goods to B on a future date, but before performance the goods are, without the fault of either party, destroyed and the further performance becomes impossible. The contract:
aRemains binding and A must pay damages for non-delivery
bBecomes void when the act becomes impossible, under Section 56
cIs void ab initio
dIs voidable at the option of B
Answer: B
Under the second paragraph of Section 56, a contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible (without the fault of the parties) becomes void when the act becomes impossible. This embodies the doctrine of frustration.
The rule that compensation for breach of contract is limited to loss which arose naturally in the usual course of things, or which the parties knew at the time of contracting to be likely to result, is embodied in Section 73 and traces to the English decision in:
aHadley v. Baxendale
bCarlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.
cFelthouse v. Bindley
dCurrie v. Misa
Answer: A
Hadley v. Baxendale lays down the test for remoteness of damages, which Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 substantially codifies; remote and indirect loss is not recoverable.
Where a contract contains a stipulation by way of penalty for breach, Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 entitles the party complaining of the breach to receive:
aOnly the actual loss proved, ignoring the stipulation altogether
bReasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named, whether or not actual loss is proved
cThe entire sum named as penalty in every case
dDouble the amount named, by way of exemplary damages
Answer: B
Under Section 74, where a sum is named or a penalty stipulated, the aggrieved party is entitled to reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount named, irrespective of proof of actual damage; Indian law does not strictly distinguish penalty from liquidated damages.
A contract by which one party promises to save the other from loss caused to him by the conduct of the promisor himself or by the conduct of any other person is defined under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as a contract of:
aGuarantee, under Section 126
bAgency, under Section 182
cIndemnity, under Section 124
dBailment, under Section 148
Answer: C
Section 124 defines a contract of indemnity as one by which one party promises to save the other from loss caused either by the conduct of the promisor himself or by the conduct of any other person.
In a contract of guarantee under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the person who gives the guarantee is called the:
aIndemnifier
bSurety
cCreditor
dPrincipal debtor
Answer: B
Under Section 126, in a contract of guarantee the person who gives the guarantee is the 'surety', the person in respect of whose default it is given is the 'principal debtor', and the person to whom it is given is the 'creditor'.
The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 was enacted primarily to:
aProvide for the control of rents and the eviction of tenants within the limits of urban areas in the State of Himachal Pradesh
bConsolidate the law relating to transfer of immovable property in rural areas
cRegulate the construction of buildings in the whole of Himachal Pradesh
dProvide only for the determination of fair rent of agricultural land in the State
Answer: A
The long title and Section 1 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 declare it an Act to control rents and regulate eviction of tenants within urban areas of Himachal Pradesh; it does not extend to rural/agricultural areas.
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, an application for determination of fair rent of a building or rented land may be made to the Controller by:
aOnly the State Government on behalf of the tenant
bThe landlord only
cThe tenant only
dEither the landlord or the tenant
Answer: D
Section 4 of the Act empowers the Controller to determine fair rent on an application made by either the landlord or the tenant.
Once fair rent of a building has been fixed under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, no further increase or decrease in such fair rent is permissible for a period of:
aThree years
bFive years
cTwo years
dTen years
Answer: B
Under Section 5 of the Act, after fair rent is fixed under Section 4, no further increase or decrease is ordinarily permissible for a period of five years.
Under Section 5 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, on expiry of the prescribed period the landlord is entitled to increase the fair rent at the rate of:
a5 per cent of the fair rent
b15 per cent of the fair rent
c25 per cent of the fair rent
d10 per cent of the fair rent
Answer: D
Section 5 permits the landlord to enhance the fair rent at the rate of ten per cent of the fair rent after the expiry of every five-year period.
Which provision of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 prohibits a landlord from claiming or receiving any fine or premium as a condition of the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy?
aSection 14
bSection 11
cSection 8
dSection 6
Answer: C
Section 8 of the Act bars a landlord from charging any fine, premium or other like sum, or any rent in excess of the fair rent, as a condition of grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy.
No person shall convert a residential building into a non-residential building except with the written permission of the Controller. This restriction is contained in:
aSection 14 of the Act
bSection 11 of the Act
cSection 12 of the Act
dSection 18 of the Act
Answer: C
Section 12 of the Act prohibits conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building except with the prior written permission of the Controller.
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, the provision restraining a landlord from cutting off or withholding any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant is contained in:
aSection 13
bSection 9
cSection 11
dSection 16
Answer: C
Section 11 of the Act deals with the cutting off or withholding of essential supply or service, and empowers the Controller to direct its restoration.
Under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent, the tenant must pay or tender the arrears of rent within how many days after the expiry of the time fixed (or, in absence of agreement, by the last day of the month next following)?
aSixty days
bFifteen days
cSeven days
dThirty days
Answer: B
Under Section 14 of the Act, a tenant is liable to eviction for non-payment only if he fails to pay or tender the rent due within fifteen days of the expiry of the time fixed.
Which of the following is NOT a ground available to a landlord for eviction of a tenant under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987?
aThe tenant has used the building for a purpose other than that for which it was let
bThe tenant has sub-let the building without the written consent of the landlord
cThe tenant has not paid the rent due within the time permitted
dThe landlord wishes to enhance the rent above the agreed contractual rent
Answer: D
Section 14 grounds include non-payment of rent, unauthorised sub-letting, change of user and material damage; a mere desire to enhance rent above the contractual rent is not a statutory ground for eviction.
Where a landlord refuses or neglects to accept the rent lawfully tendered by the tenant, or there is a bona fide doubt as to the person to whom rent is payable, the tenant under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 may:
aPay the rent into the office of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate
bDeposit such rent only in the Court of the District Judge
cDeposit such rent with the Controller in the prescribed manner
dWithhold the rent indefinitely until the dispute is resolved
Answer: C
Section 21 of the Act permits the tenant, in such circumstances, to deposit the rent with the Controller, and such deposit is treated as valid payment to the landlord.
Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a marriage solemnised with the ceremony of saptapadi becomes complete and binding on the parties:
aWhen the religious ceremony is begun before the sacred fire
bWhen the marriage is registered under Section 8
cWhen the seventh step is taken jointly by the bride and bridegroom before the sacred fire
dWhen the kanyadaan is performed
Answer: C
Under Section 7(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, where the rites include saptapadi (the taking of seven steps jointly before the sacred fire), the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken.
Under Section 3(f)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the sapinda relationship extends as far as:
aThe third generation in the line of ascent through the mother and the fifth through the father
bThe fifth generation in the line of ascent through the mother and the third through the father
cThe fourth generation through both the mother and the father
dThe third generation through both the mother and the father
Answer: A
Sapinda relationship extends to the third generation (inclusive) in the line of ascent through the mother and the fifth (inclusive) through the father, the relevant person being counted as the first generation.
As per Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the conditions for a valid Hindu marriage require that, at the time of the marriage, the bridegroom and the bride have respectively completed the age of:
aEighteen years and eighteen years
bTwenty-one years and eighteen years
cTwenty-one years and twenty-one years
dEighteen years and twenty-one years
Answer: B
Section 5(iii) requires the bridegroom to have completed the age of 21 years and the bride the age of 18 years at the time of the marriage.
Match List I (provision of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) with List II (section) and select the correct answer using the codes below:
List I: (P) Void marriages (Q) Voidable marriages (R) Restitution of conjugal rights (S) Divorce by mutual consent
List II: (i) Section 9 (ii) Section 11 (iii) Section 12 (iv) Section 13B
aP-(ii), Q-(iii), R-(i), S-(iv)
bP-(ii), Q-(iii), R-(iv), S-(i)
cP-(i), Q-(ii), R-(iii), S-(iv)
dP-(iii), Q-(ii), R-(i), S-(iv)
Answer: A
Void marriages are governed by Section 11, voidable marriages by Section 12, restitution of conjugal rights by Section 9, and divorce by mutual consent by Section 13B.
Under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which of the following is NOT a ground on which a marriage is voidable?
aThe respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner
bThe respondent has, after solemnisation, treated the petitioner with cruelty
cThe marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotence of the respondent
dThe consent of the petitioner was obtained by force or fraud as to a material fact concerning the respondent
Answer: B
Cruelty is a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia), not a ground rendering a marriage voidable under Section 12. The other three are grounds under Section 12(1).
Under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a petition for divorce by mutual consent must state that the parties have been living separately for a period of:
aTwo years or more
bThree years or more
cSix months or more
dOne year or more
Answer: D
Section 13B(1) requires that the parties have been living separately for a period of one year or more before presenting a joint petition for divorce by mutual consent.
Regarding the second motion under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the motion must be made on the petition of both parties not earlier than ____ and not later than ____ after the date of presentation of the petition:
aOne year; two years
bSix months; twelve months
cSix months; eighteen months
dThree months; twelve months
Answer: C
Under Section 13B(2), the motion must be made not earlier than six months and not later than eighteen months after the date of presentation of the petition, if it is not withdrawn in the meantime.
Under Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, where a Hindu adopts a child of the sex opposite to that of the adopter, the difference in age between the adopter and the child to be adopted must be at least:
aEighteen years
bTwenty-one years
cTwenty-five years
dFifteen years
Answer: B
Section 11(iii) and (iv) require that where a male adopts a daughter or a female adopts a son, the adoptive parent must be at least twenty-one years older than the child being adopted.
Under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the expression "transfer of property" means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to:
aOne or more other living persons only, and not to himself
bOne or more other living persons, but a company or association of persons is not a "living person"
cAny person, living or unborn, including a juristic person but excluding himself
dOne or more other living persons, or to himself, or to himself and one or more other living persons
Answer: D
Section 5 expressly permits a living person to convey property to one or more other living persons, or to himself, or to himself and others, and the Explanation states that "living person" includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.
A transfer cannot be made directly to an unborn person; the interest in favour of an unborn person must be created by first vesting a prior interest in a living person. This rule is contained in:
aSection 14 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
bSection 20 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
cSection 16 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
dSection 13 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Answer: D
Section 13 provides that a transfer for the benefit of an unborn person must be preceded by a prior life interest, and the unborn person must take the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor.
Under the rule against perpetuity in Section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, no transfer can operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the lifetime of one or more persons living at the date of the transfer and:
aThe minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period
bA further period of eighteen years in all cases
cA period of twenty-one years from the date of the transfer
dThe lifetime of the transferor only
Answer: A
Section 14 fixes the perpetuity period as the life or lives of persons living at the date of transfer plus the minority of an unborn person who must be in existence at the expiration of that period, the remainder vesting when that unborn person attains majority.
X transfers a farm to Y on condition that Y shall marry X's daughter D. At the date of the transfer, D was already dead. Under Section 25 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the transfer of the farm is:
aVoidable at the option of Y
bVoid, the condition being impossible
cValid, the condition being treated as fulfilled
dValid, but Y must pay compensation to X's estate
Answer: B
Section 25 provides that an interest created on a condition precedent which is impossible fails; since marrying a dead person is impossible, the transfer is void. This is the illustration appended to Section 25.
Which of the following is NOT transferable under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
aAn actionable claim
bA vested remainder
cThe chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate (spes successionis)
dA right of way appurtenant to land along with the dominant heritage
Answer: C
Section 6(a) expressly bars the transfer of the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy, or any other mere possibility of a like nature. The others are transferable.
The doctrine of part performance, which protects a transferee who has taken possession in part performance of a contract of transfer of immovable property, is embodied in:
aSection 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
bSection 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
cSection 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
dSection 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Answer: D
Section 53A enacts the equitable doctrine of part performance, barring the transferor from enforcing any right against the transferee in possession in respect of the property, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract.
The doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that, during the pendency of a suit in which a right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property:
aCannot be transferred at all by any party to the suit
bMay be transferred, but only so as not to affect the rights of any other party under any decree that may be made in the suit, except under the authority of the court
cMay be transferred freely, the doctrine applying only to movable property
dMay be transferred, but any such transfer is absolutely void
Answer: B
Section 52 does not prohibit a transfer pendente lite but subjects it to the result of the litigation: the transfer cannot affect the rights of any other party under the eventual decree, except with the court's authority.
Under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which of the following is NOT "immovable property"?
aStanding timber, growing crops and grass
bThings attached to the earth
cBenefits to arise out of land
dLand
Answer: A
The interpretation clause in Section 3 expressly excludes standing timber, growing crops and grass from "immovable property". Land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth are immovable.
Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in the case of tangible immovable property of a value of less than one hundred rupees, a sale may be made by:
aA registered instrument or delivery of the property
bDelivery of the property only
cA registered instrument only
dAn oral agreement followed by mutation in revenue records
Answer: A
Section 54 requires a registered instrument for tangible immovable property of value Rs. 100 or upwards, but for property of value less than Rs. 100 the sale may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property.
Under the Limitation Act, 1963, the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" reflected in the statute conveys that:
ait is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation
blimitation bars the right as well as the remedy
cdelay defeats equity in all proceedings
dthe law assists the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights
Answer: A
The maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" means it is for the general welfare of the State that litigation must come to an end; this, together with "vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt", forms the twin foundation of the law of limitation.
Statement I: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 permits condonation of delay in respect of any appeal or any application, other than an application under any provision of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Statement II: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 also permits condonation of delay in the institution of a suit on sufficient cause being shown.
Choose the correct answer:
aBoth Statement I and Statement II are true
bOnly Statement I is true
cOnly Statement II is true
dBoth Statement I and Statement II are false
Answer: B
Section 5 extends only to appeals and applications (barring Order XXI applications); a suit cannot be admitted after the prescribed period by condonation of delay, so Statement II is false.
Assertion (A): The benefit of exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is available to a plaintiff prosecuting a suit, and to an applicant making an application, in good faith in a court unable to entertain it for defect of jurisdiction.
Reason (R): Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in terms applies to suits and applications but not to appeals.
Choose the correct alternative:
aBoth A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
bBoth A and R are true, but R does not explain A correctly
cA is true, but R is false
dBoth A and R are false
Answer: A
Section 14(1) covers suits and Section 14(2) covers applications prosecuted bona fide in a court without jurisdiction; the section does not extend to appeals, and that limitation of its scope is exactly why the benefit is confined to suits and applications.
Under Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application:
aextends the period by the duration of the disability
bsuspends limitation until the disability ceases
crevives a fresh period of limitation
dstops the running of time
Answer: D
Section 9 embodies the rule that once limitation begins to run it runs continuously; a disability or inability arising thereafter does not stop or suspend it.
In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be:
aincluded only in the case of appeals
bincluded
cexcluded only where the last day is a holiday
dexcluded
Answer: D
Section 12(1) provides that in computing the period of limitation, the day from which such period is to be reckoned is to be excluded.
Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that it may be instituted, preferred or made:
aon the day the court re-opens
bonly with the leave of the court
con the last working day before the closure
dwithin thirty days of re-opening on showing sufficient cause
Answer: A
Section 4 allows the suit, appeal or application to be instituted, preferred or made on the day the court re-opens where the prescribed period expires on a day the court is closed.
Where a suit or application is based upon the fraud of the defendant or respondent, the period of limitation, under Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall not begin to run until:
aa criminal complaint for the fraud is lodged
bthe cause of action first accrues
cthe defendant admits the fraud in writing
dthe plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it
Answer: D
Section 17 postpones the commencement of limitation in cases of fraud or mistake until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or mistake, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.
To furnish a fresh period of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the acknowledgment of liability in respect of any property or right must be:
aaccompanied by part-payment of the debt
bregistered before a Sub-Registrar
cmade at any time, even after the prescribed period has expired
dmade in writing and signed before the expiration of the prescribed period
Answer: D
Section 18 requires that the acknowledgment be in writing, signed, and made before the expiration of the prescribed period; a fresh period of limitation is then computed from the time of the acknowledgment.
Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a suit by a person dispossessed of immovable property without his consent otherwise than in due course of law must be brought within:
aSix months from the date of dispossession
bThree months from the date of dispossession
cOne year from the date of dispossession
dTwelve years from the date of dispossession
Answer: A
Section 6(2)(a) bars a suit under Section 6 if brought after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession. The longer twelve-year period applies only to a title suit under Section 5.
Which of the following statements regarding a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is CORRECT?
aNo suit under Section 6 shall be brought against the Government, and no appeal or review lies from any order or decree passed thereunder
bAn appeal lies from a decree passed in a suit under Section 6
cA review, though not an appeal, lies from an order passed under Section 6
dA suit under Section 6 may be brought against the Government
Answer: A
Section 6(3) bars any appeal or review from an order/decree under Section 6, and Section 6(4) (proviso) bars a suit under Section 6 against the Government, leaving only the title-based remedy under Section 5.
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, the grant of specific performance of a contract under Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is:
aAbolished, leaving only damages as a remedy
bMandatory and shall be enforced, subject only to the provisions of Sections 11(2), 14 and 16
cAvailable only where compensation in money is also inadequate, to be proved by the plaintiff
dPurely within the discretion of the court as before
Answer: B
The 2018 amendment substituted Section 10 so that specific performance 'shall be enforced' by the court, removing the earlier discretionary character, subject only to the limitations in Sections 11(2), 14 and 16.
Under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as amended in 2018, a party suffering breach who obtains substituted performance of the contract through a third party or his own agency under Section 20 must first give the defaulting party a written notice of not less than:
a45 days
b60 days
c30 days
d15 days
Answer: C
Section 20(2) of the Act, inserted by the 2018 amendment, requires the affected party to give a notice of not less than thirty days to the party in breach calling upon it to perform, before obtaining substituted performance.
Assertion (A): A party who has obtained substituted performance of a contract under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot thereafter sue for specific performance of that contract.
Reason (R): Section 16 of the Act lists obtaining substituted performance under Section 20 as a personal bar to the relief of specific performance.
Choose the correct alternative:
aBoth A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
bBoth A and R are true, but R does not explain A correctly
cA is true, but R is false
dBoth A and R are false
Answer: A
Section 16(a), as amended in 2018, bars specific performance in favour of a person who has obtained substituted performance under Section 20; this is precisely why such a party cannot later sue for specific performance.
Which one of the following contracts is NOT specifically enforceable under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (as amended)?
aA contract which is in its nature determinable
bA contract for the sale of immovable property of special value
cA contract to assign a copyright
dA contract for transfer of shares of a company not freely available in the market
Answer: A
Section 14(c) provides that a contract which is in its nature determinable cannot be specifically enforced; the other contracts listed are capable of specific performance.
With reference to the Specific Relief Act, 1963, match List I (Provision) with List II (Section) and select the correct answer:
List I: (P) Recovery of specific immovable property (Q) Recovery of specific movable property (R) Rectification of instruments (S) Cancellation of instruments
aP-7, Q-5, R-31, S-26
bP-5, Q-7, R-26, S-31
cP-5, Q-8, R-26, S-32
dP-6, Q-8, R-25, S-30
Answer: B
Section 5 deals with recovery of specific immovable property, Section 7 with recovery of specific movable property, Section 26 with rectification of instruments, and Section 31 with cancellation of instruments.
Under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh, the definition of "bond" in Section 2(5) includes which of the following?
aOnly an instrument whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another, on condition that the obligation shall be void if a specified act is performed or is not performed
bOnly an instrument attested by a witness and not payable to order or bearer, whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another
cAll of the above
dAn instrument so attested whereby a person obliges himself to deliver grain or other agricultural produce to another
Answer: C
Section 2(5) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 defines "bond" inclusively under three limbs (a), (b) and (c), covering all three descriptions in the options. The conditional-obligation instrument, the witness-attested money instrument, and the grain/produce delivery instrument are all bonds.
Which of the following is NOT included within the definition of "lease" under Section 2(16) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899?
aAny instrument by which tolls of any description are let
bAny instrument by which one person, in consideration of a premium, engages to indemnify another against loss arising from an uncertain event
cA patta
dA kabuliyat or other undertaking in writing, not being a counterpart of a lease, to cultivate, occupy or pay or deliver rent for immovable property
Answer: B
Section 2(16) defines "lease" to include a patta, a kabuliyat, an instrument letting tolls, and a writing on an application signifying grant of a lease. The instrument indemnifying against loss on an uncertain event is an indemnity bond/insurance, not a lease.
Under Section 17 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, all instruments chargeable with duty and executed by any person in India shall be stamped:
aWithin three months after first received in India
bWithin one month of execution
cWithin three months of execution
dBefore or at the time of execution
Answer: D
Section 17 requires that all instruments chargeable with duty and executed in India be stamped before or at the time of execution. The three-month period applies only to instruments executed out of India under Section 18.
An instrument chargeable with duty, executed only out of India and not being a bill of exchange or promissory note, may under Section 18 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 be stamped:
aBefore or at the time of its execution out of India
bWithin one month after it has been first received in India
cWithin three months after it has been first received in India
dWithin two months after it has been first received in India
Answer: C
Section 18(1) permits an instrument (other than a bill of exchange or promissory note) executed only out of India to be stamped within three months after it is first received in India.
Out of the following instruments, which one may NOT be stamped with adhesive stamps under Section 11 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899?
aNotarial acts
bA conveyance of immovable property executed in India
cEntry as an advocate, vakil or attorney on the roll of a High Court
dBills of exchange and promissory notes drawn or made out of India
Answer: B
Section 11 lists the instruments that may be stamped with adhesive stamps, including bills/notes drawn out of India, entry on the roll of a High Court, notarial acts, and transfers of shares by endorsement. A conveyance of immovable property is not within this list.
Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, on conviction for dishonour of a cheque the drawer may be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine, which may extend to:
aFive thousand rupees only
bTwice the amount of the cheque
cThe amount of the cheque only
dThrice the amount of the cheque
Answer: B
Section 138 prescribes imprisonment up to two years or fine up to twice the amount of the cheque, or both.
For an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 to be made out, the payee must make a demand for payment by giving a notice in writing to the drawer:
aWithin fifteen days of receipt of information of dishonour from the bank
bWithin sixty days of receipt of information of dishonour from the bank
cWithin forty-five days of receipt of information of dishonour from the bank
dWithin thirty days of receipt of information of dishonour from the bank
Answer: D
Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 requires the payee to give written notice demanding payment within thirty days of receiving information of dishonour from the bank.
Under the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the cause of action for filing a complaint arises only when the drawer fails to make payment of the cheque amount:
aWithin fifteen days of receipt of the demand notice
bWithin seven days of receipt of the demand notice
cWithin thirty days of receipt of the demand notice
dWithin one month of receipt of the demand notice
Answer: A
Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 completes the offence only on the drawer's failure to pay within fifteen days of receipt of the demand notice.
Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 raises a presumption, until the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque:
aAs security that can never be enforced
bWithout consideration in all cases
cOf the nature referred to in Section 138, for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability
dBy way of gift only
Answer: C
Section 139 presumes that the holder received the cheque for the discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt or other liability, unless the contrary is proved.
In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 140 declares that which of the following is NOT a defence available to the drawer?
aThat the cheque was issued for a time-barred debt
bThat the notice of demand was not served on him
cThat he had no reason to believe, when he issued the cheque, that it may be dishonoured on presentment
dThat the cheque was presented after its validity period
Answer: C
Section 140 bars the drawer from pleading that he had no reason to believe, when he issued the cheque, that it might be dishonoured on presentment.
Under Section 2 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, the term "spirit" means:
aAny alcoholic beverage prepared from malt or grain with addition of hops
bAny liquor containing alcohol obtained by distillation, whether denatured or not
cAny liquor obtained by fermentation only, whether denatured or not
dAny liquid declared by the State Government, by notification, to be liquor
Answer: B
Section 2(z) defines "spirit" as any liquor containing alcohol obtained by distillation, whether denatured or not. Fermentation-based beverages such as beer fall outside this definition.
Under the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, "export" in relation to liquor means:
aTo bring into Himachal Pradesh otherwise than across a customs frontier
bTo move liquor from one place to another within the State of Himachal Pradesh
cTo take out of Himachal Pradesh otherwise than across a customs frontier as defined by the Central Government
dTo take out of India across a customs frontier as defined by the Central Government
Answer: C
Section 2(j) defines "export" as to take out of Himachal Pradesh otherwise than across a customs frontier as defined by the Central Government; bringing in is "import" [s. 2(l)] and movement within the State is "transport" [s. 2(za)].
Under the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, the "Financial Commissioner" means:
aThe Excise and Taxation Commissioner appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 5
bThe officer-in-charge of excise revenue appointed by the Central Government
cAny Excise Officer invested with powers under Section 6 of the Act
dThe Collector appointed under Section 5(2) of the Act
Answer: A
Section 2(k) defines "Financial Commissioner" as the Excise and Taxation Commissioner appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 5, in whom the general superintendence and administration of excise matters vests.
Under the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, the power to declare, by notification, what shall be deemed to be country liquor and foreign liquor vests in:
aThe Collector of the district concerned
bThe Excise Officer authorised in this behalf
cThe Financial Commissioner
dThe State Government
Answer: D
Section 3 empowers the State Government, by notification, to declare what, for the purposes of the Act, shall be deemed to be country liquor and foreign liquor.
Under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, who shall be the Chairperson of the National Board for Wild Life constituted under Section 5A?
aThe Prime Minister
bThe President of India
cThe Minister in-charge of Forests and Wild Life
dThe Director of Wild Life Preservation
Answer: A
Section 5A provides that the National Board for Wild Life shall have the Prime Minister as its Chairperson; the Minister in-charge of Forests and Wild Life is its Vice-Chairperson.
Under Section 6 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, who is the Chairperson of the State Board for Wild Life in the case of a State?
aThe Governor of the State
bThe Minister in-charge of Forests of the State
cThe Chief Wild Life Warden
dThe Chief Minister of the State
Answer: D
Section 6, as substituted by the 2002 Amendment, constitutes the State Board for Wild Life with the Chief Minister of the State as Chairperson and the Minister in-charge of Forests and Wild Life as Vice-Chairperson.
Section 9 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 prohibits hunting of wild animals specified in which of the following Schedules, except as provided under Sections 11 and 12?
aSchedule V and Schedule VI
bSchedule I only
cSchedule I and Schedule II only
dSchedule I, II, III and IV
Answer: D
Section 9 forbids hunting of any wild animal specified in Schedules I, II, III and IV save as provided in Sections 11 and 12; Schedule V animals are vermin and Schedule VI relates to specified plants.
Under Section 11 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, who is empowered to permit the hunting of a wild animal specified in Schedule I that has become dangerous to human life or is so disabled or diseased as to be beyond recovery?
aThe District Magistrate
bThe State Government by notification
cThe Central Zoo Authority
dThe Chief Wild Life Warden
Answer: D
Section 11(1)(a) empowers the Chief Wild Life Warden, on being satisfied that a Schedule I animal has become dangerous to human life or is beyond recovery, to permit by order in writing its hunting.
Under Section 2 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, the expression “timber”:
aIncludes trees, when they have fallen or have been felled, and all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not
bIncludes palms, bamboos, stumps, brush-wood and canes, but excludes wood that has been fashioned
cMeans only trees standing and growing, but not those which have fallen or been felled
dMeans all forest-produce of vegetable origin found upon or brought from forest land
Answer: A
Section 2(6) defines “timber” to include trees when fallen or felled and all wood whether cut up, fashioned or hollowed out or not. The list of palms, bamboos, stumps, brush-wood and canes belongs to the definition of “tree” in Section 2(7).
Under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, the word “tree” includes:
aGrass, creepers, reeds and moss alone
bPalms, bamboos, stumps, brush-wood and canes
cOnly standing trees having a trunk of woody fibre
dWild animals and the skins, tusks, horns and bones thereof
Answer: B
Section 2(7) provides that “tree” includes palms, bamboos, stumps, brush-wood and canes. Grass, creepers, reeds and moss are instead enumerated under the definition of “forest-produce”.
cExcludes elephants and camels, which are dealt with under separate enactments
dMeans only bovine animals, namely cows, bulls and buffaloes
Answer: B
The inclusive definition of “cattle” in Section 2(1) expressly covers elephants, camels, buffaloes, horses, mules, asses, pigs, sheep, goats and the like, so impounding/grazing provisions extend to all of them.
Under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, a “forest-offence” means:
aAn offence punishable under this Act or under any rule made thereunder
bAny cognizable offence committed within the limits of a reserved forest
cOnly an offence punishable with imprisonment under Chapter II of the Act
dAn offence in respect of which a forest-officer is competent to file a charge-sheet
Answer: A
Section 2(3) defines “forest-offence” as an offence punishable under the Act or under any rule made thereunder, and is not confined to any particular chapter or to cognizable offences alone.
Under the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976, a “Small Cause” means a suit of the nature cognizable by a Court of Small Causes under:
athe Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976 itself
bthe Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887
cthe Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882
dthe Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Answer: B
The Act defines “Small Cause” by reference to a suit of the nature cognizable by a Court of Small Causes under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.
Under Section 9 of the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976, the Court of the District Judge is deemed to be:
aa purely appellate court having no original jurisdiction
ba Court of Small Causes for the district
cthe highest revisional court in the State
dthe District Court or principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district
Answer: D
Section 9 declares that the Court of the District Judge shall be deemed to be the District Court or principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), often described as the international bill of rights for women, was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on:
a18 December 1979
b10 December 1948
c3 September 1981
d9 July 1993
Answer: A
CEDAW was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 18 December 1979 and entered into force on 3 September 1981; India ratified it on 9 July 1993.
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