Himachal Pradesh Judiciary Mock Test 3 — Questions & Solutions
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Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the power to transfer suits and appeals from one High Court to another High Court, or from a Court subordinate to one High Court to a Court subordinate to another High Court, is vested in the:
aHigh Court under Section 24
bDistrict Court under Section 22
cCentral Government under Section 24
dSupreme Court under Section 25
Answer: D
Section 25 empowers the Supreme Court, on the application of a party, to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding from a High Court or other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other Civil Court in another State where it is expedient for the ends of justice.
A second appeal lies to the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 from an appellate decree only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves:
aAny question of law or fact
bA question of law of general public importance certified by the lower court
cA substantial question of law
dA substantial question of fact
Answer: C
After the 1976 Amendment, Section 100 confines second appeals to cases involving a substantial question of law, which must be formulated by the High Court while admitting the appeal.
Which one of the following statements regarding the power of review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is NOT correct?
aA review lies on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record
bA review can be sought on the ground that the decision is erroneous on a question of law and would be reheard like an appeal
cA review lies for any other sufficient reason
dA review lies on discovery of new and important matter or evidence not within the applicant's knowledge despite due diligence
Answer: B
Order XLVII Rule 1 does not permit review as a disguised appeal; a review is not maintainable merely because the decision is alleged to be erroneous in law. The other three are the recognised grounds.
Under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, add as a party any person whose presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable it:
aTo recover the court fee payable on the plaint
bTo examine him as a witness
cTo effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit
dTo award costs against him
Answer: C
Order I Rule 10(2) allows the Court to strike out or add parties so that all questions involved in the suit may be effectually and completely adjudicated upon, even without an application by the parties.
Under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an application to set aside a sale of immovable property in execution on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it shall not be allowed unless the applicant proves that:
aHe has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud
bThe decree-holder consents to the setting aside of the sale
cThe sale price was below the reserve price fixed by the Court
dThe purchaser was a party to the suit
Answer: A
The proviso to Order XXI Rule 90 bars setting aside a sale unless the applicant proves that he has sustained substantial injury by reason of the material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale.
Under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (summary suits), a defendant who has been served with a summons for judgment must, in order to defend the suit, obtain leave to defend. Leave to defend:
aCan be granted only by the High Court on revision
bCan never be granted once a summary suit is instituted
cMay be granted unconditionally or upon such terms as the Court thinks fit, where the defendant discloses facts sufficient to entitle him to defend
dMust always be granted unconditionally as a matter of right
Answer: C
Under Order XXXVII Rule 3, leave to defend may be granted unconditionally or on terms; it is refused only where the defence is frivolous or vexatious. The principles were restated in IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Hubtown Ltd.
An interpleader suit, in which two or more persons claim adversely to one another the same debt, sum of money or property from the plaintiff who claims no interest therein other than charges or costs, is governed by:
aSection 89 read with Order XXXII
bSection 88 read with Order XXXV
cSection 80 read with Order XXVII
dSection 96 read with Order XLI
Answer: B
Section 88 provides for interpleader suits and Order XXXV lays down the procedure, requiring the plaintiff to show he claims no interest in the subject-matter other than charges or costs and is willing to deliver it to the rightful claimant.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit is termed:
aDecree under Section 2(2)
bMesne profits under Section 2(12)
cJudgment under Section 2(9)
dOrder under Section 2(14)
Answer: A
Section 2(2) defines a 'decree' as the formal expression of an adjudication conclusively determining the rights of the parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy; the 'judgment' under Section 2(9) is the statement of grounds for the decree or order.
Subject to its provisions, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 confers jurisdiction on civil courts to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is barred. This is embodied in:
aSection 15
bSection 20
cSection 9
dSection 16
Answer: C
Section 9 provides that courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except those whose cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
The bar on a court proceeding with the trial of a suit when a previously instituted suit between the same parties on the same matter is pending in a competent court (res sub judice) is contained in:
aSection 10
bSection 13
cSection 11
dSection 12
Answer: A
Section 10 (stay of suit / res sub judice) bars a court from proceeding with the trial of a suit where the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted pending suit between the same parties in a competent court.
A decision in a former suit may operate as res judicata against a person not expressly a party to it where he litigated bona fide in respect of a public or private right claimed in common for others. This is provided by:
aExplanation V to Section 11
bExplanation IV to Section 11
cExplanation VI to Section 11
dExplanation VIII to Section 11
Answer: C
Explanation VI to Section 11 deals with representative suits, providing that where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a right claimed in common for themselves and others, all so interested are deemed parties for res judicata purposes.
Where a defendant fails to present his written statement within thirty days from the date of service of summons, the proviso to Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits the court to allow it to be filed not later than:
aOne hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons
bNinety days from the date of service of summons
cSeventy-five days from the date of service of summons
dSixty days from the date of service of summons
Answer: B
The proviso to Order VIII, Rule 1 fixes an outer limit of ninety days from the date of service of summons for filing the written statement, for reasons to be recorded; the 120-day limit applies only to commercial suits under the 2015 amendment.
The power of a court to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the proceedings in such manner as may be just for determining the real questions in controversy is conferred by:
aOrder VII, Rule 11
bOrder VI, Rule 17
cOrder VI, Rule 16
dOrder VIII, Rule 9
Answer: B
Order VI, Rule 17 empowers the court to allow amendment of pleadings; after the 2002 amendment, the proviso bars amendment after the trial has commenced unless the party shows due diligence.
A plaint shall be rejected where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. This ground for rejection of plaint is found in:
aOrder VII, Rule 11(d)
bOrder VII, Rule 11(b)
cOrder VII, Rule 11(c)
dOrder VII, Rule 11(a)
Answer: A
Order VII, Rule 11(d) provides for rejection of the plaint where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; clause (a) covers absence of cause of action.
A first appeal from an original decree passed by a court exercising original jurisdiction lies under which provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
aSection 96
bSection 100
cSection 115
dSection 104
Answer: A
Section 96 provides for a first appeal from every decree passed by a court exercising original jurisdiction, except where expressly barred; a first appeal can be on questions of fact and law.
A second appeal to the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 lies only where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves:
aAny question of fact wrongly decided
bA substantial question of law
cA jurisdictional irregularity
dAn error apparent on the face of the record
Answer: B
Section 100, as substituted in 1976, confines the second appeal to cases involving a substantial question of law, which the High Court must formulate at the time of admission.
Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the revisional power of the High Court may be exercised in respect of a case decided by a subordinate court where such court appears to have:
aRefused to grant interim relief
bPassed a decree without recording reasons
cErred on a question of fact only
dExercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or acted with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction
Answer: D
Section 115 confines revision to jurisdictional errors—exercise of jurisdiction not vested, failure to exercise vested jurisdiction, or illegal/material irregularity in exercising jurisdiction; it does not lie for mere errors of fact or law.
The provision under which a court is bound, on the variation or reversal of a decree in appeal, to cause restitution by placing the parties in the position they would have occupied but for the decree so varied or reversed, is:
aSection 148
bSection 144
cSection 151
dSection 152
Answer: B
Section 144 embodies the doctrine of restitution, obliging the court to restore parties to their former position on the variation or reversal of a decree; it recognises an inherent right but does not confer a new substantive right.
Nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. This saving of inherent powers is contained in:
aSection 153
bSection 151
cSection 148
dSection 149
Answer: B
Section 151 saves the inherent powers of the court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process; it cannot be invoked where the Code provides an express remedy.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the right of private defence of the body extends to the voluntary causing of death where there is reasonable apprehension arising from an assault. Which of the following is a NEW ground expressly added by Section 38 that had no counterpart in Section 100 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860?
aAn act of throwing or administering acid causing apprehension of grievous hurt
bAn assault with the intention of committing rape
cAn assault causing reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt
dAn assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting
Answer: A
Section 38 BNS retains the six clauses of Section 100 IPC and adds a seventh clause covering an act of throwing or administering acid (or an attempt) that may reasonably cause apprehension of grievous hurt.
For the first time, the offence of ‘mob lynching’ — murder by a group of five or more persons acting in concert on the ground of race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language or personal belief — has been made punishable under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 by:
aSection 117(2)
bSection 103(2)
cSection 111(2)
dSection 101(2)
Answer: B
Section 103(2) of the BNS, 2023 specifically punishes murder committed by a group of five or more persons on the enumerated discriminatory grounds, each member being liable to death or imprisonment for life and fine.
Which of the following offences has been introduced as a distinct offence for the first time, separate from theft, under Section 304 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?
aSneaking
bCheating by personation
cExtortion
dSnatching
Answer: D
Section 304 BNS defines ‘snatching’ — theft where the offender suddenly, quickly or forcibly seizes, secures, grabs or takes away movable property — as a separate offence, a category absent from the IPC.
The offence of ‘organised crime’ — committed by a member of an organised crime syndicate or on its behalf through unlawful activities such as kidnapping, extortion, land grabbing or contract killing — has been introduced under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 in:
aSection 109
bSection 111
cSection 152
dSection 113
Answer: B
Section 111 of the BNS, 2023 defines and punishes ‘organised crime’ for the first time as a Central penal offence, covering syndicate-based unlawful activities.
‘A’ instigates ‘B’, a child under seven years of age, to set fire to a haystack. ‘B’ sets fire to it. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which statement is correct?
aNeither ‘A’ nor ‘B’ has committed any offence
bBoth ‘A’ and ‘B’ are liable for mischief by fire
c‘A’ is liable for abetment though ‘B’ is incapable of committing an offence by law
d‘A’ is liable only if ‘B’ shared the same guilty intention
Answer: C
Under the abetment provisions of the BNS, 2023, it is not necessary that the person abetted be capable of committing the offence or have the same guilty intention; the abettor remains liable even where the doer is a doli incapax child.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the definition of ‘criminal conspiracy’ is contained in:
aSection 61
bSection 120A
cSection 59
dSection 48
Answer: A
Section 61 of the BNS, 2023 defines criminal conspiracy as an agreement of two or more persons to do, or cause to be done, an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means (the IPC reference to Section 120A is now obsolete).
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the substantive offence of ‘terrorist act’ — earlier dealt with only under special legislation such as the UAPA — has been brought into the general penal code under:
aSection 113
bSection 111
cSection 152
dSection 197
Answer: A
Section 113 of the BNS, 2023 defines and punishes the ‘terrorist act’, incorporating terrorism into the general criminal law for the first time.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, in all robbery there is either theft or extortion. The offence of robbery is defined and provided for in:
aSection 303
bSection 304
cSection 309
dSection 310
Answer: C
Section 309 of the BNS, 2023 deals with robbery, providing that theft is robbery where, for that end, death, hurt or wrongful restraint (or fear of instant death, hurt or wrongful restraint) is voluntarily caused; dacoity is then dealt with in Section 310.
Under Section 304 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the newly created offence of 'snatching' is punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to:
aFive years, and fine
bSeven years, and fine
cThree years, and fine
dTwo years, and fine
Answer: C
Section 304(1) BNS defines snatching as theft committed by suddenly, quickly or forcibly seizing movable property, and Section 304(2) prescribes imprisonment of either description which may extend to three years, and also fine.
Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes sexual intercourse obtained by deceitful means or by a false promise of marriage (not amounting to rape). Per its Explanation, 'deceitful means' includes inducement for, or false promise of, employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity; the maximum punishment prescribed is imprisonment which may extend to:
aSeven years, and fine
bFourteen years, and fine
cImprisonment for life, and fine
dTen years, and fine
Answer: D
Section 69 BNS provides that such sexual intercourse, not amounting to rape, is punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and the offender shall also be liable to fine.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the principle of constructive liability that “when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone” is contained in:
aSection 190
bSection 3(5)
cSection 34
dSection 61
Answer: B
The doctrine of common intention (formerly Section 34 IPC) is now placed in the General Explanations as Section 3(5) of the BNS, 2023. Section 190 deals with common object and Section 61 with criminal conspiracy.
For the first time, a distinct offence of ‘organised crime’ has been introduced under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. It is provided in:
aSection 109
bSection 111
cSection 113
dSection 115
Answer: B
Section 111 BNS deals with organised crime; Section 112 with petty organised crime and Section 113 with terrorist act. Section 109 deals with attempt to murder.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, where a group of five or more persons acting in concert commits murder on the ground of race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language or personal belief (‘mob lynching’), each member shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term not less than:
aTen years
bFive years
cThree years
dSeven years
Answer: D
Section 103(2) BNS provides that for such group murder on discriminatory grounds, each member shall be liable to death or life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, and also to fine.
Which one of the following is a new offence created under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 that was not separately defined under the Indian Penal Code, 1860?
aSnatching
bTheft
cExtortion
dDacoity
Answer: A
Snatching is carved out as a distinct offence under Section 304 BNS, punishable with imprisonment up to three years and fine. Theft, extortion and dacoity existed under the IPC.
Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid (acid attack) is dealt with under:
aSection 326A
bSection 124
cSection 122
dSection 117
Answer: B
Section 124 BNS punishes voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid, etc. (the IPC equivalent was Section 326A, which no longer exists under the new code).
Match List I (offence) with List II (Section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) and select the correct answer using the codes given below:
List I: (P) Theft (Q) Extortion (R) Robbery (S) Dacoity
List II: (1) Section 308 (2) Section 303 (3) Section 310 (4) Section 309
aP-2, Q-1, R-3, S-4
bP-1, Q-2, R-4, S-3
cP-2, Q-1, R-4, S-3
dP-3, Q-4, R-1, S-2
Answer: C
Under BNS, theft = Section 303, extortion = Section 308, robbery = Section 309 and dacoity = Section 310, all placed in Chapter XVII (Offences Against Property).
Under Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, where information relates to a cognizable offence punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, the officer in charge of the police station may, with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, conduct a preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists, within:
atwenty-one days from receipt of the information
bseven days from receipt of the information
cthirty days from receipt of the information
dfourteen days from receipt of the information
Answer: D
Section 173(3) BNSS introduces a preliminary enquiry (to be completed within fourteen days) for cognizable offences punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, requiring prior permission of an officer of at least DSP rank.
Under Section 176(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, it is mandatory for a forensic expert to visit the scene of crime to collect forensic evidence and to videograph the process, where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term of:
afive years or more
bseven years or more
cten years or more
dthree years or more
Answer: B
Section 176(3) BNSS makes a forensic expert's visit to the crime scene and videography of evidence collection compulsory for offences punishable with seven years' imprisonment or more — a new investigative safeguard absent in the CrPC.
Recording of confessions and statements during investigation under Section 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, may be done by:
aany Judicial Magistrate, whether or not he has jurisdiction in the case, and also by audio-video electronic means
bthe Public Prosecutor in charge of the case
cany police officer not below the rank of Inspector
dany Executive Magistrate of the district
Answer: A
Section 183 BNSS empowers a Judicial Magistrate (whether or not having jurisdiction) to record a confession or statement during investigation, and expressly permits such recording by audio-video electronic means; confessions cannot be recorded by a police officer.
Under Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the total period of detention in police custody that a Magistrate may authorise (in one or more parts) is limited to a maximum of:
aseven days
bten days
cfifteen days
dthirty days
Answer: C
Section 187 BNSS caps police custody at fifteen days in the whole, but unlike Section 167 CrPC it may be sought in parts spread across the initial portion of the 60/90-day period, the balance being judicial custody.
Under Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, an order for monthly allowance for maintenance may be made in favour of:
aa wife, legitimate or illegitimate minor children, a major child unable to maintain himself by reason of physical or mental abnormality, and father or mother unable to maintain themselves
ba wife and parents only, children being excluded
ca wife and minor legitimate children only
da wife only
Answer: A
Section 144 BNSS (successor to Section 125 CrPC) allows maintenance to a wife, legitimate or illegitimate minor children, a major child unable to maintain himself due to physical or mental abnormality, and father or mother unable to maintain themselves.
Plea bargaining under Section 289 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, is NOT available where the offence is:
apunishable with imprisonment up to seven years
bcompoundable under the Sanhita
cpunishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment exceeding seven years, or affects the socio-economic condition of the country, or is committed against a woman or a child
da summons-case triable by a Magistrate
Answer: C
Section 289 BNSS bars plea bargaining for offences punishable with death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment exceeding seven years, for offences affecting the socio-economic condition of the country, and for offences committed against a woman or a child below eighteen years.
Under Section 514 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years is:
athree years
bone year
ctwo years
dsix months
Answer: A
Section 514 BNSS fixes the limitation period at six months for offences punishable with fine only, one year where punishable with imprisonment up to one year, and three years where punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
Under Section 258 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, after the conclusion of the trial in a warrant-case, the judgment is to be pronounced by the court within:
aninety days from the date of framing of charge
bfifteen days from the completion of arguments
csixty days from the completion of arguments in all cases
dthirty days from the completion of arguments, extendable to forty-five days for reasons to be recorded in writing
Answer: D
Section 258 BNSS introduces a fixed timeline: judgment must be pronounced within thirty days of completion of arguments, extendable up to forty-five days for special reasons recorded in writing — a time-bound mandate not present in the CrPC.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, where an offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term of less than three years and the person to be arrested is infirm or is above sixty years of age, no arrest shall be made except with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of:
aDeputy Superintendent of Police
bStation House Officer
cSuperintendent of Police
dInspector General of Police
Answer: A
Section 35(7) of the BNSS, 2023 introduces a new safeguard: for offences punishable with less than three years' imprisonment, no infirm person or person above sixty years of age shall be arrested without the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
Under Section 187(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, a Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused beyond fifteen days otherwise than in police custody for a total period not exceeding ninety days only where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with:
aDeath, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more
bImprisonment for a term exceeding three years
cDeath or imprisonment for life only
dDeath, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of seven years or more
Answer: A
Section 187(3)(i) of the BNSS, 2023 permits detention up to ninety days only where the offence is punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more; for all other offences the limit is sixty days, beyond which the accused gets default bail.
Under Section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding three years, or a fine, or both, or community service. The maximum amount of fine that such a Magistrate may impose is:
aOne lakh rupees
bFifty thousand rupees
cTen thousand rupees
dTwenty-five thousand rupees
Answer: B
Section 23(1) BNSS empowers a Magistrate of the first class to impose imprisonment up to three years, or a fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees, or both, or community service.
Under Section 35(7) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, no arrest of a person who is infirm or above sixty years of age, in respect of an offence punishable with imprisonment less than three years, shall be made except with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of:
aSub-Divisional Magistrate
bSuperintendent of Police
cDeputy Superintendent of Police
dInspector of Police
Answer: C
Section 35(7) BNSS introduces a fresh safeguard: where the offence is punishable with less than three years' imprisonment and the person is infirm or above sixty years, no arrest may be made without the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 requires a police officer, instead of arresting, to issue a notice directing a person to appear before him. This requirement of issuing notice applies where the offence is cognizable and punishable with imprisonment:
aUp to ten years
bFor life
cUp to three years
dUp to seven years, or with seven years and fine
Answer: D
Section 35(3) BNSS (corresponding to the erstwhile Section 41A CrPC) makes issuance of a notice of appearance the default where arrest is not required, in cognizable offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, or up to seven years and fine.
Section 43(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 permits the use of handcuffs while making an arrest. Which of the following categories of accused is NOT enumerated in Section 43(3) as a case where handcuffs may be used?
aA person accused of a terrorist act
bA habitual or repeat offender who escaped from custody
cA person accused of criminal breach of trust by a public servant
dA person accused of acid attack or rape
Answer: C
Section 43(3) BNSS lists categories such as habitual/repeat offenders who escaped custody, organised crime, terrorist acts, drug-related crimes, illegal possession of arms, murder, rape, acid attack, counterfeiting of coins/currency, human trafficking, sexual offences against children and offences against the State. Criminal breach of trust by a public servant is not enumerated.
A new safeguard under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 makes the audio-video recording of search and seizure proceedings mandatory, with the recording to be forwarded to the Magistrate without delay. This provision is contained in:
aSection 176 BNSS
bSection 105 BNSS
cSection 103 BNSS
dSection 185 BNSS
Answer: B
Section 105 BNSS mandates audio-video recording of search and seizure on mobile phone or electronic device, which the police officer must forward without delay to the District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class.
The concept of a 'Zero FIR' — registration of information relating to a cognizable offence irrespective of the area where the offence is committed — is given statutory recognition under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in:
aSection 190
bSection 154
cSection 173
dSection 200
Answer: C
Section 173(1) BNSS provides that information relating to a cognizable offence may be given orally or by electronic communication and shall be registered irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, statutorily recognising the Zero FIR.
A statement made by a person, since deceased, as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in a case in which the cause of his death comes into question, is admissible:
aOnly if the maker was, at the time of the statement, under expectation of death
bOnly in a trial for an offence of culpable homicide or murder
cWhether or not the maker was, at the time of the statement, under expectation of death, and whatever be the nature of the proceeding
dOnly if the statement was reduced into writing and attested by a Magistrate
Answer: C
Under Section 26(a) of the BSA, expectation of death is not required and the proceeding need not be one of homicide; the only condition is that the cause of the maker's death comes into question.
"A statement which merely suggests a motive for the crime cannot be admitted under Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) unless it is so intimately connected with the transaction itself as to be a circumstance of the transaction." This interpretation of the phrase 'circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death' was authoritatively laid down in:
aKushal Rao v. State of Bombay
bPakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor
cDeoman Upadhyaya v. State of U.P.
dSharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
Answer: B
In Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor (AIR 1939 PC 47), the Privy Council, per Lord Atkin, construed 'circumstances of the transaction' (now under Section 26(a) of the BSA) and held a mere statement of motive insufficient unless intimately connected with the fatal transaction.
When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of science or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger-impressions, the opinions of persons specially skilled in such matters are relevant facts. Such persons are called experts. This provision is found in:
aSection 41 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
bSection 39 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
cSection 55 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
dSection 26 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
Answer: B
Section 39 of the BSA makes the opinion of an expert on foreign law, science, art, handwriting or finger-impressions a relevant fact and defines such persons as 'experts'.
An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person, and a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice. This is the rule under:
aSection 124 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
bSection 137 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
cSection 139 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
dSection 138 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
Answer: D
Section 138 of the BSA makes an accomplice a competent witness and, as enacted, provides that a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice, while illustration (b) to Section 119 adds the rule of prudence requiring corroboration.
When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, or within any special exception or proviso, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. This is provided in:
aSection 106 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
bSection 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
cSection 109 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
dSection 104 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
Answer: B
Section 108 of the BSA places on the accused the burden of proving that his case falls within a General Exception or proviso, and directs the Court to presume the absence of such circumstances.
The provision that the Court 'may presume' the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, is contained in:
aSection 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
bSection 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
cSection 117 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
dSection 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)
Answer: B
Section 119 of the BSA is a discretionary ('may presume') provision; its illustrations include presumptions such as that a man in possession of stolen goods soon after theft is either the thief or a receiver, and that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated.
In a prosecution for rape under specified clauses of sub-section (2) of Section 64 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without consent, and the woman states in her evidence before the Court that she did not consent, the Court:
aCannot draw any presumption regarding consent
bShall presume that she did not consent
cShall presume that she consented
dMay presume that she did not consent
Answer: B
Section 120 of the BSA enacts a mandatory ('shall presume') presumption of absence of consent in the specified categories of rape once intercourse is proved and the prosecutrix so deposes.
No confession made by a person while in the custody of a police officer shall be proved against him under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) unless it is made in the immediate presence of:
aTwo independent witnesses
bA Superintendent of Police
cA Public Prosecutor
dA Magistrate
Answer: D
Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 bars proof of a confession made in police custody unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, which is the only saving condition.
Under section 24 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, dealing with consideration of a proved confession of one accused against a co-accused jointly tried for the same offence, the Explanation expressly provides that a trial shall be deemed a joint trial even where one of the persons is absent because he has absconded or has not complied with a proclamation issued under:
aSection 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
bSection 299 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
cSection 84 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
dSection 35 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
Answer: C
The Explanation to section 24 BSA deems a trial to be a joint trial even where a co-accused is absent for absconding or for non-compliance with a proclamation issued under section 84 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (the provision for proclamation for a person absconding).
When in a proceeding the court has to form an opinion on any matter relating to information transmitted or stored in a computer resource or other electronic or digital form, section 39(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 makes the opinion of the Examiner of Electronic Evidence a relevant fact, and the Explanation to that sub-section provides that such Examiner:
aShall be treated as an ordinary witness, not an expert
bShall be deemed a public servant for that purpose
cShall be an expert
dMust be examined only on an affidavit
Answer: C
Section 39(2) BSA refers to the Examiner of Electronic Evidence under section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and its Explanation expressly states that for the purposes of that sub-section the Examiner of Electronic Evidence shall be an expert.
Under Section 2 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), a fact is said to be "not proved" when:
aThe Court believes it to exist after considering the matters before it
bIt is neither "proved" nor "disproved"
cThe Court believes that it does not exist or its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act on that supposition
dThe Court is satisfied of its existence by mathematical certainty
Answer: B
The definitions clause, Section 2 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, defines "not proved" as a fact that is neither proved nor disproved; option (a) defines "proved" and option (b) defines "disproved".
The principle of res gestae, under which facts forming part of the same transaction are relevant, is contained in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) in:
aSection 7 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
bSection 9 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
cSection 4 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
dSection 3 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
Answer: C
Section 4 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 makes relevant facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction; this embodies the doctrine of res gestae.
Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), no confession made by an accused person while in the custody of a police officer is to be proved against him unless it is made:
aAfter the accused has been informed of his right to a lawyer
bIn the presence of two independent witnesses
cIn the immediate presence of a Magistrate
dIn the presence of a senior police officer above the rank of Inspector
Answer: C
Under Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, a confession made by an accused while in police custody is inadmissible against him unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.
Under the proviso to Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), when a fact is discovered in consequence of information received from an accused in police custody, what is admissible in evidence is:
aThe whole of the confessional statement leading to the discovery
bSo much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered
cOnly the part of the statement disclosing the accused's motive
dNothing, because the accused was in police custody
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, as explained in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, admits only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, not the entire confession.
A statement made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to the circumstances of the transaction resulting in his death is relevant under Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA):
aWhether or not the declarant was, at the time, under expectation of death, and whatever the nature of the proceeding
bOnly in a trial for murder or culpable homicide
cOnly if the declarant was under expectation of death when the statement was made
dOnly if the statement was recorded by a Magistrate
Answer: A
Unlike English law, Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 does not require the declarant to be under expectation of death, and the dying declaration is relevant in any proceeding in which the cause of death comes into question.
On a question of identity of handwriting, the opinion of a person specially skilled in such matters is made relevant under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) by:
aSection 26 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
bSection 55 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
cSection 73 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
dSection 39 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
Answer: D
Section 39 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 makes relevant the opinion of experts on points of foreign law, science, art, the identity of handwriting or finger impressions.
If a person, incapable of entering into a contract, is supplied by another person with necessaries suited to his condition in life, the person who furnished such supplies, under Section 68 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872:
aIs entitled to be reimbursed from the property of such incapable person
bCan recover personally from the incapable person on attaining majority
cCannot recover anything, the agreement being void
dCan recover only if the goods are returned
Answer: A
Section 68 creates a quasi-contractual obligation: the supplier of necessaries to a person incapable of contracting (e.g. a minor or person of unsound mind) is entitled to reimbursement from that person's property, not from the person himself.
Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event happens, under Section 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872:
aCan be enforced only if the event becomes impossible
bAre void from the very beginning
cCannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has happened
dCan be enforced immediately on formation of the contract
Answer: C
Under Section 32, contingent contracts dependent on the happening of an uncertain future event cannot be enforced until that event happens; and if the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void.
Under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the delivery of goods by one person to another for some purpose, upon a contract that they shall, when the purpose is accomplished, be returned or otherwise disposed of according to the directions of the person delivering them, is termed:
aBailment under Section 148
bLien under Section 170
cPledge under Section 172
dGuarantee under Section 126
Answer: A
Section 148 defines bailment as the delivery of goods by the bailor to the bailee for a purpose, on a contract that the goods be returned or disposed of per the bailor's directions once the purpose is accomplished.
In a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the person who gives the guarantee is called the surety, the person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is the principal debtor, and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the:
aIndemnifier
bBailee
cPromisor
dCreditor
Answer: D
Under Section 126, in a contract of guarantee the person to whom the guarantee is given is the creditor; the one who gives it is the surety, and the person on whose default it operates is the principal debtor.
Where a proposal prescribes that acceptance may be signified by performing certain conditions, the performance of those conditions amounts to acceptance. This rule is contained in which section of the Indian Contract Act, 1872?
aSection 9
bSection 7
cSection 5
dSection 8
Answer: D
Section 8 provides that performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal.
A mistake as to a law not in force in India, under Section 21 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, has:
aNo effect at all on the contract
bThe same effect as a mistake of fact
cThe effect of rendering the contract voidable at the creditor's option
dThe effect of rendering the contract illegal
Answer: B
Section 21 provides that a contract is not voidable because it was caused by a mistake as to any law in force in India, but a mistake as to a law not in force in India has the same effect as a mistake of fact (i.e., it may render the agreement void under Section 20).
An agreement to do an act impossible in itself, under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, is:
aVoidable at the option of the promisee
bValid until the impossibility is discovered
cEnforceable on payment of compensation
dVoid
Answer: D
The first paragraph of Section 56 lays down that an agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void; the later paragraphs deal with subsequent (supervening) impossibility making a contract to do an act void when the act becomes impossible.
Under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement made without consideration is valid where it is a promise to pay a time-barred debt. Such a promise is enforceable under Section 25 only if it is:
aSupported by fresh consideration moving from the creditor
bRegistered under the law for the registration of documents
cMade in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith or by his duly authorised agent
dMade orally before two attesting witnesses
Answer: C
The third exception in Section 25 validates a promise to pay a time-barred debt only when it is in writing and signed by the person to be charged or his agent generally or specially authorised. Registration is required for the natural-love-and-affection exception, not for the time-barred-debt exception.
A sells the goodwill of his Shimla bakery to B and agrees not to carry on a bakery business within Shimla town so long as B carries on a like business there. With reference to Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the agreement is:
aVoidable at the option of A
bValid, being saved by the statutory exception relating to sale of goodwill if the limits are reasonable
cVoid, as it is an agreement in restraint of trade
dValid only if registered and reduced to writing
Answer: B
Section 27 makes restraints of trade void to that extent, but Exception 1 saves an agreement by a seller of goodwill to refrain from a like business within specified local limits, so long as the buyer carries on the business there and the limits appear reasonable to the court.
Under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, where the promisor knew, or with reasonable diligence might have known, that the act was impossible or unlawful at the time of the contract, while the promisee did not so know, the promisor must:
aRefund only the consideration actually received without any further liability
bBe discharged absolutely with no liability of any kind
cMake compensation to the promisee for any loss sustained through the non-performance of the promise
dSpecifically perform the contract as soon as performance becomes possible
Answer: C
The last paragraph of Section 56 provides that where one party knew (or might with reasonable diligence have known) of the impossibility or unlawfulness, which the other did not, the former must make compensation to the latter for loss caused by the non-performance.
Under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, where a contract is broken and a sum is named as the amount payable on breach or a stipulation by way of penalty is made, the party complaining of the breach is entitled to receive:
aOnly such amount as actual loss is strictly proved to have been suffered
bReasonable compensation not exceeding the amount named or the penalty stipulated, whether or not actual damage is proved
cThe whole sum named, automatically, whether or not actual loss is proved
dDouble the amount stipulated as a deterrent against breach
Answer: B
Section 74 entitles the aggrieved party to reasonable compensation not exceeding the sum named or the penalty stipulated, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved. The named sum operates as a ceiling, not as an automatic entitlement.
Under Section 14(2) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, a tenant becomes liable to be evicted on the ground of non-payment of rent if he has not paid or tendered the rent due within:
aSixty days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy
bSeven days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy
cFifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy
dThirty days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy
Answer: C
Section 14(2)(i) makes a tenant liable to eviction where he has not paid or tendered the rent due within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the tenancy agreement, or in its absence by the last day of the month next following.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Dass Sharma v. Vikas Sood (2013) arose out of proceedings before the Rent Controller, Shimla, and pertained primarily to which provision of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987?
aSection 14(2) relating to eviction for non-payment of rent
bSection 11 relating to premium
cSection 24 relating to appeals
dSection 4 relating to fixation of fair rent
Answer: A
In Hari Dass Sharma v. Vikas Sood, the Supreme Court dealt with the tenant's liability to eviction under Section 14(2) for default in payment of rent within the prescribed period.
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, where a tenant has ceased to occupy the building without reasonable cause, the landlord may seek eviction if the tenant has ceased to occupy it for a continuous period of:
aThree months
bNine months
cSix months
dTwelve months
Answer: D
Under Section 14(2) of the Act, eviction may be ordered where the tenant has ceased to occupy the building or rented land for a continuous period of twelve months without reasonable cause.
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may prefer an appeal to the appellate authority within:
aThirty days from the date of the order, not extendable
bSixty days from the date of the order
cForty-five days from the date of the order
dFifteen days from the date of the order, extendable for sufficient cause
Answer: D
Section 24 of the Act allows an appeal within fifteen days from the date of the Controller's order, or such longer period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons recorded in writing; the time taken to obtain the certified copy is excluded.
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, the power of revision against orders passed in appeal is exercisable by:
aThe Financial Commissioner
bThe District Judge
cThe High Court
dThe State Government
Answer: C
Section 25 of the Act vests revisional jurisdiction in the High Court, which may call for the record to satisfy itself as to the legality or propriety of the order, but does not sit as a court of appeal.
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, where the landlord refuses to accept rent tendered by the tenant or to grant a receipt, or there is a bona fide doubt as to whom rent is payable, the tenant may:
aDeposit such rent with the Controller
bRetain the rent with himself till the dispute is resolved
cDeposit such rent with the nearest police station
dDeposit such rent in the District Court of the area
Answer: A
The Act permits the tenant, in such circumstances, to deposit the rent with the Controller in the prescribed manner, which operates as a valid tender to the landlord.
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, once the fair rent of a building or rented land has been fixed, no further increase or decrease in such fair rent shall ordinarily be permissible for a period of:
aFive years
bThree years
cTwo years
dSeven years
Answer: A
After fair rent is fixed under the Act, it cannot ordinarily be increased or decreased for a period of five years, subject to the permitted statutory increase thereafter.
Under Section 30 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, a specified landlord who, having evicted a tenant under Section 15(2), fails to occupy the building for the prescribed continuous period or re-lets it to a person other than the evicted tenant, is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to:
aOne year, or fine up to two thousand rupees, or both
bThree months, or fine up to one thousand rupees, or both
cTwo years, or fine up to five thousand rupees, or both
dSix months, or fine up to one thousand rupees, or both
Answer: D
Section 30 prescribes imprisonment up to six months, or fine up to one thousand rupees, or both, for a specified landlord who does not occupy the building or re-lets it to another after evicting the tenant under Section 15(2).
Under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, for the purpose of fixing fair rent under Section 4, the Controller has regard primarily to the prevailing rents in the locality for similar accommodation let to new tenants with reference to the year:
a1965
b1987
c1971
d1991
Answer: C
Under Section 4, the Controller fixes fair rent with reference to the rent prevailing in the locality for similar accommodation in similar circumstances during the year 1971, or the rent agreed upon between the landlord and tenant.
Under the definition clause of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, a 'non-residential building' is one which is being used:
aOnly as a place of public worship
bAs a hotel or lodging house
cSolely for the purpose of residence
dMainly for the purpose of business or trade
Answer: D
Section 2 defines a 'non-residential building' as a building being used mainly for the purpose of business or trade, while a residential building is one which is not a non-residential building.
Restitution of conjugal rights, whereby either spouse may apply to the District Court for a decree where the other has withdrawn from the society of the petitioner without reasonable excuse, is provided under which section of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
aSection 13
bSection 10
cSection 12
dSection 9
Answer: D
Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 deals with restitution of conjugal rights; Section 10 deals with judicial separation.
Under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a petition for divorce by mutual consent shall be heard on a motion made by both parties not earlier than six months and:
aNot later than twenty-four months after the date of presentation of the petition
bNot later than twelve months after the date of presentation of the petition
cAt any time, there being no upper time limit
dNot later than eighteen months after the date of presentation of the petition
Answer: D
Section 13B(2) requires the motion of both parties to be made not earlier than six months and not later than eighteen months after the date of presentation of the petition for mutual-consent divorce.
Children of a marriage which is null and void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are, by virtue of Section 16:
aAlways illegitimate and incapable of inheriting any property
bLegitimate only with respect to the property of strangers, not parents
cDeemed legitimate, whether or not a decree of nullity is granted
dLegitimate only if a decree of nullity is actually passed
Answer: C
Section 16(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 confers legitimacy on children of void marriages irrespective of whether a decree of nullity is granted, though Section 16(3) limits their rights in property to that of their parents.
In Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020), the Supreme Court of India held, with respect to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as amended in 2005, that a daughter:
aBecomes a coparcener only if her father was alive on 9 September 2005
bHas no coparcenary right but only a right to maintenance
cBecomes a coparcener by birth, whether or not her father was living on 9 September 2005
dAcquires coparcenary rights only if born after 9 September 2005
Answer: C
In Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1, the Court held that the amended Section 6 is retroactive and a daughter is a coparcener by birth, irrespective of whether the father was alive on 9 September 2005, overruling Prakash v. Phulavati.
Which of the following is NOT a Class I heir under the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in respect of the property of a male Hindu dying intestate?
aWidow
bSon
cMother
dFather
Answer: D
Under Section 8 and the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the father is a Class II heir, not a Class I heir; the widow, mother and son are Class I heirs.
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her:
aAs a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner
bAs a life-estate revertible to her husband's heirs
cAs a limited owner only
dAs a trustee for her male heirs
Answer: A
Section 14(1) converts the limited 'woman's estate' into absolute ownership, declaring that property possessed by a female Hindu is held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner.
Where a female Hindu dies intestate without leaving any son or daughter (or children of a predeceased son or daughter), property inherited by her from her father or mother shall, under Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, devolve upon:
aThe heirs of her husband
bHer husband's father-in-law's heirs
cThe heirs of her father
dThe State by escheat
Answer: C
Section 15(2)(a) provides that, in such a case, property inherited from the father or mother devolves not by the general order in Section 15(1) but upon the heirs of the father.
Under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder is:
aDisqualified only if convicted of murder, not culpable homicide
bEntitled to inherit if acquitted on appeal regardless of facts
cEntitled to inherit but only a reduced share
dDisqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered
Answer: D
Section 25 disqualifies a murderer (or abettor of murder) from inheriting the property of the person murdered or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he committed the murder.
The capacity of a male Hindu to take a child in adoption under Section 7 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is subject to the condition that, if he has a wife living, he shall not adopt except:
aWith the consent of his wife, unless she falls within the stated exceptions
bWith the permission of the District Court
cWith the prior sanction of the family priest
dAfter obtaining the consent of his eldest son
Answer: A
Section 7 of the HAMA, 1956 requires a male Hindu having a wife living to obtain her consent before adopting, unless the wife has completely renounced the world, ceased to be a Hindu, or been declared of unsound mind.
The doctrine of 'feeding the grant by estoppel', under which a transfer by an unauthorised person who subsequently acquires interest in the property operates at the option of the transferee, is embodied in:
aSection 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
bSection 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
cSection 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
dSection 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Answer: A
Section 43 provides that where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents authority to transfer property and later acquires interest in it, the transfer operates on that interest at the option of the transferee.
The doctrine of lis pendens, which restricts transfer of immovable property during the pendency of a suit so as not to affect the rights of any party thereto, is contained in:
aSection 52
bSection 41
cSection 53
dSection 48
Answer: A
Section 52 embodies the rule of lis pendens, preventing a party to a suit from transferring the disputed immovable property so as to affect any other party's rights under the eventual decree, except with the authority of the court.
Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a sale of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards can be made:
aBy an oral agreement followed by part payment
bOnly by delivery of possession
cOnly by a registered instrument
dBy a registered instrument or by delivery of possession, at the seller's option
Answer: C
Section 54 provides that in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, a sale can be made only by a registered instrument; delivery of possession suffices only for property of less than that value.
In the absence of a contract to the contrary or local usage, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes is, under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, deemed to be:
aA lease at will, terminable without notice
bA lease for a fixed term of one year, not terminable by notice
cA lease from month to month, terminable by fifteen days' notice
dA lease from year to year, terminable by six months' notice
Answer: D
Under Section 106, a lease for agricultural or manufacturing purposes is deemed to be from year to year, terminable by six months' notice; a lease for any other purpose is deemed month to month, terminable by fifteen days' notice.
The Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002 amended Section 106 by omitting the requirement that the notice to quit must expire:
aAfter registration of the notice
bOnly on a date fixed by the lessor
cWith the end of a year or month of the tenancy
dWithin thirty days of issue
Answer: C
The 2002 amendment omitted the words requiring the notice to expire 'with the end of a year of tenancy' or 'with the end of a month of tenancy', and added that a notice is not invalid merely because the period stated falls short of the statutory period.
Under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a gift of immovable property can be effected:
aBy a registered instrument signed by the donor and attested by at least two witnesses
bBy delivery of possession only
cBy an unregistered instrument followed by acceptance
dBy an oral declaration before two witnesses
Answer: A
Section 123 requires that a gift of immovable property be made by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses; delivery suffices only for movable property.
Where a gift is made subject to an agreement that it shall be revocable wholly or in part at the mere will of the donor, such a stipulation is, under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
aValid and the gift may be revoked at will
bVoid, and the gift is voidable at the option of the donee
cVoid to that extent, and the gift remains otherwise valid
dValid only if reduced to a registered instrument
Answer: C
Section 126 provides that a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable at the mere will of the donor is void to that extent; a gift may, however, be revoked on a specified condition not depending on the donor's will.
The doctrine of election, requiring a person who takes a benefit under an instrument to confirm the whole of it, is dealt with in:
aSection 25 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
bSection 35 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
cSection 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
dSection 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Answer: B
Section 35 embodies the doctrine of election: where a person professes to transfer property he has no right to transfer and as part of the same transaction confers a benefit on the owner of that property, the owner must elect either to confirm the transfer or to dissent from it.
Under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a transfer by an ostensible owner is not voidable on the ground that he was not authorised, provided the transferee:
aHas taken reasonable care to ascertain the transferor's power and acted in good faith
bHas obtained the consent of the real owner in writing
cHas paid the full market price
dHas registered the instrument within four months
Answer: A
Section 41 protects a transferee for consideration from an ostensible owner (with the consent, express or implied, of the real owner) provided the transferee took reasonable care to ascertain the transferor's power and acted in good faith.
The principle that 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 is adequately elastic to enable courts to do substantial justice, and that refusing to condone delay may throw out a meritorious matter at the threshold, was laid down in:
aSmt. Seema v. Ashwani Kumar, AIR 2006 SC 1158
bRajesh Kanta Roy v. Santi Debi, AIR 1957 SC 255
cCollector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107
dHari Dass Sharma v. Vikas Sood
Answer: C
In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, the Supreme Court adopted a liberal, justice-oriented approach to 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 and condoned a four-day delay.
Under Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it. The proviso to this rule relates to:
aThe institution of a suit to obtain relief against the consequences of a mistake
bA case where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor
cSuits founded on fraud of the defendant
dContinuing breaches and torts
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 9 carves out an exception: where letters of administration to a creditor's estate are granted to his debtor, the running of limitation for a suit to recover the debt is suspended while the administration continues.
In computing the period of limitation for an appeal, Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires exclusion of:
aOnly the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment
bOnly the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced
cThe entire period during which the appellant was prosecuting another bona fide proceeding
dThe day on which the judgment was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order appealed from
Answer: D
Section 12(2) excludes both the day on which the judgment was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from.
Exclusion of the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding in a court unable to entertain it for defect of jurisdiction or other like cause is provided in:
aSection 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963
bSection 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963
cSection 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963
dSection 13 of the Limitation Act, 1963
Answer: B
Section 14 excludes the time spent bona fide prosecuting another proceeding, founded on the same matter, in a court which lacked jurisdiction or was otherwise unable to entertain it.
Where a suit or application is based upon the fraud of the defendant, the period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud. This provision is contained in:
aSection 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963
bSection 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963
cSection 16 of the Limitation Act, 1963
dSection 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963
Answer: B
Section 17 postpones the commencement of the limitation period in cases of fraud or mistake until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the fraud or mistake.
For a written acknowledgment to furnish a fresh period of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it must be made:
aBefore the expiration of the prescribed period and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed
bOnly by way of a registered instrument
cWithin thirty days of the cause of action
dAt any time, even after the prescribed period has expired
Answer: A
Section 18 requires the acknowledgment of liability to be made in writing, signed by the party (or his agent) against whom the right is claimed, before the expiration of the prescribed period; a fresh period then runs from the date of the acknowledgment.
Under Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where, after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted:
aWhen he was so made a party
bOn the date of the original institution of the suit in every case
cOn the date the court grants leave for the amendment
dOn the date the cause of action first accrued
Answer: A
Section 21(1) provides that the suit is deemed, as against a newly added or substituted party, to have been instituted when he was so made a party, subject to the proviso allowing an earlier date where omission was due to a bona fide mistake.
In the case of a continuing breach of contract or a continuing tort, Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that a fresh period of limitation begins to run:
aFrom the date the suit is filed
bOnly once, from the date of the first breach
cAt every moment of the time during which the breach or tort continues
dFrom the date the plaintiff acquires knowledge of the breach
Answer: C
Section 22 provides that in the case of a continuing breach of contract or a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the tort continues.
Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is regarded as an exception to the general rule that limitation bars only the remedy, because it provides that:
aAt the determination of the period limited for instituting a suit for possession, the right to such property is extinguished
bA fresh period of limitation begins on each acknowledgment
cThe remedy is barred but the right survives indefinitely
dThe court may extend limitation for sufficient cause
Answer: A
Section 27 provides that at the determination of the period limited for a person to institute a suit for possession of property, his right to that property is extinguished; thus it destroys the right itself, not merely the remedy.
Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a person dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law may recover possession by suit, provided that no such suit shall be brought after the expiry of:
aOne year from the date of dispossession
bSix months from the date of dispossession
cThree months from the date of dispossession
dTwelve years from the date of dispossession
Answer: B
Section 6(2) bars any suit under this section after six months from the date of dispossession, or against the Government. The remedy is a speedy possessory one based purely on prior possession, not title.
With reference to a suit instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which of the following is correct?
aAn appeal lies but no review is allowed
bBoth an appeal and a review are allowed
cNo appeal lies from any order or decree, nor is any review allowed, but a separate suit to establish title is not barred
dNo appeal, no review and no subsequent suit on title is permissible
Answer: C
Section 6(3) bars both appeal and review of any order or decree passed under Section 6, while Section 6(4) expressly preserves the right to bring a separate suit to establish title and recover possession.
After the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, specific performance of a contract under Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963:
aShall be enforced by the court subject to the provisions of Sections 11(2), 14 and 16
bContinues to be a discretionary relief to be granted at the option of the court
cCan be granted only where money compensation is shown to be inadequate
dHas been abolished as a remedy
Answer: A
The 2018 Amendment recast Section 10 so that specific performance shall be enforced by the court subject only to Sections 11(2), 14 and 16, making it a general rule rather than a discretionary remedy dependent on adequacy of damages.
Section 14A of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which empowers the court to engage one or more experts to assist it on a specific issue, was:
aInserted by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
bInserted by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018
cInserted by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019
dPart of the original Act of 1963
Answer: B
Section 14A was newly inserted by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018; it permits the court to engage experts, whose opinion forms part of the record, and the parties may examine the expert in open court.
Under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (as substituted in 2018), before availing substituted performance of a contract through a third party or his own agency, the party suffering the breach must give the party in breach a notice in writing of:
aNot less than thirty days
bNot less than forty-five days
cNot less than fifteen days
dNot less than ninety days
Answer: A
Section 20(2) requires a written notice of not less than thirty days calling upon the party in breach to perform; only on failure within the notice period may the aggrieved party get the contract performed by a third party or its own agency.
A party who has obtained substituted performance of a contract under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963:
aIs also entitled to claim specific performance against the party in breach
bMay claim only specific performance and not compensation
cCan neither recover costs nor claim compensation
dIs not entitled to claim specific performance against the party in breach, but may recover the costs incurred and claim compensation
Answer: D
Once substituted performance is obtained, Section 20 bars a claim for specific performance against the party in breach, while permitting recovery of the costs actually incurred and a claim for compensation.
Under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, a person having authority to receive evidence before whom an instrument chargeable with duty is produced and which appears to him not to be duly stamped, is required to:
aRefer the matter directly to the High Court
bReturn the instrument to the party without any action
cDestroy the instrument forthwith
dImpound the instrument
Answer: D
Section 33 imposes a duty on every person authorised to receive evidence (and every person in charge of a public office, except a police officer) to impound an instrument that appears to him not to be duly stamped.
All duties, penalties and other sums required to be paid under Chapter IV may, under Section 48 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, be recovered by the Collector:
aOnly by distress and sale of the movable property of the person from whom they are due
bOnly by the process for recovery of arrears of land revenue
cOnly by instituting a civil suit for recovery
dBy distress and sale of the movable property of such person, or by any process in force for recovery of arrears of land revenue
Answer: D
Section 48 empowers the Collector to recover duties, penalties and other sums by distress and sale of the movable property of the person liable, or by any other process for the time being in force for the recovery of arrears of land revenue.
Under Section 62 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, a person who executes (otherwise than as a witness) an instrument chargeable with duty without the same being duly stamped is punishable with:
aImprisonment which may extend to six months
bFine which may extend to five thousand rupees
cImprisonment which may extend to one year and fine
dFine which may extend to five hundred rupees
Answer: D
Section 62 makes the execution or signing (otherwise than as a witness) of an instrument chargeable with duty without it being duly stamped punishable with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees.
Which of the following transactions in securities dealt with by a depository is NOT liable to stamp duty under Section 8A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899?
aThe transfer of registered ownership of securities from a person to a depository or from a depository to a beneficial owner
bThe transfer of beneficial ownership of securities dealt with by a depository
cNeither (a) nor (b)
dBoth (a) and (b)
Answer: D
Section 8A, inserted by the Depositories Act, 1996, provides that the transfer of registered ownership of securities from a person to a depository or from a depository to a beneficial owner, and the transfer of beneficial ownership of securities dealt with by a depository, are not liable to stamp duty.
Under Section 54 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, where a person possesses stamps for which he has no immediate use and which are not spoiled, the Collector shall repay their value in money after deducting:
aFifty naye paise for each rupee or portion of a rupee
bTwenty-five naye paise for each rupee or portion of a rupee
cTen naye paise for each rupee or portion of a rupee
dNo deduction is permitted
Answer: C
Section 54 provides that the Collector shall repay the value of unused, unspoiled stamps in money after deducting ten naye paise for each rupee or portion of a rupee, on the person delivering them up and proving bona fide purchase within the preceding six months.
Under Section 142(1)(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, an offence under Section 138 shall be tried by no court inferior to that of:
aA Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class
bAn Executive Magistrate
cA Judicial Magistrate of the second class
dA Court of Session
Answer: A
Section 142(1)(c) provides that no court inferior to a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try an offence under Section 138.
After the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015, where a cheque is delivered for collection through an account, Section 142(2)(a) of the Act vests territorial jurisdiction to try the Section 138 offence in the court within whose local jurisdiction lies:
aThe branch of the bank where the payee maintains the account in which the cheque is delivered for collection
bThe branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account
cThe place where the demand notice was issued
dThe place where the underlying contract was executed
Answer: A
Section 142(2)(a), inserted by the 2015 Amendment, fixes jurisdiction at the branch of the payee's bank where the cheque is delivered for collection through an account.
Section 142A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, introduced by the Amendment Act of 2015, primarily provides for:
aA minimum deposit on filing an appeal against conviction
bAward of interim compensation to the complainant
cValidation of the transfer of pending cheque-dishonour cases consequent upon the new jurisdiction provisions of Section 142(2)
dCompounding of offences under Chapter XVII
Answer: C
Section 142A validates the transfer and trial of cases pursuant to the territorial-jurisdiction scheme of Section 142(2) introduced by the 2015 Amendment.
Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 empowers a Magistrate to try offences under Chapter XVII summarily, and provides that an endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial:
aWithin six months from the date of filing of the complaint
bWithin three months from the date of filing of the complaint
cWithin one year from the date of filing of the complaint
dWithin nine months from the date of filing of the complaint
Answer: A
Section 143 directs Magistrates to try such cases summarily and to endeavour to conclude the trial within six months from the date of filing of the complaint.
Under Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, when trying a Section 138 case summarily, if the Magistrate at the commencement or in the course of the summary trial forms an opinion that it may be necessary to pass a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year, he shall:
aImpose only a fine and dispose of the case
bRecord an order recalling any witness already examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure
cRefer the case to the Court of Session
dAcquit the accused for want of jurisdiction
Answer: B
The proviso to Section 143(1) requires the Magistrate, on forming such an opinion, to record an order recalling witnesses already examined and to rehear the case under the ordinary CrPC procedure rather than summarily.
Under Section 39(1) of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, the maximum imprisonment ordinarily prescribed for unlawful manufacture, possession, import, export or transport of liquor (apart from the special minimum-sentence provisos) is:
aThree years
bOne year
cTwo years
dFive years
Answer: A
Section 39(1) prescribes imprisonment which may extend to three years and fine which may extend to two lakh rupees (but not less than five thousand rupees); higher minimum sentences apply under the provisos, e.g. for possession of a working still.
Under Section 53 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, offences punishable under the Act are, as a general rule:
aBailable, except those under the first and second provisos to Section 39(1) and Sections 40 and 41 which are non-bailable
bCognizable and non-bailable in every case
cNon-bailable in every case
dAlways compoundable and never triable by a Magistrate
Answer: A
Section 53 makes all offences under the Act bailable within the meaning of the Cr.P.C., except that offences under the first and second provisos to Section 39(1) and under Sections 40 and 41 are non-bailable.
Under Section 55 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, no Judicial Magistrate shall take cognizance of an offence under Section 39, 40 or 41 except on:
aThe complaint of any private person aggrieved by the offence
bThe complaint or report of an Excise Officer
cA report of a police officer not below the rank of Inspector
dAn order of the Financial Commissioner
Answer: B
Section 55(1)(a) bars a Judicial Magistrate from taking cognizance of offences under Sections 39, 40 or 41 except on the complaint or report of an Excise Officer.
Under Section 56 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, where a person is found in possession of a still or apparatus ordinarily used for manufacture of liquor, the law:
aRequires independent corroboration before any presumption arises
bPresumes, until the contrary is proved, that his possession was in contravention of the Act
cRaises no presumption at all
dPresumes his innocence until the prosecution proves contravention
Answer: B
Section 56(1) raises a rebuttable presumption: on finding such still, apparatus or materials in a person's possession, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the possession was in contravention of the Act.
Under Section 68 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011, an appeal against an order passed by an Excise Officer lies to the Collector, and must be filed within:
a90 days from the date of communication of the order
b15 days from the date of communication of the order
c30 days from the date of communication of the order
d60 days from the date of communication of the order
Answer: C
Section 68(1) allows a person aggrieved by an order of an Excise Officer to appeal to the Collector within thirty days from the date of communication of such order.
The Central Zoo Authority under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 is constituted under which section, and consists of how many members apart from the Chairperson and Member-Secretary?
aSection 38H; not exceeding twenty members
bSection 38B; not exceeding five members
cSection 38; not exceeding fifteen members
dSection 38A; not exceeding ten members
Answer: D
Section 38A constitutes the Central Zoo Authority comprising a Chairperson, a Member-Secretary, and such number of members not exceeding ten, all appointed by the Central Government.
Under Section 39 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, which of the following becomes the property of the State Government?
aOnly animals kept in recognised zoos
bOnly wild animals that are vermin
cOnly animals imported from foreign countries
dEvery wild animal (other than vermin) hunted under Section 11, and animal articles, trophies and meat derived therefrom
Answer: D
Section 39 declares that every wild animal (other than vermin) hunted under Section 11, found dead or killed by mistake, together with animal articles, trophies and meat derived from such animals, shall be the property of the State Government.
Under Section 50 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, a police officer of which minimum rank is empowered to enter, search, arrest and detain in connection with offences under the Act?
aHead Constable
bSub-Inspector
cConstable
dDeputy Superintendent of Police
Answer: B
Section 50 confers powers of entry, search, arrest and detention on the Director, Chief Wild Life Warden, authorised officers, and on any police officer not below the rank of a sub-inspector.
Under Section 51(1) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, the general penalty for contravention of any provision of the Act (where no enhanced penalty applies) is imprisonment which may extend to:
aSeven years, or fine up to one lakh rupees, or both
bSix years, or fine up to fifty thousand rupees, or both
cOne year, or fine up to five thousand rupees, or both
dThree years, or fine which may extend to twenty-five thousand rupees, or both
Answer: D
Section 51(1) prescribes the general penalty as imprisonment up to three years, or fine up to twenty-five thousand rupees, or both, for contraventions not attracting the enhanced penalty.
Which one of the following is an offence punishable under Section 26 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (acts prohibited in a reserved forest)?
aCarrying timber for which a transit pass has duly been obtained
bManufacturing liquor within a notified excise area adjoining a forest
cFishing in a river situated wholly outside the limits of any reserved or protected forest
dSetting fire to a reserved forest, or kindling any fire in such manner as to endanger such forest, in contravention of the Act
Answer: D
Section 26 makes it an offence, inter alia, to set fire to a reserved forest or to kindle fire so as to endanger it; the other acts are not offences under this section.
Under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, the assignment by the State Government of its rights over any land constituted a reserved forest to a village community results in the constitution of a:
aProtected forest under Section 29
bVillage-forest under Section 28
cPrivate forest under Section 38
dJoint forest under Section 80
Answer: B
Section 28 empowers the State Government to assign to any village community the rights of Government to or over any land which has been constituted a reserved forest, and such land is then called a village-forest.
Under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, a forest-officer or a police-officer may, without orders from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest a person against whom a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been concerned in a forest-offence:
aWhere the offence is punishable with imprisonment for one month or upwards
bOnly after obtaining the sanction of the Divisional Forest Officer in writing
cOnly if the offence is one triable exclusively by the Court of Session
dIn respect of every forest-offence, irrespective of the punishment prescribed
Answer: A
Section 64 confers power to arrest without warrant where a reasonable suspicion exists of involvement in a forest-offence punishable with imprisonment for one month or upwards.
Under Section 68 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, the power to accept from a person against whom a reasonable suspicion exists of his having committed a forest-offence a sum of money by way of compensation, and thereby to compound the offence, vests in:
aThe District Collector exercising revenue powers
bThe Court of Session before which the offence is triable
cThe Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction
dA forest-officer specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government by notification
Answer: D
Section 68 allows the State Government to empower a forest-officer, by notification, to compound forest-offences by accepting compensation and, where property is seized, its value or release.
Under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976, the High Court may authorise a Subordinate Judge/Civil Judge to take cognizance of proceedings under which of the following enactments?
aThe Indian Stamp Act, 1899
bThe Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
cThe Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
dThe Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920
Answer: D
Section 14 enables the High Court to authorise a Civil Judge to take cognizance of proceedings under enactments such as the Indian Succession Act 1925, the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 and the Provincial Insolvency Act 1920.
Under the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976, the jurisdiction of a Judge of a Court of Small Causes may be conferred upon a Civil Judge by:
athe State Government
bthe High Court
cthe Governor of Himachal Pradesh
dthe District Judge of the district concerned
Answer: B
The Act empowers the High Court to confer upon a Civil Judge the jurisdiction of a Judge of a Court of Small Causes within such local limits and up to such value as it thinks fit.
Under the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976, an appeal from a decree or order of a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising original jurisdiction shall lie to:
athe High Court
bthe Court of Session
cthe Supreme Court directly
danother District Judge nominated by the State Government
Answer: A
An appeal from a decree or order of a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising original jurisdiction lies to the High Court.
Where penetrative sexual assault is committed on a child below sixteen years of age, the minimum term of imprisonment prescribed under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act, 2012 is:
aSeven years
bTwenty years
cFourteen years
dTen years
Answer: B
Section 4(2), inserted by the 2019 Amendment, prescribes a minimum of twenty years for penetrative sexual assault on a child below sixteen, extendable to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life.
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