Himachal Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 5 — Questions & Solutions
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Under Order XXXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where no court fee is prescribed for the plaint, a person is an 'indigent person' if he is not entitled to property worth:
aFive thousand rupees, including the subject-matter of the suit
bOne thousand rupees, excluding exempt property and the subject-matter of the suit
cTen thousand rupees, excluding only exempt property
dFive hundred rupees, excluding exempt property and the subject-matter of the suit
Answer: B
Under the Explanation to Order XXXIII, Rule 1, where no fee is prescribed, a person is indigent if not entitled to property worth one thousand rupees, other than property exempt from attachment and the subject-matter of the suit.
Explanation II to Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 clarifies that, for deciding whether a suit relating to a religious office is of a civil nature:
aIt is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office or whether or not the office is attached to a particular place
bThe office must be attached to a particular place
cFees must necessarily be attached to the office
dThe suit is barred unless religious rites alone are in question
Answer: A
Explanation II, inserted by the 1976 amendment, provides that it is immaterial whether or not fees are attached to the office, or whether or not the office is attached to a particular place, thereby settling the earlier judicial divergence.
Under Order I, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in a representative suit instituted on behalf of numerous persons having the same interest, no agreement, compromise or satisfaction shall be recorded unless:
aThe Court has given notice to all persons so interested in the manner specified
bAll the persons interested personally sign the compromise
cThe Advocate-General accords his sanction
dThe compromise is reduced to a registered instrument
Answer: A
Order I, Rule 8(4) bars recording of any compromise, abandonment or satisfaction in a representative suit unless the Court has, at the plaintiff's expense, given notice to all persons interested in the prescribed manner.
Under Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the expression "decree" includes which of the following?
aAny adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order
bAn order of dismissal of a suit for default
cThe rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 144
dEvery formal expression of a decision which is not a decree
Answer: C
Section 2(2) expressly states that a decree shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 144, but shall not include an adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or any order of dismissal for default.
A foreign judgment shall NOT be conclusive under Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 where:
aIt sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India
bIt has been passed by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits of the case
cIt has been delivered in proceedings opposed only to the foreign procedural law
dIt is silent as to the costs awarded to the successful party
Answer: A
Clause (f) of Section 13 makes a foreign judgment inconclusive where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India; the other clauses (a)-(e) cover want of competent jurisdiction, decision not on merits, incorrect view of international law or refusal to recognise Indian law, breach of natural justice and fraud.
The rule of constructive res judicata, by which a matter that "might and ought" to have been made a ground of attack or defence in a former suit is deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue, is contained in which Explanation to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
aExplanation VI
bExplanation IV
cExplanation II
dExplanation VIII
Answer: B
Explanation IV to Section 11 embodies the doctrine of constructive res judicata, treating a matter which might and ought to have been raised as a ground of attack or defence in the former suit as having been directly and substantially in issue.
Under Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which of the following is NOT one of the modes by which a court may refer a dispute for settlement outside the court?
aReference to a private adjudicator appointed by the Collector
bJudicial settlement including settlement through a Lok Adalat
cArbitration
dConciliation
Answer: A
Section 89, inserted by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1999, lists four modes of out-of-court settlement: arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement including Lok Adalat, and mediation. Reference to a private adjudicator appointed by the Collector is not among them.
A second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall lie to the High Court from a decree passed in appeal by a subordinate court only if:
aBoth the lower courts have recorded concurrent findings of fact
bThe first appellate court grants a certificate of fitness
cThe High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law
dThe valuation of the suit exceeds one lakh rupees
Answer: C
Section 100(1) permits a second appeal only where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, which must be formulated at the time of admission under Section 100(4).
Under Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the court:
aOn a preliminary point of limitation
bWith the consent of the parties
cEx parte against the defendant
dIn a suit of small cause nature exceeding ten thousand rupees
Answer: B
Section 96(3) bars an appeal from a decree passed with the consent of parties; by contrast Section 96(2) expressly permits an appeal from an ex parte decree.
Under Section 80(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no suit shall be instituted against the Government or a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity until the expiration of:
aOne month after notice in writing
bThree months after notice in writing
cTwo months after notice in writing
dSix months after notice in writing
Answer: C
Section 80(1) requires that no such suit be instituted until the expiration of two months after a written notice has been delivered to or left at the office of the Government or the public officer, stating the cause of action and the relief claimed.
The power to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding from a High Court or other civil court in one State to a High Court or other civil court in any other State is vested under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in:
aThe Supreme Court under Section 25
bThe High Court concerned under Section 24
cThe State Government under Section 23
dThe District Judge under Section 24
Answer: A
Section 25 vests the power of inter-State transfer of a suit, appeal or proceeding exclusively in the Supreme Court, which may so order where it is expedient for the ends of justice; Section 24 deals with transfers within the same State.
Under Section 148A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a caveat, where no application referred to in it is made within the prescribed period, shall remain in force for:
a90 days from the date on which it was lodged
b180 days from the date on which it was lodged
c60 days from the date on which it was lodged
d30 days from the date on which it was lodged
Answer: A
Section 148A(5) provides that a caveat shall remain in force for ninety days from the date on which it was lodged, unless the application in respect of which it was lodged is made before the expiry of that period.
Which of the following is NOT a ground for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
aWhere the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law
bWhere the plaint is written in a language not understood by the defendant
cWhere it does not disclose a cause of action
dWhere the relief claimed is undervalued and the valuation is not corrected within the time fixed by the court
Answer: B
Order VII Rule 11 lists rejection grounds such as no cause of action [(a)], undervaluation [(b)], insufficient stamp [(c)], suit barred by law [(d)], not filed in duplicate [(e)] and non-compliance with Rule 9 [(f)]; the language of the plaint is not a ground.
Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature:
aOnly where the cause of action arises wholly within their local limits
bExcepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred
cOnly after the leave of the High Court is obtained
dIncluding suits in which the right to property or to an office is contested but no fees attach
Answer: B
Section 9 confers jurisdiction on civil courts to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred; the Explanations clarify that suits regarding rights to property or office are of a civil nature even if no fees attach.
Under Section 96(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no appeal shall lie except on a question of law from a decree in a suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed:
aThree thousand rupees
bTen thousand rupees
cTwenty thousand rupees
dFive thousand rupees
Answer: B
Section 96(4) bars an appeal except on a question of law from a small cause nature decree where the value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed ten thousand rupees.
The doctrine that a court shall not proceed with the trial of a suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties is embodied in which provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
aSection 11 (res judicata)
bSection 10 (res sub judice)
cSection 13 (foreign judgment)
dSection 12 (bar to further suit)
Answer: B
Section 10 enacts the rule of res sub judice (stay of suit), requiring a court not to proceed with the trial of a suit where the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted pending suit between the same parties.
Under Section 89 read with the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where a court refers a dispute to arbitration or conciliation, the provisions which thereafter govern the proceedings are those of:
aThe Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
bOrder XXXII-A of the Code itself
cThe Indian Contract Act, 1872
dThe Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
Answer: D
Section 89(2)(a) provides that where a dispute is referred to arbitration or conciliation, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply as if the proceedings were referred for settlement under that Act.
Explanation VI to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, providing that persons interested in a right litigated bona fide for themselves and others shall be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating, is principally relevant to:
aExecution of foreign decrees
bDecrees passed ex parte
cRepresentative suits, including those under Section 92
dSuits between co-defendants having adverse interests
Answer: C
Explanation VI extends the bar of res judicata to representative suits, treating all persons interested in a public or common private right as claiming under those who litigated bona fide on their behalf, as in a suit under Section 92.
Under Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit is called:
aan order
ba decree
ca judgment
da decision
Answer: B
Section 2(2) defines 'decree' as the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, a man who, by deceitful means or by making a promise to marry a woman without any intention of fulfilling it, has sexual intercourse with her (such intercourse not amounting to rape) commits an offence under:
aSection 70
bSection 63
cSection 69
dSection 64
Answer: C
Section 69 of the BNS, 2023 is a new offence punishing sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means or a false promise of marriage, with imprisonment which may extend to ten years and fine; 'deceitful means' includes false promise of employment, promotion or marrying by suppressing identity.
Under Exception 2 to Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife do not constitute rape provided the wife is not under:
aTwenty-one years of age
bFifteen years of age
cSixteen years of age
dEighteen years of age
Answer: D
Exception 2 to Section 63 of the BNS, 2023 retains the marital exception but fixes the threshold at the wife not being under eighteen years of age.
Under Section 38 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the right of private defence of the body extends to voluntarily causing death of the assailant where the offence occasioning the exercise of the right is, among others:
aAn act of throwing or administering acid, or an attempt to do so, which may reasonably cause apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence
bCriminal trespass not accompanied by any apprehension of hurt
cSimple hurt caused on grave and sudden provocation
dMischief by killing or maiming an animal
Answer: A
Section 38 of the BNS lists the situations in which private defence of the body extends to causing death, and clause (g) — an acid attack or attempt to throw/administer acid causing apprehension of grievous hurt — is newly enumerated among them.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the definition of 'Abetment of a thing' and the definition of 'Criminal conspiracy' are contained, respectively, in:
aSection 46 and Section 62
bSection 45 and Section 120B
cSection 107 and Section 120A
dSection 45 and Section 61
Answer: D
In the BNS, 2023 'Abetment of a thing' is defined in Section 45 (instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid) and 'Criminal conspiracy' is defined in Section 61.
Which one of the following has been newly introduced as a kind of 'punishment' in Section 4 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, in addition to death, imprisonment for life, imprisonment, forfeiture of property and fine?
aWhipping
bHouse arrest
cSolitary confinement
dCommunity service
Answer: D
Section 4 of the BNS, 2023 adds 'Community Service' (clause (f)) as a recognised form of punishment, which was not among the punishments under Section 53 of the IPC.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the general offence of attempt to commit suicide has been omitted; however, an 'attempt to commit suicide to compel or restrain the exercise of lawful power' of a public servant remains an offence under:
aSection 309
bSection 224
cSection 305
dSection 226
Answer: D
Section 226 of the BNS, 2023 retains, as an offence, an attempt to commit suicide with intent to compel or restrain a public servant from exercising lawful power; the general IPC Section 309 offence of attempt to suicide is not carried forward.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offences of 'Cheating', 'Criminal breach of trust' and 'Defamation' are dealt with, respectively, in:
aSections 318, 316 and 356
bSections 316, 318 and 351
cSections 318, 316 and 351
dSections 415, 405 and 499
Answer: A
In the BNS, 2023, 'Cheating' is in Section 318, 'Criminal breach of trust' in Section 316 and 'Defamation' in Section 356 (for which community service is introduced as a sentencing option); criminal intimidation is separately in Section 351.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence which replaces sedition and penalises acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India is found in:
aSection 197
bSection 147
cSection 152
dSection 124A
Answer: C
Section 152 of the BNS, 2023 ('Act endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India') is the provision enacted in place of the old offence of sedition; Section 147 deals with waging war against the Government of India.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the offence of culpable homicide is defined in:
aSection 101
bSection 99
cSection 103
dSection 100
Answer: D
Section 100 of the BNS, 2023 defines culpable homicide, corresponding to the erstwhile Section 299 IPC. Murder is dealt with separately under Section 101.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, when five or more persons acting in concert commit murder on the ground of race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other similar ground, the punishment is provided under:
aSection 103(2)
bSection 111(2)
cSection 104(2)
dSection 101(2)
Answer: A
Section 103(2) of the BNS, 2023 is a new provision (no equivalent in the IPC) punishing 'mob lynching' type murders by a group of five or more on identity-based grounds with death or life imprisonment and fine. Section 103(1) provides the general punishment for murder.
Whoever causes death of any person by doing a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide is punishable under Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 with imprisonment which may extend to:
aSeven years and fine
bFive years and fine
cThree years and fine
dTwo years and fine
Answer: B
Section 106(1) of the BNS prescribes imprisonment up to five years and fine for causing death by a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide; a registered medical practitioner performing a medical procedure faces a lower maximum of two years.
Under Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, where death is caused by a rash or negligent act done by a registered medical practitioner while performing a medical procedure, the maximum term of imprisonment is:
aFive years
bThree years
cTwo years
dOne year
Answer: C
The proviso to Section 106(1) of the BNS reduces the maximum imprisonment to two years (with fine) for a registered medical practitioner causing death during a medical procedure, a distinct concession not found in the IPC.
A pickpocket on a crowded bus in Shimla forcibly and suddenly seizes a passenger's mobile phone from her hand and runs. The newly introduced specific offence of 'snatching' under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is contained in:
aSection 304
bSection 305
cSection 309
dSection 303
Answer: A
Section 304 of the BNS, 2023 is a new, distinct offence of 'snatching' (theft is sudden, quick or forcible seizure), which had no separate counterpart in the IPC. Theft generally is in Section 303.
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 introduces a new offence of 'organised crime'. This offence is contained in:
aSection 117
bSection 113
cSection 111
dSection 109
Answer: C
Section 111 of the BNS, 2023 is a new provision defining and punishing organised crime (continuing unlawful activity by a syndicate). It had no equivalent in the IPC.
Under Section 258 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, after conclusion of arguments the court shall ordinarily pronounce its judgment within thirty days, which period may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended up to a maximum of:
aForty-five days
bNinety days
cForty days
dSixty days
Answer: A
Section 258 of the BNSS, 2023 requires judgment within thirty days of completion of arguments, extendable up to forty-five days for reasons recorded in writing.
The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 introduces, for the first time, provision for inquiry, trial or judgment in absentia of a proclaimed offender. This is contained in which section?
aSection 356
bSection 339
cSection 299
dSection 84
Answer: A
Section 356 of the BNSS, 2023 is a new provision permitting trial in absentia of a proclaimed offender, subject to safeguards such as consecutive warrants and newspaper publication.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, where investigation relating to an offence is not completed within sixty days (offences other than those punishable with death, life imprisonment or ten years or more) and the accused is prepared to furnish bail, the accused becomes entitled to be released on bail under which section?
aSection 167
bSection 187
cSection 193
dSection 480
Answer: B
Section 187 of the BNSS, 2023 (corresponding to Section 167 CrPC) confers the right to default bail on expiry of sixty days, or ninety days for graver offences, if the charge sheet is not filed.
Arrest by a private person and the procedure to be followed on such arrest is dealt with under which section of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?
aSection 43
bSection 40
cSection 35
dSection 39
Answer: B
Section 40 of the BNSS, 2023 deals with arrest by a private person and the procedure to be followed thereafter (corresponding to Section 43 of the CrPC).
Under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, before a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint, a new safeguard requires that:
aThe accused shall be given an opportunity of being heard before cognizance is taken
bThe complaint must first be referred to police for investigation
cThe complaint must be supported by an affidavit of the informant
dSanction of the District Magistrate must be obtained
Answer: A
Section 223 of the BNSS, 2023 (corresponding to Section 200 CrPC) introduces a proviso requiring that the accused be afforded an opportunity of being heard before the Magistrate takes cognizance on a complaint.
Under Section 472 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 dealing with mercy petitions in death sentence cases, the order of the President on a mercy petition is to be communicated by the Central Government to the State Home Department and the jail Superintendent within:
aTwenty-four hours
bFifteen days
cForty-eight hours
dSeven days
Answer: C
Section 472 of the BNSS, 2023 is a new provision codifying the mercy petition procedure and requires communication of the President's order within forty-eight hours of its receipt.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, when police may arrest a person without a warrant is provided in which section?
aSection 43
bSection 41
cSection 35
dSection 151
Answer: C
Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 (corresponding to Section 41 of the CrPC) enumerates the circumstances in which a police officer may arrest a person without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant.
Under Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the total period of police custody that a Magistrate may authorise is fifteen days; however, unlike the old Code, the BNSS permits this fifteen-day police custody to be:
aExtended up to thirty days with the approval of the Sessions Judge
bAvailed only after the charge sheet has been filed
cTaken in whole or in parts at any time during the initial forty or sixty days of the detention period
dAvailed only as one continuous block within the first fifteen days of arrest
Answer: C
Section 187 of the BNSS, 2023 retains the fifteen-day cap on police custody but allows it to be sought in whole or in parts during the initial 40 or 60 days (out of the 60/90-day investigation window), unlike the CrPC which required it within the first fifteen days.
Under Section 2 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a "warrant-case" means a case relating to an offence punishable with:
aImprisonment for a term of two years or more, or fine, or both
bDeath, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years
cDeath, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
dImprisonment for a term exceeding three years only
Answer: B
Section 2(1)(z) of the BNSS, 2023 defines a warrant-case as one relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years; all other cases are summons-cases.
Under Section 40 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, after a private person arrests someone committing a non-bailable and cognizable offence in his presence, he must, without unnecessary delay, make over the arrested person to a police officer or take him to the nearest police station within:
aThree hours of such arrest
bTwelve hours of such arrest
cTwenty-four hours of such arrest
dSix hours of such arrest
Answer: D
Section 40 BNSS permits any private person to arrest one who commits a non-bailable and cognizable offence in his presence, and requires the arrested person to be made over to a police officer (or taken to the nearest police station) within six hours of such arrest.
In the absence of a special order of a Magistrate under Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a person arrested without warrant shall not be detained by a police officer for a period exceeding:
aSeventy-two hours
bTwenty-four hours, exclusive of the time necessary for the journey to the Magistrate
cForty-eight hours
dFifteen days
Answer: B
Section 187(1) read with Section 58 BNSS bars detention beyond twenty-four hours (excluding journey time to the Magistrate) without a special order of the Magistrate authorising further detention.
Under Section 187(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the total period of detention authorised by a Magistrate during investigation shall not exceed ninety days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with:
aImprisonment for a term of seven years or more
bDeath, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years
cImprisonment for a term exceeding three years
dImprisonment exceeding two years
Answer: B
Under Section 187(3) BNSS the ninety-day outer limit applies where the offence is punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more; otherwise the limit is sixty days, after which the accused is entitled to default bail.
Which one of the following is a new feature expressly introduced by Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in relation to the recording of information in cognizable cases?
aAn FIR in a cognizable case cannot be registered on oral information
bInformation in a cognizable case must invariably be sent to the Magistrate before registration
cAn FIR can be registered only at the police station within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed
dInformation may be given by electronic communication, and a 'Zero FIR' may be registered irrespective of the territorial jurisdiction of the police station
Answer: D
Section 173(1) BNSS permits information about a cognizable offence to be given orally or by electronic communication and recognises the registration of a 'Zero FIR' irrespective of the area where the offence is committed; electronically given information must be signed within three days.
Under Section 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, before recording a confession of an accused during investigation, the Magistrate is required to:
aAdminister an oath to the person making the confession
bRecord it only in the presence of the investigating police officer
cExplain to the person that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence against him
dForward the person to police custody for verification before recording
Answer: C
Section 183 BNSS requires the Magistrate, before recording a confession, to explain to the maker that he is not bound to confess and that any confession may be used as evidence against him; an accused making a confession is not put on oath.
The proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 introduces which safeguard before a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint?
aSanction of the State Government must be obtained in every case
bThe complainant must furnish security for costs
cThe complaint must be referred to the police for investigation under Section 175
dThe accused must be given an opportunity of being heard before cognizance is taken
Answer: D
The proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS mandates that no cognizance of an offence shall be taken on a complaint without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard, a pre-cognizance safeguard not present under the old CrPC.
Section 356 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which provides for inquiry, trial or judgment in absentia of a proclaimed offender, contains a proviso that the Court shall not commence the trial unless a period has lapsed from the date of framing of the charge of:
aThirty days
bSixty days
cOne hundred and eighty days
dNinety days
Answer: D
Section 356 BNSS allows trial in absentia of a proclaimed offender who has absconded, but the proviso bars commencement of the trial until ninety days have lapsed from the date of framing of the charge.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the order of examination of a witness is correctly stated as:
aExamination-in-chief, then re-examination, then cross-examination
bRe-examination, then examination-in-chief, then cross-examination
cCross-examination, then examination-in-chief, then re-examination
dExamination-in-chief, then cross-examination, then re-examination
Answer: D
Section 142 BSA (corresponding to old Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act) provides that a witness is first examined-in-chief, then cross-examined, and then re-examined.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, when the question is whether a person is guilty of an offence the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any general exception is upon:
aThe prosecution, as part of the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
bThe accused person, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances
cThe Court of its own motion
dNeither party, the exception being judicially noticed
Answer: B
Section 108 BSA (corresponding to old Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act) places the burden of proving that a case falls within a general exception on the accused, and the Court presumes absence of such circumstances.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the rule that when a fact is especially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him, is contained in:
aSection 104
bSection 101
cSection 109
dSection 106
Answer: C
Section 109 BSA (corresponding to old Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act) places the burden of proving a fact especially within a person's knowledge upon that person.
A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if it appears to have been caused by any inducement, threat, coercion or promise proceeding from a person in authority. Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 this is provided in:
aSection 24
bSection 22
cSection 20
dSection 28
Answer: B
Section 22 BSA (corresponding to old Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act) renders such induced or coerced confessions irrelevant in criminal proceedings.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, where more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence and a confession made by one of them affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court:
aMay take such confession into consideration against such other person as well as against the maker
bMust convict all co-accused on the strength of that confession alone
cShall exclude the confession entirely as against the co-accused
dShall use it only against the maker and for no other purpose
Answer: A
Section 24 BSA (corresponding to old Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act) allows the Court to take a joint-trial confession into consideration against a co-accused as well as against its maker.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the admissibility of electronic or digital records as evidence is dealt with in:
aSection 39
bSection 65A
cSection 63
dSection 65B
Answer: C
Section 63 BSA (corresponding to old Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act) governs the admissibility of electronic records, requiring the prescribed certificate set out in the Schedule.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, a witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question. This is provided in:
aSection 137
bSection 142
cSection 145
dSection 148
Answer: D
Section 148 BSA (corresponding to old Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act) governs cross-examination of a witness as to previous statements made in writing.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), a confession made to a police officer is dealt with by which of the following provisions, and what is its effect?
aSection 22 — such a confession is always admissible if voluntary
bSection 23(2) proviso — the whole of such a confession may be proved once any fact is discovered
cSection 23(2) — such a confession is admissible only if made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate
dSection 23(1) — no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence
Answer: D
Section 23(1) of the BSA imposes an absolute bar: no confession made to a police officer can be proved against the accused. The proviso to Section 23(2) is only a limited exception allowing so much of the information as distinctly relates to a fact discovered.
When a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence in police custody, the proviso to Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) permits proof of:
aThe entire information whether or not it relates to the fact discovered
bOnly such part of the information, whether or not it amounts to a confession, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered
cNo part of the information, since it was given while in police custody
dOnly that part of the information which amounts to a full confession of guilt
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 23(2) of the BSA allows proof of 'so much of such information... as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered,' whether or not it amounts to a confession. It carves out an exception to the bar on confessions made to or in the custody of the police.
A statement made by a person, since deceased, as to the cause of his death or the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, is admissible under which clause of Section 26 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)?
aSection 26(a)
bSection 26(b)
cSection 26(c)
dSection 26(e)
Answer: A
Section 26(a) of the BSA makes relevant the statement of a person (who is dead or cannot be found) as to the cause of his death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death — the dying declaration. Section 26(b) deals with statements made in the course of business.
Under Section 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), the fact that a person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage, or within a stated period after its dissolution (the mother remaining unmarried), is conclusive proof of legitimacy. That period is:
aThree hundred days
bNinety days
cTwo hundred and seventy days
dTwo hundred and eighty days
Answer: D
Section 116 of the BSA fixes the period at two hundred and eighty days after dissolution of marriage, the mother remaining unmarried; legitimacy is conclusive unless non-access at the time of conception is shown.
The presumption of legitimacy under Section 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) can be displaced only by showing:
aThat the husband disowned the child after birth
bThat the child does not physically resemble the husband
cThat the marriage was later declared voidable
dThat the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten
Answer: D
Being conclusive proof under Section 2(1)(d) read with Section 116 of the BSA, the only permitted mode of rebuttal is proof of non-access between the spouses at the time of possible conception.
When the Court has to form an opinion as to foreign law, science, art, or the identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions of persons specially skilled in such matters are relevant facts under which section of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)?
aSection 39
bSection 41
cSection 54
dSection 44
Answer: A
Section 39 of the BSA makes relevant the opinions of experts on points of foreign law, science or art, or identity of handwriting or finger impressions; such persons are called experts.
The admissibility of electronic records by way of a certificate is governed by Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). Under the law preceding the BSA, the Supreme Court held that production of the certificate (now under Section 63(4) BSA) is a mandatory pre-condition for proving electronic records in:
aTomaso Bruno v. State of U.P.
bAnvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer
cRam Singh v. Col. Ram Singh
dState (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (Afsan Guru)
Answer: B
In Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014), the Supreme Court held that the electronic-records regime is a complete code and that the certificate (corresponding to Section 63(4) of the BSA) is mandatory for admitting electronic evidence, overruling Navjot Sandhu on this point; the principle continues under Section 63 of the BSA.
Under Section 138 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), the legal position regarding an accomplice is that:
aAn accomplice is not a competent witness against the accused
bAn accomplice is competent only if granted a pardon under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
cAn accomplice is a competent witness, and a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice
dAn accomplice may testify only after the trial court records reasons for examining him
Answer: C
Section 138 of the BSA declares an accomplice a competent witness and provides that a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice; this departs from the old Section 133 IEA, which spoke of uncorroborated testimony, by now requiring corroboration.
Under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject, is of sound mind and is not disqualified by any law to which he is subject. This provision is contained in:
aSection 13 of the Act
bSection 10 of the Act
cSection 12 of the Act
dSection 11 of the Act
Answer: D
Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 lays down the three conditions of competence: age of majority, soundness of mind, and not being disqualified by law. Section 12 defines soundness of mind for contracting.
cValid but unenforceable until ratified on attaining majority
dVoid ab initio
Answer: D
Following Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 IA 114, a minor's agreement is void ab initio (void from the very beginning), as a minor is not competent to contract under Section 11.
In Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Dutt (1913), where a servant traced a missing boy in ignorance of his master's reward announcement, the Allahabad High Court held that the servant could not claim the reward because:
aA master's promise to a servant lacks consideration
bThere can be no acceptance of an offer without knowledge of the offer
cThe consideration furnished was past consideration
dA reward offer can never form a valid contract
Answer: B
The Court held that knowledge of the offer is essential before there can be an acceptance; a person who performs the act in ignorance of the offer cannot be said to have accepted it and is not entitled to the reward.
A agrees with B that A will marry no one other than B, and that if A marries anyone else A shall pay B a sum of money. Under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, this agreement is:
aVoid only if A is a minor
bValid as it merely regulates the manner of marriage
cVoid as an agreement in restraint of marriage under Section 26
dVoidable at the option of B under Section 19
Answer: C
Section 26 declares every agreement in restraint of the marriage of any person, other than a minor, to be void; a promise not to marry anyone but a particular person operates as such a restraint.
Under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement by which a person is restrained from carrying on a lawful profession, trade or business is void. Which of the following is a recognised exception?
aA restraint imposed for the protection of a trade secret of any kind
bA restraint accepted in consideration of a loan of money
cA restraint accepted by an employee during the subsistence of employment
dOne who sells the goodwill of a business agreeing not to carry on a similar business within specified local limits, so long as the limits appear reasonable
Answer: D
The exception to Section 27 permits a seller of goodwill to agree to refrain from carrying on a similar business within specified local limits, provided those limits appear reasonable to the Court having regard to the nature of the business.
Which of the following statements regarding agreements by way of wager under Section 30 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is correct?
aWagering agreements are valid if the stake does not exceed a prescribed amount
bA wagering agreement is enforceable if reduced to writing and registered
cWagering agreements are voidable at the option of the loser
dAgreements by way of wager are void, and no suit shall be brought for recovering anything alleged to be won on any wager
Answer: D
Section 30 expressly makes agreements by way of wager void and bars any suit for recovering anything won on a wager or entrusted to abide the result of any game or uncertain event on which a wager is made.
A promise made in writing and signed by the person to be charged, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits, is:
aValid only if accompanied by part payment
bA valid exception under Section 25(3), enforceable though without consideration
cVoid for want of fresh consideration
dEnforceable only if made before the debt becomes time-barred
Answer: B
Section 25(3) is an exception to the rule that an agreement without consideration is void: a written, signed express promise to pay a time-barred debt is enforceable even though it is made without consideration.
The consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 where:
aIt is forbidden by law
bIt is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law, or is fraudulent
cAll of the above
dIt involves or implies injury to the person or property of another, or the Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy
Answer: C
Section 23 enumerates each of these as grounds on which the consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful; in every such case the agreement is void.
Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) is regarded as the foundation of the rule contained in which provision of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 relating to compensation for loss caused by breach of contract?
aSection 74
bSection 62
cSection 73
dSection 56
Answer: C
Section 73 embodies the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale: compensation is recoverable for loss arising naturally in the usual course of things from the breach, or which the parties knew at the time of contracting to be likely to result, but not for remote and indirect loss.
Where a contract names a sum to be paid in case of breach, Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides that the party complaining of the breach is entitled to receive:
aOnly the actual loss proved, irrespective of the amount named
bThe whole sum named, whether or not actual damage is proved
cReasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named, whether or not actual damage is proved
dDouble the amount named where the breach is wilful
Answer: C
Section 74 entitles the aggrieved party to reasonable compensation not exceeding the sum named (or penalty stipulated), whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused by the breach.
The doctrine of frustration of contract in Indian law, as explained by the Supreme Court in Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. (AIR 1954 SC 44), is referable to:
aSection 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
bThe English doctrine of implied terms, independent of the statute
cSection 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
dSection 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
Answer: A
In Satyabrata Ghose, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of frustration is an aspect of discharge by supervening impossibility or illegality and falls within the purview of Section 56 of the Act, not on any outside doctrine of implied terms.
Match List I (provision) with List II (section of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987) and select the correct answer:
List I: (P) Definitions (Q) Conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building (R) Cutting off or withholding essential supply or service (S) Eviction of tenants
List II: (1) Section 2 (2) Section 11 (3) Section 12 (4) Section 14
aP-1, Q-2, R-3, S-4
bP-2, Q-3, R-1, S-4
cP-1, Q-4, R-2, S-3
dP-1, Q-3, R-2, S-4
Answer: D
Definitions are in section 2, conversion of residential to non-residential building in section 12, cutting off essential supply or service in section 11, and eviction of tenants in section 14.
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, the authority empowered to fix the fair rent of a building or rented land on an application is the:
aMunicipal Commissioner
bDistrict Judge
cCollector of the district
dController
Answer: D
Section 4 of the Act empowers the Controller, on an application by the tenant or landlord, to fix the fair rent of a building or rented land after holding an inquiry.
Assertion (A): Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy cannot be evicted otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
Reason (R): The Act is a beneficial legislation that overrides the general law of landlord and tenant to protect tenants from arbitrary eviction.
Choose the correct alternative:
aA is true, but R is false
bBoth A and R are true, but R does not explain A correctly
cBoth A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
dBoth A and R are false
Answer: C
The Act bars eviction except on the grounds and through the procedure it prescribes; this protection flows directly from its character as a beneficial tenant-protective legislation overriding the ordinary law, so R correctly explains A.
Appeals against orders of the Controller under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 lie to the appellate authority, which is ordinarily the:
aDistrict Judge or Additional District Judge on whom appellate powers are vested by the State Government
bDivisional Commissioner
cFinancial Commissioner
dHigh Court of Himachal Pradesh in its original side
Answer: A
Under section 24, the State Government vests appellate powers on officers (the District Judge or Additional District Judges), who function as the appellate authority over the Controller's orders.
Which of the following is NOT correct with respect to the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987?
aThe Act applies to buildings and rented land situated within urban areas of Himachal Pradesh
bOnce fair rent is fixed under section 4, it cannot ordinarily be altered for five years
cA residential building may be freely converted into a non-residential building by the landlord without any permission
dA tenant may deposit rent with the Controller where the landlord refuses to accept it
Answer: C
Conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building requires the written permission of the Controller under section 12; it cannot be done freely, so option (c) is the incorrect statement.
Under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, once the fair rent of a building or rented land has been fixed under Section 4, no further increase or decrease in such fair rent shall, save as otherwise provided, be permissible for a period of:
aSeven years
bFive years
cThree years
dFour years
Answer: B
Section 5(1) of the Act bars any further increase or decrease in fair rent fixed under Section 4 for a period of five years, except as provided in sub-section (2).
The prohibition against a landlord claiming or receiving any premium, pugree, fine, advance or other like sum in consideration of the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy is contained in which section of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987?
aSection 7
bSection 8
cSection 11
dSection 6
Answer: B
Section 8 prohibits a landlord from claiming or receiving any premium, pugree, fine or other like sum for the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy; Section 7 separately bars claiming anything in excess of fair rent.
A landlord, with intent to compel a tenant to vacate, disconnects the water supply to the rented building. The provision of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 dealing with cutting off or withholding any essential supply or service is:
aSection 13
bSection 11
cSection 15
dSection 9
Answer: B
Section 11 prohibits a landlord, by himself or through any person acting on his behalf, from cutting off or withholding any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant.
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, no person shall convert a residential building into a non-residential building except with the written permission of the Controller. This restriction is provided under:
aSection 11
bSection 12
cSection 16
dSection 14
Answer: B
Section 12 of the Act bars conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building without the written permission of the Controller.
The general provision governing eviction of tenants from a building or rented land under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 is contained in:
aSection 15
bSection 14
cSection 21
dSection 13
Answer: B
Section 14 is the principal eviction provision, enumerating the grounds (such as non-payment of rent, sub-letting, change of user, bona fide requirement) on which a tenant may be ordered to be evicted.
Under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a female Hindu who is unmarried and of sound mind and has completed the age of eighteen years has the capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption under:
aSection 9
bSection 11
cSection 8
dSection 7
Answer: C
Section 8 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 lays down the capacity of a female Hindu (major, of sound mind, not a minor) to take in adoption.
Under Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, where the adoption is of a son, the condition is that the adoptive father or mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a:
aHindu son, son's son or son's son's son living at the time of adoption
bHindu son only, grandsons being irrelevant
cHindu daughter living at the time of adoption
dSpouse living at the time of adoption
Answer: A
Section 11(i) provides that, for the adoption of a son, the adoptive parent must not have a Hindu son, son's son or son's son's son (whether by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption) living at the time of adoption.
Under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime; however, she is NOT entitled to separate residence and maintenance if she:
aIs unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion
bFinds the husband has another wife living
cIs deserted by the husband without reasonable cause
dIs treated with cruelty by the husband
Answer: A
Section 18(3) provides that a wife is not entitled to separate residence and maintenance if she is unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion.
Under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the natural guardian of a Hindu minor in respect of the minor's person, in the case of an illegitimate boy or illegitimate unmarried girl, is:
aThe father, and after him, the mother
bThe maternal grandfather
cEither parent at the option of the minor
dThe mother, and after her, the father
Answer: D
Section 6(b) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 provides that for an illegitimate boy or illegitimate unmarried girl, the natural guardian is the mother, and after her, the father.
In Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1999 SC 1149, the Supreme Court interpreted the word 'after' in Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 to mean:
aThe father and mother are joint guardians in all circumstances
bThe mother can never be the natural guardian during the father's lifetime
cOnly after the lifetime of the father
dIn the absence of the father, including his physical absence or indifference, the mother can act as natural guardian
Answer: D
In Githa Hariharan, the Supreme Court read down 'after' to mean 'in the absence of', so that the mother can be the natural guardian even during the father's lifetime where he is absent or unable/unwilling to act.
After the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the daughter of a coparcener in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law:
aBecomes a coparcener by birth in her own right in the same manner as a son
bHas no interest in coparcenary property
cBecomes a coparcener only if unmarried on the date of the amendment
dAcquires only a right to maintenance out of coparcenary property
Answer: A
The amended Section 6 makes the daughter of a coparcener a coparcener by birth in her own right in the same manner as a son, with the same rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property.
In Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held that the coparcenary right of a daughter under the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956:
aIs available only to unmarried daughters
bIs available only if the father coparcener was alive on 9 September 2005
cAccrues by birth, and the daughter need not have a living father as on the date of the 2005 amendment
dIs available only to daughters born after 9 September 2005
Answer: C
Vineeta Sharma held that the coparcenary right is by birth, the father need not be alive on the date of the 2005 amendment, and overruled the contrary view in Prakash v. Phulavati.
Under the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in the case of a Hindu male dying intestate, the property devolves firstly upon the heirs in:
aClass II of the Schedule
bThe cognates
cClass I of the Schedule
dThe agnates
Answer: C
Section 8 read with the Schedule provides that the property of a Hindu male dying intestate devolves firstly upon the heirs specified in Class I; only in their absence does it pass to Class II, then agnates, then cognates.
Under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, is held by her:
aAs a limited owner only
bSubject to the reversionary rights of her husband's heirs
cAs a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner
dOnly as a trustee for her sons
Answer: C
Section 14(1) converts the limited estate of a female Hindu (the old 'woman's estate') into absolute ownership, making her the full owner of property possessed by her.
Where a person erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer it for consideration, and afterwards acquires an interest in that property, the transferee may, at his option, require the transfer to be completed. This rule of "feeding the grant by estoppel" is contained in:
aSection 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
bSection 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
cSection 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
dSection 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Answer: C
Section 43 enacts the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel: a fraudulent or erroneous representation of authority to transfer, followed by acquisition of the interest, enables the transferee to enforce the original transfer at his option, so long as it subsists.
Under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (doctrine of lis pendens), a transfer of immovable property which is directly and specifically in question in a pending non-collusive suit is:
aValid, but the transferee takes subject to the rights of the parties as decided in the suit
bVoidable at the option of the transferor
cValid and wholly unaffected by the decree in the suit
dVoid ab initio
Answer: A
Section 52 does not make a transfer pendente lite void; the transfer is valid but the transferee is bound by the result of the litigation, the property not being dealt with so as to affect the rights of any other party under the decree, except with the Court's authority.
Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, a sale can be made:
aBy delivery of the property alone
bOnly by a registered instrument
cBy an unregistered written agreement attested by two witnesses
dEither by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property
Answer: B
Section 54 requires that a sale of tangible immovable property of value Rs. 100 or upwards (or of a reversion or other intangible thing) be made only by a registered instrument; delivery is an option only where the value is below Rs. 100.
A mortgage where the mortgagor delivers documents of title to immovable property to a creditor with intent to create a security thereon, in a town notified by the State Government, is known under Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as a:
aEnglish mortgage
bSimple mortgage
cUsufructuary mortgage
dMortgage by deposit of title-deeds
Answer: D
Section 58(f) defines a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds (equitable mortgage), available in towns specified by the State Government, where the mortgagor delivers title documents with intent to create a security.
In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes is deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable by:
aThirty days' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy
bThree months' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy
cSix months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy
dFifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy
Answer: C
Section 106 deems a lease for agricultural or manufacturing purposes to be from year to year, terminable by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; leases for any other purpose are month to month, terminable by fifteen days' notice.
Under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a gift of immovable property can be made only:
aBy delivery of possession of the property
bBy a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses
cBy an unregistered written instrument signed by the donor
dBy an oral declaration before two witnesses
Answer: B
Section 123 requires a gift of immovable property to be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses; for movable property, registration or delivery suffices.
Under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a gift may be revoked where:
aThe donee fails to take possession within one year
bThe gift was made without consideration
cThe donor, at his sole will and pleasure, changes his mind after the gift
dThe donor and donee have agreed that on the happening of a specified event, not depending on the will of the donor, the gift shall be revoked
Answer: D
Section 126 permits revocation where the parties agree that on the happening of a specified event not depending on the donor's will the gift shall be suspended or revoked, or on any ground on which a contract may be rescinded; a gift revocable at the mere will of the donor is void.
In Rajes Kanta Roy v. Santi Debi, AIR 1957 SC 255, the Supreme Court of India was concerned with the distinction between:
aSale and mortgage
bActionable claim and mere right to sue
cLease and licence
dVested interest and contingent interest
Answer: D
In Rajes Kanta Roy v. Santi Debi, the Court examined whether the interest of the appellant under a trust deed was vested or contingent and held it to be a vested interest, illustrating the rule under Sections 19 and 21 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which of the following may be validly transferred?
aThe chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate (spes successionis)
bA mere right to sue
cA right of re-entry for breach of a condition subsequent, apart from the land affected by it
dAn actionable claim
Answer: D
Section 6 expressly bars transfer of spes successionis [s.6(a)], a bare right of re-entry [s.6(b)] and a mere right to sue [s.6(e)], whereas an actionable claim is transferable. An actionable claim is in fact dealt with under Sections 130 and 3 of the Act.
Under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the effect of a valid acknowledgment of liability in writing, made before the expiry of the prescribed period and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, is that:
aThe acknowledgment creates a fresh cause of action but does not affect limitation
bThe claim becomes barred immediately
cThe original period of limitation is merely extended by ninety days
dA fresh period of limitation is computed from the time when the acknowledgment was signed
Answer: D
Section 18(1) provides that a fresh period of limitation is computed from the time when a valid written acknowledgment of liability is signed, provided it is made before the expiry of the prescribed period.
Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that at the determination of the period limited to a person for instituting a suit for possession of any property:
aHis right to such property shall be extinguished
bHis right to sue is merely barred but the title survives
cThe adverse possessor must apply for a fresh declaration of title
dThe property vests in the State
Answer: A
Section 27 is an exception to the general rule that limitation bars the remedy only; it extinguishes the very right to the property once the period for a possession suit determines.
Under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged (Article 61) is:
a12 years
b60 years
c3 years
d30 years
Answer: D
Article 61(a) of the Schedule prescribes thirty years for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of mortgaged immovable property, running from when the right to redeem or recover possession accrues.
Under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for a suit by a mortgagee for foreclosure (Article 63) and the time from which it runs are:
a12 years from when the mortgagee becomes entitled to possession
b30 years from when the money secured by the mortgage becomes due
c3 years from the date of the mortgage deed
d12 years from when the money sued for becomes due
Answer: B
Article 63(a) prescribes thirty years for a mortgagee's foreclosure suit, computed from when the money secured by the mortgage becomes due; Article 63(b) gives twelve years for a mortgagee's possession suit.
Under Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit for possession of immovable property based on title is governed by a period of limitation of twelve years computed from:
aWhen the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff
bWhen the right to sue first accrues
cThe date of the plaintiff's purchase of the property
dThe date of dispossession of the plaintiff
Answer: A
Article 65 fixes twelve years for a title-based possession suit, but uniquely the time runs from 'when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff', casting the burden of adverse possession on the defendant.
Under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for a suit for specific performance of a contract is three years, which begins to run from:
aThe date on which the consideration is paid
bThe date of execution of the agreement in every case
cThe date fixed for performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused
dWhen the right to sue first accrues
Answer: C
Article 54 provides three years from the date fixed for performance, or, where no date is fixed, from when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.
Under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, an application to set aside a decree passed ex parte, or to rehear an appeal decreed or heard ex parte (Article 123), must be made within:
a60 days
b3 years
c30 days
d90 days
Answer: C
Article 123 prescribes thirty days for an application to set aside an ex parte decree, running from the date of the decree, or where the summons or notice was not duly served, from when the applicant had knowledge of the decree.
Under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for any application for which no period is provided elsewhere in the Third Division (residuary application) is:
a3 years from when the right to apply accrues
b90 days from when the right to apply accrues
c12 years from when the right to apply accrues
d30 days from when the right to apply accrues
Answer: A
Article 137 is the residuary provision for applications, prescribing three years computed from when the right to apply accrues; Article 136 separately gives twelve years for execution of a decree.
Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period:
aShall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence
bMay be entertained at the discretion of the court even without sufficient cause
cShall be returned to the plaintiff for presentation before the proper court
dShall be dismissed only if the defendant or respondent sets up limitation as a defence
Answer: A
Section 3(1) makes the bar of limitation mandatory: the court must dismiss a time-barred proceeding even though limitation has not been pleaded as a defence.
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, clause (ha) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that an injunction cannot be granted if it:
aWould impede or delay the progress or completion of any infrastructure project, or interfere with the continued provision of relevant facility related thereto
bIs sought to prevent a continuing breach acquiesced in by the plaintiff
cWould prevent the breach of a contract not specifically enforceable
dIs sought against the Government in a revenue matter
Answer: A
Clause (ha), inserted by the 2018 Amendment, bars grant of an injunction where it would impede or delay the progress or completion of an infrastructure project or interfere with the continued provision of the relevant facility.
Under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, where the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff's right to enjoyment of property, a perpetual injunction may be granted in which of the following cases?
aWhere the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff
bWhere there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by the invasion
cIn all of the above cases
dWhere the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings
Answer: C
Section 38(3) enumerates these situations—trusteeship, no standard for ascertaining damage, money compensation being inadequate, and prevention of multiplicity of proceedings—as cases where a perpetual injunction may be granted to protect property rights.
Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a suit by a person dispossessed of immovable property without his consent and otherwise than in due course of law must be instituted within:
aTwelve years from the date of dispossession
bThree years from the date of dispossession
cOne year from the date of dispossession
dSix months from the date of dispossession
Answer: D
The proviso to Section 6(2) bars a suit brought after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession (or against the Government).
Against an order or decree passed in a suit instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for recovery of possession:
aAn appeal lies but no review
bNeither an appeal nor a review lies
cA review lies but no appeal
dBoth an appeal and a review lie
Answer: B
Section 6(3) expressly provides that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in a suit under this section, nor shall any review be allowed; the only remedy is a regular title suit.
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, the relief of specific performance of a contract under Section 10 is:
aCompletely abolished for contracts relating to immovable property
bTo be enforced subject to Sections 11(2), 14 and 16, and is no longer purely discretionary
cAvailable only in the discretion of the court
dAvailable only where compensation is an inadequate relief
Answer: B
The 2018 amendment substituted Section 10 so that specific performance shall be enforced subject to Sections 11(2), 14 and 16; courts no longer enjoy unfettered discretion to refuse it.
Which one of the following contracts is, by its very nature, NOT specifically enforceable under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
aA contract for sale of ancestral immovable property
bA contract for sale of an heirloom of special value
cA contract for sale of a specific house
dA contract which is in its nature determinable
Answer: D
Section 14 bars specific performance of a contract which is in its nature determinable; contracts for immovable property and articles of special value are ordinarily enforceable.
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, under Section 29 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the expense of providing the proper stamp in the case of a lease or agreement to lease shall be borne by:
athe lessee or intended lessee
bwhichever party presents the instrument for registration
cthe lessor and lessee in equal shares
dthe lessor
Answer: A
Section 29 provides that in the case of a lease or agreement to lease the stamp duty, absent a contrary agreement, is borne by the lessee or intended lessee.
Under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, an instrument chargeable with duty which is not duly stamped:
ais void ab initio and confers no rights whatsoever
bmay be admitted in evidence only with the prior sanction of the High Court
cshall not be admitted in evidence for any purpose by a person having authority to receive evidence
dis admissible in evidence but cannot be registered
Answer: C
Section 35 bars an instrument not duly stamped from being admitted in evidence for any purpose, or being acted upon, registered or authenticated, subject to the proviso permitting admission on payment of duty and penalty.
Under the proviso to Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, an instrument insufficiently stamped may be admitted in evidence on payment of the deficient duty together with a penalty of:
aa flat sum of one hundred rupees
ba sum equal to ten times the deficient duty (or five rupees, whichever is higher)
cdouble the amount of the deficient duty
da sum equal to five times the deficient duty
Answer: B
The proviso (a) to Section 35 allows admission on payment of the duty or deficient portion plus a penalty of five rupees, or where ten times the proper duty or deficient portion exceeds five rupees, a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion.
Under Section 12 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, an instrument bearing an adhesive stamp which has not been cancelled so that it cannot be used again shall, so far as such stamp is concerned, be deemed to be:
astamped subject to adjudication by the Collector
binsufficiently stamped only
cunstamped
dduly stamped
Answer: C
Section 12 requires cancellation of an adhesive stamp at the time of execution; an adhesive stamp not so cancelled is deemed, so far as that stamp is concerned, to be unstamped.
Under Section 27 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the consideration and all other facts and circumstances affecting the chargeability of an instrument with duty are required to be:
adisclosed only to the Collector at the time of adjudication
bfully and truly set forth in the instrument
crecorded in a separate memorandum filed with the Sub-Registrar
dset forth only where the duty is ad valorem
Answer: B
Section 27 mandates that the consideration and all other facts affecting the chargeability of an instrument with duty, or the amount of duty, must be fully and truly set forth in the instrument.
Under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where a cheque referred to in Section 138 is shown to have been issued, the court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder received the cheque:
aAs a gift
bFor the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability
cWithout consideration
dOnly as security and not in discharge of any liability
Answer: B
Section 139 raises a rebuttable presumption that the holder received the cheque for the discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt or other liability; the burden of rebuttal lies on the accused.
In a prosecution under Section 138, the accused pleads that when he issued the cheque he had no reason to believe it would be dishonoured. Under Section 140 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, this plea is:
aA complete defence to the charge
bA valid defence only in respect of post-dated cheques
cA partial defence reducing the sentence by half
dNot a valid defence in a prosecution for an offence under Section 138
Answer: D
Section 140 expressly bars the defence that the drawer had no reason to believe, when he issued the cheque, that it might be dishonoured on presentment.
Under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where the offence under Section 138 is committed by a company, the persons primarily deemed guilty are:
aThe company, and every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business
bOnly the auditors of the company
cAll shareholders of the company
dThe company alone, and no individual
Answer: A
Section 141 fixes liability on the company and on every person who, at the time of the offence, was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business.
Under the Explanation to Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the expression 'company' includes:
aAny body corporate, and includes a firm or other association of individuals
bOnly registered partnership firms
cOnly a body corporate incorporated under the Companies Act
dAny educational institution run by a trust
Answer: A
The Explanation to Section 141 defines 'company' to mean any body corporate and to include a firm or other association of individuals; a 'director' in relation to a firm means a partner.
Under Section 142(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, no court inferior to which of the following shall try an offence punishable under Section 138?
aA Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class
bAn Executive Magistrate
cA Judicial Magistrate of the second class
dA Court of Session
Answer: A
Section 142(1)(b) provides that no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try an offence under Section 138.
Under Section 32 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, where the granting authority considers that a license, permit or pass should be withdrawn for a cause other than those specified in section 29, it may withdraw it on the expiration of a notice in writing of:
aSeven days
bThirty days
cFifteen days
dOne month
Answer: C
Section 32(1)(a) permits withdrawal of a license, permit or pass on the expiration of fifteen days' notice in writing, while clause (b) permits withdrawal forthwith without notice (in which case compensation is payable under sub-section (2)).
Under Section 53 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, while offences under the Act are generally bailable, which of the following offences is declared NON-bailable?
aSection 43 (penalty for certain acts by licensee or his servant)
bSection 26 (sale to or employment of a minor)
cSection 47 (offences not otherwise provided for)
dSection 40 (rendering denatured spirit fit for human consumption)
Answer: D
Section 53 makes all offences bailable, except those under the first and second provisos to section 39(1) and under sections 40 and 41, which are non-bailable.
Under Section 55 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, no Judicial Magistrate shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 39, 40 or 41 except on the:
aComplaint of any aggrieved person
bComplaint or report of an Excise Officer
cOrder of the Collector only
dReport of an officer-in-charge of a police station
Answer: B
Section 55(1)(a) bars cognizance of offences under sections 39, 40 or 41 except on the complaint or report of an Excise Officer; for sections 26, 43-47 and 59, the complaint must be of the Collector or an Excise Officer authorised by him.
Under Section 68 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, a person aggrieved by an order passed by an Excise Officer may appeal to the Collector within:
aSixty days from the date of communication of the order
bNinety days from the date of communication of the order
cFifteen days from the date of communication of the order
dThirty days from the date of communication of the order
Answer: D
Section 68(1) provides a thirty-day appeal period to the Collector against an order of an Excise Officer; a further appeal lies to the Financial Commissioner within thirty days under section 68(2).
Under the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, the power of revision under Section 69 to call for the record of any proceedings pending before or disposed of by any Collector or Excise Officer vests in the:
aFinancial Commissioner
bHigh Court of Himachal Pradesh
cSessions Judge
dState Government
Answer: A
Section 69 confers revisional power on the Financial Commissioner, who may of his own motion call for the record of proceedings of any Collector or Excise Officer to satisfy himself as to their legality or propriety.
Within what period must the Collector complete the proceedings for inquiring into and determining the existence, nature and extent of rights of any person in or over land comprised within the limits of a notified sanctuary?
aThree years from the date of notification under Section 18
bOne year from the date of notification under Section 18
cTwo years from the date of notification under Section 18
dFour years from the date of notification under Section 18
Answer: C
Section 25A requires the Collector to complete the proceedings under Sections 19 to 25 within two years from the date of notification of declaration of the sanctuary under Section 18, though the notification does not lapse merely because the proceedings are not completed within that period.
Under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, the protection of specified plants is dealt with in which one of the following Chapters?
aChapter III
bChapter III-A
cChapter IV-A
dChapter IV
Answer: B
Chapter III-A (Sections 17A to 17H), inserted by the 1991 amendment, deals with the 'Protection of Specified Plants'. Section 17A prohibits picking, uprooting, etc., of any specified plant.
Who is the ex-officio Chairperson of the National Board for Wild Life constituted under Section 5A of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972?
aThe President of India
bThe Union Minister in charge of Forests and Wild Life
cThe Prime Minister of India
dThe Chief Justice of India
Answer: C
Under Section 5A, the National Board for Wild Life is headed by the Prime Minister as ex-officio Chairperson, with the Minister in charge of Forests and Wild Life as Vice-Chairperson.
Which authority is competent to declare an area, whether within a sanctuary or not, to be a National Park under Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972?
aThe State Government, by notification
bThe National Board for Wild Life
cThe Collector of the district
dThe Central Government
Answer: A
Under Section 35, whenever it appears to the State Government that an area is needed to be constituted as a National Park for protecting wildlife, it may, by notification, declare its intention to do so.
Under the interpretation clause (Section 2) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, the expression "timber":
aIncludes trees when they have fallen or have been felled, and all wood whether cut up or fashioned or not
bIncludes palms, bamboos, stumps, brush-wood and canes only
cMeans only standing trees marked for felling by a Forest-officer
dExcludes wood that has been hollowed out for any purpose
Answer: A
Section 2(6) defines "timber" to include trees when they have fallen or been felled, and all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not; the inclusion of palms, bamboos, stumps, etc. belongs to the definition of "tree" in Section 2(7).
Under Section 28 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, a village-forest is constituted when the State Government:
aAssigns to a village-community the rights of Government to or over land which has been constituted a reserved forest
bDeclares any class of trees reserved from a fixed date in a protected forest
cNotifies any waste-land which is the property of Government as a protected forest
dAcquires private forest-land for the benefit of a village panchayat
Answer: A
Section 28(1) provides that the State Government may assign to any village-community the rights of Government to or over land already constituted a reserved forest; all forests so assigned are called village-forests.
Under Section 64 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, a Forest-officer or Police-officer may arrest without a warrant a person reasonably suspected of a forest-offence punishable with imprisonment of:
aSix months or upwards
bOne year or upwards
cThree months or upwards
dOne month or upwards
Answer: D
Section 64(1) empowers a Forest-officer or Police-officer to arrest without warrant any person reasonably suspected of a forest-offence punishable with imprisonment for one month or upwards.
Under Section 52 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, property seized as liable to confiscation (forest-produce together with tools, boats, carts or cattle) may be seized by:
aOnly the Collector of the district
bOnly a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence
cOnly a Forest-officer not below the rank of Ranger
dAny Forest-officer or Police-officer
Answer: D
Section 52(1) provides that where there is reason to believe a forest-offence has been committed in respect of any forest-produce, such produce with all tools, boats, carts or cattle used may be seized by any Forest-officer or Police-officer.
Assertion (A): Under the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976, the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Civil Judge are defined by the High Court.
Reason (R): The Act makes the High Court the authority responsible for matters relating to the organisation and jurisdiction of the subordinate civil courts, including conferment of Small Cause jurisdiction.
Choose the correct alternative:
aBoth A and R are false.
bBoth A and R are true, but R does not explain A correctly.
cA is true, but R is false.
dBoth A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A.
Answer: D
The Act vests the High Court with the power to define the local limits of a Civil Judge's jurisdiction and to confer Small Cause jurisdiction, so the reason correctly explains the assertion.
Under the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976, the classes of subordinate civil courts, besides Courts of Small Causes, include:
athe Court of the District Judge, the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) and the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division)
bthe Court of the District Judge and the Court of the Executive Magistrate
cthe Court of the District Judge and the Court of Session
donly the Court of the District Judge
Answer: A
The Act lists, as classes of subordinate civil courts (besides Courts of Small Causes), the Court of the District Judge, the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) and the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division).
The Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law, popularly known as the Justice Verma Committee, constituted after the December 2012 Delhi gang-rape, submitted its report on:
a16 December 2013
b23 December 2012
c23 January 2013
d3 February 2013
Answer: C
The Verma Committee was constituted on 23 December 2012 and submitted its report on 23 January 2013, within the 30 days it had set for itself.
The punishment for sexual assault under Section 8 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to:
aTwo years
bFive years
cSeven years
dTen years
Answer: B
Section 8 prescribes imprisonment of not less than three years extending up to five years, and fine, for sexual assault (non-penetrative touching of specified parts) defined under Section 7.
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